McChrystal Gets Blunt--Very Blunt

General Stanley McChrystal has a reputation for telling it like it is to the best of his knowledge and belief. He shows how he developed that rep in an interview published in the WSJ.

(The Truth In Blogging Act requires the Geek to note that the Pentagon has taken the position that the WSJ misinterpreted the General's remarks. It prefers the version attributed to McChrystal in USA Today in which he says it matters not if the US is winning, losing or stalemated, but "Taliban has the initiative which we are trying to reverse." In war, the side having the initiative is the side which is winning.)

Right now, the general avers, Taliban is winning. It has the initiative. The momentum. It has moved out of the traditional strongholds in southern Afghanistan to carry the war to formerly quiet areas in the country's north and east. In these assessments, General McChrystal is correct.

In one area he is wrong. The general insists that Taliban has forced a change in strategy and tactics upon the US and other International Security Assistance Force members. While it is true that the US and its allies have changed their approach to fighting and defeating Taliban, the change was not so much forced upon us by Taliban as by the belated recognition that the war-on-the-cheap method favored by Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld had handed Taliban the opportunity first to recover and next to go on the effective offensive.

There is no more destructive a notion than that of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign without sufficient strength on the ground. No matter how much technology may enhance the counter-insurgent's capacity to collect information, develop intelligence, move forces quickly, and coordinate the efforts of widely dispersed small units, success demands a large number of boots on the ground. The more boots, of course, the greater is the likelihood of more casualties.

General McChrystal does not minimise the brutal reality that US and other friendly casualties will continue to be high in the months to come. The necessity of wresting and maintaining the initiative from Taliban requires that risks be run and losses accepted. McChrystal's correct emphasis upon our troops interposing themselves between the trigger pullers and suicide bombers of Taliban on the one hand and the civilian population on the other also assures our loss rate will be high.

The fact remains that even more US and allied combat forces are needed in Afghanistan if we are going to achieve even the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing." To be certain that there will be no chance for Taliban or al-Qaeda or any other Islamist jihadist group claiming to have defeated the Americans and their allies militarily regardless of what happens eventually in Afghanistan is and must remain the minimum goal.

Right now, even considering the 21,000 additional troops approved by the Obama administration, there will not be enough combat and support forces in theater to assure the gaining of even the minimum goal. National Security Advisor and former general, James Jones, strongly implied that in the Sunday talk show circuit. While he carefully hedged his statement by noting that further deployments depended on a number of imponderables including the success or failure of Pakistani efforts in the FATA, Jones made it clear that the administration was not averse to sending more troops to Afghanistan.

The highly respected defense intellectual, Anthony Cordesman, no doubt would approve. Cordesman, who is, among other things, an advisor to NATO on Afghanistan, argues in the Times of London that the US and its allies must dispatch anywhere from three to nine combat brigades above the currently authorized level. Cordesman also maintains that the Afghan National Security Force must be nearly doubled from the currently envisioned levels of 134,000 for the army and 82,000 for the constabulary.

It might be noted that Cordesman's numbers are still lower from the obviously quite theoretical figure given by the Director of National Intelligence Admiral, Dennis Blair, to the Senate Intelligence Committee last February. It also deserves mention that the increase in the Afghan National Force called for by Cordesman would require a substantial ramp up in the number of trainers provided by the US and its partners.

Most importantly, the military options in and of themselves will not win the war in Afghanistan in any meaningful way. All that can be accomplished by the military is the achievement of the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing." Ultimately, this is what the widely criticised "surge" did. The additional boots on the ground--and bodies in bags--forestalled any possibility of the US being defeated in the field by the assorted insurgent groups.

Victory in an interventionary operation is a far more elusive critter. First, and most basic, the definition of "victory" is inherently subjective. Obviously, victory in the eyes of the locals may--probably will--mean something quite different from victory as seen from Washington. When the shooting stops, both the former insurgents and the former indigenous counter insurgents have to live together. This means power-sharing with the one time counter insurgents having operational dominance perhaps but not anything resembling total authority.

This means the deals, compromises, and practical details of inventing political and social stability may not meet with the approval of either the US government or We the People. At nightfall both may wonder what we made the sacrifices for. What was the use of spending lives and treasure for the benefit of a lot of ingrates?

We best get a grip on the fact that the most we can hope for from the use of military force in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, or in some future war against the Islamist jihadists, is simply "not-losing" and denying a safe haven to the hostile forces of the Islamists and their armed component, the jihadists. We cannot--and should not try--to plant American values, institutions, norms, structures, and practices at bayonet point. It simply cannot be done.

