This time around the coveted "What A Maroon!" Award goes to the foreign policy component of the Obama administration. Rarely has an administration equaled, let alone exceeded the current one's capacity to be totally divorced from the real world requirements of national interest. While the Obama foreign policy "Team" has tried hard to demonstrate just how far its policies could be removed from either reality or national interest, their handling of Pakistan surpasses all former gaffes.
Hilary Clinton announced the awarding of a two billion dollar package of aid to the Pakistani military. With an irony far outstripping the merely heavy handed, the announcement came only hours after the same brain trust alluded to the possibility of barring some Pakistani military units from receiving American largess or training due to personnel from these formations having engaged in extrajudicial executions--at least one of which was caught on video.
By law the US government is precluded from providing aid to military forces which grossly violate the laws of land warfare or those governing human rights. For reasons left unexplained the Secretary of State did not make any reference to the possible sanctions when passing the word of the latest attempt to bribe the Pakistani government and military.
The US government has a long, bi-partisan history of offering bribes to Islamabad. These bribes have been unsolicited on rare occasions. More typically the lads in Islamabad--whether in uniform or mufti--make extortionate demands of the give-us-money-or-something-horrid-but-unspecified-will-happen variety. The US government showing the courage of a rabbit and the intellectual vacuity of a snail always pays up.
And so it is with Ms Clinton and the others of Team Obama. Even Secretary of Defense Gates, a man normally well known for his realism, integrity, and intelligence has gone along with the grim charade. This is most unfortunate as it provides a gloss of respectability to a policy which is both indefensible and contrary to longer term US interests in the region.
Bob Gates, after all, was around in the days of the Reagan administration. He was there when all hands down in the lower levels of the food chain who were both situationally aware and unheeding of careers warned against turning over more responsibility to the Pakistanis in the end game period of the proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In those here-there-be-tiger days, the low ranking field hands stated categorically that further Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan would redound ultimately against the better interests of both the Afghans and the US.
The decision makers in and near the Oval trusted the assurances from Islamabad. They trusted in the power of American bribes. They trusted in the ability of the Pakistanis to stay bought once we paid their price.
Of course this attitude was unjustified by mere facts, the facts of Pakistani (and Muslim) history, the facts of the ongoing Indo-Pakistani conflict. Afghanistan was an annoying sideshow. Pakistan had been pro-US during all the years when the Indians were locked in a love fest with Moscow. And, the Pakistanis came cheap--or so it seemed way back then.
It is not that the US did not know what Islamabad's ambitions in Afghanistan were twenty years ago. We knew them as well as we know the current plans harbored by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the army. Then as now Pakistan wants to have operational dominance over Afghanistan for reasons outlined in numerous previous posts.
Ignoring Islamabad's plans were part of the bribe in those bygone years. Similarly, the US had to publicly ignore Pakistan's nuclear hopes--until Islamabad pushed the "Fire!" button. Even then, presented by an accomplished feat, the US rejoinders to this act of obstreperous nuclear proliferation was mild, not to say weak of knee. Another part of the never ending bribery.
An unreasoning fear of just what the Pakistanis might or might not do has rendered the Islamabad extortion plot all the more effective. It has forced our silence over the policies in Afghanistan. It has forced our acceptance of their nuclear capacity without measurable cost to the proliferator. It has cost us literally billions of dollars.
To date the positive results have been so close to zilch that an electron microscope would be necessary to detect them. The negative consequences are far more evident. They include among others: Taliban, the A.Q. Khan network, the origins of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the stoking of Indo-Pakistani tensions, the support of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere, and the emboldening of advocates of violent political Islam .
Whew!
With that record it is hard to find any real world based justification for the latest bribe. It comes hard on the heels of two previous handsome gratuities--the seven plus billion dollar multi-year civilian aid program and the enormous flood rescue and reconstruction effort. In return for this set of payments, totalling well over ten billion dollars, the US must plan (hope?) to get something in return other than that mythical quality, "good will."
The US expects (wishes?) that in return for these commitments the Pakistani government and military will undertake two critical actions. One is simply that the army will get off its collective duff and take the war to the final redoubts in North Waziristan. The other is that neither ISI nor the army nor the government will attempt to derail the tentative talks between elements of Taliban and the Karzai government.
The talks which have been admitted to by both Afghan and US officials are in their earliest and most delicate stages. The talks are underway in response to the success of the US/ISAF/Afghan national forces campaigns to date, particularly that near Kandahar. (Even the NYT had to admit that we were having real success there, much to its chagrin.)
Taliban, or, more accurately, elements of Taliban are seeing that the better alternative is a political settlement giving them a role in Afghanistan's future. Intentionally, Mullah Omar has been excluded from the talks along with others of high rank and under the control of ISI. The position of many even in the Quetta Shura is that Omar's day has come and gone. There is also a wide spread realization that too many in Taliban and other insurgent groups have suffered too much and too long not for Afghanistan and the Afghan people or even Islam but rather for the agenda of Islamabad, the ambitions of ISI.
In short, nationalism has conspired with battlefield realities to convince more than a few in Taliban that the time to give peace a chance is upon them. The Karzai government, nationalist to the core, could not agree more. Beyond that the Karzai government (and at least some in Taliban) know the US and its Western partners will be leaving. Perhaps leaving soon.
They also understand perfectly that Pakistan is not leaving. Pakistan is quite willing and able to use any and all means to control Afghan affairs for its own purposes and reasons. No good Afghan is willing to accept that. As has been the case before, nationalism trumps the "universal" nature of Islam. The Pakistanis have ridden the Prophet's Horse too long and too hard.
Still the ISI and other Pakistan players have the potential to play the spoilers role. There is no doubt but many in the army as well as the civilian government would be willing to do just that. It is important to the US, our allies, and the Afghans that Pakistan not stop the talks or halt the move to peace in some other way.
Enter the bribe.
It won't be enough. The Pakistanis will not abandon their goal of having operational dominance over Afghanistan any more than they will abandon their constant building of new and better nuclear systems. Both are central to their anti-India focus. While the specter of India may be a phantom now, it is the phantom which will not vanish with the coming of day. Fear and loathing of India is not simply the only justification for the army's existence at its bloated and expensive level, it is the existential foundation of Pakistan.
It does not matter that there is no reality behind the black myth of India, its existence is central to the continued existence of Pakistan. Should Pakistanis ever come to grips with the unpleasant truth that Muslims in India not only do not live at some disadvantage compared to their Hindu neighbors but actually have a present standard of living as well as future prospects which exceed those of most Pakistanis things might change. But, absent that level of a sanity attack, nothing will alter for the better.
Not that anything so banal as reality will beat myth enhanced by generations of internally directed propaganda and reinforced by religion.
Pakistan will try to stop the talks. Similarly, the army will not move with effectiveness against North Waziristan. Moving against ones own clients is not in the cards. Or, so dictates the voice of reality.
The bribes will not work. They will only encourage more demands, more extortion, more reluctance to offer more than minimal compliance to US policy requirements.
Admittedly, the latest bribes come with some thin, slight strings. The conditions are enough to cause howls of protest from the ever-so-sensitive nationalists of the army and government. They are not sufficient to have any benefits from the American perspective.
Mental illness, it has been said, exists when a person repeats the same unsuccessful efforts irrespective of experience. The same might be said of governments, which, after all, are mere assemblages of individuals.
Or, they might just get the "What A Maroon!" Award.
Friday, October 22, 2010
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Red Faces On Red Square
OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the red faces are not in Red Square but right nearby in the Kremlin. The cause for the embarrassment is easy to discover. Despite recent declarations of victory, the advocates and practitioners of violent political Islam are not only alive and well in Chechnya but eager to show their vitality.
As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve. Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.
The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny. They died, of course. They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.
The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted. The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year. In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.
Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle. This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated. He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."
The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year. But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.
For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties. Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005. In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period. All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.
The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus. Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency. The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."
The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate. While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic. The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.
Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring. The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance." Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies. While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat. With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.
If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable. The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings. In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus. Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.
The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics. Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency. The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation. Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.
Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy. Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets. Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.
Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies. Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition. This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.
Back to the drawing board, Vladimir. The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism. The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior. It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid. So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.
In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin. The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan. The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.
Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley. The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years. Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.
The IUU has been around since 1991. Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well. Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports. This make IUU a large and growing threat.
The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone. The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents. However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.
Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents. Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division. This unit shares responsibility for border security. Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.
The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water. Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.
Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region. Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.
The US has a bull in this herd. Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses. The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan. Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.
The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions. More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere. To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.
There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia. The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran. In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.
Don't you just love it?
As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve. Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.
The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny. They died, of course. They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.
The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted. The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year. In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.
Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle. This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated. He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."
The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year. But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.
For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties. Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005. In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period. All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.
The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus. Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency. The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."
The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate. While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic. The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.
Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring. The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance." Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies. While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat. With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.
If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable. The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings. In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus. Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.
The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics. Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency. The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation. Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.
Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy. Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets. Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.
Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies. Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition. This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.
Back to the drawing board, Vladimir. The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism. The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior. It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid. So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.
In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin. The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan. The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.
Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley. The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years. Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.
The IUU has been around since 1991. Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well. Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports. This make IUU a large and growing threat.
The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone. The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents. However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.
Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents. Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division. This unit shares responsibility for border security. Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.
The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water. Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.
Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region. Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.
The US has a bull in this herd. Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses. The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan. Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.
The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions. More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere. To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.
There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia. The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran. In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.
Don't you just love it?
