The Saudis Are Hitting Their Worry Beads

The House of Sand--oops!  Bad Geek!  It's the House of Saud--is having a serious Xanax moment all because of what is going on in Egypt.  No, it's not because the feudal regime is all that worried about being the next domino falling in the Arab world.

The Saudis have their burnooses in a twist because Egypt has been a very critical ally in the ongoing conflict between the reactionary Sunni regimes and the flatly paleolithic Shiite theocracy in Iran.  The fear is that a new Egyptian government may ooze closer to the stream of Islam best called political.  Should that happen, the Saudis will find themselves more isolated in the contest with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has been more keen than even the US in pursuing a strategy of isolating Iran.  Egypt has been a very important associate in this endeavor.  The support of Cairo has been key in offsetting the efforts of other Muslim majority states such as Qatar and Turkey to lessen the impact of sanctions and other isolation enhancing mechanisms.  Should Egypt under a new government slack off on these efforts, the result would be not only a lessening of Saudi influence but a collateral increase in that of Turkey.  The net outcome would be a species of defeat for the House of Sand.

While not having received any great play in American MSM, the cold war between Riyadh and Tehran has been the highest priority within the Saudi government.  The fear felt in Saudi Arabia concerning the ambitions and reach of the mullahs has been high and continues to grow.  The Saudis fear not only the military capacities of Iran, including the impending nuclear one, but also the growth of its direct and indirect influence within the smaller states of the region.

The growth of Iranian influence was behind the frantic efforts made by Saudi diplomats--and the Saudi king--to come to an understanding with Syria regarding the political arrangements within Lebanon.  The failure of these efforts not only indicated that Damascus had fallen deeper into the Iranian gravity well, but that Lebanon was being dragged in as well.  This meant simply that as of two weeks ago only Egypt was a solid backer of the Saudi play.

Should, as seems quite likely, the next Egyptian government will include the Muslim Brotherhood under some guise, it is almost inevitable that Egypt will back down from its solid pro-Saudi stance.  This, in turn, will enhance the ability of Qatar to wean at least some of the other, lesser Gulf States away from the Saudi line with a corresponding increase in the numbers and power of the soft-line-on-Iran bloc.

Because the centuries old split between Sunni and Shiite Islam is at the center of the current Saudi-Iran cold war, the Saudis have injured their own cause with the position taken by the Kingdom with respect to Iraq.  The Iraqis have as much if not more to worry about when looking at Tehran than the Saudis--and the Saudi government undoubtedly knows this.  But, because Iraq is majority Shiite in its demographics, the Kingdom has stiff armed the requests and importuning of Baghdad repeatedly.

It does not seem to matter to the Wahhibists of the Kingdom that the Iraqis are Arab.  Nor does it seem to count for much that more that a third or more of all Iraqis are Sunni.  It doesn't appear important to the strategists of Riyadh that the national interests of the Kingdom and Iraq coincide at several key points.  None of these considerations have offset the big one: Iraq is majority Shiite.

The chance of losing Egypt as an anchor ally may prompt some more realistic thinking in the Kingdom.  That is to be hoped for as an alliance between these two oil giants would be a force for political stability in the region.

Nice as such a development might be, it does not address the key problem for the Saudi regime as it contemplates an Egypt without Hosni Mubarak.  The dilemma for Riyadh is how to find and cultivate more allies.  It is no help for the Kingdom that it is autocratic even by the standards of the Mideast.  This means that insofar as the disaffiliated citizens of any state see their own less than legitimate authoritarian regime embracing the Saudis, it weakens the local structure.

Consider Jordan.  On the one hand Jordan seems a very obvious and attractive state for the Saudis to cultivate and support.  Jordan needs money.  Massive infusions of Saudi cash would assist greatly in meeting the needs for subsidization of consumer prices, the creation of jobs through public employment projects, even direct subventions to students and their families.  The list of potentials for order enhancing bribery are legion.

And, now for the on-the-other-hand department.  The current king of Jordan, Abdullah II, has none of the popularity of his father.  That is important given how much depends on personal relations between monarch and tribal chiefs.  And, at root, order in Jordan depends upon the strong support of the Bedouin tribes against the Palestinians.  Complicating the personal factors at work in Jordan is the severe unpopularity of the queen, Riana, whose let-them-eat-cake attitude came into harsh relief during her birthday bash a while back.  Going beyond the personal, the government has a record of exceptional inefficiency.  Finally, there is the intense friction between the traditional tribesmen: the "old" Palestinians and the "new" Palestinians.

The upshot is that a too obvious, too open, too close relation between Abdullah II and the House of Saud would rebound to the disadvantage of the monarchy.  It is not going too far to assert that moving too fast and far in the direction of Saudi Arabia would produce significant disorder in Amman.  As both the King of Saudi Arabia and the King of Jordan are under the pressure of fear complicated by a perception that time is running out, the probability of a too rapid, too open movement is high.

The other alternatives are no more attractive.  The more or less constitutional monarchy of Morocco is both too distant geographically and too fragile to be of much use to Saudi Arabia.  Algeria has its own problems with violent political Islam which may--or, more probably, may not--be helped by a more open and comprehensive alliance with Saudi Arabia.

The takeaway is the House of Sand has few options when it comes to replacing Egypt as an ally against Iran.  By any realistic assessment, the least-worst approach if for Riyadh to mend its relations with Iraq.  This would fry off the clerical establishment of the Kingdom.  The elderly, ailing King Abdullah and his almost as old, nearly as frail successor(s) have already taken actions which have annoyed the religious hardliners, so this should be an acceptable cost of maintaining the House in power.

As a companion move the House would not be out of line to push a "reset" button in its relations with Turkey. The Ottoman Empire has been gone long enough to forget about the bad old days.  The AKP is religiously conservative enough.  Turkey's diplomatic trajectory is oriented to the Turkic speaking regions of Central Asia.  And, Turkey would benefit from the one product other than oil which Saudi Arabia exports--cash.

Diplomatically, which is to say, in the creation of areas of strategic interest, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are complementary.  At the same time Turkey and Iran are rivals in that both see room for the expansion of influence in the same geographic region.  Thus, there are real limits to the degree to which Iran and Turkey can work in alliance.

If Saudi Arabia is actually as worried about Iran as seems to be the case, it should be possible for the government to reexamine its stance with respect to Syria.  As the abortive effort in Lebanon shows, it is possible for the Kingdom to push the Wahhibists to the side in pursing national interest.  Syria, of course, looks to be the model of authoritarian order but as recent events have made clear, appearances can differ markedly from substance.  The embrace of Iran by Assad's government is not universally supported by the public or even the elite.  The Syria-Iran hook-up is one of convenience from the perspective of Damascus and is far less certain than the oft repeated protestations of undying love made by the Syrian government would seem to indicate.

This means the House of Saud has maneuvering room regarding Syria.  Saudi Arabia has two very important commodities it can bring to the table: money and its relation with the US.  Both of these could have high value in Damascus.  In comparison, Tehran has very little to offer.  Its money is not as unlimited as that of Saudi Arabia and it has no relation with the US.  One not need to be the most sophisticated diplomat since Bismark to see the opportunities or how to play them.

There is no question that the elderly bunch running Saudi Arabia are worried.  Nor is there any doubt about the genuine nature of the worries.  The only question is whether or not the fugitives from the moribund ward in Riyadh have the wit and will to address the anxieties with speed and effect.