Today the same situation exists but now it holds forth on both sides of the great divide and not just one. There is good reason for Iranians and Israelis both to have the idea that time is working to the disadvantage of each.
It is arguably true that Iranian power is peaking in comparison to Israel's. When Iran gains even a rudimentary nuclear capacity, the Jewish state is under real and immediate threat.
It is arguably true that Iran is facing potentially fatal internal opposition now that the merchants of the bazaars in Tehran and other large cities have been expressing not only anti-tax but anti-government sentiments. The Iranian government's stability is in no way assisted by the effects of the new sanctions imposed by the European Union and the US. There will be more shortages, more unemployment, more unrest, more repression.
In a very real sense then the rulers of Iran may be expected to conclude that now represents their last, best chance to go to (indirect) war for purposes of regime maintenance and diplomatic diversion. The availability of competent proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas provide the needed avenue for indirect war.
On the Israeli side of the hill it is to be expected that the country's strategists have seen all the alternatives available to the mullahs in the proxy war category--and will not be diverted from their main enemy, Iran. The awareness that being distracted, tied down both militarily and diplomatically in a proxy war in Lebanon would provide advantage only to Iran must pervade the corridors of Israeli political and military command.
In a quirky way the situation resembles not only that before August 1914 but the contest over who would invade Norway first in 1940, Germany or England. For Iran, it is critical to let the Hezbollah dogs of war loose before Israel makes the go decision to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. For Israel the necessity is hitting Iran before the proxy war, the Hezbollah threat, puts the diplomatic kibosh on any hope of a direct attack on Iran.
Both Iran and Israel have good reasons to resort to war. At the moment the conventional advantage rests with Israel. However, Iran has demonstrated great skill at offsetting conventional advantage with creative use of proxies and terror.
And, at the moment, Iran has the initiative. Iran can decide when and to what initial extent Hezbollah is to be cranked up. After that, of course, Iran will not be able to control either the extent or the intensity of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, which includes the potential that Israel will be able to ignore diplomatic strictures and go for the master behind the puppet.
Israel's freedom of action as well as its ability to ignore any diplomatic repercussions resulting from retaliating to Hezbollah provocations is enhanced by the general perception within the Arab states that the world is much better off if Iran does not get the Big Bomb than would be the case if it did. While only the UN representative of the UAE has made this explicit, there can be no doubt but he was speaking publicly what all others have been saying in private.
Other than Syria there are no Iran fans to be found in the Arab states. The depth of Syrian commitment to the Iranian cause would be tested severely if Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah spilled over into Syria. It would be tested even more severely should Israel seek to buy its peace on the Syrian front by giving the Golan Heights back. That option would have more appeal when taken in conjunction with an ongoing confrontation with Hezbollah and the need for a hard strike on the main enemy, Iran.
Iran has allies on the wider stage but only one, China, is a Great Power. Others, including Russia and Germany, may have interests, primarily economic, in play in Iran but are not or are no longer willing to go to the mat to protect Iran's right to join the Nuclear Club. Words may fly like automatic weapons fire at the UN and other fora but without real conviction and without backing on the action front.
The American administration may, in contemporary jargon, "be deeply conflicted" over any Israeli retaliation to Hezbollah provocation as well as a go-it-alone Israel strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities but will be unable to do anything about it. The political realities of America assure that the Obama administration would be unable to do more than rhetorically hand-wring and counsel "restraint" without expecting the Israeli government to heed the exhortations.
No one will be happy should push come to shove in Lebanon and Iran. Any attack on Iran will derail the fragile global economic recovery as oil prices spike. The noise of terrorist bombs and the body parts of suicide bombers will shatter the quiet and litter the landscape as political Islamists seek their opportunity in the window of chaos opened by any Israeli attack on Iran--or occurring as a sideline to the Hezbollah proxy war.
When the war comes, when Iran unleashes Hezbollah or when Israel preempts by hitting Iran's nuclear constellation, it will be in large measure the result of failed US diplomacy. Two successive American administrations--W. Bush and Obama--have faltered before the challenge of Iranian ambitions. Tough--overly tough--words were backed by weak and vacillating actions to the ultimate advantage of the Iranian regime. Lines were drawn on ever-shifting sand, again to the ultimate advantage of the Iranians.
It must be recalled that whatever benefits Iran acts to the disadvantage not only of Israel and the Mideast but the totality of the world. That is the most discouraging implication of the dismal record of two administrations. The US failed completely in its paramount goal of acting to preserve the global balance of power which acts not so much to the advantage of the US as to the peace of the world.
With every passing day Israel is in more of a get-or-get-got position. Every day the choice for Israel narrows: Fight the war of our choice or fight one of Iran's choice and timing.
Any reasonably able strategist knows the answer to that problem.
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