The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad. The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered. It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.
Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.
Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity. The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.
The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date. The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice. The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.
There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan. That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil. Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally. The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine. Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.
Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray. Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making. As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues. More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.
Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime. There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause. But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite. Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."
Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point. His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint. However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.
The same dynamic applied in Iraq. The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural. The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate. The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.
As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border. Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities. In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.
As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance. This man is Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a Shia cleric. He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context. He runs a very large and rather competent private militia. And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.
The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing. Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price. For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.
The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran. The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.
A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon. Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government. The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level. The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.
The departure of the Americans will have two results. One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations. The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.
Isn't that a fascinating prospect?
The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real. The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.
President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not. They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik. Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.
Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box. Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France. The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.
Libya is in a profound state of flux. It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed. The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on. Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.
So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department. While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.
Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it. Doesn't it?
Monday, August 29, 2011
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
The "Fall" Of Tripoli And Other Polite Fictions
You will recall no doubt that NATO air forces have been operating under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution to "protect" civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops loyal to noted humanitarian, African "King of Kings," and Brother Leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi. To some of the NATO countries such as Germany and Turkey, even this limited mission was unacceptably broad and all too fraught with the possibility that someone, somewhere, somehow might kill someone else. To other members, the US, the UK, and France come to mind, the only way to accomplish the prescribed action was through the removal of Gaddafi.
Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime. When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure. It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.
In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west. The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation. Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.
The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces. Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO." Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.
The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate. Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size. The associated body counts were equally small. In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.
As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties. That should have raised flags with all observers. There were darn few dots to connect. The rebels were suddenly more effective. "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target. There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.
Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control. In the past couple of days, due in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.
The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet. In a sense there is no real reason. After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains? Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans? Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?
Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya. A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth. The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.
The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable. The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary. The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.
The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel. Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli. In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.
The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies. Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it. On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush. But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.
A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People. That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan. Hooey! Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone. He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country. This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi. There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.
There is a final polite fiction. That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli. Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental. The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction. The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars. Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.
The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little. Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men." No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off. For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.
A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq. That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not. Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.
The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi. It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise. It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace. It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime. None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.
That challenge?
Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.
If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.
Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime. When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure. It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.
In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west. The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation. Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.
The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces. Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO." Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.
The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate. Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size. The associated body counts were equally small. In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.
As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties. That should have raised flags with all observers. There were darn few dots to connect. The rebels were suddenly more effective. "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target. There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.
Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control. In the past couple of days, due in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.
The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet. In a sense there is no real reason. After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains? Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans? Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?
Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya. A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth. The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.
The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable. The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary. The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.
The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel. Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli. In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.
The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies. Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it. On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush. But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.
A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People. That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan. Hooey! Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone. He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country. This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi. There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.
There is a final polite fiction. That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli. Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental. The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction. The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars. Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.
The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little. Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men." No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off. For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.
A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq. That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not. Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.
The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi. It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise. It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace. It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime. None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.
That challenge?
Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.
If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.
Friday, August 19, 2011
Smart(?) Power In Action
The other day Hilary Clinton and Leon Panetta were on stage at the National Defense University. In the course of the action Ms Clinton bragged on the use of "smart power" by her boss, The Nice Young Man From Chicago, with respect to the Syrian conundrum. She went on to imply strongly that the graduated escalation of economic and diplomatic sanctions in support of the anti-government demonstrators was both without precedent in American diplomatic history and (drum roll, please) constituted a paradigm for the future.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
Sunday, August 14, 2011
Rick Perry And The Big, Bad World
As had been expected for several weeks, Rick Perry has entered the GOP contest. Of this the Geek is both glad and positive. Governor Perry appears to possess the stomach and head necessary for a down and dirty campaign against the Nice Young Man From Chicago which is singularly lacking with other Elephant hopefuls.
The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.
It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.
Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.
On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.
In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.
At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.
This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.
Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.
It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.
More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.
The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.
As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.
In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.
(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)
The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.
It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.
Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.
On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.
In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.
At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.
This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.
Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.
It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.
More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.
The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.
As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.
In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.
