Both have been expensive in lives lost. Both have been inconclusive to date. Both, but more importantly the one in the South, are on the brink of renewal.
At the same time the central government, the Muslim one in Khartoum under the unpleasant leadership of a born-again proponent of violent political Islam, Omar al-Bashir, is not given to compromise with US policy requirements. Nor is the indicted war criminal inclined to renounce violence either "official" or through the use of informal mechanisms resembling the pogroms of Imperial Russia.
Khartoum has much at stake. The territorial integrity of Africa's largest country is at risk, quite explicit risk given the referendum scheduled under the 2005 truce deal brokered by the Bush/Cheney administration. Also at great risk is the future of the oil rich land surrounding the city of Abyei and extending into the South.
The referendum on the status of the South is currently scheduled for January 2011. A second vote is to be held on the Abyei question. There is no doubt but the Black African population of the South will vote for independence. Not surprisingly the Arab Muslim North will take the opposite position.
A vote for succession in highest probability will restart the southern insurgency. It will be every bit as bloody and destructive as the the twenty-one years of fighting which ended with the truce. Too much is in play to allow either side to settle for much less than a total victory, a victory which will give the winner all or the vast majority of the cash flow from the extensive oil deposits.
Even without the enormous cash cow mooing away under the sands of the South, the legacy of the first round of insurgency as well as the generations of antipathy which preceded 1984 would be enough to assure an internal war viewed by both North and South as a total war of national survival. The long-standing animus held by Arab Muslim for African Christian or animist is returned measure for measure. That enough insures any future war will be fought without any restraint.
The passions both North and South are deep, hot, and sufficient to power Sudan into a condition tantamount to Somalia. That potential is more than enough to bring many a night without sleep to the Deep Thinkers responsible for US policy in the area.
The policies adopted and actions taken by outside powers have done nothing to facilitate a negotiated end to the brewing war. The indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court was notably ill-considered. This action provided instant support for Bashir by the majority of African states whose collective political leadership has come to conclude (with some justice) that the ICC singles out African rulers for unique attention. At the same time the indictment provided the Organization of the Islamic Conference and even the Arab League to rally around Bashir's flag.
No matter how distasteful any governmental figure in any member state of these several organizations might find Bashir and his government, the identity politics so central to each group demands solidarity in the face of "Western" threat. Beyond providing a diplomatic prop for the odious Omar, the support given him by these three international entities constitute a potent antidote to foreign pressure on Khartoum.
Not that the outsiders have much more potential pressure points at their disposal. As all American policy makers holding a brief for Sudan must recognize full well, Sudan is under sanctions equivalent to those applied to Iran or North Korea. This means there ain't a whole lot of options for those who believe against all odds in the efficacy of sanctions.
The only set of divisions rivaling those in Sudan are the splits in the Heavyweight Strategists of Team Obama. While Mr Obama has been concerned with the important matters such as where to take the next family vacation and Ms Clinton worried over how to pin the human rights violator's tail on the UN Human Rights Council donkey, the Sudan policy questions have been handed over to the bench.
The polar opposites on the bench are Susan Rice, the UN Ambassador, and J. Scott Gration, Mr Obama's Special Envoy. These two can agree on only one basic premise: Sudan is a mess and likely to get worse.
The opposing views of Ms Rice and Mr Gration were painted over last October when the administration after months of gestation and labor delivered itself of a non-policy policy. Depending upon whether or not the Sudanese government(s) met or did not meet specified milestones, the defaulter(s) would either be rewarded or punished.
"Duh" doesn't adequately cover the rational response to this monumental effort in diplomatic genius.
Ms Rice has been possessed of a deep, visceral distaste for the Bashir regime since she personally witnessed some of the consequences of Khartoum's version of counterinsurgency in Darfur. There can be little doubt but she favors "punishment," preferably of the sort awarded to Saddam Hussein.
Mr Gration for reasons which he has not articulated in a convincing way advocates a policy of "rewards." He is all for providing incentives to Khartoum. The nature of the incentives as well as the intended results are less than clear.
In the field Joe Biden has been doing what passes for heavy lifting. He has met with Silva Kiir the Honcho of All Honchos in South Sudan. Mr Kiir is all in favor of (a) peace, (b) independence and (c) the US doing "something." Joe I-Am-Too-An-Adult Biden also achieved a breakthrough of world historical importance in that he gained the support of Egypt for the referendum.
Not that Egypt hauls much freight in Khartoum. (What freight Cairo might haul is contained in the escalating dispute between Egypt and Sudan over water, the all-important water of the Nile.)
China hauls beaucoup more freight with Bashir (and Kiir.) Chinese influence in the two Sudans is predicated upon Chinese national interest. Specifically, the same interest which has occasioned Beijing's large position in Iran--the need for secure, long term oil supplies preferably at below world market prices.
The president apparently understands China's pivotal position in each of the two Sudans. He raised the issue of the referendum in his bilateral meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao. Their meeting was polite and the Troll From Beijing noncommittal. It was rather the same as the conversations the two men have had regarding Iran.
No matter how events play out in Sudan, the Trolls have covered their bets. Also it can be assumed the Chinese will throw decisive weight behind the contender providing the better deal.
Mr Obama also attended a meeting between his National Security Advisor, Gen. James Jones USMC (ret), and former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who has been designated as the main man for implementing the results of the referendum. (Of course, for Mr Mbeki to be a player, the referendum must come to pass and the results not attended by overwhelming violence, but it seems Mr Obama is a perpetual optimist.)
It's a bit of a poser. The US and other Western countries have very little left in the sanctions area. The US and other Western countries have very little if any influence. While the subject of inducements is open, the only one likely to have a positive impact on Khartoum would be a quashing of the ICC indictment with guarantees it would not be reissued at some convenient future date.
This option would not prove popular with many countries of the EU where the abstract of "justice" has more potency than the avoidance of one more spectacle of African blood letting. (It probably would be no more popular with the American president considering his touching faith in equal justice under law in the international arena.)
There is no realistic way the administration might hope to play a "China card" as Beijing has no compelling reason to play a constructive role in the situation. Their interests are already covered, and the Trolls of Beijing have a well-founded belief in the competence of their intelligence and foreign services to know the right moment to make a move and the right move to make.
In principle one option is left by apparent default. This would be the Rice-favored Adventure in Regime Change. Real world constraints of a self-evident nature confine this option to the realm of the hypothetical.
In any even the administration has about a month, maybe two at a stretch, if there is going to be even a remote chance of the independence referendum being held early next year. Forget January. But, unless the Southerners have a firm belief the referendum will take place before the long, hot days of summer, the insurgency may start without delay.
A policy must be in place before the votes are counted here if there are going to be any votes to count in Sudan. Then, unless the policy can (a) defang Bashir, (b) assure with credible guarantees Southern independence, (c) demarcate the border in an agreeable way, (d) divide oil revenues in a way seen by both North and South as equitable, (e) provide a way to prevent the Darfur conflict from spreading, and (f) create an effective way to police and neutralize the border between North and South, the war will crank back up anyway.
Then, Sudan will become a blood soaked geographical expression rather resembling Somalia on a far grander scale. At this point al-Qaeda and other proponents of violent political Islam can genuflect deeply, bounce their foreheads on the mosque floor, and give heartfelt thanks to a most merciful and compassionate Allah for providing a new and improved base in their effort to bring "peace to the "House of War."
Ain't that a wonderful picture?
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