It's Time To Snarl--Not Whimper--At North Korea

And, while we are at it, do a little fang-baring at the PRC.

The stakes are high. Specifically, the continuation of North Korea's role as the leading nuclear proliferator on the planet.

And, the (to use an old Soviet term) the correlation of forces favors the US.

"But, wait," you insist, "North Korea has blinked on the plutonium production and our current administration has taken it off the terrorism sponsorship list."

The Geek allows as how your observations are correct. They are, however, to an important extent meaningless. Let's walk through the rest of the matter.

The agreement as it presently stands does not cover the North Korean uranium enrichment program. This is the same kind of centrifuge based excursion into fissionable materials productions which has the US so exercised against Iran.

The agreement does not adequately address technology transfer. The same applies to the thirty kilos of Pu239 which the North Koreans admit (privately to the PRC) having on hand. Debate exists as to whether or not independent auditors can accurately confirm the amount of plutonium produced by the North.

Then there are a set of contextual factors. North Korea is dead broke. For the third straight year the North's economy has sunk. Once again a goodly chunk of its population faces famine. The bad economic conditions have not yet impaired the NKPA or its ability to wage destructive even if ultimately suicidal war against the South. Finally, there is the question of Kim Jong Il's health. Recent reports from Japan state the 66 year old Dear Leader is still in the hospital and not a good life insurance risk.

Time to take a dekko at the correlation of forces.

Up until roughly two years ago the governments of both South Korea and Japan were inclined to an accomodationist posture with the Hermit Kingdom of the North. Now the governments of both countries are headed by men quite disinclined to embrace policies smacking of appeasement.

The only regional player that is inclined to give support or cover to the North Koreans is the PRC. There are several factors contributing to this stance.

One, perhaps the most important, is the Chinese government's conviction that it is the regional hegemon. Providing cover or running interference on behalf of the North is a component of flexing hegemonic muscles against rivals such as Japan. It is also a way of gaining bargaining leverage against the US regarding the status of Taiwan.

(In conjunction with this final consideration, keep in mind just how annoyed Beijing is with the US over the recent sales of military equipment to Taiwan.)

Then there is the consideration of North Korea's potential future utility. A potent, but not too potent North might some day be able to establish a political relationship with the South which would amount to de facto if not de jure reunification under the North's leadership. This possibility, no matter how remote, is appealing to Beijing. (It would be a relatively easy matter to take a reunified Korea, notionally governed from the North, under Chinese "protection.")

Finally there is the matter of emotion. While it is common to see the men of Beijing as remote, calculating and preternaturally rational actors in self-interest, that one dimensional view does little justice to reality.

The PRC took horrendous losses during the Korean War. Both North Korea and PRC are at least nominally "Communist." In a real sense the Korean War was the time when the Communist regime both firmly established its grip on power and created a national army from the earlier communist cadre. There is a lot of history, a lot of emotional attachment there. It should never be overlooked or underrated.

A little history is in order. Death has played a crucial role in diplomacy between North Korea and its assorted interlocutors. The death of Joe Stalin was pivotal in achieving the 1953 armistice. Fourteen years ago the death of Kim Il Sung was a central factor in the Agreed Framework talks.

If the Dear Leader is as far along the road to the grave as many indications hint, the time may be ripe to practice some coercive diplomacy. Admittedly, such a course would be risky given the nature, character and belligerence of the NKPA command echelon.

The counter is simple: Is it less risky to allow the North to put some Pu239 on the market? Is it more prudent to let the North go ahead with uranium enrichment?

Coercive American diplomacy should--must--focus on the PRC. Even though the Chinese government holds vast supplies of dollar denominated debt instruments and, in principle, has the capacity to commit economic mischief on a large scale, the current global recession militates against this sort of response.

The global recession also means that right now and for some months if not years to come the PRC needs us a lot more than we need them. We are the largest market for Chinese manufactured goods (thanks Walmart.) Any slowing of the US consumption of these Made in China products will cause PRC more than a little discomfort.

China needs access to US origin technology. We have little if any need to provide it without appropriate compensation. (No. The Geek does not mean more money for Boeing or Raytheon.)

The US need only employ normal bureaucratic techniques to inflict severe economic pain on PRC. A "work-to-rules" approach to trade, technology transfer and financial interchange would be sufficient. At the same time, a strict and rigorous application of all relevant rules would not give the PRC a cause to take to the WTO.

Then, leave it to Beijing to put the screws to the North Koreans. They are already in a position to do some creative rattling of sabers given the recent increase of PLA deployments to the border region.

The North Koreans may be rude, obnoxious and rhetorically aggressive, but they are still quite rational. Why else the recent expatriation of funds to friendly and close-mouthed bankers in small European states?