"Nation building" is done by those most personally and directly involved. This means, quite self-evidently, the people who live there. And, in particular, those who are the most politically engaged. The most politically engaged come from two camps--the government and its supporters and the insurgents. These two antipodal groups ultimately will have to make the peace, build the nation, live together in whatever degree of harmony or rivalry organically emerges once the active hostilities have stopped.

General McChrystal and Anthony Cordesman are experienced and realistic enough to recognize and accept this fact. Now all that can be hoped is that the agenda driven Obama administration and its ideological soulmates in Congress as well as We the People can equal this degree of realism.

Not likely, to be sure. But, still one can hope, because the alternative is so much worse.

Immovable Object Meets Immovable Object

As predicted the Fatah convention, the first in twenty years, saw the oldest and at one time largest of the Palestinian "resistance" groups trying to outdo Hamas in the militant irredentist category. All that was missing was the physical presence of Arafat complete with checked table cloth on his head and pistol on his hip. His spirit hung heavy in the air of Bethlehem as delegates, old and young, militant and more so, haggled, bargained, and spouted expletives against the Zionist entity.

As the votes were counted in the uncontested re-election of Mahmoud Abbas, the fire breathing folks declared that Fatah would continue resistance to Israel unless its conditions for peace were fully met. The major requirement for Palestinian peace in our time was the full evacuation of the 300,000 or so Israelis from the "settlements" built on land taken from Jordan in the Six Day War including East Jerusalem.

As a conference paper put it with typical Palestinian delicacy, "Fatah will continue to sacrifice victims until Jerusalem is returned clean of settlements and settlers." That seems rather definite, doesn't it?

The Israeli government response was not long in coming. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu was blunt. His government would not repeat the "mistake" of "evacuating" settlers from the disputed territories of the West Bank. He would not do what former prime minister Sharon did in the Gaza Strip--remove Jewish settlers at bayonet point.

PM Netanyahu pointedly noted that the Israeli withdrawal did not bring peace and security for either the Israelis or the Arabs of the Gaza. No one oriented as to time and place could argue with him on that point. Even before Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip, Islamist jihadists used the place as a launching point for attacks of all sorts. Since Hamas took over, life has been nasty, brutish, and often short for the citizens of Gaza as Israel was compelled to defend its people and territory against indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire.

The majority of the Israeli public supports Netanyahu's defiant stand. This is particularly true with respect to the "settlements" in and around East Jerusalem. There is no conceivable way that the Israelis will continence a retreat from East Jerusalem. Period.

Israel long ago annexed the entirety of Jerusalem. While the US and other countries do not recognise the annexation, this is quite irrelevant. Even if some miracle provided for the Israelis to agree to move out of the other "settlements" and retreat back across the fossil of the 1949 armistice, the Green Line, there is no possibility that East Jerusalem and its environs would be abandoned to the Arabs.

The Palestinians (along with the Arabs generally) will never accept a peace agreement which leaves East Jerusalem in Jewish hands. The Israelis will never accept a peace treaty which surrenders the Old City and new "settlements" to the Arabs.

Immovable object meets immovable object. There is not any wiggle room for diplomacy to work. For each side, peace without Jerusalem is not worth the price. There is no coinciding interest or set of interests which diplomats can use to lever either party into a less intransigent posture.

The lads of Fatah recognise this. That is why the group with a more than a half century of terrorism behind it is quite willing to grease the skids to compromise (read Israeli surrender) with the blood of "victims."

Fatah has long been indifferent to killing and being killed. As long as the leadership can exhibit the bravery of being out of range, Fatah is quite willing to dispatch suicide bombers, gun-toting commandos, and others filled with murderous rage in the hope that sufficient killing will either undercut Israeli political will or force the tender hearted of the "international community" to pressure Israel into surrender.

Fatah has been every bit as willing as Hamas to use murder and the bodies of its own people as weapons in the never ending war against Israel. Whether called "intafada" or something else, the brutal truth remains that Fatah is ready, willing, able, and eager to use the lives of civilians as its preferred tool of war.

The Fatah tiger has been willing to cover its stripes in recent years with the whitewash of the Palestinian Authority. The stripes have come back during the convention in Bethlehem. The essential difference between Fatah and Hamas is that the latter is much more honest, open, and transparent about its nature, character, and goals than the former.

There is a bit of delightful irony in that Hamas has been undertaking a tendentious charm and smile offensive directed at the Obama administration at the same time as Fatah has been showing its true colors. Of course, the Hamas public relations campaign is undermined by its continued hate Israel rhetoric and actions aimed at the population under its control, which are easily accessed by outsiders on the Internet.

Presumably, the Obama administration has the capacity to understand what is at work with both Fatah and Hamas. Presumably, it is aware that both Hamas and Fatah share the goals of removing Israel from the map. Presumably it is aware that the immovable object dilemma posed by East Jerusalem, the nature of borders, and the Palestinian "right of return," all stand as obstacles to a comprehensive peace treaty which are not reducible by either pressure on Israel or the normal tools of diplomacy.