(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Afghanistan Or Pashtunstan--A Back-to-the-Future Ending
Overshadowed by the Great Debt Ceiling Battle, the Great Downgrading, and the Miracle of the Job Free Recovery, the US has reached a very critical crossroad in Afghanistan. In truth we haven't just reached it, we have pushed for it, rushed to it, and sought it with the eagerness of a drowning man clawing for the sky.
The US wants out of Afghanistan in the worst sort of way. With the exception of some military people, most but not all of senior rank, the current political leadership of the US along with most of We the People want out, right now if possible, but tomorrow at the latest. This is the ground reality regardless of President Obama's patent bromide about pressing on regardless delivered in the wake of the Chinook shoot-down and the deaths of more than two dozen men from Boat Six.
Of course, We the People, the congress, and the Clueless Guy in the Oval would like it best if the US can get out of Afghanistan with a modicum of dignity and a sufficient simulacrum of success to offset the billions of bucks spent and the hundreds of lives sacrificed on the alter of "nation-building." Congressman Ron Paul was speaking for many besides himself at the Iowa debate when he denounced the American adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan while warning against any repeat in Iran. Heads no doubt nodded in agreement across the country as he delivered his neo-isolationist message for the umpteenth time.
One unnecessary and unjustifiable war is reaching its quite unsatisfying conclusion. As the Iraqi excuse for a parliament dithers over whether or not to invite American "trainers" to remain in country after the last day of this year, it has become brilliantly clear that only Saddam Hussein lost to a greater extent than did the US over the course of this long, bloody exercise in regime change.
Iran has emerged as the big winner in the contest as shown by Baghdad's alignment with Tehran over the question of Syria. This is simply the most recent, most dramatic example of the triumph of Shia faith over all other considerations in the deeply divided human terrain of Iraq. But, far outside of international politics, in the quotidian dealings of business, it is instructive that US companies have lost out repeatedly and consistently to competitors from China, Russia, and Europe for the lucrative opportunities available in the country which was--we were assured--going to pay for the costs of liberation, rejoice in new democratic freedoms, greet American troops as the French did after D-Day, and generally rally to the American flag.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the US lost in the Iraqi gambit. And, now, we face losing in Afghanistan as well. No, we will not be defeated in the field by Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani backers. There are simply not enough lucky shots by RPGs to do that. Rather, we will conspire in our own defeat at the hands not of Taliban alone, nor by the combination of Taliban and Pakistan but rather by the joint efforts of "our man in Kabul," Hamid Karzai, the Pakistanis, and Taliban.
Karzai wants out of the war with a fervor which surpasses even that of the US and its partners in the ISAF. To this end he has been seeking a species of separate peace with Taliban for some time now. He has been seeking this goal not through the public means of the Supreme Peace Jurga, a large, unwieldy and totally implausible group, but through low key, private, and ever-so-discrete conversations in the presidential palace as well as out of country locations.
The glue which would hold any peace agreement together is simply that Karzai as well as the overwhelming majority of Taliban is Pashtu speaking. They are all good Pashtuns on the Secret Peace Bus. As the Pakistanis understand and support the Pashtun super-tribe due to its domination of the key border areas of the FATA, there is no doubt but Islamabad is well represented on the Peace Bus as well. This means their strategic political position in Afghanistan will be protected in full.
The ethnic Uzbeks, Tajjks, and Hazaras constituting the majority of the population in northern Afghanistan are not represented on the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pashtun Peace Express. These are the same people who suffered the most under the rule of the Taliban and whose Northern Alliance comprised the bulk of the indigenous fighters cooperating with the American invaders ten years ago.
It is not surprising that the old Northern Alliance is silently reforming. It is no surprise that the non-Pushtu population is rearming at a great rate of knots. Nor will it be surprising when renewed civil war greets the announcement of a peace brokered by Pushtuns for the benefit of Pushtuns. Last of all, there will be no surprise when the US greets the peace with loud applause and the ensuing internal war with a complete and utter silence.
It is not that the Deep Thinkers around the Oval are unaware of what is taking place in Kabul. Even if the totality of American intelligence assets was detained on matters of tactical and operational focus, the US is aware of both the ongoing Karzai effort and the probable outcome(s.) The former head of Afghanistan's premiere intelligence service, Amrolah Saleh, has been all but shouting it from the minarets since he was forced from office last year by Karzai.