Monday, October 18, 2010
NATO Heads For The Rocks--Again
NATO has been the cynosure of mission drift ever since the Soviet Union went toes up twenty years ago. The attacks of 9/11 provided a brief respite from its drift into uselessness. With the pervasive disillusionment over the adventure in Afghanistan rising, the organization is once more heading to the abyss.
This is not to say that NATO no longer has a vital reason for existence. It does. While life may be all kisses and hugs with the Russians, the ground truth remains: Europe remains a threatened region. The elites of the place may not like to admit it and the budget crunches militate against a realistic appraisal of the degree of threat currently extant, but neither can gainsay the looming mushroom shaped shadow of Iran.
The Iranian potential has been directly addressed by the US proposal to base interceptor missiles and associated radar facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland. The US under two very different presidents has pushed the installation as being critical for the defense of Western Europe against incoming Iranian missiles. At least some other NATO members have joined with the US in this effort, braving the opposition of Moscow backed by all the usual Kremlin huffings and puffings. The matter is still on the table after years of talks, preliminary actions, diplomatic faux pas, and alterations in the hardware constellation and basing concepts.
Now the measure is being opposed by NATO member Turkey. Under the AKP, a political party with strong roots in armed political Islam, Turkey has moved ever closer to Iran. The calculating Turkish leader, Erdogan, along with the ambitious and naive Brazilian president Lula brokered a specious "deal" regarding Iran's nuclear program last year which was rejected by the US and its partners. Since then Erdogan and company have spewed anti-American words beyond count, alternating attacks on Washington with standard issue antisemitic billingsgate in the direction of Israel.
Recently the Turkish government announced it was removing Iran from the list of countries threatening Turkey. At the same time the Ankara Bunch hyped the new joint campaign against Kurds which was being mounted with both Iran and Syria. As the hoary cliche has it, "birds of a feather..."
Furthering the Tehran agenda, the Turkish delegation to NATO has opened what it is pleased to call "negotiations" with a view to blocking the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system if it is targeted against Iran. Suddenly the Erdogan government is very much opposed to the idea of NATO calling Syria or Iran "enemies." The peace loving Turks are offended by the notion that any neighboring country might actually use ballistic missiles and consider the defense system to be provocative.
The "negotiations" opened by the Turks in Brussels will lead to one of two outcomes. NATO will develop some formula which will not name Iran or Syria but will represent the system as a counter to a broad spectrum of hypothetical threats from somewhere in northwest Asia. Or it will not.
If NATO does not invent some sort of diplomatic language acceptable to the very sensitive people in Ankara, then the Turks will have the potential to directly block deployment. NATO runs by consensus; this means that a single formal objection prevails. The consensus approach gives Iran's strong ally the power to prevent Western and Central Europe from undertaking necessary defense measures. Does the word "absurd" come to mind? Or "idiotic?" Maybe "asinine."
Of course, NATO could drop the consensus theme. This would, of necessity as well as calculation, hack off Ankara. The Turks might even threaten to leave the organization. This eventuality will upset any number of multikulti oriented folks. Winds of chaos would be seen blowing throughout Europe. All the usual and quite expectable hyperbole would ensue.
If NATO is to continue as a relevant body meriting American support and participation, it has no choice but to come to terms with the nature of the threats confronting Europe now and into the future. While there is always a remote possibility that Russia will rethink its current foreign policy and grab a blast from the Soviet past, the real threat, the one which is up close and personal, is that of armed political Islam. It should go without saying that Iran is the pillar of armed political Islam.
The mullahs and their frontmen have diplomatic ambitions which are literally global in nature. At the moment the primary focus is on what Tehran sees as their "near abroad." That is the Persian Gulf, the Central Asian Republics, Northwest Asia, and the Mideast. But their vision is not myopic. Beyond the "near abroad" are other regions in which Tehran seeks clout. Europe is one. Latin America is another. And, should those prove insufficient to meet the Iranian appetite, there is the rest of the world.
Absurd as it may seem on first sight, Iran defines itself as a global power in the making. Given ruthless ambition, nuclear weapons, regional hegemony, and a combination of Chinese support and Western spinelessness, the ambition is not so hallucinatory.
Europeans well understand a phenomenon which went by the name of "Finlandization." The Soviet Union had no need to occupy Finland after World War II. The threat was sufficient to assure Finland was compliant, a dutiful stooge on the world stage and an accommodating supplier of advanced technology icebreakers and other equipment at artificially low prices.
It was the American presence along with the American nuclear deterrent which prevented the Soviet Union from expanding the concept from Finland to all of Europe. It is illustrative to note that whenever the US was preoccupied elsewhere or going through its post-Vietnam angst, Europeans made placatory moves toward the Kremlin.
The same dynamic is possible, even probable, should (or when) Iran gains a nuclear capability to go with its missiles and ambitions. This gives additional impetus to the planned ABM system. There is no doubt that the leaders in Iran understand this. They are realists in many essential respects. Thus, it is critical to the longer term needs of Iranian policy that the planned deployment be stopped or at least delayed as long as possible.
Turkey is playing Tehran's game once again. The US and other powers need to call Ankara on this move. Call the bluff. No negotiations. No calling the planned system by some euphemism. Tell the Turks the time has come to choose sides: NATO or Tehran. Let the dinosaurs of the multicultural sort wheeze, moan, and groan. If NATO is to survive, perhaps to be reborn, it must be as the bulwark against the expansion of armed political Islam.
To do this, the countries of NATO must tell the Turks bluntly that the days of the expansionist Ottoman Empire are gone. The gates of Vienna are long locked. And, no combination of Islamic ambition and Turkish revanchism will unlock them.
This is not to say that NATO no longer has a vital reason for existence. It does. While life may be all kisses and hugs with the Russians, the ground truth remains: Europe remains a threatened region. The elites of the place may not like to admit it and the budget crunches militate against a realistic appraisal of the degree of threat currently extant, but neither can gainsay the looming mushroom shaped shadow of Iran.
The Iranian potential has been directly addressed by the US proposal to base interceptor missiles and associated radar facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland. The US under two very different presidents has pushed the installation as being critical for the defense of Western Europe against incoming Iranian missiles. At least some other NATO members have joined with the US in this effort, braving the opposition of Moscow backed by all the usual Kremlin huffings and puffings. The matter is still on the table after years of talks, preliminary actions, diplomatic faux pas, and alterations in the hardware constellation and basing concepts.
Now the measure is being opposed by NATO member Turkey. Under the AKP, a political party with strong roots in armed political Islam, Turkey has moved ever closer to Iran. The calculating Turkish leader, Erdogan, along with the ambitious and naive Brazilian president Lula brokered a specious "deal" regarding Iran's nuclear program last year which was rejected by the US and its partners. Since then Erdogan and company have spewed anti-American words beyond count, alternating attacks on Washington with standard issue antisemitic billingsgate in the direction of Israel.
Recently the Turkish government announced it was removing Iran from the list of countries threatening Turkey. At the same time the Ankara Bunch hyped the new joint campaign against Kurds which was being mounted with both Iran and Syria. As the hoary cliche has it, "birds of a feather..."
Furthering the Tehran agenda, the Turkish delegation to NATO has opened what it is pleased to call "negotiations" with a view to blocking the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system if it is targeted against Iran. Suddenly the Erdogan government is very much opposed to the idea of NATO calling Syria or Iran "enemies." The peace loving Turks are offended by the notion that any neighboring country might actually use ballistic missiles and consider the defense system to be provocative.
The "negotiations" opened by the Turks in Brussels will lead to one of two outcomes. NATO will develop some formula which will not name Iran or Syria but will represent the system as a counter to a broad spectrum of hypothetical threats from somewhere in northwest Asia. Or it will not.
If NATO does not invent some sort of diplomatic language acceptable to the very sensitive people in Ankara, then the Turks will have the potential to directly block deployment. NATO runs by consensus; this means that a single formal objection prevails. The consensus approach gives Iran's strong ally the power to prevent Western and Central Europe from undertaking necessary defense measures. Does the word "absurd" come to mind? Or "idiotic?" Maybe "asinine."
Of course, NATO could drop the consensus theme. This would, of necessity as well as calculation, hack off Ankara. The Turks might even threaten to leave the organization. This eventuality will upset any number of multikulti oriented folks. Winds of chaos would be seen blowing throughout Europe. All the usual and quite expectable hyperbole would ensue.
If NATO is to continue as a relevant body meriting American support and participation, it has no choice but to come to terms with the nature of the threats confronting Europe now and into the future. While there is always a remote possibility that Russia will rethink its current foreign policy and grab a blast from the Soviet past, the real threat, the one which is up close and personal, is that of armed political Islam. It should go without saying that Iran is the pillar of armed political Islam.
The mullahs and their frontmen have diplomatic ambitions which are literally global in nature. At the moment the primary focus is on what Tehran sees as their "near abroad." That is the Persian Gulf, the Central Asian Republics, Northwest Asia, and the Mideast. But their vision is not myopic. Beyond the "near abroad" are other regions in which Tehran seeks clout. Europe is one. Latin America is another. And, should those prove insufficient to meet the Iranian appetite, there is the rest of the world.
Absurd as it may seem on first sight, Iran defines itself as a global power in the making. Given ruthless ambition, nuclear weapons, regional hegemony, and a combination of Chinese support and Western spinelessness, the ambition is not so hallucinatory.
Europeans well understand a phenomenon which went by the name of "Finlandization." The Soviet Union had no need to occupy Finland after World War II. The threat was sufficient to assure Finland was compliant, a dutiful stooge on the world stage and an accommodating supplier of advanced technology icebreakers and other equipment at artificially low prices.
