H.W. Bush Created A Test--And Flunked It

As posted previously, presidents are more often than not faced by unanticipated tests thrown in their faces by the dynamics of global politics--not necessarily the machinations of persons of evil intent. On occasion presidents become essential co-conspirators in the making of the test.

An excellent example of this is LBJ and the decision to escalate the US involvement in the Vietnamese War. He did this by authorizing Operation Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against North Vietnam.

There was no need for the operation. Intelligence had shown clearly that the flow of weapons and other materiel from North to South was of no moment to the Viet Cong capacity and will to conduct offensive operations successfully. Intelligence also demonstrated clearly that there were no US national or strategic interests at stake in the region. Indeed, the often cited "Domino Theory" had been shown to have no basis.

The air campaign had two easily foreseen if unintended consequences.

The first, in the words of a perceptive historian of the period was, "In an effort to end a problem which did not exist--infiltration of men and supplies from North to South, the US created a problem which could not be solved--the infiltration of men and supplies North to South."

The second effect of Operation Rolling Thunder was the investment of American political prestige and potency. Air operations are not stealthy. They announce to the world that an area has become of great importance to the US. Thus the potential for de-commitment from the area is greatly impaired.

The continued deterioration of the military situation in South Vietnam left LBJ with a test. To cut our losses before they became politically and diplomatically unacceptable or to escalate the American commitment by introducing ground combat forces. The President opted for the latter.

The results we know. All too well.

George H.W. Bush was more than a co-conspirator in the greatest foreign policy test which he faced. Arguably, he created the test which he ultimately failed with consequences which remain with us today.

H. W. was not inexperienced in the summer of 1990. Rarely had a man come to the Oval with a more impressive resume. He had foreign policy experience out the ying-yang. He knew his way around the corridors of international politics well enough to navigate them blindfolded.

The President and the senior members of his administration that summer must have been aware of the long festering dispute between Iraq and Kuwait over the latter country's slant drilling under the hazily marked border and tapping oil reserves which Saddam Hussein believed in all sincerity were Iraqi. They must have been situationally aware regarding Iraq's need for money in the wake of the long and very costly war with Iran.

These two factors taken together strongly indicated that the new US ambassador to Iraq should receive very carefully drafted and detailed instructions on US policy regarding the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. Instead the instructions both written and oral were vague.

As a result Ms Glaspie conveyed the impression of US indifference to the manner in which Saddam solved his problem with Kuwait. The Iraqi dictator concluded that the US saw the problem as an Iraqi internal matter.

Saddam's conclusion was not irrational. Nor was it unjustified. He interpreted the American vagueness in an Iraqi historical context. This context defined Kuwait as a "lost" Iraqi province based upon the political nature of the Ottoman Empire and the consequences of the Franco-British dismantlement of that empire following WW I. The context also contained the recent US "tilt" toward Iraq during the recently concluded war with Iran.

In short, Saddam took the hazy American stance as an operational green light to seize Kuwait.

The posture of the Iraqi Army during and immediately after the crossing of the Kuwait border showed that there was no intention on the part of Baghdad to continue military operations into Saudi Arabia. The quick and decisive blitz of Kuwait was the limit of Saddam's ambitions.

Given the American surveillance and reconnaissance assets extent at the time there is no doubt that we were quite well apprised of the Iraqi intentions and capacities. This did not stop the Bush Administration from flatly lying to the Saudi regime regarding the threat to it.

The manufacturing of this "test" of US resolve and power projection capacity did not end with pouring duplicity upon the House of Saud in super-tanker quantities. The same sort of duplicity was poured all over the world as well as within the US.

Even a few months into the build-up phase of the war, the cynic (which is to say the realpolitik oriented historian) had the clear impression that the exercise had been intentional, provoked and desired. It was not a crisis forced upon the US and the world by the ambitions of a single dictator.

In short, the Gulf War was one that was wanted by Washington (and arguably a number of other capitals around the world.) A short, successful war against Iraq would serve long-term US policy interests such as assuring that no single state would have the potential to dominate the Persian Gulf region. A crippled Iraq would not pose a threat to the Gulf, the Mideast (read Israel) or the stability of regional oil production and prices.

As in a more recent US war in Iraq, the real failure of the test came the day after conventionally defined military victory had been achieved.

While we will not know until some day in the distant future when the relevant documents are finally declassified it may well be that the Deep Thinkers of H.W.'s administration didn't realise until the guns fell silent that Saddam would remain in power and Iraq would become the classic "wounded enemy." It may well be that not until the 100 hour blitz ended with worn machines and exhausted troops that unless one of two equally distasteful and risky actions were taken, the Saddamites would remain in power leaving us with a long duration, low-grade crisis.

As the war ended with US troops on the outskirts of Basra and dramatic pictures of the "Highway to Hell" on our television screens, the administration had to bite the cliched bullet. The guys in and around the Oval had three choices. They were all bad.

The first was to continue the war. Drive on to Baghdad. This would mean more time, more troops and, most compellingly, a hell of a lot more bodies in bags coming into Dover AFB. We knew from observing the Iran-Iraq War that the Iraqi Army had a great capacity for resistance. We also knew that the best components of the Iraqi Army had been withdrawn from harm's way in a prudent and timely fashion. It could be a long, long and very bloody slog.

The second choice was arming and equipping (and probably directly supporting) Shiite insurgents. This implied a strong possibility of inviting Iranian sub rosa elements into the affair. Any benefit to Iran would violate the US policy requirement of assuring no one state emerged paramount in the area. It would also mean having to somehow contain the obnoxious Tehran regime. Also implicit in the calculus was the probable impact upon Saudi Arabia of seeing Shiites gain bloody hegemony over the Sunni minority.

The third option was the one we took. Pressure intended to spark a military coup against the Saddamite regime. The third option marked the failure.

It is one thing to manufacture a "crisis." It is another to manipulate the outcome of the "crisis" so that a meaningful policy success is achieved.

The administration of H.W. Bush succeeded in creating a test for itself. It failed the test of its own making.

In so doing the father provided the ground for the son. W. Bush created a test with the invasion of Iraq, an invasion intended in pertinent part to finish the uncompleted work of H.W. Like the father, the son failed the test of his own devising.

The lessons from H.W.'s failure, from W.'s failure are the same as that of LBJ's failure. Before creating a "crisis" either in whole or in part (or for that matter responding to a genuine crisis) an administration must have both the wit and the will to do three things.

First, there must, absolutely must, be an awareness of the historical context in which one is and will be operating. This means an awareness of the history, both objective and subjective of the human terrain upon which we will be operating.

The second is to be fully attuned to the universality of the Law of Unintended Consequences. This can best be understood as being the full-bore application of Clausewitz's small caliber dictum "no plan survives first contact with the enemy."

Finally, when the use of military force is considered, an administration and its military commanders must focus not so much on the achievement of mere military victory. No. They have to focus on the days after the victory parade.

After all the purpose of war is to produce a better state of peace.