If President Obama and his plethora of foreign policy "experts" can get a grip on reality, the administration will back off from pressuring Israel. It will re-focus its efforts on Syria, which has the advantage of being a rational actor with one firm requirement for peace with Israel--return of the Golan Heights.

Levering Israel and Syria to the bargaining table and shepherding a treaty between the two will further isolate the Palestinians. It will put another potential wedge in the Arab bloc. It will deprive Hamas of the necessary intermediary between itself and its prime sponsor, Iran.

None of these are inconsiderable goals. Their achievement will not be easy, but the rewards would be worth the effort. The Syrian gambit has a greater probability of success than continuing the present course of attempting to pretend that either Fatah or Hamas contains a single rational brain cell in their collective skulls.

Or, as a second, and viable alternative, the Obama administration can just walk away from the mess. There is little to win and much to lose in continuing the game when the sheer intransigence of all parties is considered.

Yeah, presidents hate to admit they are not all-powerful, but sometimes the truth, painful as it is, hurts less than keeping up the pretense of being able to do the impossible.

Sanctions! Once More With Feeling

In its nearly desperate effort to avoid the truth about the geographic expression known as Somalia, the Obama administration in the person of SecState Clinton has waved the big rhetorical stick of sanctions at Eritrea. The reason for the new threat is the administration's belief that Eritrea is providing assistance to al-Shabab. And, as we all know, al-Shabab is the latest Islamist jihadist bogeyman.

If al-Shabab wins in Somalia, the administration's logic holds, al-Qaeda will have a new safe haven from which to attack the West generally and the US in particular. The logic is correct. But, that is as far as it goes.

Eritrea is a wretched pimple on the collective anus of humanity. It is a miserable one party state which is best characterised by pervasive poverty, governmental repression, and a proclivity to be a troublemaker. After being forced into a merger with Ethiopia fifty-seven years ago, the Eritreans formed, what else? That's right, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which waged a thirty year long nasty insurgency which finally culminated in de facto independence which became de jure in 1993.

The Eritrean constitution has never been implemented. The elections scheduled for 2001 were postponed indefinitely. The horrid little place lives under the regime of the Peoples Front For Democracy and Justice (PFDF.) Both democracy and justice are conspicuous in their absence.

In the past Eritrea has provided refuge for Somali political figures. These include Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed after he was ousted as a senior capo of the Islamic Courts Union by the Ethiopian army operating at American behest. Sheik Ahmed is now the "elected" head of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG.) Also gaining sanctuary in Eritrea for a while was Sheik Hassan Aweys whose Hizbul Islam insurgent group is, depending on the phase of the moon and other similarly arcane determinants, either fighting alongside or in opposition to al-Shabab.

Hopefully, the Obama administration including Ms Clinton can distinguish between giving sanctuary and providing material assistance. The amount of weapons, other equipment, and Islamist jihadists flowing from Eritrea to Somalia is difficult to ascertain in detail, but it is not sufficient to account for the success of al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam in the past few months.

To put it simply enough for even the Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration to understand, al-Shabab is winning because it is more dedicated, more resilient, more effective, more willing to both kill and be killed than the TFG forces including the "peace keepers" from the African Union. Sheik Ahmed has not yet shown himself capable of attracting and keeping the loyalty of tribal warlords hostile to al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam.

Regardless of the assorted brave statements emanating from assorted members of the TFG, the reality is that it is losing and al-Shabab is winning. Period. And, the ascending fortunes of al-Shabab owe little or nothing to the presumed assistance flowing from Eritrea.

It is difficult to see just how sanctions might coerce Eritrea into ceasing whatever assistance it may be providing to Somalia. The place is dead broke. Over eighty percent of its population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. International development schemes intended to exploit mineral resources are moribund. Its primary exports are agricultural and go, in the main, to Italy, China, and Sudan. Its imports come chiefly from Saudi Arabia, Italy, and China.

It might be noted that none of Eritrea's major trading partners have a splendid record in observing sanctions. That is not likely to change in the event the US is able to ramrod an embargo on Eritrea through the UN.

While the population of Eritrea is split among several religious confessions, Islam has the largest share. The PFDJ leadership has not shown a particularly robust orientation toward the Islamist agenda, but that is subject to change. The imposition of sanctions is likely to result in a sudden epiphany among the chieftains of the country. And, they are not at all likely to tilt toward, say, Roman Catholicism or Buddhism.

The first reaction of the Eritrean president, Isias Afewark, to SecState Clinton's threats was, to say the least, truculent. While undoubtedly exaggerating the degree of aid already provided to al-Shabab, the Eritrean strongman promised more would be along shortly. The Eritrean foreign ministry echoed the president's position while taking it a bit more over the edge of paranoia.

