Worrying By Analogy

Since even Hosni Mubarak has agreed that his days are numbered and that the number isn't a large one, it seems fair to consider the hypothetical "day after."  The fact that quite a few Egyptians do not agree with Hosni's estimate of seven more months in his political life gives the consideration a real impetus.

Humans have a tendency (lamentable much of the time) to reason by analogy.  Often the basis of analogy is historical with the inevitable consequence that the reasoning process is highly selective both as to the data used and the interpretative methods used.  In considering Egypt after Mubarak there is a great appeal to employing the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution as the analogy.

There are some seemingly compelling points of identity between Egypt today and Iran of thirty-two years ago.  Both countries belong to the species dictatorship.  Both dictators enjoyed very significant American support.  Both were seen by administrations of both Democratic and Republican nature as key allies in the region as well as islands of predictable stability.  In both countries the armed forces and internal security organs received massive US assistance and training.

Both Egypt and Iran are majority Muslim countries.  Egypt today like Iran thirty-two years ago fields a large, well organized, and militant advocate of violent political Islam.

At that point the identities end.  Even similarities fade.  The differences become all important--and, critically, make the process of reasoning by analogy suspect.

Chief among the differences is the brand of Islam prevalent in Egypt compared with that of Iran.  Egyptians are predominantly Sunni while ninety percent or more of the Muslims in Iran in 1979 were Shia.  There is a mound of distinction between the two "brands."  Shia is given to political expression, martyrdom, and centralization of religious doctrine.  Sunnis, while far from indifferent to politics per se, are not such eager seekers after martyrdom as their Shia cousins.  More importantly, religious doctrine and direction is decentralized, diffuse within the Sunni community.  There is no figure equivalent to the Grand Ayatollah, the Supreme Guardian of the faith.

Another critical distinction between Iran in 1979 and Egypt today (and one which is still subject to change) is the role of the army.  The army in Egypt is held in high repute due to its having administered a severe drubbing to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War.  The Iranian army had no such cachet.  Beyond that, the Egyptian army to date has taken no suppressive actions against the demonstrators.

When the Iranian army made the fateful and fatal decision to execute the Shah's orders to open fire on demonstrators on 8 September 1978 (with the result that hundreds died in Tehran's Jaleh Square from tank and helicopter gunships), that spelled the end of any perceived legitimacy for the army as a transitional instrument.  So far the Egyptian army has not done the same.  Hopefully, it will not even should Mubarak be so ill-advised as to order a crackdown.

Another important consideration is the role of the Muslim Brotherhood as compared to the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.  The Muslim Brotherhood has been a latecomer to the party, undoubtedly as a calculated decision later reversed when the demonstrators were not blown away in the first police actions.  In sharp contrast, the followers of Khomeini were good to go from the giddy-up moving swiftly to the forefront as the Shah's regime crumbled.

While the Geek in no way agrees with presidential advisor and former CIA officer, Bruce Reidel, to the effect that there ain't no reason to be scared of the Muslim Brotherhood as the group has long dropped its agenda of violent political Islam, there is no basis for the belief that the Brotherhood will take over the post-Mubarak environment.  The Brotherhood has a wide base of popular support within Egypt's most impoverished and politically marginalized citizens thanks more to its excellent network of social, education, and medical services than to its agenda, the assumption that this will translate into domination of any post-Mubarak government is poorly justified at best.

Egypt contains not only a large demographic segment of the impoverished and marginal, of former peasants forced to seek employment in the bursting urban centers, it also contains a larger portion of educated, more or less, Westernized youth who seek jobs, opportunity, a sense of personal dignity, personal future, who are not prone to accept the austere religious dictates of the harder line Muslim Brotherhood cadre.  The balance of power resides with the second group to a far greater extent than to the myrmidons of the Brotherhood.  This view is reinforced by the nature of the demonstrators as well as their creative use of Western developed horizontal communications methods as well as the absence of obvious Islamist slogans (either in Arabic or English) in the iconography surrounding the protests.

The most likely result of the tension between Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptians less given to political Islam is the formation of an Egyptian version of the Turkish AKP.  While the AKP has shown some disquieting signs of being a little too inclined to see the positive with respect to more violently inclined advocates of political Islam, it has not gone over--or even near--the edge of the abyss.  The AKP has shown itself to be more pragmatic than ideological, more success oriented than willing to risk all for the "cause."

Another key distinction which is all too often overlooked particularly by members of the American Right is simply that Barack Obama is not Jimmy Carter.  Even when it became obvious to all but the most intellectually challenged, Jimmy Carter dithered.  He did not put effective pressure on the Shah to step aside in a bid for "orderly transition."  Then he made the situation worse by not supporting the Shah when support would still have mattered.  Finally, he turned sentimental with his allowing the ailing fugitive Shah to find sanctuary for a time and of a sort in the US.  This demonized the US all the more in the eyes of the True Believers of the Ayatollah Khomeini.  Obama may have started late compared to events on the Egyptian street but has come up fast, perhaps claiming too much credit for Mubarak's I'm-leaving-in-September pledge.

The influence of the US on the Egyptian military should not be overlooked either.  That plus the personal relationship between Mubarak and Secretary of State Clinton have been of great assistance in assuring that Mubarak came to realize sooner rather than later that getting out of power skin intact requires speedy action.

This is not to imply that there is no cause for anxiety about the next few days and weeks to say nothing of the hypothetical "day after," but it does imply strongly that the Iranian analogy is not the best one to use in assessing Egypt or US policy toward that country.  It does imply that the probability of the Muslim Brotherhood establishing a Sunni counterpoise to the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran or the Egyptian army becoming the next Revolutionary Guards Corps is very low.

The looming regime change in Egypt should give Israel grounds for reconsidering its intransigence on the Two State Question.  This becomes more salient given the pressure being exerted by advocates of violent political Islam and others on the government of Jordan.  The specter of these countries both abrogating their peace agreements with Israel should focus Israeli attention sharply on the role of the Two State Solution in maintaining the less-than-perfect but still acceptable Mideast status quo.  A dramatic move by Israel to meet some of the demands of the Palestinian Authority would go a long way to pulling the propaganda fangs of the Muslim Brotherhood and others of the political Islam bent.  It would also bolster the PA against the potential of Hamas going more radical hoping to capitalize on the general dissatisfaction in the Arab populations.

It would behoove the US administration to play this card not only in its dealings with the political opposition in Egypt and Jordan but also with the Netanyahu government.  Right now intransigence is not in Israel's best interests, even at the cost of losing domestic political support.  Rocks may stand against the waves but will always be submerged by the tide.  At this time the tide of events in the Mideast is running in favor of change, even remarkable, unprecedented change.

Egypt can yet become the new century's Iran.  But, for that to happen will require stupidity in Cairo, in Washington or in Jerusalem of a very high order.  One way, perhaps the best, to assure stupidity reigns is to focus too narrowly on the Iranian analogy.

It has been mooted about that President Obama is a keen student of history as well as being a very unsentimental character.  The second proposition is no doubt correct.  The first can be proven only if Mr Obama really understands history rather than simplemindedly reasoning by (inapposite) historical analogy.