Sunday, July 4, 2010

Looking At Life From The Other Side Of The Hill

There was a time when the Geek hated above all else receiving a tasking memo containing the words, "estimate probable reactions to a proposed course of US action." Filling the order always required looking deeply into a very cloudy crystal ball. It also required rejecting the American mindset, a difficult task at best for someone who is profoundly American.

However, there are times when the lads on the other side of the hill do the equivalent of sending a fax outlining their intentions. Events of recent weeks in Lebanon combine with other Iranian demarches to give a clear hint as to what the mullahs fear might be about to happen--and what they and their political stooges hope to do as a preventative.

The Iranian Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, must be getting a bit anxious about the potential of an attack against the country's nuclear facilities, and, quite possibly, other very high value point targets. The anxiety felt by Allah's Voice In the Islamic Republic may focus on the Israelis, but might include the remote possibility that the US would join in the festival of air delivered destruction. And, just as feces is impelled downhill by the force of gravity, so also is the Ayatollah's anxiety.

The challenge for the strategists of the Islamic Republic is that of preventing any strike by Israel alone or the (highly) hypothetical joint US-Israel attack. The goal must be the absolute prevention of any attack and not simply the mitigation of an attack's effectiveness or adequate retaliation for the attack. Anything less than a total prevention of any attack of any weight would constitute a significant defeat for the Iranians.

There are two reinforcing avenues by which the strategic goal might be reached. The first, the self-evident, consists of diplomatic gambits meant to cause divisions within the P5+1 states and the larger "international community." The second would be the more robust mechanism of forestalling Israel by means of a proxy preventative war.

The diplomatic axis is already in play. Most recently, the Iranians have brought the rejected Turkey-Brazil brokered exchange deal back into play. The Tehran regime has hinted it will stop its twenty percent enrichment program if the requisite higher quality uranium is furnished according to the deal first proposed by the US and its allies last Fall. Not surprisingly, Ankara has praised the proposal. Similar hosannas may be expected shortly from Brazil. And, in all probability, Beijing will join the chorus of "Give Peace (and diplomacy) A Chance."

The new sanctions regime, including the tougher measures adopted by both the US and EU, will be less than effective, to say nothing of not being the "crippling" measures promised by SecState Clinton months ago. Both Turkey and Pakistan have made it clear that neither feels bound by the UN Security Council measures, nor, it appears the stance of the US. Most recently the government of Pakistan rejected American pressures (and inducements) to sign an agreement running a natural gas pipeline from Iran into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The unhelpful positions taken by two key American "allies" in the region taken in conjunction with Iran's well demonstrated capacity to evade sanctions in major part will serve to nullify the isolation. This reality when seen as a reinforcement for the delay and division producing charm offensive embodied in the "we will stop enriching, if you do what we want" campaign gives Iran breathing room while enhancing the chance that Israel will undertake a go-it-alone air strike against the Iranian nuclear constellation.

And, that brings us to the second, more critical part of what might be underway on the other side of the hill--preventing Israel from exercising its aerial option.

The key to this is Lebanon. More precisely it is found in the capacity of Hezbollah to provoke Israel into a rematch of the 2006 Second Lebanese War.

The most important aspect of the Hezbollah Option is found not in 2006 but in the aftermath of last year's Operation Cast Lead against Hamas. The highest profile "lesson learned" by enemies of Israel in the wreckage of Gaza is the degree of international condemnation focused on Israel.

Given that this lesson of Cast Lead has been powerfully reinforced by the consequences of the IDF boarding of the Marmara, the potential of the Hezbollah Option to stymie Israel in undertaking any air attack on Iran is self-evident. The ease with which Israel can be rendered harmless has been enhanced by the posture adopted and actions taken regarding Israel by the Obama administration.