It was the American presence along with the American nuclear deterrent which prevented the Soviet Union from expanding the concept from Finland to all of Europe. It is illustrative to note that whenever the US was preoccupied elsewhere or going through its post-Vietnam angst, Europeans made placatory moves toward the Kremlin.
The same dynamic is possible, even probable, should (or when) Iran gains a nuclear capability to go with its missiles and ambitions. This gives additional impetus to the planned ABM system. There is no doubt that the leaders in Iran understand this. They are realists in many essential respects. Thus, it is critical to the longer term needs of Iranian policy that the planned deployment be stopped or at least delayed as long as possible.
Turkey is playing Tehran's game once again. The US and other powers need to call Ankara on this move. Call the bluff. No negotiations. No calling the planned system by some euphemism. Tell the Turks the time has come to choose sides: NATO or Tehran. Let the dinosaurs of the multicultural sort wheeze, moan, and groan. If NATO is to survive, perhaps to be reborn, it must be as the bulwark against the expansion of armed political Islam.
To do this, the countries of NATO must tell the Turks bluntly that the days of the expansionist Ottoman Empire are gone. The gates of Vienna are long locked. And, no combination of Islamic ambition and Turkish revanchism will unlock them.
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Ask The Geek!
In a new occasional feature the Geek will respond to questions from his ever so personal mailbag---both snail and e. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the Geek will post answers to questions he would have liked to receive from people who ought to be asking them. Here is the first---
Dear Geek,
There is a lot of verbiage to the effect that the Karzai government has opened preliminary talks with the two main insurgent groups, Taliban and the Haqqani network. Word has it that the US is cooperating and facilitating the process.
Now my question is this: Does the start of talks mean that I and my colleagues on the editorial board have been correct and the US is about to accept defeat in Afghanistan or is the opposite the case (say it isn't so, Geek) and the US approach to counterinsurgency is actually working and Washington may achieve the minimal strategic goal of not losing?
Give me an answer ASAP as my coworkers here as well as our counterparts at the NYT and MoveOn.org are nervous wrecks.
Signed, Perplexed at the WaPo
Dear Perplexed,
You have asked a key question, indeed the keyest of questions. In order to provide an answer which is complete, accurate, and (hopefully) easy to comprehend by people such as yourself, it is necessary to go back to the basics. You have to understand how the insurgency game is played as well as how it ends to say nothing of why it ends to decide who is "winning" or "losing."
So, like the coach sez, "Back to basics." (All of the following points have been discussed in previous posts, so consider this a review. Pay attention as this will be on the final.
Insurgency is the armed expression of political disaffiliation with the goal of either completely replacing the system of government in operation or creating a new state. The target in all insurgencies is the loyalty and support of the majority of the population most of whom are not particularly committed to either the government or the insurgents. The purpose of all operations and activities both violent and peaceful by both the insurgents and the government is the mobilization of support among the uncommitted majority while demobilizing support from the opponent.
In the contest for the affiliation of the uncommitted majority, both the government and the insurgents have the same two basic methods. One is to emphasize legitimacy. The other is coercion. Think of it as a set of wrenches and a battery of hammers.
Legitimacy comes in two forms, existential (the nature of the relationship itself between authority and citizen) and functional (what can or have you done for me the citizen lately?)
In the legitimacy contest the government normally has the advantages--if it can actually provide effective services to the population including security. The question of existential legitimacy is harder to address, but in Afghanistan the insurgents can claim the higher authority as they maintain they are representing the purest, most fundamental form of Islam while the government is apostate.
An insurgent group is like a three tier onion.
The first layer is the passive mass support base. These people are sources of support, logistics, intelligence and recruiting provided not too much risk or inconvenience is involved.
Closer to the center is the active mass support base. People in this category are willing to take risks, pull triggers, plant bombs, penetrate the adversary's security forces, engage in propaganda and recruiting. The majority of active combatants are drawn from this category.
At the center of the onion is the hard core. These are the leaders, the planners, the executives, the middle management. By and large the hard core is constituted of True Believers. Typically the True Belief of the hard core members is so complete that the Belief becomes the source of individual identity and sense of self-worth to the extent that the insurgency is literally existential for these people.
The supporters of the government can be divided in the same way: passive and active mass support base and hard core. The crucial difference rests with the simple fact that the hard core of the government and its supporting elites are not propelled by a totalistic True Belief. For the government the insurgency does not constitute an existential conflict.
This distinction implies something quite central in the process of ending an insurgency, In seeking both hostilities termination and the far more important end stage of conflict resolution, the government and its hard core supporters can choose to seek the reintegration of the insurgents as well as provide mechanisms of power sharing. Because the struggle is not existential, the government can go for the option of operational dominance rather than absolute authority.
The insurgents do not have this option. They must go for the big gold ring of absolute authority. The power of True Belief admits of no compromise, no sharing. This is particularly true with the Mighty Men of the One True Faith raised with the pornography of hell and the appeals of paradise from earliest childhood on.
Before looking in detail at what has transpired during the past year or so in Afghanistan, there is one last very important bit of context to keep in mind. In an insurgent environment, outsiders have no existential legitimacy and only limited functional. The single greatest source of functional legitimacy available to an outsider whether the US and the other components of the ISAF or the Arab and other foreign fighters in the ranks of Taliban is the capacity and willingness to insulate the civilians of the uncommitted majority from the risks of war. This is why not killing local non-combatants is so critical--the outsider who kills least is most likely to gain legitimacy and thus the assistance of the locals.
The US and other ISAF forces have put the members of the active mass support base of the insurgents under ever greater pressure. The costs, the risks of aligning with the insurgents have been increased, and the probability of a pay off for such alignment has decreased. The Karzai government has made it clear that it is quite prepared to provide reintegration and power sharing mechanisms to insurgents who renounce violence and agree to abide by the Afghan constitution.
While operations in Afghanistan have been putting the squeeze on, other approaches have focused on the hard core. It is critical to understand that the hard core cannot be converted, cannot be "pacified." The nature and character of the religiously predicated insurgency means the hard core membership must be killed, or, if detained, be detained in perpetuity.
The permanent removal of senior or midlevel hard core personnel not only take personalities off the board, it disrupts the organization. The brain drain of experienced commanders and technical specialists combines synergistically with the increase in operational frictions resulting from the disruption of the organization to limit combat and political effectiveness.
Over the past year, with a particular emphasis on the past six months, the US and its allies including the larger and marginally improved Afghan security forces have killed or captured over six hundred insurgents who are hard core and serve in command or technical billets. Additionally, the Predator attacks in the FATA have energetically disassembled a generous chunk of hard core leaders and technicians.
The insurgents have been demonstrating a decreased capacity to gain and retain the initiative. This does not mean they are incapable of fighting effectively in defense. They can and are. However, the insurgents have once again shifted to low risk attacks on soft targets. This results in a greater number of dead and wounded civilians.
While Afghans are relatively tolerant of Muslim Taliban killing Muslim Afghan civilians as contrasted with infidel killed Muslim Afghan civilians, there are limits. The limits have been reached. One important result is the weakening of the insurgent passive mass support base. Another is the increase in actionable intelligence from civilians. Yet another is the willingness of offended locals to take up their "personal assault weapons" and take out after obnoxious Taliban or Haqqani network units.
The killing of hard core personalities along with the greater military pressure on the active mass support base members in Helmand province and nearby territory has complemented the Karzai political reconciliation approach. It is to be regretted that the US at the highest levels of government was slow to understand and support what Karzai was up to. Be that as it may, we have awakened and smelled the coffee.
As it stands right now the insurgents in Afghanistan are in a graveyard spiral. For the moment at least, the correlation of forces favors the government in Kabul and its foreign supporters. Continued use of the military hammers while backing Karzai's play should see an acceleration in the favorable trends early next year, say March or April.
Do not despair, Perplexed. The Geek understands that his assessment does not lead to the conclusions which you and your associates at the WaPo desire but there is still hope. The joker in the deck is President Obama's drop dead date for commencement of withdrawal. It is still there, twisting in the wind, giving hope for the Ever Victorious Thugs of Allah.
Since insurgency is a contest of political wills which in no way exempts outsiders like us, it is yet possible for us to defeat ourselves. Further hope exists in the friction between Mr Obama and the aren't-we-so-civilized bunch on his "Team" on the one hand and President Karzai on the other that the whole move toward genuine peace and power sharing talks may be abruptly ended at our instance. Or, the Pakistani government may either collapse or lurch toward armed political Islam.
So, Perplexed, be of good cheer there are still ample opportunities for the US to suffer defeat. Just think of those nifty headlines you might yet write.
Dear Geek,
There is a lot of verbiage to the effect that the Karzai government has opened preliminary talks with the two main insurgent groups, Taliban and the Haqqani network. Word has it that the US is cooperating and facilitating the process.
Now my question is this: Does the start of talks mean that I and my colleagues on the editorial board have been correct and the US is about to accept defeat in Afghanistan or is the opposite the case (say it isn't so, Geek) and the US approach to counterinsurgency is actually working and Washington may achieve the minimal strategic goal of not losing?
Give me an answer ASAP as my coworkers here as well as our counterparts at the NYT and MoveOn.org are nervous wrecks.
Signed, Perplexed at the WaPo
Dear Perplexed,
You have asked a key question, indeed the keyest of questions. In order to provide an answer which is complete, accurate, and (hopefully) easy to comprehend by people such as yourself, it is necessary to go back to the basics. You have to understand how the insurgency game is played as well as how it ends to say nothing of why it ends to decide who is "winning" or "losing."
