He advances two cogent arguments in support of his conclusion that the benefits far outweigh the price of preventing Islamist jihadists from acquiring a "safe haven" in Afghanistan. The first is that the jihadists do not need a physical sanctuary in order to plan and execute their operations. The second prong is directed specifically at al-Qaeda. Pillar contends that there is no longer any central command and control echelon but rather Osama bin Laden et al are iconic and thus, in a sense, universal.
He could have added a third component to his appraisal. Potential "safe havens" are proliferating. The geographic expression called "Somalia" is one. The dissolving country of Yemen is another. The vast emptiness of Western North Africa represents yet a third. And, Sudan is always waiting in the wings for another chance to be a center of Islamist jihadist activities. Nor can the ever present facilities of the Gaza Strip be ignored (except at great peril.)
In short, ready made "safe havens" abound. Travel between them is quick and easy. The soil of combat is well plowed, so a crop of new martyrdom seekers can grow rapidly and proliferate with ease.
Pillar's assessment is accurate. It is also irrelevant.
The actual importance of the US led war in Afghanistan is emblematic. Had the Deep Thinkers of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld days not been so ideologically blinded by the bright and misleading sun of neoconism, they would have sent the troops to Afghanistan on an old style "punitive expedition" with the prime goal being the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban government which sheltered them.
They didn't. Instead the great global war on al-Qaeda et al foundered in a morass of strategic overreach, insufficient boots on the ground, and too much bowing and scraping to the presumed needs and wishes of the Islamists within the Pakistani military and government.
The result of the failed US approach was clear to anyone with a historically based appreciation of the dynamics of armed political unrest--the bad guys would be back, bigger, bolder, and badder than ever. Now we are stuck with dealing with that unfortunate reality.
And deal with it we must. We must demonstrate convincingly to Islamist jihadists everywhere that the US cannot and will not be defeated by force of arms. We must show beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt that the US has both the political will and the material capacity to wage long, long, long fights against those hostile to us.
The notion of fighting long, long wars without a prospect of a clear victory marked by unconditional surrender documents and appropriate parade based celebrations has never sat well with We the People. And, it still doesn't.
In a very real way the fighting in Afghanistan is not about holding terrain. Nor is it about nation building. The fighting is about political will. About the capacity to have unending political will. About resolve. Dedication. The ability to sacrifice, to take casualties, to take them and keep on coming.
There is a precedent for this approach to war. The progenitor of the sort of war being fought in Afghanistan today--a contest between opposing political wills and the ability to accept casualties while keeping on, keeping on--is found in the Korean War.
After the line of contact stabilized and the seemingly endless truce talks commenced, there were a number of seemingly pointless battles over terrain features of no military or political import. The sanguinary effusions at places like Pork Chop Hill, Bloody Ridge, and Heartbreak Ridge had no inherent meaning. None represented breakthrough battles. None had the slightest potential for altering the course and final outcome of the war.
So, why were they fought? Why were the Chinese (and the Americans in response) willing to expend thousands of lives over hills without value?
Because they had value. An indirect value. An emblematic value. To the Chinese, the assorted bloody battles they precipitated were tests of American political will. American resolve. The American capacity to accept casualties and keep on coming. By measuring our political toughness in battle the Chinese hoped to gain advantage in the truce talks.
There is a direct and--in the boring transcripts of the endless palaver--quite evident linkage between the conduct of American forces at Pork Chop, Heartbreak and the rest and the Chinese negotiating stance. Had the US not contested the hills without meaning and lost lives in so doing, the truce would have been longer in coming and not so favorable in outcome.
We Americans tend to understand war as a clear contest in which success can be measured in terrain gained. In phase lines accomplished. In a final surrender by the enemy. But, not all wars fit this pattern.
Wars are contests not of armies, nor of governments. They are, at root, battles of political will. Our own experience demonstrates this. The War of Independence ended when the British lost the political will to continue. The South surrendered when its population and leadership lost their political will to continue.
World War I ended when the German high command lost its confidence. When the loss of confidence on the part of Hindenburg and Company translated to a loss of political will on the part of the All Highest, as Kaiser William liked to be called.
World War II, the paradigmatic war for many if not most Americans, was the rarity, but only in part. It ended with the obliteration of one hostile government--Nazi Germany, but with the other enemy--Japan losing its political will.
Korea ended because both sides had better things to do and the potential gains were not worth the cost. The Vietnam War came to its sad conclusion because We the People and our government lost our political will to continue.
In the entire sweep of our military and diplomatic history, only one half of one war ended with the total destruction, the complete defeat of the enemy. All the others ended because one side lost its political will.
So it is in Afghanistan. Should the US lose its political will and give victory to the Islamist jihadists the result will be an emboldened enemy and a weakened Western community. This is what is critical about Afghanistan: Which side has the greater political will? The US and its partners or the Islamist jihadists?
How that question is answered will dictate the type of world we live in for decades if not generations yet to come. It is unfortunate that Mr Pillar could not see beyond the superficial question of "safe havens."
It is to be hoped that Mr Obama and others in his administration and political party are not so short-sighted, so superficial.
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