Now, let's take a dekko at southern Lebanon, specifically the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. This area of Lebanon was the focus of Israeli military operations during the Carter and Reagan administrations. At that time and later, the region was the area of operations assigned to the United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon (UNIFIL.) Following the 2006 Second Lebanese War, UNIFIL was enlarged and charged with the responsibility of enforcing all the assorted provisions governing the region and the larger Israeli-Lebanese conflict.

In theory, UNIFIL is supposed to assure that only the official Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have an armed presence in the region. The patrols and mere presence of UNIFIL was presumed by the UN to guard against a renewal of Hezbollah's armed component using the area as a base of attacks against Israel.

In practice, matters have not worked out as the international "statesmen" at the UN had intended. Hezbollah has not only joined the Lebanese government, it has taken effective control of the region where UNIFIL holds forth. By providing essential services and using tried and true methods of intimidation, Hezbollah has gained unquestioned dominance over the numerous villages of south Lebanon.

Nonetheless, UNIFIL has impeded the efforts of Hezbollah to prepare the border area as an effective base of offensive operations. Hezbollah has not been stopped in stockpiling weapons including short range unguided missiles but it has been slowed, made less effective, inhibited in many ways by the embarrassing existence of the UNIFIL troops.

Until recently this has not been a major problem. However, recent events show that Hezbollah is feeling some pressure to prepare more effectively, more rapidly. Enter the villagers.

In the past few weeks "outraged" villagers have engaged in "spontaneous" actions against UNIFL patrols and installations. This escalating campaign of harassment culminated during regularly scheduled UNIFIL practice operations with an attack on a French contingent which included the temporary blockade of vehicles, seizure of weapons, and detention of personnel. In this case as in the previous ones, UNIFIL had to wait until "rescued" by units of the LAF. Even the UN Secretary General became officially "concerned" over the ability of UNFIL to operate free of impediment.

The Secretary General is also given to fretting over the continued "violation" of Lebanese air space by reconnaissance assets of the Israeli Air Force. Of course, the Israelis have no alternative given that the continued and escalating interference with UNIFIL enhances the ability of Hezbollah to emplace weapons and munitions, undertake field exercises, and otherwise improve the group's capacity at both offensive and defensive operations.

It is most likely that Hezbollah has been responding to the directions of Tehran to prepare for attacks against Israel as well as the inevitable Israeli response. This would be a time sensitive matter as Tehran must be aware that Israeli patience with the US led effort to block the quest for a nuclear weapon is running short.

There is a high probability that Hezbollah will be fully ready to undertake offensive operations against Israel within the next thirty to sixty days. This implies a commensurate readiness to resist and counter the Israeli retaliation--including ground operations.

No matter how Israel may respond to Hezbollah attacks and without regard to the success of the response, the critical reality from Tehran's perspective is that Israel will be tied up in an international firestorm of criticism and diplomatic condemnation. Even if Israel is delayed in its response by pressure from the US to "show restraint," the major effect will be to severely, perhaps fatally, inhibit Israel's potential use of its military option against Iran.

In short, the most attractive alternative for Iran in its search for a sovereign remedy against the power of the IDF is the use of Hezbollah. Hezbollah's leadership does not fear any Israeli attack including a major ground offensive of the 2006 sort. There is high confidence within the organization that it is better prepared today than four years ago to handle the IDF roughly.

This confidence extends to Damascus. Not only have the Syrians done much to facilitate improvements in Hezbollah's war fighting capacities, it is prepared to ostensibly distance itself from whatever provocations Hezbollah may exercise. It is sufficient, the Syrian government believes, to have plausible deniability in its involvement. This attitude is based upon its assessment of the lack of American political will to provide support to Israel as well as the way in which the tide of international opinion (at least among the political elites) has run increasingly against Israel.

Should this scenario play out, the loudest sounds will not be from exploding missiles or bombs but rather from the sighs of relief and chortles of triumph coming from Tehran. No matter what happens on the killing grounds of Lebanon and Israel, the winner will be Iran.

That means the largest losers will be the US--and the rest of the civilized world.

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