Edging Toward "Kill Or Be Killed"

The jolly maritime marauders of the Somali coast may have finally gone a skiff too far.  The wanton killing of four wrong-side-of-middle-age American yachters by a temporarily leaderless and faction riven clutch of Somali pirates might serve as a long overdue tipping point in the policy of the US and other countries regarding the self-proclaimed Somali "coast guard."

The deaths of the four Americans being held hostage on the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel Quest has provoked the inevitable insinuations of bungling by the American hostage negotiator, but when stripped to the essentials it was an act of brutality for which the Somali perpetrators alone are responsible.  Not even the squid ink spouted by the pirates to the effect that the US Navy fired first--a truly preposterous notion worthy of the mind of someone who has chewed too much khat--alters that.

At root the pirates blundered.  Once they saw that they were almost literally surrounded by combatant ships of the American navy, they must have known the gig was blown.  Instead of accepting the (overly) generous US offer of the Quest as theirs to take, of course leaving the hostages with the Navy, the chuckleheads turned out to be less than serious.  As the American negotiator, reportedly an experienced FBI man, realized he was dealing with an insincere duo he ordered them detained.  The pirates were advised to think the matter over.

Whatever passed for cognition among the Brave Muslim Raiders Of The Briney Deep resulted in two salient actions.  One of the pirates fired an RPG at the nearby frigate.  Others on the seized yacht started shooting.  Among those who stopped bullets with fatal result were the four Americans.  This gory and tragic part of the story was discovered by the SEAL boarding team which also terminally neutralized two overly zealous Somali "coastguards."

The thirteen surviving members of the once merry band of pirates joined their two fellows in enjoying the comforts of the brig on the aircraft carrier Enterprise which introduced them to their most probable future--sterile bulkheads and locked doors.  It also dropped the what-do-we-do-with-them problem in the lap of Attorney General Holder, a man who rather enjoys lecturing Americans on their "cowardice" more than he does enforcing the US Code.

It is not surprising that the Holder Department of Justice has taken a noncommittal "we are considering the options" stance regarding the inconvenient presence of the Somalis in American custody.  It is rather like the Holder view of members of the New Black Panther Party waving clubs in the faces of potential voters outside a Philadelphia polling place--a sort of  well-the-boys-were-just-acting-out-a-bit approach to clear cut violations of the law.

The immediate problem will be solved.  The Somalis will be prosecuted in an American court.  There is no other politically viable way to go.  The pirates had their chance to walk (or, more accurately, sail) away.  They failed to take it and must now take the consequences.

The immediate problem is, of course, the easy one.  Far more difficult is the larger one, the reality that the pirates of Somalia are not only still around but ranging ever farther afield.  More ships and more cargoes and more crew are at risk today than ever before.  This despite the large number of naval vessels from numerous countries dedicated to maintaining safety in the critical sealanes of the region.

The nature of Somalia as a mere geographic expression in which the pathetic excuse for a central government controls very little outside of its official buildings is not going to change in the near future.  The recent combined offensive by forces of the African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional National Government, and the Ethiopian army along with the militias currently fighting on the side of the government has not altered the balance of power in the venue nor extended stability more than a few blocks.

This means the Deep Thinkers who argue there is no solution to the pirate problem until Somalia once more has a stable, effective government are simply kicking the can down a long and dusty street.  As the pirate threat extends its shadow over more and more of the key routes to and from the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf, there is a very real menace to the global economic recovery.  Additionally, there is an object lesson to other advocates of violent political Islam including those in the environs of the Straits of Malacca showing the power of piracy to hobble the economies of the "infidels" and "apostates" around the world.

Taken in total there is only one response now available to any realistic government.  Actually, it is a response with several components.  The first is the creation of yet one more special international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of piracy.  The second is a prohibition of ransom payments by ship owners and others.  The third is the mandatory formation of convoys in the affected areas.  The final consists of the stationing of armed guards--preferably regularly organized units of national navies or marine forces--on board ships transiting the danger zone.

This combination would increase the costs of doing business while reducing the profit potential.  While there are alternatives such as armed guards with shoot-to-kill authority and immunity from liability in the (inevitable) incident of misidentification, these are less satisfactory than the full panoply of defensive measures.  Admittedly, there will be resistance to the prohibition of ransom payment, but that resistance can be overcome.  The same is true with respect to the use of deadly force by shipborne defense forces.

It does not good to excuse the piracy with smooth words about just how the poor Somalis have no chance for honest employment or the removal of some pirates will simply assure that new, younger, and more violent candidates will take their place.  Nor does the argument that any robust measures will place the lives of the several hundred hostages currently held in Somali ports at risk deserve genuflection.

The pirates have altered their behavior toward the hostages.  Reports of torture and threats have grown significantly in recent months.  The day will come soon when hostages are killed in exemplary fashion in order to force faster payment of larger ransoms.  The only way this can be defeated is to add a major raid with the objective of freeing as many of the present hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates as might be conveniently accomplished to the defensive mix.

"Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!" may have been a popular toast of two hundred years ago when the US faced the pirates of Tripoli.  It was true then.  It is true today.  The US eventually prevailed in the long and unpleasant war with the Bey of Tunis and others of his ilk back then.  The same may--indeed, must--be true today.

The stakes are higher than a mere cost add-on to international trade.  Lives are at risk as shown with the killing of the four Americans.  Beyond that, the pirates are a form of maritime jihadist whose acts can threaten the peaceful commerce of much of the world, a threat which can benefit only those who wish the West harm.

It is to be hoped most ardently that the current administration might take a firm grip on the realities of the world including the pirates and what they mean to the US and other civilized states.  While this hope may be pious given the record to date of the Obama administration, the reality is too dark to admit of being passed on down the line in the hope that a more reality oriented and more robustly minded president may be in the Oval two years hence.