Afghanistan Goes Down The Tube--So What?

The Geek has never been a fan of our effort in Afghanistan. As outlined in post over a year ago, the American (read neocon ninnie) defined and driven mission of nation building in that loose assemblage of tribes was both idiotic and totally unnecessary. It was a mission almost certainly doomed to fail.

Afghanistan is a geographic expression. It is not a modern nation-state in the making. To put a long and complex history in one short, blunt and harsh statement: Afghanistan is and always has been a congeries of differing ethno-linguistic groups welded into a semi-coherent whole only during brief periods of either external invasion or a remarkably potent ruler.

Even during the Soviet invasion and occupation, the unity of the Afghan "nation" was conspicuous by its absence. The deep factionation allowed both the US proxy war to be effective and the Pakistani sponsored Taliban to finally seize power after the Soviet defeat.

Against this background--which was well known to any and all who had access to a library of more than minimal holdings--it is impossible to credit the war planners in Washington with even the most minimal grip on reality.

The ideological fanatics of the neocon ninnie core within the current administration might have seen the Afghanistan operation as an unwelcome diversion on the road to Baghdad. But, they also saw it as an excellent and low risk way to demonstrate the sovereign efficacy of "shock and awe" in jump-starting the process of building a Western style democracy.

Of course, We the People--or at least the High Minded in our midst--would never have accepted quietly the rational choice for us in Afghanistan. The outrage which would have followed the mounting of an "old fashioned" punitive operation aimed at killing or capturing as many of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and shooters as possible and getting out as fast as possible after bouncing the rubble would have been heard from here to Mars and back.

Oh, well. Reality is an elusive commodity for the ideologically pure whether neocon or High Minded.

The misleading appearance of quick victory over the rag-tag forces of Taliban and al-Qaeda resulted inexorably in leaving behind an insufficient number of boots on the ground to finish the job. It also assured that the US and its junior partners would hoist an inept government equipped with a foreign made constitution into some semblance of power--or at least de jure existence.

Then, marching off for our Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq, the neocon ninnies waved over their shoulders in the general direction of Afghanistan. Sure, the US bribed Pakistan with ten gigabucks of military aid focusing on big-ticket systems. And, we brought in brigades of civilian contractors with supposedly requisite "expertise" in creating a liberal, pluralistic, secular democracy and free-market economy.

Repeat after the Geek, "What meds were they taking in DC? Hallucinogens?"

If the lads and lassies in the current administration were on 'shrooms or acid, they (and the rest of us) went on a very bad trip.

The bitch is that the trip was eminently predictable both as to its bad nature and its overall direction. The direction labeled "defeat."

More than three years ago the resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda in the border region of Pakistan's FATA was evident. More than evident, it was glaring.

Also glaring was the decrease in both perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the Pakistani military dictatorship. No amount of cosmetics could conceal the failure of Musharraf and his regime to address either the recovery of Taliban and al-Qaeda in the FATA or the rapidly blooming Islamist presence and militancy within Pakistan.

With seemingly willful obtuseness, the neocon ninnies and their president ignored the unpleasant and growingly obvious reality in Afghanistan. They probably believed they had no choice. Events in Iraq were far more alarming and far more attractive for the media. And, Iraq had always been the Show as far as the neocons were concerned.

We surged to Iraq while pretending that everything was perfect and getting better in Afghanistan. Whoopie! We can "win" the big one even if it means losing the little one.

At least the surge assure that the US would accomplish a minimum strategic goal in Iraq. The goal which the Geek terms the third option--"not-losing."

Now the question before us is simple to ask and hard to answer. Can the US and its allies accomplish the same minimum strategic goal in Afghanistan? Can we "not-lose?"

The signs are mixed, but essentially pointed in a negative direction.

The positive indicators are few.

They include the Pakistani offensive in the FATA. If pursued the offensive might spell long-term organisational perturbation for the black turbans. The question of whether the current government of Pakistan can continue the pressure long enough to prove effective is open.

The increase in US combat troops is a necessary first step. The number of new boots is nowhere near enough, but it is a start. No matter how effective the Predator strikes on Taliban/al-Qaeda sites in the FATA might be, they are no substitute for the persistent presence of troops on the ground.

Of course, given the forthcoming election and the striking ignorance of both major candidates regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, the political will of the US to continue and enlarge its effort is in doubt. Adding to the uncertainty is the effect of the present global economic collapse on the capacity of the US to continue its effort in Afghanistan.

The recent decision by US commanders in-country to work directly with tribal militias is perhaps the most favorable indicator. Afghanistan is not a nation. It is a collection of tribes. Authority and loyalty exist at the tribal not the "national" level.

However, this action may be five or six years too late. Only time will tell. And, that time may well not exist,

A meaningless indicator is the recent decision by NATO to allow and encourage its member states with troops in Afghanistan to attack the opium producers and morphine base refiners. True, some ninety percent of the world's heroin originates in Afghanistan and the black turbans get perhaps eighty megabucks from the trade. Sure, the opium traffic fuels the pervasive and growing corruption in the already less-than-liked Karzai ethnic minority government.

But, the probability of NATO member forces in-county being able to effectively erode the widespread cultivation of opium is minimal. It looks to be one of those all-too-familiar drug cultivation scenarios: one acre eradicated and two acres planted

The negative indicators are several.

Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan is growing in numbers, combat capacities and firepower. There is no rapid end in sight for this trajectory.

Within Afganistan, the Karzai government is held in near universal disapproval. The corruption of the regime is increasing, which will drive more disapproval.

Without foreign stiffening and support, the Afghan National Army would collapse in a light wind.
Afghans are good and enthusiastic fighters--when they have a reason, a cause they believe in. At bottom the ANA is less important than the tribal militias. But, for the moment the Afghan Army is all we have as a credible indigenous force.

There are other negatives but these are the big two. In short, there are no inherently legitimate national entities. This gives the field to the Taliban.

The folks in the middle--the uncommitted majority--want peace. They want their own culture, religion and all. The foreigners and their strange ideas as well as their aircraft, bombs, shells and ever present soldiers are no longer welcome.

If the outsiders had brought peace and stability in their wake, that would be different. However, they didn't.

Taliban promises peace. It promises order. It promises the indigenous norms, values and culture will be undisturbed.

This gives Taliban the color of legitimacy. For the outsiders, Taliban may mean medieval views, medieval law and punishment. It may mean to us the return of repression which we find totally unacceptable.

Peace may come at a high price. But, to those who live in the midst of war day after bloody day for year after groaning year, the price is worth it.

The price of peace might be high for the Afghans. The price of peace will be much higher for the US if it comes without the accomplishment of the minimum goal of "not-losing."

A perceived defeat of the US and its allies will have profound and negative ramifications. The least and most obvious of these will be a strengthening of the militant Islamists who wish us nothing but ill.

In so far as we are seen to lose, the Islamist based terror groups and sponsoring regimes are seen to win. That is a very high price.

But, not the only one.