These early indicators point at Eritrea becoming more rather than less involved in Somalia should the US continue its pressure campaign. There are two reasons for this.

The first is simply Eritrea's total inability to put the war with Ethiopia behind it. There is a powerful reservoir of hatred which emerges far more from the 1998-2000 Ethiopian invasion than from the earlier thirty year's war. As a result, Eritrea sees the jihadist-TFG struggle as a proxy conflict between itself and Ethiopia.

The second reason is, quite unsurprisingly, religion. While, as mentioned earlier, the PFDJ command echelon is not overly Islamist in public, through much of the insurgency, ELF did hype its Islamic roots in distinction to the Christian and later Marxist orientation of Ethiopia. The totem of Islam has not lost its magic; if anything the magic has grown in recent years. The same dynamic has been visible off and on for years in Sudan. It is at work behind the scenes in Eritrea today.

The US, the AU, the UN, have all used Eritrea and its presumed critical aid to al-Shabab as a way to avoid facing reality. All these, most importantly the current American administration, need to get a grip on a very prickly, highly unpleasant, quite brutal truth. If Somalia is to be stabilized under a non-Islamist, non-jihadist government, military intervention is necessary.

If former general and current National Security Advisor Jones was speaking accurately the other day, the Obama administration is committed to fighting al-Qaeda and its associates whenever and wherever they arise. It is best to take the Islamist jihadists on before they have consolidated their hold on a country.

It is less painful, far less bloody, and far, far less costly in treasure to defeat the Islamist jihadists while they are still in the process of seizing power. This means in Somalia the time is now.

Right now al-Shabab has not won. Right now, there are significant sections of the Somali population which want peace and freedom from fear far more than they desire Shriah. Right now the outside world has its last best chance to stop Somalia from becoming the Afghanistan, the FATA of tomorrow.

Yes, this means Americans and others must fight a war none of us wants to fight. For the Obama administration and the Democratic Party's Progressive Caucus it means putting the much desired (by them) "Transformational Agenda" on long-term hold. For We the People it means more frustration with a distant war in an unlovely part of the world with people who will hate us no matter how the fracas ends.

It is a very bitter prospect to contemplate. It is far more tempting to turn our collective backs on Somalia and the Somalis. After all, just who are they to us and we to them?

On the other hand, temporizing, putting off, ignoring the threat was the way in which the Clinton administration played the game of nations a decade and more ago. That approach brought us not only 9/11 but all the very unpleasant matters which followed it. Do we want to go through that sort of thing again?

Forty-one years ago, Robert Kennedy liked to challenge We the People. He used to ask, "If not us, who? If not now, when?"

Indeed.

The Irony Of Secretary Clinton And Somalia

If one is a maven of irony, the commitment made by Secretary of State Clinton to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia is truly delicious, thoroughly delightful. The Secretary advanced only one reason to justify her vow of assistance to Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed and his government.

Ready for it?

Here it is. Al-Qaeda. That's right. The reason is al-Qaeda. Or, more broadly, "terrorism."

The irony comes from the simple historical fact that it was President William Jefferson Clinton who ordered US forces out of Somalia in the aftermath of the poorly planned and worse executed operation which resulted in two Blackhawk helicopters down and eighteen Americans killed. It is true that the televised scenes of a dead American being dragged through the dust of Mogadishu while the Somalis cheered and hooted were both disturbing and redolent of savagery, but that was a very poor reason to cut and run.

Worse, the cut and run in the wake of such limited losses did nothing but embolden Osama bin Laden and others committed to the Islamist jihadist True Belief. The message sent to bin Laden and others by President Clinton was simple: Kill a few Americans and we beat feet with world record alacrity.

The irony is made all the more compelling by other actions of President Clinton. The responses by his administration (of which Ms Clinton was a member in all save title) to the truck bombing at Khobar Tower in Saudi Arabia, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole did nothing but encourage bin Laden and other Islamist jihadists.

The inappropriately mild reactions to these attacks convinced Islamists generally and bin Laden in particular that the US could not even aspire to the level of "paper tiger." The lack of a resolute American counter to the outrages perpetrated by al-Qaeda also convinced the Taliban dictator of Afghanistan, Omar, that there were no risks involved by continuing to harbor al-Qaeda following 9/11.

To put the matter short, brutal, and accurately, there would be no al-Qaeda, no terrorist threat, had it not been for the spineless, risk averse, overly lawyered Clinton administration responses to the provocations of the Islamist jihadists of the Nineties. When al-Qaeda could have been squashed like a grape, President Clinton and his administration lacked either or both the wit and testicular fortitude necessary to lift a foot and do the job.