So, like the coach sez, "Back to basics." (All of the following points have been discussed in previous posts, so consider this a review. Pay attention as this will be on the final.
Insurgency is the armed expression of political disaffiliation with the goal of either completely replacing the system of government in operation or creating a new state. The target in all insurgencies is the loyalty and support of the majority of the population most of whom are not particularly committed to either the government or the insurgents. The purpose of all operations and activities both violent and peaceful by both the insurgents and the government is the mobilization of support among the uncommitted majority while demobilizing support from the opponent.
In the contest for the affiliation of the uncommitted majority, both the government and the insurgents have the same two basic methods. One is to emphasize legitimacy. The other is coercion. Think of it as a set of wrenches and a battery of hammers.
Legitimacy comes in two forms, existential (the nature of the relationship itself between authority and citizen) and functional (what can or have you done for me the citizen lately?)
In the legitimacy contest the government normally has the advantages--if it can actually provide effective services to the population including security. The question of existential legitimacy is harder to address, but in Afghanistan the insurgents can claim the higher authority as they maintain they are representing the purest, most fundamental form of Islam while the government is apostate.
An insurgent group is like a three tier onion.
The first layer is the passive mass support base. These people are sources of support, logistics, intelligence and recruiting provided not too much risk or inconvenience is involved.
Closer to the center is the active mass support base. People in this category are willing to take risks, pull triggers, plant bombs, penetrate the adversary's security forces, engage in propaganda and recruiting. The majority of active combatants are drawn from this category.
At the center of the onion is the hard core. These are the leaders, the planners, the executives, the middle management. By and large the hard core is constituted of True Believers. Typically the True Belief of the hard core members is so complete that the Belief becomes the source of individual identity and sense of self-worth to the extent that the insurgency is literally existential for these people.
The supporters of the government can be divided in the same way: passive and active mass support base and hard core. The crucial difference rests with the simple fact that the hard core of the government and its supporting elites are not propelled by a totalistic True Belief. For the government the insurgency does not constitute an existential conflict.
This distinction implies something quite central in the process of ending an insurgency, In seeking both hostilities termination and the far more important end stage of conflict resolution, the government and its hard core supporters can choose to seek the reintegration of the insurgents as well as provide mechanisms of power sharing. Because the struggle is not existential, the government can go for the option of operational dominance rather than absolute authority.
The insurgents do not have this option. They must go for the big gold ring of absolute authority. The power of True Belief admits of no compromise, no sharing. This is particularly true with the Mighty Men of the One True Faith raised with the pornography of hell and the appeals of paradise from earliest childhood on.
Before looking in detail at what has transpired during the past year or so in Afghanistan, there is one last very important bit of context to keep in mind. In an insurgent environment, outsiders have no existential legitimacy and only limited functional. The single greatest source of functional legitimacy available to an outsider whether the US and the other components of the ISAF or the Arab and other foreign fighters in the ranks of Taliban is the capacity and willingness to insulate the civilians of the uncommitted majority from the risks of war. This is why not killing local non-combatants is so critical--the outsider who kills least is most likely to gain legitimacy and thus the assistance of the locals.
The US and other ISAF forces have put the members of the active mass support base of the insurgents under ever greater pressure. The costs, the risks of aligning with the insurgents have been increased, and the probability of a pay off for such alignment has decreased. The Karzai government has made it clear that it is quite prepared to provide reintegration and power sharing mechanisms to insurgents who renounce violence and agree to abide by the Afghan constitution.
While operations in Afghanistan have been putting the squeeze on, other approaches have focused on the hard core. It is critical to understand that the hard core cannot be converted, cannot be "pacified." The nature and character of the religiously predicated insurgency means the hard core membership must be killed, or, if detained, be detained in perpetuity.
The permanent removal of senior or midlevel hard core personnel not only take personalities off the board, it disrupts the organization. The brain drain of experienced commanders and technical specialists combines synergistically with the increase in operational frictions resulting from the disruption of the organization to limit combat and political effectiveness.
Over the past year, with a particular emphasis on the past six months, the US and its allies including the larger and marginally improved Afghan security forces have killed or captured over six hundred insurgents who are hard core and serve in command or technical billets. Additionally, the Predator attacks in the FATA have energetically disassembled a generous chunk of hard core leaders and technicians.
The insurgents have been demonstrating a decreased capacity to gain and retain the initiative. This does not mean they are incapable of fighting effectively in defense. They can and are. However, the insurgents have once again shifted to low risk attacks on soft targets. This results in a greater number of dead and wounded civilians.
While Afghans are relatively tolerant of Muslim Taliban killing Muslim Afghan civilians as contrasted with infidel killed Muslim Afghan civilians, there are limits. The limits have been reached. One important result is the weakening of the insurgent passive mass support base. Another is the increase in actionable intelligence from civilians. Yet another is the willingness of offended locals to take up their "personal assault weapons" and take out after obnoxious Taliban or Haqqani network units.
The killing of hard core personalities along with the greater military pressure on the active mass support base members in Helmand province and nearby territory has complemented the Karzai political reconciliation approach. It is to be regretted that the US at the highest levels of government was slow to understand and support what Karzai was up to. Be that as it may, we have awakened and smelled the coffee.
As it stands right now the insurgents in Afghanistan are in a graveyard spiral. For the moment at least, the correlation of forces favors the government in Kabul and its foreign supporters. Continued use of the military hammers while backing Karzai's play should see an acceleration in the favorable trends early next year, say March or April.
Do not despair, Perplexed. The Geek understands that his assessment does not lead to the conclusions which you and your associates at the WaPo desire but there is still hope. The joker in the deck is President Obama's drop dead date for commencement of withdrawal. It is still there, twisting in the wind, giving hope for the Ever Victorious Thugs of Allah.
Since insurgency is a contest of political wills which in no way exempts outsiders like us, it is yet possible for us to defeat ourselves. Further hope exists in the friction between Mr Obama and the aren't-we-so-civilized bunch on his "Team" on the one hand and President Karzai on the other that the whole move toward genuine peace and power sharing talks may be abruptly ended at our instance. Or, the Pakistani government may either collapse or lurch toward armed political Islam.
So, Perplexed, be of good cheer there are still ample opportunities for the US to suffer defeat. Just think of those nifty headlines you might yet write.
Friday, October 15, 2010
Special Relationships: Alive And Well? Or Going Down The Tube?
Whether the Obama administration likes the idea or not (or is even aware of it) the US has a number of "special relationships." Three have been called into question recently. In no particular order of importance, or specialness, these are: The Granddaddy of 'em all: the UK--the most solid in terms of approval by We the People: Israel--and, the most quiet of relations: Canada.
The relationship between the US and the UK was no doubt harmed by the cavalier treatment extended to the Brits by Mr Obama. However that damage was low and self-limiting--the two countries need each other too much to stay in a snit over the sheer ineptitude of a president and some of his "team."
More recently the strong, historically rooted special relationship between the "Mother country" and "The Colonies" has been put in a greater degree of very real peril by the upcoming British review of defense requirements. Due to a ukase from the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence is under irresistible pressure to cut its budget somewhere between twenty and forty percent. This means simply that the British must view the threats to their security and global interests over the next ten years in terms of the severely constricted budgetary environment currently extant.
The last time HMG attempted to cut the size of the threats to meet the cloth of the Exchequer was during the Thirties. The Great Depression was real. So also was the looming threat of expansionist Nazism, Fascism, and Imperial Japan. The budget driven weakness of the British was a major, arguably, the major, reason forcing the appeasement of Munich and the later set of defeats for British forces around the world.
At that time the US was available (along with the invaded Soviet Union) to provide the necessary wherewithal to contain and ultimately defeat the three aggressors. That, as they say, is history.
The fallout from the Great Recession has combined with the spendthrift policies of New Labor governments to compel a period of austerity not seen since the grim, grey days following World War II. The need for fiscal prudence is self-evident. Not so self-evident is the need or safety of placing a great burden on the defense establishment.
Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have viewed the potential retrenchment (to be polite) of the British armed services with a fair degree of public alarm. So also have a number of British senior officers, both active duty and retired.
Stripped to its essentials, any British defense program which is predicated on cutting its active duty ground combat forces to something on the order of eighty thousand will have the effect of making the UK a military nullity in any joint operations approaching even pre-surge Afghanistan. That unfortunate realty, a reality which will see British deployable battalions at forty percent authorized strength, is not compensated for by the very high quality of British troops. General Petraeus was not simply being polite and politic when he praised the British operations in Afghanistan; he was being essentially accurate.
Weak battalions remain weak battalions even when the "few" are trigger pullers without equal. In planning operations, US decision makers must look at quantity as well as quality. The same is true for their colleagues in the UK when considering force projection missions even on the small scale of the one undertaken in Sierra Leone a few years back. If a contemplated mission requires X troops backed with Y capacities in artillery, logistics, engineering, air support, and so on, but you only have X- men or Y- capacities, the mission cannot be undertaken with any measure of certainty.
Complicating the situation is the very hard to understand position adopted by the Royal Navy. The Navy has two aircraft carriers authorized with one under construction presently. To assure gaining these two large and evidently competent ships, the Navy's senior command is willing to cut their total fleet of surface combatants to roughly twenty-five (about enough to assure adequate defense against air, missile, and submarine threats.) This would mean the Senior Service would have the same number of warships it did when Henry VIII was chopping off wives' heads. The complete scuttling of any amphibious warfare capacity would make the Royal Marines redundant--and make it deucedly tough to replicate the Sierra Leone operation let alone the successful retaking of the Falkland Islands. (The aging fleet of SSBN Trident carrying subs would be retained but on a scale which might render constant one boat deployment impossible.)
