This time the secretary was on CNN responding to the WikiLeaks "revelations," particularly those dealing with the collaboration between the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Taliban. Predictably, he did play down the current closeness between ISI and the insurgents. As a needed balance he did bring the historical dimension of that cooperation into sharp focus. In this he is unique among the flurry of pontification, viewing-with-alarm, and all around hand-wringing which has characterized both politicians and the mainstream media.
Gates said, " we walked out on Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 and left them basically holding the bag. And there is always the fear that we will do that again. And I believe that's the reason there's a certain hedge." The Geek can say only, "Amen." (Of course, with his usual modesty the Geek points out that he has made the same point several times in posts over the past three years.)
The unthinking way in which the administrations of both Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush walked away from the morass in Afghanistan not only "left them basically holding the bag" but paved the way for the emergence of Taliban. The senior decision makers of both administrations were warned in a timely manner as to the dangers of handing the Afghan brief over to Islamabad generally and the ISI particularly. But the warnings came from people far down the food chain in the bureaucracies in Langley, Foggy Bottom, and the Pentagon. And, the folks topside had bigger fish to fry as well as a very short term view of the future.
In recent years the short-term vision of the Reagan and H.W. Bush days has been mirrored by the short memories of the W. Bush and Obama administrations. The people breathing the rarefied air around the Oval (as well as journalists and politicians generally) have forgotten the experiences of our earlier activities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This statement presupposes that the minds of today have ever been cluttered by any knowledge of the past, even the very recent and quite critical past.)
When the Americans went to Afghanistan nine plus years ago, their plans were in no way based upon the vast experience collected during the long years of the anti-Soviet proxy war or the years of Pakistani-Taliban collaboration which followed. It is was this willful and easily cured ignorance which both allowed and encouraged the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld bunch to fail to properly define the goal of the invasion as being purely punitive. Or, to use the less offensive term invented during the Obama administration, "counter-terrorism."
Rather than putting the most narrow focus on the goal of the invasion, the W. Bush administration opted for a hazy and attractive view of somehow building a modern Western style nation-state in the rocky and sterile soil of Afghanistan. At the same time neocon ninnies of the Bush/Cheney days were scared silly by the prospect of somehow angering, alienating, even slightly annoying the military junta which ran Pakistan.
As a result the Americans stood by as the ISI assisted any number of Taliban and al-Qaeda heavyweights to flee the new boots on the ground for the hospitable lands of the FATA--and Pakistan proper. This gross blunder assured that two unpleasant realities would come to pass in the fullness of time. Taliban along with the Haqqani network and other, smaller adherents of armed political Islam would recover their strength; ISI and other components of the Pakistani military and government would continue to provide support and assistance.
When Taliban and the others were ready, they returned to the fight in Afghanistan. The reentry was done with the full support of ISI and understanding of other parts of the Pakistani military and government. There is no doubt but ISI and others depended upon two eventualities coming to pass so as to secure Pakistani goals and reduce any risks to Islamabad.
The first of this was the existence within the US of sufficient war weariness to limit the American will and capacity to counter the new, stronger Taliban. Along with this, the planners of ISI assumed the armed political Islamists of Taliban, et al would be focused sufficiently upon gaining victory in Afghanistan to be willing to refrain from attacks against Pakistan.
In both assumptions ISI was proven wrong. To their consternation, the new, ever-so-peaceful, ever-ready-to-reach-out President Obama was willing to take the risk of sending more troops as well as a competent commander to Afghanistan. And, the LeT was quite willing and able to present an existential challenge to Islamabad in the FATA and elsewhere.
In response to the (unplanned for if not completely unexpected) ramping up of the Islamist political challenge as well as the violence which accompanied it, the government and armed forces of Pakistan had no choice but to wage war against LeT and other groups. The campaigns in Swat and portions of the FATA have been slow motion, fought primarily by the second string of paramilitary forces or the low risk, low effectiveness means of air and artillery strikes and have been conducted in a way assuring minimum losses to the "bad guys," particularly the command echelons.
The Pakistanis have been somewhat more forthcoming in assistance to the US in its conduct of the Predator targeted killing program. The actionable intelligence flow has increased along with the tempo of Predator operations. This has benefited the Pakistanis by eliminating key hostile personnel without any political risk.
If the remarks of Secretary Gates regarding the improvement in Pakistani cooperation are restricted to this area, they are completely correct. At the same time it is critical to note that the collaboration of Islamabad in such matters as impairing the Haqqani network have remained unchanged month to month for years now.
The mention of targeted killings opens the door to the question of just which strategy is the US now following in Afghanistan--counterinsurgency with nation-building or a punitive counter-terrorism approach? At root this constitutes a distinction without a difference. However, since there are some contemporary Great Captains such as Vice-president Joe Biden and the New York Times for which it is critical, a general comment is required.
Both Joe (If-I-Feel-It-I-Say-It) Biden and the NYT are of the view that targeted killing is the hallmark of punitive counter-terrorism but is totally unsuited to counterinsurgency. The V-P and the NYT see the recent higher volume use of both air and ground strikes against identified commanders of Taliban and other groups as being the refutation of the protect the civilians emphasis of General McChrystal.
They are as wrong as a soup sandwich. Organizational disruption is equally important in a genuine counterinsurgent strategy as it is in a pure effort at counter-terrorism. Any success in a counterinsurgent effort requires mobilizing support from the uncommitted majority of the civilian population to the government at the expense of the insurgent. Any success in a counter-insurgent campaign also demands a progressive reduction of the organizational coherence of the insurgents.
In short, successful counterinsurgency requires protecting those who need protection, converting the insurgents who are open to conversion, and killing those insurgents who are immune to any compromise, any power sharing agreement, any alternative less than total victory. For the hard core leadership of Taliban et al, the war is existential in nature. This means they must be killed. Period.
When a commando team on the ground or a UAV delivered Hellfire kills a Taliban heavyweight, it is both a success in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. Killing these people is both a necessity and a good thing. Period.
The difference between punitive oriented counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency comes in the other measures taken. Insofar as an emphasis is placed upon all the areas falling under the rubric "nation-building" the outside intervenor as well as the host government is waging a counterinsurgent effort.
The nature of the human terrain in Afghanistan militates against nation-building if such is defined as the creation of a Western style nation-state in Afghanistan. This reality does not allow the US and its partners an easy way out however. The domestic political realities as well as the mindset of American and Western European elites will not allow a simple refocus on the eminently realistic policy of punitively oriented counter-terrorism.
It is necessary for reasons endemic to the politics and values of the West to make a good show of nation-building in Afghanistan even if such provides an endstate far less than wished. There is no way in which most Western elitfes would be satisfied if, when the shooting stops, Afghanistan is a medieval feudal theocracy--even if that is precisely what most Afghans are most comfortable with.
The next time Secretary Gates is on TV it would be nice if he could turn his highly realistic and vastly experienced brain loose on that matter. On the matter of explaining just why there can be no nation-building possible in Afghanistan without a severe redefinition of the term.
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