The Geek is well prepared for monumental amounts of sheer ennui occasioned by the reading of awesomely repetitive and frightfully mundane materials which are the major product of all wars, particularly those of the "overseas contingency operation" sort. In his various employments, the Geek has spent (subjective) centuries plowing through hundreds of thousands of documents from the Vietnam War as well as other similar conflicts before and after the Great Southeast Asian War Game.
The documents flowing through Wikileaks are of a piece with those of Vietnam, Greece, Malaya, Somalia, portions of the Korean War, the interventions in the Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, and elsewhere. They are inherently without real interest to anyone other than the specialist in the history of fouled up interventions or screwed up attempts at counterinsurgency and its evil cousin, nation-building.
Insofar as the documents have value it is to be found in demonstrating just how long and deeply the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been involved with Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network. While that involvement is well known to any and all with both an interest in the dynamics of the AfPak region and a proper orientation in time and place, the repetitive mentions of direct ISI partnership with the "radical extremists" of Taliban et al down to the level of operational planning and execution support provides the sort of detail necessary to counter even the most ardent attempts to portray Islamabad as a reliable ally in the war against the adherents of violent political Islam.
As the Geek has noted in numerous posts (as well as elsewhere), the government and military of Pakistan have worked both sides of the street for more than twenty years. Primarily but not exclusively relying upon ISI, Islamabad has sought consistently and effectively to exploit the opportunities presented by Taliban on the one hand and the US fear and loathing of that group on the other to secure and advance Pakistani national interests.
The Pakistani government and, to an even greater extent, its military deserve credit for pursuing national interest at all costs. The firm focus, dedication, and skill shown by the Pakistanis in keeping their eyes on the prize are all outstanding. The Pakistanis deserve congratulations for their effective exploitation of every opportunity presented in Afghanistan as well as their equally high level of ability at practicing extortion against the US.
Indeed, it does not distort reality to assert the Pakistanis have exceeded even the Israelis in the tail-wags-dog areas of foreign policy. Not only have the Pakistani regimes and ISI both created the threat of violent political Islam in Afghanistan and facilitated the survival of al-Qaeda both before and after the US invasion of 2002, they have used the threat they created to extort US military aid and diplomatic support.
No regime has ever surpassed or even equaled the Pakistani for working both sides of the American street. This accomplishment merits respect.
It also has to be ended.
The difficulty comes in that there is no simple, direct, and certain way to depose the fine folks in Islamabad, particularly at the ISI, from their comfortable position in the catbird seat. The dynamic has existed so long (over twenty-five years) and has become so deeply rooted in the relationship between Pakistan and the US, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, that ending it seemingly defies imagination and reality alike.
Pakistan, in and of itself, presents the fundamental conundrum for policy makers.
The Pakistanis are profoundly anti-American. The fear, loathing, and hatred of the US felt and expressed by so many Pakistanis is such that mere civilian aid projects, simple economic development projects even if carefully planned and executed so as to provide immediate, direct, positive results to the Pakistani public, will do nothing to end or even significantly reduce the anti-American sentiments pervading so many in the country. Of course the probability of civilian projects being so perfect must be rated realistically as close to zero.
Also, the Pakistani population has shifted increasingly to the political Islam side of the Muslim opinion spectrum. The shift started during Partition. It accelerated during the several losing wars fought against India. It was intentionally enhanced by General Zia as a means of developing political coherence among the fractured Pakistani population. Finally, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were used effectively by promoters of both Pakistani nationalism and violent political Islam to give an additional fast boost to radicalization over the past several years.
The population of no country, not Iran, not Saudi Arabia, not Turkey, not even the quasi-country of Palestine, can equal that of Pakistan in embracing the goals, motives, justifications, and methods of violent political Islam. That sorry actuality is most pronounced among the younger elements of the population. And, it must not escape notice, the young provide the wannabe martyrs, the eager trigger-pullers, the guys willing to kill and die.
In Pakistan there are always three public villains: The US, Israel, and India. The relative place on the list may shift from time to time, but overall India occupies the position of Main Enemy, leaving Israel and the US to fight it out for the second spot.
For the government, and, even more, the army, India is always Enemy Number One. It has been that way since Partition. It will stay that way as far into the future as anyone cares to speculate. The English never hated and feared the French, nor the French the Germans with anywhere near the intensity exhibited by the Pakistanis for the Indians. On the other side of the hill, the intensity is nearly equal.
This equation does not bode well for a sudden outbreak of peace, love, and harmony on the sub-continent. The legacy of blood has stood too long for that to be in the tealeaves. Even if the Pakistanis and Indians were to be afflicted with the sort of memory deficiency which characterizes the American public, there have been too many recent events and too many emerging points of friction to provide a basis for genuine conflict resolution.
The focus on India has meant and will continue to mean that Afghanistan serves as a sort of strategic depth for Pakistan. The goal of Islamabad during and after the anti-Soviet war in which the ISI played such a critical role was the establishment of strategic depth. The use of the Islamist Taliban was a brilliant stroke by the ISI and was executed with equal brilliance by Lt General Hamid Gul. The Islamist glue provided Taliban with a coherence unequalled by any of the other contenders for power in post-Soviet Kabul. In violent political struggles, cohesion is the single most important consideration. Taliban had it in spades.
Finally, Pakistan is a member of the nuclear club. It achieved this status despite both American opposition and liberal bribes. Of course, once Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability, the regime gained both status internationally and a degree of freedom from coercion it lacked previously.
The US policy regarding Pakistan was governed not by any realistic appraisal of coinciding national interests but rather from a total distaste for the Kremlin leaning governments of India. US policy in Pakistan was a pure artifact of the Cold War. However, the creation of Taliban dominated Afghanistan by ISI just as the Cold War ended made radical shifting of previous US policy difficult.
The emergence of violent political Islam during the Clinton administration locked the US into the long standing stance of accommodating Pakistan. The achievement of a nuclear capability by Pakistan further froze the US into its subordinate role in the bilateral relationship.
As a result Pakistan has had a free hand in simultaneously supporting and aiding Taliban and the Haqqani network while extorting evermore assistance from the US. We have known all of this all along, so the "revelations" of the Wikileaks dump add nothing.
The Pakistanis have proven to be resistant to American hectorings, threats, and blandishments alike. They can take this rejectionist stance because we need them far more than they need us.
Without the minimal cooperation the Pakistanis have provided it would be impossible for us to continue our program of Predator strikes in the FATA. Without the minimal cooperation the ISI has furnished to CIA the flow of actionable intelligence regarding al-Qaeda and Taliban actions and personalities would be lessened, perhaps fatally so. And, without the minimal cooperation of Islamabad it would be impossible to support the forces already deployed in Afghanistan.
Those are representative of the bitter realities upon which members of congress must take a grip as they debate the continuation of the war in Afghanistan and our cooperation with the regime in Islamabad. In short, unless we continue to conform with Pakistani policy dictates, there will be few choices beyond abandoning our efforts in Afghanistan and leaving the place to the locals--and ISI.
We know and have known for years now just what Islamabad is up to in Afghanistan. Islamabad is completely aware that we know. There are no secrets here. This means in turn that there is no room for the US to play bluffs, to wiggle diplomatically, or to coerce credibly.
Back during the Reagan years we let Islamabad get us by the shortest of short hairs. That is where they have us today. Nothing changes that.
Our cone of options has narrowed to two: Go along with Islamabad's tune; get out of the region.
Nothing in the Wikileaks dump changes that. And, in that fact one finds the only matters of interest, the only non-boring matters.
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