Saleh is not only very highly respected by intelligence professionals from the US, the UK, and elsewhere, he is personally honest, not at all corrupt, and, most important, committed to the notion of an Afghanistan which includes all the several ethnic groups on a basis of equality before the law as well as in politics. He is post-tribal to a fault. And, in Afghanistan, being post-tribal in worldview is a grave fault.
Saleh's message is simple, easy to corroborate, and very well rooted historically. Should the Great All Pashtun Peace Express arrive at its destination, the result will be fatal for Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan will return to what it was the day before the first American boot hit Afghan soil. A predominantly Pushtu, religiously predicated, and robustly violent Taliban will run the southern two thirds of the country to the advantage of Islamabad while the reconstituted Northern Alliance will fight a defensive insurgency based upon ethnic identity in the final third.
A decade or more of war, hundreds of American lives, billions of dollars to say nothing of the indescribable sufferings of the Afghans caught in the crossfire, will finally result in a back-to-the-future ending. Worst of all, there is virtually nothing the US can do about it.
We were doomed in our efforts the moment George W. Bush and his neocon ninny crew decided to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan in lieu of a simple, straight forward punitive expedition. In the rush to invade Iraq so as to teach the Arabs a lesson in how to elect good men which was not needed or indicated, the men of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld administration assured we were on a mission-impossible in Afghanistan.
Now we must reap the harvest of the seeds those intellectually challenged, ideologically driven men planted. We can see the crop now, a government which is a broken, rotten travesty, a people demoralized and victimized by a war in which none have a direct stake, an army and police force which exists more in name than in the field, and an "ally" in Pakistan which is an adversary in all but name. All that is needed to complete the harvest is the "success" of the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pushtun Peace Bus.
When that happens--and it is question of when not if, the US will be (including Vietnam) 0 for 3 in large scale interventionary operations. That record is not simply pathetic, it is one of self-inflicted defeats unrivaled by any other major country in recent history. (Even the French were only 0 for 2.)
Does this mean that Ron Paul is right? Does it mean the US would be best served by an isolationist posture? It does imply that the US is so preposterously pathetic in its efforts at muscular nation-building that we should abandon any future efforts in that direction. Of course, the world may not be willing to let us off so easy--and we may not be able to resist future temptations to do good.
The Geek has some thoughts on those questions. (No shock there.) Stay tuned. He will be back.
The US wants out of Afghanistan in the worst sort of way. With the exception of some military people, most but not all of senior rank, the current political leadership of the US along with most of We the People want out, right now if possible, but tomorrow at the latest. This is the ground reality regardless of President Obama's patent bromide about pressing on regardless delivered in the wake of the Chinook shoot-down and the deaths of more than two dozen men from Boat Six.
Of course, We the People, the congress, and the Clueless Guy in the Oval would like it best if the US can get out of Afghanistan with a modicum of dignity and a sufficient simulacrum of success to offset the billions of bucks spent and the hundreds of lives sacrificed on the alter of "nation-building." Congressman Ron Paul was speaking for many besides himself at the Iowa debate when he denounced the American adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan while warning against any repeat in Iran. Heads no doubt nodded in agreement across the country as he delivered his neo-isolationist message for the umpteenth time.
One unnecessary and unjustifiable war is reaching its quite unsatisfying conclusion. As the Iraqi excuse for a parliament dithers over whether or not to invite American "trainers" to remain in country after the last day of this year, it has become brilliantly clear that only Saddam Hussein lost to a greater extent than did the US over the course of this long, bloody exercise in regime change.
Iran has emerged as the big winner in the contest as shown by Baghdad's alignment with Tehran over the question of Syria. This is simply the most recent, most dramatic example of the triumph of Shia faith over all other considerations in the deeply divided human terrain of Iraq. But, far outside of international politics, in the quotidian dealings of business, it is instructive that US companies have lost out repeatedly and consistently to competitors from China, Russia, and Europe for the lucrative opportunities available in the country which was--we were assured--going to pay for the costs of liberation, rejoice in new democratic freedoms, greet American troops as the French did after D-Day, and generally rally to the American flag.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the US lost in the Iraqi gambit. And, now, we face losing in Afghanistan as well. No, we will not be defeated in the field by Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani backers. There are simply not enough lucky shots by RPGs to do that. Rather, we will conspire in our own defeat at the hands not of Taliban alone, nor by the combination of Taliban and Pakistan but rather by the joint efforts of "our man in Kabul," Hamid Karzai, the Pakistanis, and Taliban.