It is quite true that the Bush/Cheney administration made a very bad situation much, much worse with their blunders. Both the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq and the use of the Ethiopian proxy to rid Somalia of the Islamic Courts Union made life worse for much of the world--including Somalia. Having written that, it is still necessary to underscore that the primary responsibility for creating both the ongoing sanguinary effusion known as Somalia as well as the continuing threat of Islamist jihadist actions rests with President Clinton and those of his inner circle--including Ms Clinton.

Her commitment to the TFG is every bit as insufficient as were her husband's actions fifteen and more years ago. Providing some training and forty tons of weapons and ammunition are no more likely to stop the success of al-Shabaab then sending a few Tomahawks to Sudan and Afghanistan stopped al-Qaeda. If Ms Clinton and President Obama are actually serious about preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for Islamist jihadists including fugitives from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, they will have to promise far, far more than a little bit of guns and bullets.

If the region called Somalia is to be denied to the Islamist jihadists, it will take a very real and very bloody effort on the part of the US and other potential target countries. The imposition of even a semblance of stability on Somalia will require more than the African Union is willing and able to provide. It will demand far more than stand-off training and equipment. The task involves taking on and defeating a very well motivated force of irregulars.

The brutal ground truth is that the denial of Somalia to the Islamist jihadists necessitates one more war. That's right, it means fighting another war which the American public does not seek and will not support absent an attack upon the homeland.

Ms Clinton should have made no promises at all, if she is unable to acknowledge that the employment of American combat forces may--no--will be necessary if the Islamist jihadists are to be stopped. Since the SecState explicitly ruled out that possibility she should have made no "vow." At least that would have been honest. It would have raised no false hopes either within Somalia or other countries, such as Kenya, which are in harm's way as a result of al-Shabaab's success to date.

If Ms Clinton wants to make amends to the American people for the abject failure of the Clinton administration fifteen plus years ago, she should truck on back to Washington and have a heart-to-heart talk with President Obama. In a very real sense she has the ethical responsibility to urge Mr Obama not to repeat the disastrous errors of her husband.

She has the ethical responsibility to be honest with the president. To tell him in no uncertain terms that the only way to assure that Somalia will not become the next Afghanistan, the next safe house for Islamist jihadists, is to send US combat forces there.

Of course this is something she will not do. She, like the president, is too committed to the progressive cause, the Transformational Agenda, to be honest about Somalia, Islamist jihadist, or the shape of things to come.

Being a progressive True Believer Ms Clinton would rather shuck, jive, and lie to the people. Lie to the people of the TFG. Lie to the people of the region. Lie to the American people. Lie--and hope that the worst realistic case will not come to pass until she is out of office and her self-congratulatory memoirs safely in press.

And, that's a fact, Jack.

Baitullah Mehsud Is Dead--Don't Get Too Excited

In 1943 working from PURPLE intercepts the Army Air Forces planned and executed a daring, very long range assassination. The target was Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the too-complex-to-work plan which ended in the Battle of Midway. The operation was reviewed and approved at the highest levels of government since those were more innocent days and moral questions were raised regarding the targeted killing of a single man.

The Army P-38 aircraft operated at extreme range. The pilots knew the target was very, very important. The Admiral made a rendezvous with the American fighters and death over the jungles of a southwest Pacific island.

His death brought a fair amount of rejoicing in the ranks of the US military. It was a fine piece of payback. The news of Yamamoto's death brought smiles all around the White House. It was a fine piece of payback.

Beyond that it is doubtful that the death of Isoroku Yamamoto had any profound effect upon the war in the Pacific. His death may have lowered the depth on the Imperial Japanese Navy's bench significantly. But, it did not lessen the Navy's will and ability to keep on fighting. Nor was the capacity of the Imperial Japanese Army's capacity and desire for fighting diminished in the slightest by the shoot-down.

The killing of Baitullah Mehsud by an American UAV launched missile will have more impact on the capacity of Taliban in Pakistan to wage war than did the death of Admiral Yamamoto in the gunsights of a P-38 pilot. While Taliban's capacity to fight may be impaired at least slightly and temporarily by the Hellfire-up-the-butt attack, the jihadist group's will to fight remains intact, perhaps even strengthened.

Taliban is an irregular force. That means it is far more personality dependent in its operational efficiency than is a regular army. Lacking the mechanisms for orderly replacement of top leadership levels, there is a strong, even a very strong, probability that Taliban will suffer a period of organisational perturbation.

Disruption at the senior and mid-levels will result in deep and perhaps irreversible splits occurring in the amphyctony of tribal groups which comprise the far-from-monolithic Taliban structure. This new reality opens a fine opportunity for the armed forces of Pakistan. Once the process of organisational disruption starts it is easy to accelerate--and almost impossible to stop.

