So far what passes for foreign policy in the current administration seems to be composed in equal measure of "We ain't the same as those Bush guys," and "Gee, we sure are sorry about _____." In addition the Obama simulacrum of foreign policy consists of bootless pressure against states with which the US is allied or which are very much on the periphery of policy concerns.
Proclaiming a desire to see the world free of nuclear weapons is a fine exercise in frothy high mindedness but it does not constitute a policy, a basis for diplomacy. Neither is repeating the assertion, "give peace a chance."
Foreign policy and military affairs are areas of governance which are not amenable to pure oratory. No one is impressed at all by the capacity to speak softly or well while holding either a very small stick or none at all.
While Secretary of Defense Gates is undoubtedly well aware of the vast gulf between words and the deeds which make the words real--and effective--there is little evidence that this has penetrated either the President or his Secretary of State. It must since the combination of Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor cannot formulate let alone execute the totality of American foreign policy.
At one time the US could afford the luxury of not having a foreign policy. Calvin Coolidge didn't bother with much beyond the borders of the US. Neither did Herbert Hoover.
Arguably, after the hash the idealistic (that sounds nicer than ideologically blinded) Woodrow Wilson made at Versailles, the US was better off without a foreign policy. However, that luxury did not extend past the first administration of FDR--a reality he dimly glimpsed even though We the People did not.
From 1937 on through the end of the Cold War, the US faced a series of existential threats--or at the least perceived this to be the case. The cold forces of global circumstances compelled us to abandon the long decades of American Splendid Isolation, much as the same had done to England during the Edwardian period. Whether We the People liked the idea or not (and in the main we didn't) the realities of world politics made us a Great Power.
We conducted World War II as a Great Power (in the Pacific as the one and only Great Power). The US responded to the (mis)perception of Soviet ambitions at war's end as the only non-Communist Great Power standing. The costs in both life and treasure of this involuntary and increasingly far from universally approved Great Power period were not insignificant.
The end of the Cold War was met with a great sigh of relief by many in the US as it seemed certain that now we could stop behaving as a Great Power. That we could now lay down the never really desired burden of leadership, enjoy the "peace benefit," and generally stop and smell the roses of a good life, la dolce vita, American style.
History shows that a country has never resigned Great Power status. Great Powerdom may be lost, taken away, even frittered away in meaningless exercises in coercion, but never has it been voluntarily abandoned. In the years following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the rest of the world did not let the US quit the field as the one and only Great Power around.
Bill Clinton must have wished otherwise. But even he had to respond to the challenges of the day. Sure, he responded poorly, ineptly. His neo-liberal focus on globalization was filled with foreseeable but ignored invocations of the Law of Unintended Consequences for both the US and the globe generally. His opening of "free trade" with China may have benefited the American consumer's love of a bargain, but it gave undue muscle to a country inherently hostile to much which the US wants to see in the world. And, his bootless responses to the provocations of al-Qaeda and other Islamist jihadist crews did much to assure that they would only strengthen.
The "New American Century" of George W. Bush's unilateralism was not the correct way to exercise our Great Power status. It was too crude, too blunt, too unconcerned with the national egos of other powers such as Russia. The Bush/Cheney approach to foreign relations might have made the neocons of the country feel buff as all get out, but it made the cliched bull in a china shop look both mild mannered and nondestructive in comparison.
Admittedly, the Great Recession has put an inevitable crimp in the possibilities for American foreign policy as has the pervasive war weariness of the American public. But, neither imply that the best road to American leadership as a Great Power--arguably the Greatest Power given the unique mixture of hard and soft power tools at our possession--is paved by cringing genuflections before the alter of multi-lateralism, the UN, the EU, or the congeries of sand dune ridden oil sheikdoms, and other Arab despotates.
Consultation with allies is fine. It is necessary. It can lead to much better policy decisions and implementations. We should have consulting modalities as a centrality to the policy process at both the front and back ends. But, we must not make a fetish of it. Inevitably there will be times--such as the Iranian Question--where complete, effective consensus is not possible considering the vastly differing national interests in play.
Indeed, the only effective base for foreign policy is a rigorous definition of American national and strategic interests. Everything arises from this soil. All countries great and small play the Game of Nations with this rule uppermost in mind. The Obama administration had best get this straight--US national and strategic interests first, foremost, and forever.
It is the understanding of core national and strategic interests which provide the schemata from which compelling issues can be addressed effectively. What purely American interest is at play in Iran? Afghanistan and Pakistan? The Mideast? Mexico? What purely American interests are in play regarding US relations with China? Russia? The European Union states? Latin America?
How would core American national and strategic interests be advanced or retarded by proposed policies in energy, global economic reform, anthropogenic climate change? Would US interests be harmed or helped by the ending of the dollar as the reserve currency? Can the global warming pseudo-crisis be employed to use an "oil weapon" in reverse? Would, for example, a crash program on alternative energy, carbon capture from coal fired plants, the construction of standard design risk reduction designed nuclear weapons enhance our leverage on Mideast and other oil producing states?
How can the US best employ its innovations in the new technologies, including biotechnologies, as a soft power tool? An economic asset? What about the role of our first rank educational and research institutions? Are they being used to the maximum in the "battle for minds?"
What about the "war on drugs?" Is its continued pursuit to our national advantage or not? Would controlled legalization help or hurt our relations with other states? Could the foreign aid provided under its cover be better employed in other ways? The manpower?
More immediately, can the US survive? Flourish? Accept? Adjust to? a world in which Iran has a nuclear weapon arsenal? How about North Korea? If the answer is "no," what can? should? we do when and if the combination of diplomatic negotiations and sanctions fails? Try the nuclear deterrent ploy? Launch a full scale war? Kick the can down the road?
None of these core matters have been addressed to date by the Obama administration. Or so it appears to a reasonably well-informed observer. Since resignation from Great Power status is not a viable option much as the "progressives" behind the "Transformational Agenda" might wish, we have to answer these questions and others. Quickly.
Diplomacy and foreign relations are like time chess. The clock never stops. There is no time for long contemplation, no room for naval gazing, no allowance for inexperience.
The Nice Young Man From Chicago is a lawyer. It is long overdue for him and his lawyer Secretary of State to recall a phrase much loved by lawyers, "Time is of the essence."
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