In the past few days the Lebanese crank has been turned not once, but several times. The most dramatic of these actions was the fatal shooting of an IDF reserve colonel overseeing a brush clearing operation on Israel's side of the border. In the resulting firefight another Israeli officer was wounded and a Lebanese troop or two killed, as was a reporter for Hezbollah's television station on hand to document the fun and games.
The presence of the journalist and an accompanying cameraman suggests the Lebanese forces had planned the action. Given the close--dare one write, "intimate?"--ties between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah as well as the fact that Hezbollah is a fully functioning component of the government of Lebanon (GOL), it is highly probable that not only was the outrage planned but also approved at a high level in both the LAF and GOL.
One result of the unprovoked, unjustified sniper fire has been a (temporary perhaps) cessation of American military assistance to the LAF. The initial move to halt the flow of already programmed assistance was taken by the chairs of the relevant subcommittee and full House Foreign Affairs committee. But, there is support in Congress for a more extensive block on aid.
The State Department is, unsurprisingly, pushing back on the hold. State has grounds for concern. GOL has taken the expectable position of rejecting any US aid that comes with any appended conditions. In a move equally devoid of drama or shock value, the Iranian government has offered any and all necessary assistance to assure Lebanon's territorial integrity against "Zionist" aggression.
It is the second factor which rubs State's fur the wrong way, of course. The folks in Foggy Bottom and, presumably, the Pentagon hold some faith in the proposition that US aid to LAF will bring some influence upon the Lebanese military and government in its train.
Duh!
These people must be either off their meds or know a dealer handling truly righteous stuff actually to believe that a few hundred million bucks worth of obsolescent gear will somehow, someway, offset the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon or the capacity of Iran to wag the Lebanese dog's tail whenever and to whatever degree Tehran believes indicated. Hezbollah has an effective veto power over GOL even without resorting to force. It controls vital ministries including the one dealing with foreign affairs.
Need more be known?
The potency of Hezbollah as well as GOL's subservience was highlighted in a speech by Hezbollah capo, Hassan Nasrallah, in which the cleric accused Israel of being behind the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, whose son is the current incumbent. The "evidence" offered by Nasrallah was a risible pastiche of intercepted non-encrypted imagery transmissions from Israel UAVs of a decade ago and allegations of sinister Israeli spies littering the Lebanese landscape.
The Lebanese government, which should have been insulted by Nasrallah's speech, said nothing. The current prime minister was seemingly in agreement, if not with the speech, then with the goal toward which Nasrallah's speech was directed--the ending of the UN investigation which was aimed evermore closely at Hezbollah.
After a disastrous false start lamentably supported by the George W. Bush administration in which the UN created tribunal sought to pin the tail of blame on Syria, the investigation finally got back on course. This course led directly to Hezbollah as the agent of death. This, in turn, implies Tehran knew and at least tacitly approved of the killing.
The takeaway is simple: Neither Hezbollah nor Lebanon, nor, for that matter, Iran, can tolerate any imputation of responsibility for the death of Hariri, senior, a very popular and effective politician who had a unique ability to straddle the several competing religious communities which comprise Lebanon. Any odor of culpability would fracture the tenuous stability which has taken root in the past couple of years.
Fracturing Lebanon would immediately and drastically reduce the value of both Hezbollah and Lebanon as the means and venue for diverting Israel from going after the Iranian nuke plants. That would be a major no-no from the perspective of Tehran.
The need to preclude Israel from using its military muscle has become more critical to the mullahs and their stooges. This fact has been bought front and center in an article in the Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg. In this apparently well researched and evidently well reasoned piece, the writer comes to a stark conclusion--Israel will go it alone if necessary by next July at the latest to abate the Iranian nuclear threat. That is, of course, barring the success of other, less robust means.
Iran is long, very long in bluster, threats and photo-op weapons. Its actual capacity to defend against advanced air and missile delivered munitions is far more questionable. Against an American attack Iran is virtually defenseless. Against an Israeli attack the same may well be the case.
While Tehran is secure against any American threat given the tone and character of the current president, the mullahs cannot be so sanguine regarding Israel. The latter country perceives correctly that a nuclear armed Iran is not simply a game changer but a very real threat to the lives of thousands of its citizens.
As a consequence, the imperative to deter Israel through a diversionary effort looms large in the calculations of the Iranian leadership. The best opportunity for doing this given the current state of global affairs and perceptions within the elites of the West is by way of Lebanon. One more round of warfare between Israel and Lebanon (read Hezbollah) would defang Israel for months, perhaps years.
That would be the equivalent of victory for the mullahs. It would be the same for the legions of people in the Arab street who see Iran as no threat and Israel as the biggest bully in the world.
The upshot of this concatenation of considerations is simply that the ball is back in Obama's court. Unfortunately, it is most probable that the b-ball playing president will muff his shot.
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