Karzai wants out of the war with a fervor which surpasses even that of the US and its partners in the ISAF. To this end he has been seeking a species of separate peace with Taliban for some time now. He has been seeking this goal not through the public means of the Supreme Peace Jurga, a large, unwieldy and totally implausible group, but through low key, private, and ever-so-discrete conversations in the presidential palace as well as out of country locations.
The glue which would hold any peace agreement together is simply that Karzai as well as the overwhelming majority of Taliban is Pashtu speaking. They are all good Pashtuns on the Secret Peace Bus. As the Pakistanis understand and support the Pashtun super-tribe due to its domination of the key border areas of the FATA, there is no doubt but Islamabad is well represented on the Peace Bus as well. This means their strategic political position in Afghanistan will be protected in full.
The ethnic Uzbeks, Tajjks, and Hazaras constituting the majority of the population in northern Afghanistan are not represented on the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pashtun Peace Express. These are the same people who suffered the most under the rule of the Taliban and whose Northern Alliance comprised the bulk of the indigenous fighters cooperating with the American invaders ten years ago.
It is not surprising that the old Northern Alliance is silently reforming. It is no surprise that the non-Pushtu population is rearming at a great rate of knots. Nor will it be surprising when renewed civil war greets the announcement of a peace brokered by Pushtuns for the benefit of Pushtuns. Last of all, there will be no surprise when the US greets the peace with loud applause and the ensuing internal war with a complete and utter silence.
It is not that the Deep Thinkers around the Oval are unaware of what is taking place in Kabul. Even if the totality of American intelligence assets was detained on matters of tactical and operational focus, the US is aware of both the ongoing Karzai effort and the probable outcome(s.) The former head of Afghanistan's premiere intelligence service, Amrolah Saleh, has been all but shouting it from the minarets since he was forced from office last year by Karzai.
Saleh is not only very highly respected by intelligence professionals from the US, the UK, and elsewhere, he is personally honest, not at all corrupt, and, most important, committed to the notion of an Afghanistan which includes all the several ethnic groups on a basis of equality before the law as well as in politics. He is post-tribal to a fault. And, in Afghanistan, being post-tribal in worldview is a grave fault.
Saleh's message is simple, easy to corroborate, and very well rooted historically. Should the Great All Pashtun Peace Express arrive at its destination, the result will be fatal for Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan will return to what it was the day before the first American boot hit Afghan soil. A predominantly Pushtu, religiously predicated, and robustly violent Taliban will run the southern two thirds of the country to the advantage of Islamabad while the reconstituted Northern Alliance will fight a defensive insurgency based upon ethnic identity in the final third.
A decade or more of war, hundreds of American lives, billions of dollars to say nothing of the indescribable sufferings of the Afghans caught in the crossfire, will finally result in a back-to-the-future ending. Worst of all, there is virtually nothing the US can do about it.
We were doomed in our efforts the moment George W. Bush and his neocon ninny crew decided to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan in lieu of a simple, straight forward punitive expedition. In the rush to invade Iraq so as to teach the Arabs a lesson in how to elect good men which was not needed or indicated, the men of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld administration assured we were on a mission-impossible in Afghanistan.
Now we must reap the harvest of the seeds those intellectually challenged, ideologically driven men planted. We can see the crop now, a government which is a broken, rotten travesty, a people demoralized and victimized by a war in which none have a direct stake, an army and police force which exists more in name than in the field, and an "ally" in Pakistan which is an adversary in all but name. All that is needed to complete the harvest is the "success" of the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pushtun Peace Bus.
When that happens--and it is question of when not if, the US will be (including Vietnam) 0 for 3 in large scale interventionary operations. That record is not simply pathetic, it is one of self-inflicted defeats unrivaled by any other major country in recent history. (Even the French were only 0 for 2.)