Even regular, well disciplined militaries with an intact chain of command can suffer from the pernicious results of senior level lack of leadership. The German Army in August 1918 suffered a collapse of political will at its highest levels in the wake of the Battle of Amiens. The Army High Command recovered its poise after a few days. But it was too late. Organisational disruption had spread down the chain and forward to the front line units. The German Army had lost its will and thus its ability for waging war effectively. It was defeated in all but formalities.

If the Pakistani army and government seize the (American provided) golden opportunity with a fast, hard, and well-coordinated offensive into the two Waziristans, it can finish the job of fracturing an already off-balance and faction ridden Taliban. That may be a big "if" but it is not an impossible one.

It has been reported that the civilian population of Peshawar and, presumably elsewhere in the FATA, has greeted the death of Mehsud with a mix of relief and joy. This implies that the army of Pakistan can shuck its aversion to casualties and actually operate on the ground rather than simply from the air and with the bravery of being out of range. The public will accept losses--if victory over Taliban is the result.

Taking advantage of organisational disruption and rivalries for succession gives the Pakistani Army the chance to gain the initiative for once and for all. In counterinsurgency as in conventional war, initiative is everything. It allows the battle to be taken to the enemy. It assures that the enemy is not only taken off balance but is kept that way. It means the enemy cannot mount either a coordinated, effective defense or break contact in an organised manner.

In short, the battle is now that for the Pakistani Army to win--or lose. It is a matter of courage and dedication on the part of the Army's command echelon. Further, it is a matter of whether or not the senior and mid-level officers are on the side of a (comparatively) secular and democratic government or closet supporters of the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

Even counter-terrorism "expert" and professional pessimist Walid Phares grants that the killing of Mehsud may give the Pakistanis the chance they need to win. He is of the view that the window of opportunity for this is limited. This is one of the few times that the Geek and Dr Phares are in tandem on something.

The Pakistanis have less than a month, perhaps as little as ten to fourteen days, to exploit the confusion which has emerged in the dust of the Hellfire's explosion. Should the Army sit on its hands using only aircraft and artillery rather than regular ground combat forces, the Taliban has a good to excellent chance of recovering its poise and combat efficiency.

If, however, the Army finds the courage and will to shift more of its regular forces from the Indian border to the Waziristans and start shooting Taliban up close and personal, then there is a better than good chance that the days of Taliban are numbered. And, the number will not be a big one.

Coupled with the continued pressure being exerted by US and allied forces across the border in Helmand province, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as the shattered remnants of al-Qaeda will be under nearly irresistible pressure. This implies that the military portion of the effort in Afghanistan may soon reach the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing."

Long term that is the very best that can be hoped for in Afghanistan. The corrupt and inefficient Karzai government is such that no long term stability can be achieved. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan, the country will revert over time to what it always has been--a geographical expression in which assorted rival tribal groups co-exist in some degree of cold peace.

The goal of the US and its allies in Afghanistan is and always has been the destruction of al-Qaeda and Taliban. More than that has been either wishful thinking, self-delusion, or flat out tergiversation.

The situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are and always have been connected at the hip, shoulder and head. The elimination of Mehsud is important but not decisive in either of these interconnected wars. If--and only if--the Pakistani Army can take full, effective advantage of the new situation on the ground in the FATA can it be said honestly that we and our allies have reached, not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

The best advice which can be given the government and senior military leadership of Pakistan is that of the French national anthem: Form your battalions and march! March!

On Safari With Secretary Clinton

After urging African youth to use their skills with the new potentials of the Internet to expose corruption and other endemic sins of politics in the Dark Continent and spewing vague promises of support to the Transitional Federal Government in the geographic entity known as Somalia, the fast-stepping SecState donned her pith helmet and jetted into South Africa. In Pretoria, Ms Clinton dove into the deep end of Southern Africa's liberation mythology and its political implications.

Other than perusing the archives of Nelson Mandela, and "seeking better relations" with Pretoria, the former senator from New York sought to get the effective cooperation of South Africa in bringing stability, economic recovery, and governmental transparency to Zimbabwe. In the process of schmoozing the country's new foreign minister, Maite Nakoana Mashabane, Ms Clinton made all the requisite noises about South Africa being, along with China, India, and Brazil, one of the world's "major and emerging global powers."

She will make the same soft, soothing, and stroking noises when she meets with the new president Jacob Zuma tomorrow. It does all sound good and it is correct--in principle.

But, not so in practice. While a far cry from the nearly failed state of Zimbabwe, South Africa is facing a host of major problems. Most of them made by the majority rule based government. It may not be politically correct to write that, but the statement does have the simple virtue of being accurate.