It is ironic that if the Navy gets its carrier, it will have to borrow some other country's aircraft to fly from it. But, the chatter surrounding the forthcoming review hints at a severe shrinking of the RAF. The famed "few" of seventy years ago will actually be constricted to an aircraft inventory not seen since 1913. This state of affairs calls into question the capacity of the RAF to support even a miniature expeditionary force.
Asymmetrical homeland threats might be countered in a cost effective way by creative use of the Territorial Forces, but any projection of force to the centers of threat would be well neigh onto impossible unless as part of a coalition. Of course it is difficult (but not impossible) to envision the British doing a go-it-alone. For the US as the most likely coalition partner, the question is what can the new, downsized British armed forces add to our efforts beyond diplomatic cover and concealment. More bluntly, is it worth the inevitable political complications of coalition warfare to add even a highly proficient but quite pint sized British component?
With that as context, the larger question demands consideration. If the British military capacity is of very limited diplomatic usage and almost nonexistent warfighting utility, what then exists as a basis for a special relationship? History is nice. So also is a legacy of shared values and norms. Ditto a more or less common language. But, when the vibram hits the road, the only thing that counts is the muscle behind the words of diplomacy.
In short, if the Incredible Shrinking British Military comes into existence, the US will have to (in the words of John Foster Dulles) undergo an "agonizing reappraisal" of our relation with the UK. This process will be driven by a primary consideration: The British will need us a lot more than we will need them. This will not be good for either us or them. The special relationship has benefited our global diplomacy in the past far more than a mere comparison of relative military strength might appear to merit. But, there is a point where one party's extreme weakness permanently alters the relation from one of equals to one of patron-client. The US-UK dyad may soon cross that point.
The special relationship between the US and Israel is often seen as one of patron-client where the client is in charge. No doubt it looks that way, particularly when the American president leans on the Israeli prime minister without useful result.
The important consideration when examining this particular special relationship is that its existence and parameters are not determined by the president or secretary of state. Nor are they determined and defined by congress. No indeed. The nature and extent of the relations between Israel and the US have been and are determined and defined by We the People. To an extent not equaled by any other state, We the People have decided that Israel merits unreserved support and assistance. While the precise percentage of support waxes and wanes over time, there has never been a withdrawing of the commitment made generations ago to the existence and flourishing of the Jewish state.
The government of Israel is perfectly well aware of this. After all, it was responsible in significant measure for the public relations efforts which have provided a great impetus for this support within We the People. When Ike blew the whistle on the Anglo-French-Israeli Sinai War in 1956, the reaction of Israel's government was to take action to preclude such an event in the future. There is nothing wrong nor reprehensible in a state pursuing its national interests through intensive and effective public relations, political actions, and lobbying.
The result is simply that Israel has the capacity to shrug off presidential coercion. It can ignore arm twisting and veiled threats with impunity. And has.
Unless and until the Israeli reputation within We the People can be changed or attenuated, the special relation will continue as presidents come and go.
To the north of us is a big country. It contains people who are very nice, very concerned, people who are quite proud that their country has long been an excellent global citizen. Beyond that, Canada has been an ally of the US in quite a few wars including the one in Afghanistan. Because of shared norms, values, and understandings of life, the Canadian government has usually been on the same side of the voting in the UN as the US.
Canada wanted very much to hold a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. It has already occupied one of the rotating seats six times. The government mounted a long and hard fought campaign to gain one of the two seats reserved under the UN's geographical apportionment system for European and other Western countries. It lost.
Despite having 135 written and 15 verbal commitments of support, Canada trailed Germany and Portugal so that, humiliatingly, it dropped out of the contest. Various explanations for the defeat have been advanced up in the Great White North. Among them are: Canada alienated Muslim countries by supporting the US and Israel; the US did not go to bat for the Canadians.
Not surprisingly these explanations have come with demands that Canada rethink its foreign policies with a view to putting more blue sky between it and the Colossus of the South. While the Canadians are nice, very civilized people, they are also dedicated nationalists. There is resentment of the US--its domination of the Canadian economy, the appeal of American television, and other matters of even less consequential but quite irritating sort.
With that as context and considering that the US delegation to the UN did not make any real, evident effort to support Canada's bid, it would not be surprising if the Canadian government did not become more "independent" in its conduct of foreign relations. This will not imply something as radical as the Canadians suddenly supporting the Islamist demands for an ending of free speech on religious matters, but it could indicate a set of subtle and eventually harmful lessening of Canadian understanding on a raft of issues including the growing matter of Arctic sovereignty.
The US and Canada have had more than a few down points in their mutual history--such as our two invasions of the country two and more centuries ago. But, we share more than a common and still unfortified border, so any unnecessary daylight between us in foreign relations would be more than simply regrettable. They would be mutually injurious.
We and the Canadians are joined hip and shoulder. Far more than economics dictates this sometimes uncomfortable truth. While not talked about as such, our relationship with Canada is uniquely special. However, the contemporary dynamic is such that we must not take it for granted. We would be well advised to undertake actions which will reassure the Canadians that we value them greatly. This will require more than honeyed words and soothing mood music. It will demand actions. Perhaps the time is on us to have a more accommodating view of Canadian ambitions in the Arctic or environmental matters.
Special relations exist. But each is different in its dynamics and requirements for nurture. With the UK, we must quietly but firmly insist that the British armed forces remain credible. With Israel it must be acknowledged that presidents do not define the relationship. For the Canadians it is necessary that we listen effectively and treat with respect.
But, the Obama administration is tone deaf. So we shouldn't hold our collective breath.
The relationship between the US and the UK was no doubt harmed by the cavalier treatment extended to the Brits by Mr Obama. However that damage was low and self-limiting--the two countries need each other too much to stay in a snit over the sheer ineptitude of a president and some of his "team."
More recently the strong, historically rooted special relationship between the "Mother country" and "The Colonies" has been put in a greater degree of very real peril by the upcoming British review of defense requirements. Due to a ukase from the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence is under irresistible pressure to cut its budget somewhere between twenty and forty percent. This means simply that the British must view the threats to their security and global interests over the next ten years in terms of the severely constricted budgetary environment currently extant.
The last time HMG attempted to cut the size of the threats to meet the cloth of the Exchequer was during the Thirties. The Great Depression was real. So also was the looming threat of expansionist Nazism, Fascism, and Imperial Japan. The budget driven weakness of the British was a major, arguably, the major, reason forcing the appeasement of Munich and the later set of defeats for British forces around the world.
At that time the US was available (along with the invaded Soviet Union) to provide the necessary wherewithal to contain and ultimately defeat the three aggressors. That, as they say, is history.
The fallout from the Great Recession has combined with the spendthrift policies of New Labor governments to compel a period of austerity not seen since the grim, grey days following World War II. The need for fiscal prudence is self-evident. Not so self-evident is the need or safety of placing a great burden on the defense establishment.
Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have viewed the potential retrenchment (to be polite) of the British armed services with a fair degree of public alarm. So also have a number of British senior officers, both active duty and retired.
Stripped to its essentials, any British defense program which is predicated on cutting its active duty ground combat forces to something on the order of eighty thousand will have the effect of making the UK a military nullity in any joint operations approaching even pre-surge Afghanistan. That unfortunate realty, a reality which will see British deployable battalions at forty percent authorized strength, is not compensated for by the very high quality of British troops. General Petraeus was not simply being polite and politic when he praised the British operations in Afghanistan; he was being essentially accurate.
Weak battalions remain weak battalions even when the "few" are trigger pullers without equal. In planning operations, US decision makers must look at quantity as well as quality. The same is true for their colleagues in the UK when considering force projection missions even on the small scale of the one undertaken in Sierra Leone a few years back. If a contemplated mission requires X troops backed with Y capacities in artillery, logistics, engineering, air support, and so on, but you only have X- men or Y- capacities, the mission cannot be undertaken with any measure of certainty.
Complicating the situation is the very hard to understand position adopted by the Royal Navy. The Navy has two aircraft carriers authorized with one under construction presently. To assure gaining these two large and evidently competent ships, the Navy's senior command is willing to cut their total fleet of surface combatants to roughly twenty-five (about enough to assure adequate defense against air, missile, and submarine threats.) This would mean the Senior Service would have the same number of warships it did when Henry VIII was chopping off wives' heads. The complete scuttling of any amphibious warfare capacity would make the Royal Marines redundant--and make it deucedly tough to replicate the Sierra Leone operation let alone the successful retaking of the Falkland Islands. (The aging fleet of SSBN Trident carrying subs would be retained but on a scale which might render constant one boat deployment impossible.)
It is ironic that if the Navy gets its carrier, it will have to borrow some other country's aircraft to fly from it. But, the chatter surrounding the forthcoming review hints at a severe shrinking of the RAF. The famed "few" of seventy years ago will actually be constricted to an aircraft inventory not seen since 1913. This state of affairs calls into question the capacity of the RAF to support even a miniature expeditionary force.
Asymmetrical homeland threats might be countered in a cost effective way by creative use of the Territorial Forces, but any projection of force to the centers of threat would be well neigh onto impossible unless as part of a coalition. Of course it is difficult (but not impossible) to envision the British doing a go-it-alone. For the US as the most likely coalition partner, the question is what can the new, downsized British armed forces add to our efforts beyond diplomatic cover and concealment. More bluntly, is it worth the inevitable political complications of coalition warfare to add even a highly proficient but quite pint sized British component?
