Well, It's (Almost) Palaver With North Korea Time

Reportedly the Deep Thinkers of the Obama Foreign Policy Team are giving serious consideration to opening some sort of (to use the fashionable term) dialog with North Korea. This wouldn't be done instantly but rather would occur after some more pressure is placed upon the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

Since the incremental approach employed to date has been notably lacking in success, it seems only logical that some more incrementalism be used. Then, after a bit, the US would graciously consent to enter into some sort of conversation about something other than the only issue which matters, the Hermit Kingdom's nuclear weapon development and procurement program.

Duh!

Rationality is the curse of the thinking class. Members of this august group are convinced that diplomacy is a supremely rational, ultimately logical endeavor. They are sincere believers in the proposition that coercion can be calibrated with a degree of precision such as to please the most exacting of experimental physicists. They are also blessed with a faith holding that all countries, all governments, share an identical calculus of rationality so every government will see and understand coercive measures in an identical manner and respond in a predictable way.

Diplomats of the US have had these touching articles of belief for generations now. Our faith in both gradualism and the identity of rationality has been proven wrong again and again, yet, with childlike certainty we use the same magic time after time.

Before we got involved in the shooting part of World War II, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, sought to use a carefully calibrated escalation of gradual economic sanctions to compel Imperial Japan to adjust its expansionist foreign policy in China to American policy requirements. Starting with a ban on the export of chopsticks (yes, kids, we were the OPEC of disposable eating utensils of this nature way back then) and proceeding by increments until a freezing of Japanese assets along with a total ban on the export of refined petroleum products was imposed in the summer of 1941, the US sought to coerce Japan into disgorging its conquests in China and abiding with American policy for the region.

The result of this carefully thought out exercise in rational pressure was the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Singapore. Most folks call this the start of WW II in the Pacific.

Twenty-five years later McGeorge Bundy, LBJ's National Security Advisor, used a calibrated campaign of rational coercion on North Vietnam. The Air Force called it Operation Rolling Thunder while Mr Bundy called it "progressive squeeze and talk." The idea was the US would increase the amount of "punishment" inflicted on North Vietnam for a bit and then would stop, stand back and inquire of Hanoi, "Are you ready to talk yet?"

As LBJ feared, the North Vietnamese matched us escalation for escalation. Each increase in bombing was followed by an increase of North Vietnamese presence in the war in the South. Each pause or hint of a pause was ignored by Hanoi particularly as the Northern leadership discovered that their population had the political will to resist and that bombing caused loathing of those who dropped the bombs not those who refused to talk.

As had been the case with the non-lethal coercion of twenty-five years earlier, the lethal sort engaged in by the ever-so-rational McGeorge Bundy proved to be an expensive and quite counterproductive failure. Of course, we didn't learn the limits of rational gradualism. Nor did we realize that not all governments have the same calculus of rationality or the same view of coercion.

After all we tried the same incremental approaches with respect to Panama in the late 1980s and Iraq in the aftermath of the Kuwait War. In both cases we finally concluded that there was no viable option other than waging aggressive, regime change oriented war.

The US in common with all democracies is very reluctant to go to war. Pace, progressives and other folks of the Left, but the US is quite loath to seek war, even to accept it as a viable, least-worst option. Other advanced, democratic countries see life in the same way with the result that there exists a conspiracy of diplomatic rationality.

The "conspiracy" seeks first, last, and always to employ non-lethal coercive mechanisms to persuade governments to come to the negotiating table and bargain in good faith to reach a compromise on some policy feature or another. Matters become more complicated when the members of the "conspiracy" attempt to reach agreement on the means and extent of any contemplated exercise in coercion by consensus.

The demand for consensus requires all parties to delicately balance domestic interests with foreign policy needs and interests. It also requires an equally difficult balance between short-term interests and those of a long-term nature.

Rendering effective consensus impossible is the necessity of involving countries which are either or both authoritarian and intensely self-interested. To put the matter short and sour, the necessity of achieving a consensus based understanding about coercive means and their extent with countries such as China or Russia makes the imposition of effective coercion impossible.

Even among democratic countries with more or less free enterprise economies, the need for consensus acts to insure that any and all coercive mechanisms are incremental in both design and implementation. This means in turn that the target country has ample time and warning to take measures intended to nullify the coercive intent.

The result is self-evident with respect to both Iran and North Korea. Consensus based incremental coercion be it diplomatic or economic in orientation may retard an obnoxious policy, impair an objectionable course of action, but it will not have significant effect. It will not end the policy or course of action which called the coercion into application.

Diplomatic coercion (aka "isolation") or economic coercion (aka "sanctions") must be applied swiftly and at the maximum rather than the minimum end of the scale if it is to be effective. More disturbingly to those who worship at the alter of "peace" in the temple of the "global community," diplomatic and economic coercion must reside ultimately on the credible will and capacity to employ military force in support of policy.

Coercive diplomacy in all its many forms is the effort to create an artificial coincidence of national interest. The target state seeks to end the coercion; the country or countries inflicting the coercion seek an end to a specific policy or course of action. Herein resides the coinciding national interests.

The US has violated most if not all the rules seen historically for the use of coercion in its policy toward North Korea over the past two decades. Any and all diplomatic and economic coercion has been applied through consensus approved incrementalism. As a result the effects in terms of altering North Korean behavior have been nil. The role played by China over the years has been instrumental in assuring the failure to date.

As the role of China is most unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, there is no reason to conclude any new coercion will prove effective. Even the unexpectedly muscular posture adopted by the US in its naval and military exercises with South Korea have not served to convince the Trolls of Beijing to adopt a more favorable (from the American perspective) stance.

Since South Korea has too much at risk, the use of military force is not a realistic option. In its occasional moments of lucidity, the Hermits of Pyongyang undoubtedly understand this. They also know that North Korea is too important as a physical and political buffer for China to allow the Pyongyang regime to go down the tubes.

It is quite legitimate for the Hermits of the North to conclude they can ignore the huffings and puffings of the US with impunity. Similarly, they can ignore any sweet words, mellow mood music, or blandishments Washington might say, play, or offer.

In short, the US has nothing to talk about with Pyongyang. We should save our effort. With respect to coercion, well, there is more we can do to make life unpleasant for the Hermits--if we are willing to inflict further misery on the population generally. Of course, that sort of thing would be anathema to the current administration.

The takeaway is simple and unpleasant for Uncle Sam's ego. The Pissants of Pyongyang can and will go their own way without the let or hindrance of the US. They will continue to be an annoying and potentially quite dangerous annoyance, but there is nothing the US can do about it realistically.

Sure, it is a diplomatic bramble but there is no choice beyond getting a grip on it.

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