Emblematic of the problems besetting South Africa is the pending strike against the national electric company, Eskom. The country's largest union is in the final stages of negotiations. If these fail, the strike will further paralyse South Africa's mining industry. Production of both platinum and gold have already been adversely effected by rolling brownouts caused by the failure of the government to budget for long necessary infrastructure improvements and repairs.

The big money makers for South Africa are minerals, gold, platinum, and chrome. Diamonds may be the most famous export, but the dollars--or rands--are in the minerals. The US takes a lot of these, accounting for nearly twelve percent of the South African exports.

Any further curtailment of mineral production such as would necessarily result from a strike against Eskom shakes the country's economy--hard. The gap between the union's demands (fourteen percent pay hike) and the company's offer (eight percent) as well as the current inflation rate of 6.9 percent makes the probability of a strike very high.

Another union has already hit the national telecommunications company. The communications workers hit the bricks in four of South Africa's nine provinces. In addition, the union representing the platinum miners rejected an 8.5 percent wage increase, holding firm at 15 percent, so the threat of layered strikes is high. While the rail workers called off their 28 July strike, the state rail company, Metrorail, is not likely to meet the 12.5 percent increase the union wants. Strike three!

Not surprisingly both the rand and the South African stock market tottered more than a little.

With beaucoup strikers added to the large pool of previously unemployed people, the economy is likely to shake, rattle, and roll even more than it has in recent months. This can easily lead to political problems for President Zuma, who was elected on promises to end inflation and unemployment alike. He has not been able to pay off on the promises with the result that street demonstrations blasted across the country last month. More are in the offing.

While it is customary to put the onus for South Africa's current problems on the residue of the ancien regime, it has been more than a decade since majority rule became the rule. Since then the indigenous governments have shown a remarkable willingness to benefit their supporters rather than make proper investments in the common political and economic weal. While no where near so extreme as in, say, Zimbabwe, there has been a propensity to shower goodies on the Alte Kampfer of the liberation movement to the detriment of the country as a whole.

For years the nature of the global economy allowed this short-sighted, ethnocentric approach to government. But, the events of the past couple of years brought the flow of cash and goodies to an end. The dues collector is at the door.

Since South Africa's mineral riches and impressive (white developed) industrial infrastructure and agricultural equivalent has made the country the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, any sort of major spasm there will echo throughout Africa. The spasm will happen unless the government can focus on efficiency even at the expense of liberation mythology.

The very heavy hand of this myth rests on President Zuma as it did on his less-than-impressive predecessor Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was so anti-white, anti-West that he was in a state of constant denial about the realities around him including the high HIV infection rate in South Africa. This attitude coupled in a synergistic way with the Bush/Cheney regime's unique ability to either ignore or insult countries which were not in total tandem with its policies to sour bilateral relations.

Ms Clinton is aware of the Bush/Cheney delinquency but seems totally oblivious to the power of the liberation mythology. Zuma no more than Mbeki will be able to step out of the shadow of the myth to pressure liberation "hero" Mugabe next door in Zimbabwe. This, in turn, means that Zimbabwe will remain a running sore. The refugees will continue to flock to South Africa and other neighboring states. Additional costs will be imposed on South Africa at a time when the country cannot afford them.

Additional costs will couple with continued alienation among Zuma's base with destabilizing effects. A tipping point may be reached with results which will be devastating to the country. Any increase in white flight from South Africa will do the country no good. And, white flight can be stimulated quickly by any move by the government to expropriate or otherwise take wealth, land, or businesses from white owners.

The unfortunate history of post-colonial Africa has shown time and time again that when economic conditions are such as to breed unrest among the lower socio-economic segments, governments respond by seizing property from the white minority regardless of the longer term consequences. Governments, particularly new ones, live in the shortest of short terms.

This potential is the unmentioned T. rex at the meetings between Secretary Clinton and the South African ForMin and President. It is not the sort of thing that anyone likes to mention--particularly if one is a progressive, a believer in multi-cultural diversity as the touchstone of an "enlightened" society and polity.

The potential of social dislocation bringing ill-advised government seizures and white flight is real enough, close enough, that failing to get a grip on this brutal ground truth will spell ruin to the well intentioned effort to build a new relation with South Africa. It also will spell the difference between South Africa as a "global and emerging" nation and South Africa as the next African basket case.

Finally--An End To The "Global War On Terrorism"

Among the idiotic actions of the Bush/Cheney administration was declaring war on terrorism. The notion of fighting a war against a specific tactic was both illogical and distracting. One fights an enemy--not the tactics the enemy employs.

Finally, the abominable circumlocution has been heaved out of the official US lexicon. Counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan gave the old "GWOT" the heave ho in a speech at Georgetown yesterday. The Geek applauds.

