This foundation stimulated the WaPo to ask the wrong question, "If the Iraq war is over does Bush get the W?" History indicates rather persuasively that an outside intervenor cannot "win" ultimately when the war becomes internal in nature. While the intervenor can lose in a very meaningful way (see the Vietnam debacle) the very best that can be hoped for at either the hostilities termination or conflict resolution end stages is "not-losing."
The concept of "not-losing" was defined by the outcome of the Korean War at the time of the armistice in summer 1953. It means, quite simply, that the enemy has not and can not inflict a military defeat. In Korea specifically, the Chinese and North Koreans could not militarily defeat the US, ROK, and UN coalition. Neither could the US et al militarily defeat the Chinese at a politically and diplomatically acceptable price. "Not-losing" was the necessary result.
The concept applies not only to conventional, limited wars in support of policy such as the Korean War. It applies with even more saliency to wars which are internal at root in which the US intervenes in pursuit of a policy goal. This was the case in Vietnam. It was and is the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan (even if the Bush/Cheney crowd did not realize it.)
Kicking Saddam's conventional forces in their collective groin was not and never could be conceived of as a genuine "victory." The defeat of the Iraqi army, the overthrow of Saddam was simply the opening move. The real war was yet to come. If Bush/Cheney and company thought otherwise, they must have had a dynamite dealer. It is evident that the junior--and at least some of the senior--military leaders did not share the administration's stash.
The refusal of the Bush policy makers to recognize the internal nature of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan finally brought the vultures home to roost. To his credit Bush acknowledged the reality of the war and its requirements at the last possible moment in 2007. To his greater credit the Texan held firm against torrents of obloquy and opposition to put enough American boots on the ground even as the body bags came home in ever greater number.
To continue the WaPo's sports metaphor President Bush deserves not a "W" but a "Save." He must share this credit with the military commanders on the ground who belatedly accepted the need to institute genuine, effective counterinsurgency tactics and operational concepts.
The result of the combination of more boots and more appropriate tactics suppressed the violence to a level which allowed and continues to allow the Iraqis to grope toward their own solution, their own "victory." The real deal in any internal war is that only the locals can define and achieve "victory."
The "victory" will never be complete, totally satisfying to the outsider (or even many insiders) but will allow conflict resolution to be pursued. Any ultimate resolution of an internal war, particularly one in an ethnically fractured, religiously divided, tribally based society will be very long, quite messy, and frustratingly inelegant.
That's the nature of the beast, whether the WaPo or the political scientists cited like the idea or not. The nature of the beast also means the violence will continue in Iraq for some time to come. It means the recent election will settle less than it creates. The important fact is that elections provide a means of conflict resolution which does not demand violence--even as they permit the bombings and shootings to continue. Only as Iraqis discover and prove to their own satisfaction that non-violent politics provides a better way to deal with deeply divisive issues will the violence inclined folks be both marginalized and eventually suppressed.
What has been and is true in Iraq is also true in Afghanistan. Should the US/ISAF/Afghan National Forces prove successful in suppressing Taliban and other insurgent groups, then President Obama will deserve a "Save" for his gutsy action in defying his own base and belatedly agreeing to a US troop augmentation. Of course, he will have to share the honor with General Stanley McChrystal.
The combined campaign currently underway may result in hostilities termination. At this point the US will have achieved the same outcome as it did in Iraq--"not-losing." That is the only and best outcome to which the US can aspire.
As in Iraq the road from hostilities termination to conflict resolution will be long, messy, not at all pretty, and quite unsatisfying from the perspective of the US and other Western nations. The process perforce will necessitate political arrangements with Taliban and other insurgent groups. Necessity will demand the road to and through conflict resolution be paved with Islam. The Afghans are Muslim and that implies an absence of blue sky between state and faith.
Conflict resolution as well as hostilities termination requires the cooperation and participation of Pakistan. As the two are so deeply involved in each others affairs, it is impossible to see an outcome which does not involve Islamabad.
The Pakistan connection may complicate and lengthen the process but it cannot be avoided. The Pakistanis have too much at stake in Afghanistan. Peace in the FATA and the always dominant fear of lack of strategic depth in the anticipated next war with India dictate this.
For years to come people will debate whether or not the loss of American lives and treasure were worth it in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This debate is one where no final answer can ever be achieved.
Afghanistan was forced upon us by Omar's refusal to give Osama bin Laden over despite vigorous diplomatic efforts. Arguably the resulting invasion was "worth it." Had the Bush/Cheney administration not been so eager to go to Iraq, and had the initial force been both stronger and more intelligently employed, the war would have been over within a year of the first boot hitting the Afghan soil. This didn't happen and now there is only the choice between losing and "not-losing." The second is the better.
The invasion of Iraq was both volitional and unnecessary (even arguably against the better interests of the US) but, having been initiated had to be carried through to a conclusion which did not involve an American military defeat. Redeeming the failure of decision making in the Oval has cost the US over four thousand lives and more money than can readily be comprehended.
The result may or not be good for the Iraqi people. The result may or not be "worth it," but that determination cannot be made by an American vice-president, nor an American newspaper, nor by We the People either today in the future.
The decision can be made only by the Iraqis. And, it can only be made when (and if) they successfully travel the long, hard road to and through conflict resolution.
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