Does this mean that Ron Paul is right? Does it mean the US would be best served by an isolationist posture? It does imply that the US is so preposterously pathetic in its efforts at muscular nation-building that we should abandon any future efforts in that direction. Of course, the world may not be willing to let us off so easy--and we may not be able to resist future temptations to do good.
The Geek has some thoughts on those questions. (No shock there.) Stay tuned. He will be back.
Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Time For The "Nuclear Option"
The US and assorted other civilized states have been making noises and ugly faces for some years now over the Iranian efforts to attain nuclear weapons. Diplomatic and economic sanctions have been employed. So have more robust measures ranging from the more or less covert such as computer viruses to the rather obvious, the shooting of nuclear researchers.
Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.
Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron. During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy. It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune. Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.
Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond. Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments. Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.
The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades. In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own. Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs. Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.
The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter. The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Islamabad Bad Boys were handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.
This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages. Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency. These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.
There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy. There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.
Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning. In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff. Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.
Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective. In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government. This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.
For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."
While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941. That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US. This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.
As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative. The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.
It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future. The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession. It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan. The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.
The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move. This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial. As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate. And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.
Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it. Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence. The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit. In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures. This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.
We forget how unready the US was for World War II. We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible. It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944. The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.
Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war. Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.
President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb. We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results. Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.
The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision. Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act. The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it. Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.
Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be. As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"
Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.
Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron. During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy. It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune. Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.
Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond. Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments. Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.
The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades. In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own. Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs. Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.
The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter. The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Islamabad Bad Boys were handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.
This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages. Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency. These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.
There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy. There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.
Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning. In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff. Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.
Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective. In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government. This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.
For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."
While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941. That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US. This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.
As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative. The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.
It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future. The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession. It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan. The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.
The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move. This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial. As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate. And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.
Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it. Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence. The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit. In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures. This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.
We forget how unready the US was for World War II. We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible. It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944. The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.
Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war. Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.
President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb. We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results. Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.
The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision. Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act. The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it. Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.
Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be. As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"
Sunday, August 7, 2011
The Bugs Bunny "What A Maroon!" Award Returns
It has been some time since the Geek last bestowed the highly coveted "What A Maroon! Award." This has not been due to a dearth of candidates. Quite the contrary, the past several months have been awash to the scuppers with moronic policies and the severely intellectually challenged folks behind them. Simply, there have been entirely too many possibilities to single out just one each and every week.
Fortunately, a person has emerged from the fog of merely inept, incompetent, brain dead wonks and pols inside the Beltway. Finally there has been an act of such unmitigated idiocy that the Award must be bestowed.
The envelop, please. Riiippp. Raise the slip of paper inside. Read the distinguished name of the winner.
"And, the winner is.....(drum roll.) Lick lips in anticipations. "The winner is Hillary Clinton!" Applause.
That's right, bucko. The recipient is our most distinguished Secretary of State. Ms Clinton gets the Award not for her efforts to push back on the eviscerated foreign aid budget. Nor for her opposition to the cuts to the Foreign Service appropriation. No. Those were not moronic.
Well, what then? Is this belated recognition for Hilary's hard work to bring about the Libyan policy morass? No, although a strong case can be made for her receiving at least an honorable mention in this area.
SecState Clinton deserves the "What A Maroon!" Award for her recent collaboration with the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC,) the Turkish proponent of political Islam and historian manque, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in the area of preventing religious defamation. In an announcement datelined Jeddah, Ms Clinton and Dr Ihsanoglu declared the US would host a series of meetings to focus on the implementation of a UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.
This measure passed by the discredited Human Rights Council last March is intended to combat in an "urgent" fashion the growth of something called "Islamophobia." While carefully avoiding the use of either the word "Islam" or "Muslim," the intent of the resolution to single out the faith of the Prophet for special protection is clear. The fifty plus Muslim majority states of the OIC have long pushed for the criminalization of any written, spoken, or graphic consideration of any aspect of Islam in any manner other than the adulatory. After many failures, the OIC and its supporters such as Russia and China succeeded in getting 16/18 passed by a minority of the HRC members.