The Geek is not ready to give Brennan and the Obama administration kudos for abandoning the term "jihad" and its cognates. Tossing out "jihad" is an exercise in the absurd. It is also lacking in logic.

Brennan admits that our enemy, which he defines as al-Qaeda and akin groups, are seeking the establishment of a "global caliphate." Well, golly-gee, ain't that a religiously motivated goal? You know, Shariah and all that?

Then, gosh, what is wrong with "jihad?"

According to Brennan, the term means the internal struggle on the part of the believer to be an ever better Muslim. He is right. That is one of the word's denotative values. The lesser one.

The greater meaning is armed struggle against the infidels and apostates. It is an obligation on all good Muslims. It is the means by which "The House of Peace" (Islam) will defeat, conquer and occupy "The House of War" (everyone else.)

What is hard to understand about this? It is in the Sacred Writings of Islam as well as all the revered commentaries by Islamic scholars over the centuries. Heck, it is even what the jihadists say they are waging--jihad against the infidels and apostates.

Certainly as an old Mideast hand for the Agency, Mr Brennan is quite well aware of the word, its primary meaning, and its widespread currency. There is no need to attenuate the reality--particularly as Mr Brennan has correctly described the long-term goal of the Islamists including their armed component, the jihadists.

It is not, as Mr Brennan and others would pretend, a matter of elevating criminals to the dignity of religion. Not that at all. Rather it is a matter of correctly identifying the use of religiously rooted terms and concepts to justify criminal acts.

The religious coloration given to criminal acts by quoting Koranic verses, issuing fatwas, and insisting that jihad is incumbent on every true Muslim does not alter the basic nature of the act. Rather, acknowledging the use of concepts and terms from religion by terrorists and other criminals allows the proper parsing between observant Muslims and jihadists.

Getting beyond terms--important as these are in the definition of the enemy--and looking at motivations, Brennan seems to have adopted the socio-economic-political stance. He appears to have bought into the thesis that economic marginalisation, political marginalisation, and poor education are the root causes of Islamist terrorism.

While the poor, the disenfranchised, and ignorant are to be found in the ranks of Islamist jihadist groups including al-Qaeda, so also are the un-poor, the enfranchised, the educated. One need not be a former CIA officer nor a counter-terrorism specialist to know that the overwhelming majority of the leaders, the planners, even the executors of high profile attacks, have been drawn from the ranks of the economically well-founded, the educated, the upwardly mobile, even those who could have a most comfortable and well-integrated existence in their host society.

Even in the Gaza Strip an appreciable number of wannabe martyrs to say nothing of those who command and control them are not the flotsam of the refugee camps, the detritus of war. Even in that armpit of the human race, the chief jihadists, and most of the trigger pullers and suicide vest wearers are not poor, alienated, hopeless.

Social work, psychiatric intervention, economic uplift, educational outreach will not dent the population of actual or potential jihadists and the Islamists who direct their lives--and deaths. It beggars the imagination to believe that a man with the experience of Mr Brennan does not know this.

Islamists and jihadists alike are True Believers as Eric Hoffer defined the term. Their identity as individuals with worth and meaning is derived completely from their acceptance of and subscription to a particular interpretation of Islam. Some of the Islamists and jihadists are also nationalist True Believers. The combination of religious and nationalist True Belief cannot be addressed by mere economic or political reforms. Nor can it be countered by "public diplomacy" and education.

To the Islamist jihadist True Believer, other Muslims, even the most observant who do not share their world view of a global caliphate, Shariah for all, and the use of all means--fair or foul--to attain these goals, are suspect at best. The Islamist jihadist True Believer is more totalistic in his motivation than was even the most committed Nazi or Marxist-Leninist. Get a grip on that ground truth.

Mr Brennan has spent most of his adult life at the Agency. That sort of experience is noted for its breeding of a cynical but realistic view of people and their motivations. It is difficult to accept that Mr Brennan escaped this. Or that he really believes the pap about social work, economic development, and education as even a partial counter to the enemy before us.

However, Mr Brennan's boss, POTUS Obama is probably so naive as to believe that some ACORN style community organizing will end the jihadist (OOPS! Bad Geek! You should have written "violent extremist.") menace. And, as the hoary cliche has it: You have to go along to get along.

Sure, use the soft power tools to peel away the softest of the soft-core support for the Islamist jihadist agenda. That might work. But, for the hard core, the True Believers, there is but one sovereign remedy. They must be killed.

As the white eyes used to say about a chunk of the Geek's ancestors: "The only good Apache is a dead one." Every now and then as in the recent case of Baitullah Mehsud, we do manufacture a good Islamist jihadist.

The real deal is the need to make a whole lot more "good jihadists" not rename them.