With that as context, the larger question demands consideration. If the British military capacity is of very limited diplomatic usage and almost nonexistent warfighting utility, what then exists as a basis for a special relationship? History is nice. So also is a legacy of shared values and norms. Ditto a more or less common language. But, when the vibram hits the road, the only thing that counts is the muscle behind the words of diplomacy.
In short, if the Incredible Shrinking British Military comes into existence, the US will have to (in the words of John Foster Dulles) undergo an "agonizing reappraisal" of our relation with the UK. This process will be driven by a primary consideration: The British will need us a lot more than we will need them. This will not be good for either us or them. The special relationship has benefited our global diplomacy in the past far more than a mere comparison of relative military strength might appear to merit. But, there is a point where one party's extreme weakness permanently alters the relation from one of equals to one of patron-client. The US-UK dyad may soon cross that point.
The special relationship between the US and Israel is often seen as one of patron-client where the client is in charge. No doubt it looks that way, particularly when the American president leans on the Israeli prime minister without useful result.
The important consideration when examining this particular special relationship is that its existence and parameters are not determined by the president or secretary of state. Nor are they determined and defined by congress. No indeed. The nature and extent of the relations between Israel and the US have been and are determined and defined by We the People. To an extent not equaled by any other state, We the People have decided that Israel merits unreserved support and assistance. While the precise percentage of support waxes and wanes over time, there has never been a withdrawing of the commitment made generations ago to the existence and flourishing of the Jewish state.
The government of Israel is perfectly well aware of this. After all, it was responsible in significant measure for the public relations efforts which have provided a great impetus for this support within We the People. When Ike blew the whistle on the Anglo-French-Israeli Sinai War in 1956, the reaction of Israel's government was to take action to preclude such an event in the future. There is nothing wrong nor reprehensible in a state pursuing its national interests through intensive and effective public relations, political actions, and lobbying.
The result is simply that Israel has the capacity to shrug off presidential coercion. It can ignore arm twisting and veiled threats with impunity. And has.
Unless and until the Israeli reputation within We the People can be changed or attenuated, the special relation will continue as presidents come and go.
To the north of us is a big country. It contains people who are very nice, very concerned, people who are quite proud that their country has long been an excellent global citizen. Beyond that, Canada has been an ally of the US in quite a few wars including the one in Afghanistan. Because of shared norms, values, and understandings of life, the Canadian government has usually been on the same side of the voting in the UN as the US.
Canada wanted very much to hold a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. It has already occupied one of the rotating seats six times. The government mounted a long and hard fought campaign to gain one of the two seats reserved under the UN's geographical apportionment system for European and other Western countries. It lost.
Despite having 135 written and 15 verbal commitments of support, Canada trailed Germany and Portugal so that, humiliatingly, it dropped out of the contest. Various explanations for the defeat have been advanced up in the Great White North. Among them are: Canada alienated Muslim countries by supporting the US and Israel; the US did not go to bat for the Canadians.
Not surprisingly these explanations have come with demands that Canada rethink its foreign policies with a view to putting more blue sky between it and the Colossus of the South. While the Canadians are nice, very civilized people, they are also dedicated nationalists. There is resentment of the US--its domination of the Canadian economy, the appeal of American television, and other matters of even less consequential but quite irritating sort.
With that as context and considering that the US delegation to the UN did not make any real, evident effort to support Canada's bid, it would not be surprising if the Canadian government did not become more "independent" in its conduct of foreign relations. This will not imply something as radical as the Canadians suddenly supporting the Islamist demands for an ending of free speech on religious matters, but it could indicate a set of subtle and eventually harmful lessening of Canadian understanding on a raft of issues including the growing matter of Arctic sovereignty.
The US and Canada have had more than a few down points in their mutual history--such as our two invasions of the country two and more centuries ago. But, we share more than a common and still unfortified border, so any unnecessary daylight between us in foreign relations would be more than simply regrettable. They would be mutually injurious.
We and the Canadians are joined hip and shoulder. Far more than economics dictates this sometimes uncomfortable truth. While not talked about as such, our relationship with Canada is uniquely special. However, the contemporary dynamic is such that we must not take it for granted. We would be well advised to undertake actions which will reassure the Canadians that we value them greatly. This will require more than honeyed words and soothing mood music. It will demand actions. Perhaps the time is on us to have a more accommodating view of Canadian ambitions in the Arctic or environmental matters.
Special relations exist. But each is different in its dynamics and requirements for nurture. With the UK, we must quietly but firmly insist that the British armed forces remain credible. With Israel it must be acknowledged that presidents do not define the relationship. For the Canadians it is necessary that we listen effectively and treat with respect.
But, the Obama administration is tone deaf. So we shouldn't hold our collective breath.
Monday, October 11, 2010
In War Murphy Always Wins
According to reports tracing back to a highly placed and usually reliable source, General David Petraeus via Prime Minister David Cameron, the kidnapped British (Scots actually) aid worker employed by an American company in Afghanistan died as the result of friendly fire on the part of the Special Forces rescue force. The reported cause of the woman's death was a grenade. It has not been stated if the grenade in question was hand thrown or fired from a rifle mounted launcher.
That distinction is critical. If the lethal weapon was a hand thrown fragmentation grenade, it was bad enough. If, however, the grenade was of the launched sort, it was a misuse of force which may not be criminal but was blatantly stupid.
Hostage rescue is a most demanding tactical operation. That is why certain units, the SAS in the UK or Delta and other forces in the US, were tasked with and trained for the incredibly difficult job of forcible entry, very prompt neutralization of all hostiles, and securing unharmed the hostage(s.) Carried out in the hours of darkness and normally in confined spaces, the requirements of split second timing, coordination, weapons control, swift and perfectly orchestrated movement are legion. The opportunities for lethal error are also manifold.
The first prerequisite for a successful hostage rescue (other than having a team which is fully trained and properly equipped for the task) is detailed intelligence regarding the physical layout of the area where the hostage(s) is held as well as the number, placement, armament, and other relevant details of the hostage takers. Right now it is an open question as to whether or not this level of actionable intelligence was available to the rescuers. Also, an open question exists as to whether or not sufficient time for briefing and (highly desirable) rehearsal was available.
The overarching question yet to be answered was the most basic: Were the members of the rescue party properly trained, equipped, and prepared for the mission? Quite frankly, simple Special Forces training and experience is not sufficient preparation for a hostage rescue mission. Even the most able and experienced Special Forces or SEAL troopie is not automatically qualified for this sort of thing. The necessity of a properly trained team (put emphasis on the last word as hostage rescue even more than typical combat operations is a team matter, remember split second timing of orchestrated fire and movement in dark, close quarters) is more urgent if the pre-op intelligence is scant and time prohibits rehearsal.
Presumably, these questions and others, such as why were launched explosive grenades authorized, will be raised by the forthcoming joint UK-US investigation. It may even be that the investigators will look into the matter of why American rather than British assets were employed? Was it a matter of time? Or, were appropriate British assets not available in theater?
Presumably, the investigators will examine the question of time. This is the key issue when considering the alternative of gaining Ms Norgrove's release by negotiation. Local Afghan officials have maintained that the local tribal elders were ready and willing to engage in palaver with the bad guys. The family of the deceased has already been rather vehement on this, and it is to be expected the negotiation issue will be widely raised by politicians and media types--particularly those whose ignorance of war is surpassed only by their desire to see the US either out of or defeated in Afghanistan.
An unpleasant reality is any person kidnapped by members of groups espousing violent political Islam had best be considered dead the moment they are seized. This does not imply that negotiations (provided they give the thugs nothing meaningful) nor forcible rescue attempts should not be considered, planned, and executed if appropriate. Rather, it means the family of the victim and the media should be told to hold no specific hope, no positive expectations. This is harsh but utterly necessary in order to inhibit future kidnappings for political or monetary ransom.
This approach demands a very stern "Birkenhead drill" on the part of governments, and, even more, the family. There is a model--and an inspiration--for this. Years ago an American Marine officer was kidnapped, held by one of those old style secular Arab terror outfits in Lebanon. He was tortured and ultimately murdered. Imagery of the butchered body were made available. The officer's wife--another Marine--from the beginning of her ordeal played the stiff upper lip role with fine distinction, at one time saying that she had to consider her husband dead, but if he returned it would be as Lazarus--but far more warmly welcomed.
Her performance in its bravery and complete integrity is a tough act to emulate. However, considering the nature of the enemy today--barbarically indifferent to killing or dying, fully committed to a religiously derived agenda, lacking any ethic beyond winning--no other manner of dealing with the phenomenon is feasible.
At the same time it is incumbent upon the senior command in Afghanistan to be certain that properly trained and equipped teams are available immediately in theater. National pride cannot be allowed to interfere with hostage rescue. It does not matter what the nationality of the victim is--all that counts is the capacity of the team(s) on call. If SAS is best--use it. If an American unit is best, then use it.
The inadvertent, certainly unintended death of Ms Norgrove is a tragedy not only for her family and friends. It is a misfortune of the first degree for the US force involved and for the US effort generally as it provides ammunition for those who oppose continued operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere against the advocates of violent political Islam.
This means the US, the UK, and other forces must study what went wrong in the rescue attempt and put the proper reforms in place--quickly. As sure as Muslims pray five times a day there will be more snatches in Afghanistan. The snatch is a tool becoming ever more popular with the Mighty Warriors of the One True Faith not only in Afghanistan but wherever the Thugs of the Koran are present.
That distinction is critical. If the lethal weapon was a hand thrown fragmentation grenade, it was bad enough. If, however, the grenade was of the launched sort, it was a misuse of force which may not be criminal but was blatantly stupid.
