Here are the choices. Call in a police helicopter with orders to bomb the house. Surround the place, and, if negotiations fail, use minimum necessary force to subdue and capture the suspects.
The advantages of the first choice are these: Low risk of friendly casualties. Saves time.
Disadvantage of first choice: High risk of killing innocent parties.
The advantage of the second option is simply the risk of innocent casualties is minimized.
The disadvantage of the second option is the high probability of police being killed or wounded.
Now for the second scenario. Actionable intelligence is developed indicating that a Taliban mid-level commander and multiple trigger-pullers are present in a compound along with multiple civilian women, children, and non-combatant men.
The choices are the same as in the first hypothetical situation: airstrike or ground assault using minimum force following an attempt at negotiating the surrender of the insurgents.
The advantages and disadvantages of each choice are identical with those outlined in the first situation. The only significant difference--and it is highly significant--is the impact of collateral non-combatant casualties on the larger Afghan public, particularly the uncommitted majority.
There has been only one use of the air power option by a local police force during a hostage and barricade situation in recent American history. That occasion was the use of a state police helicopter delivered homemade bomb on a house in the Move compound during a siege conducted by the Philadelphia police during the days of Rizzo. A number of women and children were injured or killed as a result of the bombing and consequent fire.
In Waco, Texas, the FBI used a heavy ground assault to end the long siege of the Branch Davidian compound. While many, if not all of the deaths of women and children which came in the wake of the breeching vehicle's attack are attributable to fires set by the religious fanatics in the compound, the attack was resoundingly criticized by many Americans as was the bombing of the Move compound in Philadelphia. The Waco attack was also a contributory factor in later terrorist events most importantly the bombing of the Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City.
In both cases, Philadelphia and Waco, the use of means which caused either directly or indirectly the loss of "non-combatant" lives were negative. In Afghanistan the death or wounding of non-combatants as a collateral to US and ISAF operations is not just negative. This type of death, even if clearly inadvertent, obviously unintended is a defeat.
The often decried McChrystal doctrine of "courageous restraint" was predicated upon a sound understanding that every non-combatant death, every non-combatant injury constituted a victory for Taliban or the other insurgent groups. It was also based upon the historically well rooted view that counterinsurgency is more a species of police action than it is a variety of war.
To men at the sharp point "courageous restraint" smacked of a belief that the life and skin of the American (or British or other ISAF) infantryman was of less value than the lives and skins of the Afghan civilians who, after all, may be civilians now but Taliban fighters later in the day. It is not a surprise that commanders came to see matters in the same way since they were responsible for the lives of those under their command.
The bitter reality as the Geek knows from too much personal acquaintance, the effective counter insurgent, the "winning" counter insurgent must value the lives and skins of the uncommitted majority, the non-combatants, the women and children more highly than he does his own--if he wants success to come his way. That means quite simply that "courageous restraint" may be highly unpleasant to those called upon to show it, but it is the best, cheapest, most certain way to secure the support, assistance and loyalty of the previously uncommitted majority.
And, (here is the nitty-gritty) without the increasing support, assistance and loyalty of the previously uncommitted majority there can be no success. There can be only failure. Defeat.
It is absolutely critical that the onus for killing civilians, non-combatants, particularly women and children fall upon the insurgents. And, only the insurgents.
Indeed one way the counterinsurgent knows he is winning is when the insurgent starts killing women and children, starts slaughtering civilians of the uncommitted majority as a matter of policy and not accident. Recently Mullah Omar, the jefe grande and spiritual father of Taliban reversed the course he set last year and ordered his troops to target civilians, particularly women. So far this year the insurgents have been responsible for the majority of non-combatant fatalities in Afghanistan thus continuing the pattern established last year. Mullah Omar's new order assures the number of civilian corpses will grow, fast.
This switch in Taliban policy makes the necessity of staying with "courageous restraint" all the more critical. If the McChrystal doctrine is abandoned with the same lack of thinking which characterized the general's sacking, it will lessen the effects of Omar's new way of war.
Keeping "courageous restraint" as the primary operational doctrine will go a very long way to mobilizing the uncommitted majority to the US/ISAF/Afghan government side. Omar's kill-our-way-to-victory gambit will turn the uncommitted majority against Taliban with the certainty of the moon governing the tides.
In the short run keeping "courageous restraint" in place will mean a high probability of more dead and maimed Americans. In the longer run it will mean fewer deaths, fewer injuries and a high likelihood of success before the magic date of 2014 or even the Obama pious hope date of mid-2011.
Abandoning "courageous restraint" particularly in light of the Omar Directive will mean less fear and fewer deaths in the short term. And, in the longer term, it will mean failure. Defeat.
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