Somalia is and always has been a purely geographic expression inhabited by diverse tribes made up of fractious clans with no national center and little in the way of national identity. After the tides of colonization and war had swept through the area, well-intended and high-minded foreigners decided the time had come to create a state. And, in a frenzy of prestidigitation hallowed by the UN, Somalia was summoned into existence. Most of the "citizens" of the new "state" neither knew of or cared about their new status as a member of the "international community."
Other than geographic location Somalia had little to offer in the way of advantage to either of the Cold War major players. By and large it was left as alone as if it existed on the backside of the moon. In no way did this lack of attention by the movers and shakers of the outside world perturb the majority of the locals who went along as always, as marginal agriculturalists, semi-nomadic pastoralists, low imprint fishermen, chewing kif, drinking coffee, practicing a rather laid back form of Islam and pursuing politics through poetry.
Those who were ambitious left. Or became warlords, wannabe warlords, and the trigger pullers for the warlords. The only clouds on the Somali horizon (other than getting caught in the crossfire between rival warlords) were the attentions of Wahhibist clerics fueled by Saudi petrodollars.
The seasons came and went. The warlords, clan leaders, and political poets rose and fell. The clerics preached. And, as far as the average Somali was concerned, little changed, even less did anything change for the better.
The pretend state, the artifact of guilty Western ex-colonizers, Somalia could have gone along in its timeless way little bothered by men landing on the moon, Berlin Walls falling, Marx and Lenin being dethroned, or the other bagatelles which meant and mean so much to the governments and people of real states.
Even the overtures of Islamist jihadists to Somalis were rejected. After all, these Islamists were foreigners, not like us Somalis. Somalis continued to feud, form transient political, economic, and social alliances as they had for generations almost beyond counting.
All of this changed following the decision by the US and other foreigners to intervene in Somalia under the UN mantel to address the humanitarian crisis perceived to exist in the wake of the collapse of the warlord government in 1991. The well-intended, high-minded effort led quickly to the use of military force with the initial goal of protecting aid workers. This modest intent rapidly morphed into establishing stability under a new government.
When the Somalis showed their lack of appreciation for American good intents by actually shooting at and even having the effrontery to kill US Special Forces men, the Clinton administration with the full support of We the People beat feet as fast as we could. Let the ingrates boil in their own juices was the universal sentiment.
And, so they have. The process of boiling has been enhanced by such purportedly well-intended efforts as paying the ever-so-eager Ethiopians to toss out the Islamic Courts Union shortly after it had established a government which seemed to be tolerable to the Somalis generally. The Islamic Courts Union was able to end the worst of the bloodshed and put a reasonable simulacrum of normal life in the place of armed chaos. The ICU was an opportunistic alliance of clan leaders, clerics (mainly Saudi sponsored Wahhibists), and what passed for the business community.
Being Islamist in orientation the ICU was not acceptable to the US. Overlooked in making this assessment was the domestic orientation of the ICU leadership. More importantly the US managed to ignore the way in which the ICU rejected the notions of global jihad and the blandishments of al-Qaeda. These concepts and people were, after all, foreign, simply not Somali.
The arrival of the Ethiopian kill, loot, and pillage team assured the departure of stability, a tolerable degree of peace, and any hopes for a better future which may have intruded upon the individual or collective Somali imagination. This consequence may have been unintended by the Deep Thinkers of Washington, but it was drearily predictable.
Equally predictable was the sequel. The emergence of al-Shabaab was inevitable. So also was the increasingly attractive nature of the Islamist jihadist narrative.
Years of flailing and failing on the part of Deep Thinkers and High Minded sorts alike finally led to the latest foreign creation: The Transitional Federal Government. The most recent outsider driven decision, that of anointing Sheikh Sharif as president of the TFG, was intended to rehabilitate the old ICU and thus confer legitimacy on the government du jour.
Now, bucko, here is where the rubber hits the road. Al-Shabaab and the TFG are both fragile, faction riddled assemblages of transient alliances, ephemeral allegiances. Neither the hyper-Muslims of al-Shabaab (or any of the other, smaller, warring Islamist jihadist groups) nor the Western approved TFG has any existential legitimacy. And, other than the capacity to reward (with money or power) supporters and punish enemies does either amphyctony have the slightest functional legitimacy.
However both of these "contestants" for ultimate authority share one critical and all-too-often ignored value. Both are opposed to foreign intervention. And, it must not be overlooked, both groups share a love for foreign money or goodies which can be exchanged for money and power.
The flood of foreign aid, specifically food meant to feed the purportedly starving majority, has provided an almost literal manna from heaven as demonstrated by the leaked UN Security Council report. The World Food Program aid has gone to corrupt TFG personnel, al-Shabaab leaders, and, last but not least, sticky fingered UN staffers and employees.
The aid both civilian and military fuels alliances and allegiances in both the TFG and the jihadists. It does not serve to promote the development of a unitary state, let alone one with the features so beloved in the West such as secularism, democracy, transparency of government or even a bit of basic honesty.
Nor does the aid serve to make the geographic expression, Somalia, less amenable to al-Qaeda or others of the global jihadist bent. In short, the efforts by the outsiders, including the UN, the US, the EU, have not done anything useful in the construction of a state. Nor have they made the world one whit safer from Islamist jihadism.
The challenge for the Obama administration (as if it needed another) is simply that of creative and effective disengagement from the Somali tar pit. Other than emulating the French and actually stopping pirates operating from Somalia or Puntland, the US has no interests in play which cannot be best served by getting out and staying out of Somali internal affairs.
It is a safe bet that the inherent Somali distaste for foreigners and foreign causes will continue to effectively inoculate the people against the virus of al-Qaeda in any of its many guises. It is an equally safe bet that continued well-meaning interference will facilitate the penetration of Somali minds by the global jihadist meme.
The old idea of "benign neglect" has much historically based evidence in its support. True it is hard, very hard for a Great Power, particularly a Great Power with beaucoup high minded progressive people gripping the levers of power to acknowledge the best course of action is one of turning a blind eye to an apparent crisis be it humanitarian or political.
Still the dynamic of the Somali culture and its history is one of leave-us-alone! This reality governs. The best way to help the Somalis develop their region, their collective life, their shared future is to adopt a hands-off policy.
The short-term will not be pretty. But, the ugliness will pass faster if we ignore its existence for a couple of years. The Somalis are competent to manage their own affairs, even if the result is not completely to our taste and liking. We should--must--draw only one line in their sand: No globally minded Islamist jihadists! No emulation of Taliban's intimate relation with al-Qaeda.
Beyond that leaving the Somalis to stew in their own juices is the fastest, best way to see stability return to that ancient geographic expression and the people who live there.
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