Hostage rescue is a most demanding tactical operation. That is why certain units, the SAS in the UK or Delta and other forces in the US, were tasked with and trained for the incredibly difficult job of forcible entry, very prompt neutralization of all hostiles, and securing unharmed the hostage(s.) Carried out in the hours of darkness and normally in confined spaces, the requirements of split second timing, coordination, weapons control, swift and perfectly orchestrated movement are legion. The opportunities for lethal error are also manifold.
The first prerequisite for a successful hostage rescue (other than having a team which is fully trained and properly equipped for the task) is detailed intelligence regarding the physical layout of the area where the hostage(s) is held as well as the number, placement, armament, and other relevant details of the hostage takers. Right now it is an open question as to whether or not this level of actionable intelligence was available to the rescuers. Also, an open question exists as to whether or not sufficient time for briefing and (highly desirable) rehearsal was available.
The overarching question yet to be answered was the most basic: Were the members of the rescue party properly trained, equipped, and prepared for the mission? Quite frankly, simple Special Forces training and experience is not sufficient preparation for a hostage rescue mission. Even the most able and experienced Special Forces or SEAL troopie is not automatically qualified for this sort of thing. The necessity of a properly trained team (put emphasis on the last word as hostage rescue even more than typical combat operations is a team matter, remember split second timing of orchestrated fire and movement in dark, close quarters) is more urgent if the pre-op intelligence is scant and time prohibits rehearsal.
Presumably, these questions and others, such as why were launched explosive grenades authorized, will be raised by the forthcoming joint UK-US investigation. It may even be that the investigators will look into the matter of why American rather than British assets were employed? Was it a matter of time? Or, were appropriate British assets not available in theater?
Presumably, the investigators will examine the question of time. This is the key issue when considering the alternative of gaining Ms Norgrove's release by negotiation. Local Afghan officials have maintained that the local tribal elders were ready and willing to engage in palaver with the bad guys. The family of the deceased has already been rather vehement on this, and it is to be expected the negotiation issue will be widely raised by politicians and media types--particularly those whose ignorance of war is surpassed only by their desire to see the US either out of or defeated in Afghanistan.
An unpleasant reality is any person kidnapped by members of groups espousing violent political Islam had best be considered dead the moment they are seized. This does not imply that negotiations (provided they give the thugs nothing meaningful) nor forcible rescue attempts should not be considered, planned, and executed if appropriate. Rather, it means the family of the victim and the media should be told to hold no specific hope, no positive expectations. This is harsh but utterly necessary in order to inhibit future kidnappings for political or monetary ransom.
This approach demands a very stern "Birkenhead drill" on the part of governments, and, even more, the family. There is a model--and an inspiration--for this. Years ago an American Marine officer was kidnapped, held by one of those old style secular Arab terror outfits in Lebanon. He was tortured and ultimately murdered. Imagery of the butchered body were made available. The officer's wife--another Marine--from the beginning of her ordeal played the stiff upper lip role with fine distinction, at one time saying that she had to consider her husband dead, but if he returned it would be as Lazarus--but far more warmly welcomed.
Her performance in its bravery and complete integrity is a tough act to emulate. However, considering the nature of the enemy today--barbarically indifferent to killing or dying, fully committed to a religiously derived agenda, lacking any ethic beyond winning--no other manner of dealing with the phenomenon is feasible.
At the same time it is incumbent upon the senior command in Afghanistan to be certain that properly trained and equipped teams are available immediately in theater. National pride cannot be allowed to interfere with hostage rescue. It does not matter what the nationality of the victim is--all that counts is the capacity of the team(s) on call. If SAS is best--use it. If an American unit is best, then use it.
The inadvertent, certainly unintended death of Ms Norgrove is a tragedy not only for her family and friends. It is a misfortune of the first degree for the US force involved and for the US effort generally as it provides ammunition for those who oppose continued operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere against the advocates of violent political Islam.
This means the US, the UK, and other forces must study what went wrong in the rescue attempt and put the proper reforms in place--quickly. As sure as Muslims pray five times a day there will be more snatches in Afghanistan. The snatch is a tool becoming ever more popular with the Mighty Warriors of the One True Faith not only in Afghanistan but wherever the Thugs of the Koran are present.
Sunday, October 10, 2010
There Are Some Loose Screws In The Israeli Government
The Geek often has a favorable view of Israel in comparison to its Arab neighbors, particularly those paragons of intransigence in the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Killers running Gaza. There are occasions, however, when the Geek becomes convinced that the political leadership of Israel has lost all grip on reality.
This is one of those times. Before continuing, the Geek has to express frustration. Frustration with the utterly asinine acts of the Netanyahu administration as well as other, lesser elements of the government. Frustration at the implications of their actions which necessitate comment at the expense of considering other, lesser known and fascinating subjects such as the continued downward trajectory in the North Caucasus or the slow motion disintegration of Tajikistan under the weight of armed political Islam.
Or the stupidity of the Royal Navy's high command which is reportedly willing to cut its "fleet" to as few as a dozen surface combatants so that the new aircraft carriers might be afforded. This sort of decision making boggles the mind, particularly considering that Argentina is feeling its oats once more over the Falkland Islands.
And so to Israel. The most shocking of the self-destructive acts of the Netanyahu crew is the new loyalty bill which would require all new, non-Jewish citizens to swear loyalty to "the Jewish and democratic state of Israel." This measure has been a pet of the ultra-ultra right Yisrael Beiteinu party--the party headed by the Israeli version of Joe Biden, ForMin Avigador Lieberman.
Adoption of this measure by the Knesset would destroy the final vestige of the liberal, democratic, and socialist vision of Israel which gained the country so much sympathy and support among the goyim of the US a half century and more ago. The Israel of those days was seen widely by Americans as being an outpost of the best of European or Western culture, values, norms, and institutions taking root in the hostile soil of authoritarian, often feudal, and occasionally communist Mideast. In a real sense many of We the People saw the Israelis as being "just like us," open, tolerant, expressive, even boisterous. Being "like us" it was easy to support the embattled country even when American national interests would have been better served by doing otherwise.
Loyalty oaths are a feature of both authoritarian regimes and societies under stress from forces abroad and hidden in the domestic population. In the US during the Fifties and Sixties, during the era of the Great Anti-Communist Crusade, loyalty oaths for public employees and others were all the rage. (Even the Geek as a fifteen year old swimming instructor in a Saturday morning program at the local high school had to sign a loyalty oath before he could get his paycheck, minuscule as it was.)
Israel is under stress to say the least. The stress has an internal dimension given that a fifth of the population is non-Jewish, primarily Muslim Arabs. It has not helped that the PA and its Arab supporters have refused to acknowledge officially a fact that is all too self-evident in reality--Israel was established to be and exists as a Jewish state. Even though a congress of three Jews might provide at least five differing definitions of what the term "Jewish state" means, the foundational reality remains that Israel is precisely what it was founded to be--a nation-state for Jews.
Admittedly the Israelis have made attempts to render their land free of all non-Jews. The Wars of Independence were ethically scarred by the forced removal of Arab populations--both Muslim and Christian. True, the major responsibility for the ethnic cleansing rests with the Arab states whose leaders promised the temporarily displaced locals would come back home in triumph riding Arab tanks. That does not relieve the Israelis of that far gone day from their culpability which extended to murder.
So too were Arabs displaced forcibly during and in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War. Israelis got a bad case of the "victory disease," showing its worst symptoms in their treatment of the occupied territory and its residents. Muscular expansionism, a sort of Old Testament based "manifest destiny" ruled the public mood with results which fester to the present. To put it not unkindly but accurately, it was the attitude exhibited by the Israeli public which started the corrosive process of myth destruction which has also continued to the present with the deligitimatization campaign so odiously evident in the West generally.
The climate of stress and concomitant fear helps explain the strong need by the nationalists in government and public alike to embrace the loyalty oath. Be that as it may, the global impact of the oath will be negative. It will reinforce the notion which has taken a pernicious hold on many in Europe and the US that Israel is a "racist" society and polity. It will strengthen the hand of those who argue "Israel equals Apartheid." It will also make the Arabs both inside and without Israel more irredentist. It will feed the needs of the extremes on both sides.
There have been some other recent actions by lesser components of the government which serve to potentate the evil effects of the oath bill. In one the Israeli Defense Ministry has blocked the construction of an ambitious middle class oriented planned community on land which has been granted to the PA. At issue is a stretch of two miles needed to build an access road for the town. Two miles is in question. The Defense Ministry with the full-throated support of "settlers" in a nearby new Israeli town has dragged its feet to the point the entire project is threatened.
This is stupidity on the level of pointing a pistol at ones own gonads--and pulling the trigger. The PA needs a vibrant middle class and the economic consequences of having one in order to have even a faint chance of stability over time. It needs sound stakeholders to counter the ever advancing potency of the advocates of violent political Islam. Israel should be bending backwards to facilitate the construction of this new Arab town and not dragging up sham issues (like sewage and trash handling plans) in order to slow, perhaps stop it. Even the "settlers" should have brains enough to realize that an increased prosperity along with the inherently more conservative mood of those who "have arrived" is their best protection against terror attacks, the drive by shootings they allege will occur if the road and town are built.
Then there is the matter of breaching the wall around the Old City of Jerusalem. Reportedly the municipal council (Israeli of course) has floated a plan to build a new gate in the old wall so as to provide entrance to a parking lot and multi-purpose building near the Western Wall. It has been 112 years since the wall was last breached so that Kaiser Willem II could ride in style into the Old City. The new breach has outraged Palestinian opinion and given the PA another excuse (as if it needed one more) to postpone, stall, or stop the on-and-off talks.
