The Game Is Getting Much Rougher In Libya

The Geek has to admit his hot wash on the initial unrest in Benghazi missed the mark.  He discounted the demonstrations too much because Benghazi has been the epicenter of Hate-Brother-Leader since the prison massacre in 1996.  He also overestimated the positive impact of Gaddafi's unique brand of tribal based politics which is omnipresent even in the army.

It is true that the ongoing protests have centered on Benghazi.  The second largest city in Libya has had the greatest butchers' bill by far.  And, most importantly, the protesters have matched the government in the escalation game.  

Not only have the anti-government forces matched the security wallahs in vertical escalation, they have engaged in successful horizontal escalation as well.  Other cities in eastern Libya have now joined the violence.  Tobruk of World War II fame as well as Al-Bayda, Ajdabiya, and Darnah have seen violent unrest.  In Darnah the insurrectionists briefly seized and held an arsenal, finally leaving with an unknown amount of weaponry.  

In Ajdabiya the protesters burned down several buildings including the local headquarters of Gaddafi's political party and declared the burg to be a "free city."  In Benghazi, the central government in effect has been run out of town.  The anti-government groups attacked the military base (which contains Gaddafi's "Eastern Palace") with an explosives laden vehicle at one point--and with an armored vehicle at another.

The focus on the military installation is understandable given that hours earlier security forces had sallied forth from it in order to attack the funeral demonstration which was carrying the bodies of those killed the previous day to the graveyard.  In an important development, reports from Benghazi indicate that Gaddafi has brought in mercenary troops from Chad to do the dirty work.

The mercenaries whether from Chad or elsewhere were described by locals as kill crazy, a sort of "wild eyed pistol waver not afraid to die."  Grisly tales of people jumping from a bridge to avoid the mercenaries and their bullets compete for attention with stories of helicopter gunships spraying machinegun fire on fleeing civilians.

While it is not possible to divine the truth in the welter of words, it is unmistakable that Brother Leader has decided to ramp up coercion to a degree surpassing that employed in Bahrain or Yemen.  He must be feeling more than a tad desperate.  

The desperation is powered by a fear that the entire east of Libya will go the way of Benghazi, setting the stage either for a tumbling row of dominoes ending in Tripoli or a resumption of the inter-regional warfare which existed prior to the Italian occupation a century ago.  Either development would be fatal to Gaddafi's idiosyncratic forty-two year old regime.

So far Brother Leader has kept a low profile, appearing on state television only briefly.  Apparently, he has given over day-to-day control of the security operation to his number three son, Saadi.  The son is a thirty-seven year old former vocational soccer player who has been described as "fiercely loyal" to dear old dad as well as a potential follow on to Gaddafi senior in running the family business.  He is probably more than tough enough to oversee very robust repression.

In addition to using mercenaries, automatic and even heavy weapons, the Gaddafi regime has taken the customary step of pulling the plug on the Internet and blocking other horizontal communications methods.  Libya is already one of the most isolated countries on the planet and became even more so with the ending of cell phone and Internet communication.  Given the vast distances involved (Benghazi is a thousand kilometers from Tripoli), this does hurt the anti-government movement significantly.

Merely impairing the communications capacities of the protesters does not address the basic conditions which have produced the violent unrest.  Unemployment is at least thirty percent.  Housing is scarce and usually allocated on the basis of political connections.  There is no true national identity but rather a patchwork of clan, tribal, and regional affiliations which are reflected in every institution of state including the armed forces.  There is absolutely no organized political opposition to the Gaddafi regime and its political party expression.  Nor is there any excuse for an open and free media.  In comparison, Egypt was a wide open boisterous democracy and Tunisia a free for all.

The Gaddafi regime has expended (squandered?) vast amounts of its oil and natural gas revenues on utter non-essentials including support for foreign insurgencies, a quest for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a military without a real mission, and grandiose schemes to drill deep wells in the south to bring water to the north.  Very little money has gone to long term development needs whether in infrastructure or education or economic alternatives to the oil and gas.  What did not go to the quixotic delusions of Brother Leader went to the pockets of the well-connected.  The combination has assured damn little has been left over to benefit the Libyan in the street or provide any basis for either long term order or the slow emergence of stability in an evolving national system.

The overthrow of Gaddafi would be a good thing for the Libyans--maybe.  The caveat comes from the simple fact that the four decades of dictatorship have left the country without any semblance of a political culture.  This means Libya is starting from less than Tunisia or Egypt.  In both of those countries there had been a long history of organized opposition.  The opposition might have been suppressed but it was never eliminated.  Even if in exile the opposition continued to develop, to plan, to prepare.  The suppression by Brother Leader has been so complete, so absolute, so far reaching that there is little in the way of an organized and forward looking political alternative to the status quo.

The situation in Libya is also complicated by its having no clear national identity well supported by national institutions.  When even the army reflects tribal and clan roots, it is hard to see from where a unified sense of being Libyan will be found.  Taken in aggregate these factors assure that any overthrow of Gaddafi will not result in a quick transition to a democratic government.  It is not easy to see just who will run the country on even a caretaker basis should Brother Leader and his sons catch the next flight to the Land of Unemployed Dictators.

Both Italy and the UK have large exposures in the Libyan oil and natural gas industry.  Both governments should be working overtime right now on just what can be done practically to keep the trains running on time as well as dissuade the Gaddafi family from further very robust exercises in suppression and set the ground rules for a post-Gaddafi government.  It is not practical to suggest that some foreign or international entity step in to secure a peaceful transition, such would not be acceptable to any Libyan in the street, but the so called international community needs to shoulder a legitimate burden in the sense of aiding the endgame and the emergence of an organic Libyan government.

At least the Obama administration has been mainly silent on events in Libya.  This is as it should be.  Libya is one of the few spots in the Mideast or North Africa where the US interests are minimal.  But, our government would be well advised to nudge the UK, Italy, and the EU generally in the area of contingency planning for the day after the revolts succeed in their goal--or the day the security forces violate any sense of decency in their shedding of demonstrators blood.

It's called being "proactive."  Sadly, the record shows this is an area where the US (and the West) is more than a little deficient.