Nationalism Is More Alive--And Legal--Then Ever

Yesterday the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Kosovo three years ago was and is legal. The ICJ, as well as assorted proponents of Kosovo's independence including the US, maintains that the decision does not constitute a precedent. Instead, it has been argued, the unique threats presented to the Albanian Muslim majority population of Kosovo by the Serbian government and military dictate the decision is not broadly applicable.

Duh.

Certainly there are ethnic groups such as the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria would disagree violently. The Kurds of Iraq insist with total accuracy that they have been the recipients of armed repression by every indigenous Iraqi regime from the 1930s to the present. This representation could be--and is--echoed by the Kurds of Turkey, Iran, and Syria with only slight differences in detail.

If the test of legality for any unilateral declaration of independence is that of violence perpetrated or threatened by a central government against a region and its people on racial, ethnic, linguistic, or religious grounds then a Kurdish UDI would be as legal as that of Kosovo. So would UDIs issued by other definable groups which constitute a majority in a given region but a minority in the country overall.

There are a number of such today. The Hungarian minorities in defined and narrowly circumscribed areas of Romania and Slovakia are in that number. So also are the Armenians of Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabah. While the degree of armed repression or informal but tacitly approved violence directed against these groups is both less than that suffered by the Kurds and even arguable as to existence, a plausible case for justifiable UDI can be made.

There are numerous other ethno-linguistic minorities constituting majorities in definable regions throughout Europe. The Basques are one. So also are the inhabitants of Catalonia. The Scots might say they merit more independence than the amount offered by devolution. The German speakers of the Italian Alps may suddenly discover they have a unique national consciousness and identity.

Nor are other parts of the world immune to the virus of nationalism. Russia is willing, even eager, to see South Ossetia and Abkhazia as genuine national entities deserving of both sovereignty and Russian protection but are not of a similarly generous view when confronted by nationalist insurgencies in the North Caucasus. China is flatly opposed to new nationalisms--when such inflame Tibet or the predominantly Muslim provinces of west China.

Indonesia is currently facing nationalism within its large and diverse in all things except religion population. The provinces of Aceh (which is increasingly Islamist leaning) and West Papua have found they are incompatible with the rest of Indonesia.

The list can go on, but this is enough to outline some of the implications resident in the central part of the ICJ ruling: The protection of the territorial integrity of an established state is no longer unassailable, no longer automatically paramount. This is a seismic shift.

A cardinal principle for years has been dethroned from unquestioned legitimacy. States are no longer sacrosanct. Provided a identifiable and circumscribed region is inhabited by an identifiable and self-conscious majority which is simultaneously a minority subject to persecution at the hands of the larger population and government, its rights of self-determination (and, by implication) self-defense allow for UDI. The provisos of minority status in the larger state and liability to persecution seem to be the critical limit to the ICJ decision as regards applicability or status as a precedent.

Whether this limit is meaningful in the real world outside of courtrooms and chanceries is debatable at best. However, even if the limit defined by the Kosovo decision is observed, there is no bar to the Kurds issuing a UDI without delay. There is no doubt but the Kurds in all four countries where they constitute a regional majority but national minority have been at the totally untender mercies of the central regimes for generations.

Other self-conscious and easily definable minorities such as the Muslims in China and the Tibetans can do the same with legality even if without success. So can the folks in West Papua.

For other self-aware minorities such as the Basques and Catalonians to say nothing of the Scots, Welsh, and German-speakers of the formerly Austrian Alps the same does not apply. There is no recent history of repression or persecution. The Hungarians of Slovakia and Romania fall somewhere in the middle. These ethnic and linguistic minorities have suffered repression in the past and still labor under unofficial and technically illegal disabilities and prejudice. The Kosovo decision is not relevant to any of these groups or the context in which they live.

Now for the Department of Irony. There is a whole bunch of irony resident in the ICJ decision and the reactions of various governments to it. The Russians have already been alluded to. The Kremlin is flatly schizophrenic in the matter. UDI is good for South Ossetia and Abkhazia but very, very bad for the North Caucasus states.

In Washington we see the utter irony of the post-modern, post-nationalist Obama administration eagerly embracing the Kosovo decision and urging all countries which have not yet recognized Kosovo as an independent, sovereign state to do so immediately. At the same time the administration in keeping with its predecessors sees no justification for Kurdish independence.

The Obama administration is generally of the view that the era of the nation-state has (thankfully) come to an end. Except for Kosovo. In its double think the administration not unlike the internationalist minded elites of the European Union is out of step with many, if not most, of humanity. The devolution of power to lower levels, to smaller groups of people sharing history, language, traditions, religion, and defining mythology has been on the upsurge for several decades now. And, it shows no sign of abating let alone reversing.

For some years now there has been a growing reaction against central governments which are seen rightly or wrongly as remote, uncaring, arrogant, and disconnected with the needs, hopes, and fears of the common folks. One symptom of this phenomenon is the push to governments made up of "people like us." That is people who speak the same language, share the same values, hold the same traditions dear, and believe in the same defining mythology. This in its turn implies a move toward ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural identity as the primary means of defining legitimate government and a legitimate state representing the self-conscious nation.

In the Kosovo decision the ICJ has put itself willingly or not, knowingly or not, on the side of this specific historical trajectory. In being selective as to approval of the Kosovo ruling, the Obama administration and others of similar mind in Western Europe have shown a total obliviousness to the emergence and power of this still new and growing trajectory.

As a final irony it is interesting to see the "progressives" being the most reactionary.