Head Busting Time In Bahrain

The demos in Bahrain not only are different in thrust and goals from those in other Arab states, they present the Obama administration with a degree of diplomatic difficulty surpassing that contained in the Egyptian conundrum.  The situation in Bahrain, both demographic and political as well as the diplomatic context, constitutes a genuine one-off problem which only superficially resembles what has or will  happen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, or Iran.

The fundamental dynamic in Bahrain is sectarian.  The overwhelming majority of the native population of the micro-state is Shiite.  The ruling elite (and the individuals imported from other countries including those in Asia to act as security personnel) are Sunni.  The Shiite majority claims with a high degree of documentable accuracy to have suffered discrimination both political and economic.

The government--a monarchy with some very limited features of constitutionality--not only denies the charges of discrimination but counters with accusations of Iranian influence at work within the Shiite community.  There is no doubt but Tehran's agents have been beavering away seeking to broaden and focus the latent political disaffiliation extant in the population.  This is not to imply the mullahs have created the disaffiliation and its outgrowth de novo but rather to argue the Iranian influence has accelerated the pace of development along the insurgent continuum.  The past few years have demonstrated a continued and escalating progress from latent and inchoate political disaffiliation to the beginnings of genuine organization.

The government in Manama has given too much emphasis to the not-so-hidden hand of Tehran in justifying the excessive use of force in its overnight security operation clearing the Pearl Park.  There was some, probably not overly important, Iranian guidance, but the real impetus to the demonstrations came from their essential nature as self-organizing.

It is unfortunate but expectable that the local government as well as the Deep Thinkers in the US have underestimated the rapidly growing potency of non-linear, self-organizing systems.  The notion of "leaderless" political movements was strictly fictional until the advent of widespread horizontal communications methods. Now that these are a normal part of quotidian life nearly everywhere, the "leaderless" political movement, even the "leaderless" political organization (an apparent oxymoron) have become not only possible but annoyingly commonplace.

Whichever side first and best comprehends the potency of the self-organizing, non-linear political movement will gain an undeniable advantage in the great game of insurgency and its close cousin, political revolution.  The existence of the self-organizing movement allows the heavy lifting of direct confrontation with the status quo to occur without risk to agenda driven men in the back room.  For example, the real work of deposing Hosni Mubarak was done by the self-organizing folk of Tahiri Square not the Muslim Brotherhood or any other opposition group.  Now, with the decks of the ancien regime having been cleared, the second stage of political change can be accomplished by whichever group can offer the most tightly organized, well focused agenda as well as co-opt the energy and frustrations of the folks who did the earlier work.

The same dynamic can be seen as having been at work in Tunisia.  The deck clearing was done in fine "leaderless" style, but the construction of a new political/social/economic structure will be done by those who run the old, well organized primarily Muslim oriented groups.

The situation in Bahrain shows the self-organizing phenomenon at work.  The protests were not directed, let alone ordered by Tehran.  But, should the government continue to bobble its task of keeping short term order with the hope that long term stability might emerge, Tehran is in the wings, plans and agents at the ready.  With the bloody suppression of the nearly peaceful demonstrations, the king and his men have made the challenge offered by the demonstrators truly existential.

The demonstrators, after all, are Shiite.  What makes this label important is not simply the identity with the majority of Iran's population but the cultural traditions and definers of the Shia branch of Islam.  Shiites have a long history and deep tradition of martyrdom.  Martyrdom is the single greatest definer of a "Partisan of Ali."  Shia was born in martyrdom.  It is nourished by the blood of martyrs.  The transcendent ecstasy of pain felt and blood spilled in truth to the faith is evident at all major Shiite rituals, ceremonies, and high holy days.

In a very real sense when the (primarily imported) police forces cut loose last night with concussion and tear gas grenades, truncheons, and shotguns, they gave the Shiites what was not only expected, but desired: martyrdom.  Martyrdom for the faith.  Blood and pain shed and suffered on behalf of Ali.  As a result, a result which is as inevitable as predictable, the demonstrations will become even more of an auto de fe--an act of faith.

Both the self-organizing demonstrators and the agents of Tehran will use this to their (mutual, whether intended as such or not) advantage.  There is no way around that dreary reality.  Even if the demonstrations are suspended, they will not end.  Even if the protesters go underground, they will not go away.  Even if the Pearl Roundabout is empty, the nights will be full--full of preparations for and execution of violent episodes.

King Hamad made a momentous decision when he decided (as presumably he must have) to turn the security forces loose on the sleeping occupants of the Pearl.  He bet on the impossible--that he could drown the protests of Shiites in a wave of martyrs' blood.  In essence he bet the ranch on the impossible with the result that violence will not only continue, it will take an upward trajectory.  Realistically there is very little chance his regime will remain unchanged.  It may take weeks--or years--but the clock is running.

From the perspective of the US the King could not have made a worse choice.  We are in Bahrain as we have been for years.  The kingdom exists thanks to our military protection.  It provides a useful but not utterly critical homeport for the Fifth Fleet.  It has even proven open to our suggestions about opening government at the local level to a measure of democracy.  And, our stance with regard to Bahrain is crucial to the Saudis and Kuwait.

As a consequence of last night's action, the options available to the Obama administration are limited.  Of course, the administration must "deplore" violence.  Of course, it must counsel "restraint."  Beyond that, there is little if anything which can be accomplished by the US.

We can, and should, advise King Hamad to offload responsibility onto the interior minister and others further down the food chain.  There is some slight chance that the King can retrieve some legitimacy by demanding his underlings to fall on their swords.  There is some slight chance he can assist this by passing out huge lumps of cash to the survivors and wounded.  There is some slight chance he can improve his position in the eyes of the population by surrendering some power gracefully, by opening parliamentary elections more, by inviting the opposition party into effective governance.

None of these taken individually will be sufficient, but taken in aggregate may purchase time, time during which the passions of and for martyrdom might diminish.  Whether the King likes the idea or not, the only path to continuation on the throne requires he rule less and merely reign more.  This means he must bow to the necessity of genuine power sharing.  It means an end to importing security personnel from far afield using the promise of citizenship as a potent lure.

Bahrain was down through most of the Nineteenth Century a province of Persia.  In the short span of time which has elapsed since then there has been no creation of a concept of nationalism in the minds of most in Bahrain.  Appeals to this nonexistent concept as has been attempted by the Foreign Minister are of no use.  But, if one looks at the creation of a genuine constitutional monarchy one can see the instrument by which a genuine national identity can be generated.

The King needs to understand that only by opening a new era of constitutional government can a legitimate Bahrain be created.  This has to be the main message given to Manama by the US.  Only by so doing can we assist in achieving a mutual national interest with Bahrain.  We need to tell the King and his intimates that they stand on one of those few, genuine cusps of history.  By their actions and words in the near future, they and only they can determine what emerges from the fog of gas and welter of pain in the Pearl Roundabout--an ongoing sectarian driven insurgency from which only Iran can benefit or the creation of a new, authentic state named Bahrain with a legitimate constitutional government.

It is a simple, stark choice.  It is not even a tough choice to put into action.  Even our Community-Organizer-in-Chief should be able to understand that.