Even though the Western Wall will remain under Israeli control in any final settlement, there is no reason to bring up even a remote possibility of taking down more bricks in the wall. The Old City is a running sore of animosity as has been demonstrated when even a tunnel near the West Wall resulted in riots and killing just over a decade ago. One has to wonder if the Jerusalem municipal council was off its collective meds at the time of making this decision or simply indifferent to reality.
The Israelis may be convinced that the threat of the UN Security Council creating a Palestinian state is unlikely to happen, but recent statements by the French ForMin bring that conviction into question. Similarly the Israeli government is certain the PA will make no request of the Security Council to short circuit the negotiation process. It is true that a similar proposal by the then foreign affairs chief of the European Union gained no traction either in Europe or in Washington, but a lot has happened since then--none of it to the advantage of Israel.
The opinion molding elites of Western Europe and the US have not become any more tolerant of Israeli practices or more doubting of the sin-free nature of the PA. The current administration has not only invested all too much diplomatic capital in the present talks, it has been given an ultimatum by the Arab League. The previous unforced errors of Mr Obama--most notably the demand for a total halt to settlement construction of an open ended nature--have provided the PA with the belief the US will do the heavy lifting on its behalf. The Arab League ultimatum--the US has one month, no more, to get the talks back on track or something unspecified but horrid will happen--greatly increases the pressure on Obama to put pressure on Israel.
The oath bill and the lesser damaging measures show the Israeli push back on the pressures to date. This implies that there is little more in the way of coercion available to the administration. At the same time the inducements offered in the alleged Obama letter have no value as they are inherently non-credible given the administration's previous refusal to honor commitments made in a letter from George W. Bush.
The oath bill and the rest have hardened the PA and its supporters in demanding that the US cut the knot and bring Palestine into existence. The questioned measures have also given fuel to the let-the-Security-Council-do-it movement currently orchestrated by the French ForMin. Finally, they have demonstrated the limits of American coercion.
The oath bill in particular demonstrates the political will of the nationalistic right in Israel. Even when the self-destructive potential of the bill is so evident, the force of nationalism under attack--even from presumed and previous allies--cannot be denied. Reasoned considerations of national interest, stability, and international repute are no match for the forces of fear.
This is one of those times. Before continuing, the Geek has to express frustration. Frustration with the utterly asinine acts of the Netanyahu administration as well as other, lesser elements of the government. Frustration at the implications of their actions which necessitate comment at the expense of considering other, lesser known and fascinating subjects such as the continued downward trajectory in the North Caucasus or the slow motion disintegration of Tajikistan under the weight of armed political Islam.
Or the stupidity of the Royal Navy's high command which is reportedly willing to cut its "fleet" to as few as a dozen surface combatants so that the new aircraft carriers might be afforded. This sort of decision making boggles the mind, particularly considering that Argentina is feeling its oats once more over the Falkland Islands.
And so to Israel. The most shocking of the self-destructive acts of the Netanyahu crew is the new loyalty bill which would require all new, non-Jewish citizens to swear loyalty to "the Jewish and democratic state of Israel." This measure has been a pet of the ultra-ultra right Yisrael Beiteinu party--the party headed by the Israeli version of Joe Biden, ForMin Avigador Lieberman.
Adoption of this measure by the Knesset would destroy the final vestige of the liberal, democratic, and socialist vision of Israel which gained the country so much sympathy and support among the goyim of the US a half century and more ago. The Israel of those days was seen widely by Americans as being an outpost of the best of European or Western culture, values, norms, and institutions taking root in the hostile soil of authoritarian, often feudal, and occasionally communist Mideast. In a real sense many of We the People saw the Israelis as being "just like us," open, tolerant, expressive, even boisterous. Being "like us" it was easy to support the embattled country even when American national interests would have been better served by doing otherwise.
Loyalty oaths are a feature of both authoritarian regimes and societies under stress from forces abroad and hidden in the domestic population. In the US during the Fifties and Sixties, during the era of the Great Anti-Communist Crusade, loyalty oaths for public employees and others were all the rage. (Even the Geek as a fifteen year old swimming instructor in a Saturday morning program at the local high school had to sign a loyalty oath before he could get his paycheck, minuscule as it was.)
Israel is under stress to say the least. The stress has an internal dimension given that a fifth of the population is non-Jewish, primarily Muslim Arabs. It has not helped that the PA and its Arab supporters have refused to acknowledge officially a fact that is all too self-evident in reality--Israel was established to be and exists as a Jewish state. Even though a congress of three Jews might provide at least five differing definitions of what the term "Jewish state" means, the foundational reality remains that Israel is precisely what it was founded to be--a nation-state for Jews.
Admittedly the Israelis have made attempts to render their land free of all non-Jews. The Wars of Independence were ethically scarred by the forced removal of Arab populations--both Muslim and Christian. True, the major responsibility for the ethnic cleansing rests with the Arab states whose leaders promised the temporarily displaced locals would come back home in triumph riding Arab tanks. That does not relieve the Israelis of that far gone day from their culpability which extended to murder.
So too were Arabs displaced forcibly during and in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War. Israelis got a bad case of the "victory disease," showing its worst symptoms in their treatment of the occupied territory and its residents. Muscular expansionism, a sort of Old Testament based "manifest destiny" ruled the public mood with results which fester to the present. To put it not unkindly but accurately, it was the attitude exhibited by the Israeli public which started the corrosive process of myth destruction which has also continued to the present with the deligitimatization campaign so odiously evident in the West generally.
The climate of stress and concomitant fear helps explain the strong need by the nationalists in government and public alike to embrace the loyalty oath. Be that as it may, the global impact of the oath will be negative. It will reinforce the notion which has taken a pernicious hold on many in Europe and the US that Israel is a "racist" society and polity. It will strengthen the hand of those who argue "Israel equals Apartheid." It will also make the Arabs both inside and without Israel more irredentist. It will feed the needs of the extremes on both sides.
There have been some other recent actions by lesser components of the government which serve to potentate the evil effects of the oath bill. In one the Israeli Defense Ministry has blocked the construction of an ambitious middle class oriented planned community on land which has been granted to the PA. At issue is a stretch of two miles needed to build an access road for the town. Two miles is in question. The Defense Ministry with the full-throated support of "settlers" in a nearby new Israeli town has dragged its feet to the point the entire project is threatened.
This is stupidity on the level of pointing a pistol at ones own gonads--and pulling the trigger. The PA needs a vibrant middle class and the economic consequences of having one in order to have even a faint chance of stability over time. It needs sound stakeholders to counter the ever advancing potency of the advocates of violent political Islam. Israel should be bending backwards to facilitate the construction of this new Arab town and not dragging up sham issues (like sewage and trash handling plans) in order to slow, perhaps stop it. Even the "settlers" should have brains enough to realize that an increased prosperity along with the inherently more conservative mood of those who "have arrived" is their best protection against terror attacks, the drive by shootings they allege will occur if the road and town are built.
Then there is the matter of breaching the wall around the Old City of Jerusalem. Reportedly the municipal council (Israeli of course) has floated a plan to build a new gate in the old wall so as to provide entrance to a parking lot and multi-purpose building near the Western Wall. It has been 112 years since the wall was last breached so that Kaiser Willem II could ride in style into the Old City. The new breach has outraged Palestinian opinion and given the PA another excuse (as if it needed one more) to postpone, stall, or stop the on-and-off talks.
Even though the Western Wall will remain under Israeli control in any final settlement, there is no reason to bring up even a remote possibility of taking down more bricks in the wall. The Old City is a running sore of animosity as has been demonstrated when even a tunnel near the West Wall resulted in riots and killing just over a decade ago. One has to wonder if the Jerusalem municipal council was off its collective meds at the time of making this decision or simply indifferent to reality.
The Israelis may be convinced that the threat of the UN Security Council creating a Palestinian state is unlikely to happen, but recent statements by the French ForMin bring that conviction into question. Similarly the Israeli government is certain the PA will make no request of the Security Council to short circuit the negotiation process. It is true that a similar proposal by the then foreign affairs chief of the European Union gained no traction either in Europe or in Washington, but a lot has happened since then--none of it to the advantage of Israel.
The opinion molding elites of Western Europe and the US have not become any more tolerant of Israeli practices or more doubting of the sin-free nature of the PA. The current administration has not only invested all too much diplomatic capital in the present talks, it has been given an ultimatum by the Arab League. The previous unforced errors of Mr Obama--most notably the demand for a total halt to settlement construction of an open ended nature--have provided the PA with the belief the US will do the heavy lifting on its behalf. The Arab League ultimatum--the US has one month, no more, to get the talks back on track or something unspecified but horrid will happen--greatly increases the pressure on Obama to put pressure on Israel.
The oath bill and the lesser damaging measures show the Israeli push back on the pressures to date. This implies that there is little more in the way of coercion available to the administration. At the same time the inducements offered in the alleged Obama letter have no value as they are inherently non-credible given the administration's previous refusal to honor commitments made in a letter from George W. Bush.
The oath bill and the rest have hardened the PA and its supporters in demanding that the US cut the knot and bring Palestine into existence. The questioned measures have also given fuel to the let-the-Security-Council-do-it movement currently orchestrated by the French ForMin. Finally, they have demonstrated the limits of American coercion.
The oath bill in particular demonstrates the political will of the nationalistic right in Israel. Even when the self-destructive potential of the bill is so evident, the force of nationalism under attack--even from presumed and previous allies--cannot be denied. Reasoned considerations of national interest, stability, and international repute are no match for the forces of fear.
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