It is always essential to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the OIC membership is well known for limiting free expression and inquiry. The same is true of states which have sided with the OIC in its efforts to stifle open expression and the equally free inquiry which accompanies expression. Some OIC states, such as Pakistan, whose delegation introduced 16/18 as well as its numerous predecessors, has blasphemy laws of the most draconian sort enshrined in law.
It is equally necessary to recall that OIC states such as Egypt are (in)famous for the easy availability of antisemitic billingsgate such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Throughout the Muslim states, Judaism is defamed in the worst imaginable ways and in all media. Christianity is no better treated. Nor is Hinduism. Or Buddhism. Or minority groups within Islam such as the Alawites of Syria. All religions other than the most mainstream versions of Islam are fair targets for "defamation." Even the two largest subgroups of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia are willing, even eager, to "defame" the other.
Of course this "defamation" is not seen as such by the Muslims. To a good Muslim, the other faiths are either bastions of the infidel or expressions of apostasy. Thus, it is impossible by definition to "defame" them. Having not submitted to the unique Muslim view of the deity, adherents to all other faiths are fair game for whatever vitriol any Muslim cares to spill forth.
Logically, as the only "true" faith, only Islam merits protection as only Islam can be "defamed" by the vile slanders of the infidels and apostates. It is not extreme to assert that even the most objective, fact based, well documented assessment of Islam is automatically "defamatory" if it comes from the tongue or pen of an infidel or apostate. Considered from a Muslim perspective, the HRC resolution and all national policies or actions which arise from its application can serve to protect only Islam as only Islam resides in the realm of true faith.
As a dedicated adherent of political Islam, the OIC Secretary General is willing to do whatever is necessary to advance and protect the interests and position of Islam. Thus, it is not surprising that he seized upon the Norwegian tragedy to argue that now more than ever the states of the West must move quickly and effectively to turn the theory of resolution 16/18 into legal practice. The unfortunate reaction of so many in the Western and American elites to the berserker act of Brevik gave added power to Ishanoglu's argument.
The elites in the post-Brevik days continued and amplified their assertion that any criticism of Islam or any linkage of Muslims with terror serves the end of alleged "rightwing extremists" with the results such as those in Norway. This exercise in absurdity and political correctness automatically plays into the censorious hands of the OIC. Somehow, even the most objective and well-documented negative interpretations of Islam or the relation between the tenets of the faith and violent political actions are seen by the left leaning elites as being responsible for the action of Brevik. Without any documentation, the same people argue that a myriad of potential Breviks are lurking all through Western and American societies waiting to be triggered into violence by some less than hosanna laden treatment of Islam or Muslims.
Showing her elite credentials and leftward bent, Ms Clinton signed onto the OIC's gag-the-infidels gambit. No matter what her intentions are and no matter what the outcome may be, the secretary's agreement to a series of meetings oriented to putting 16/18 into practice gives the Muslim "speechophobic" move a legitimacy it does not deserve. Her action provides an imprimatur to a resolution which strikes at the heart of the most basic and critical right resident in Western societies.
Free inquiry and expression is a protean right. It is also a right from which many others emerge. It is so basic to Western liberties and Western economic, social, political, and cultural development that it is simply impossible to separate free speech from the West as it exists today. The utter absence of any real free inquiry and expression in the countries of the OIC goes far to explain why these states are comparatively backwards in all respects.
The irrelevance of rights, including that of free expression and inquiry, in Muslim majority states is not surprising. Islam, unlike other major faiths, has no inherent concept of rights. Islam is all about duty. Believers have duties to the deity and to other believers, but, as good slaves, they have no inherent rights. In sharp contrast, other faiths, particularly those preeminent in the West, not only acknowledge the existence of rights, rights which are inherent to the human condition, but exalt those rights by stating clearly and repeatedly that the exercise of rights requires the concomitant acceptance of duties.
To the faithful Muslim, the Western emphasis on rights constitutes a world through the looking glass. It is not comprehensible to the good and faithful Muslim with his focus on knowing his duties and executing them with willing joy. The Muslim has a duty to protect his religion against the words of the infidels and apostates. His duty goes so far as to seek to prevent the infidel and apostate from sullying the faith by even an honest and objective narrative treatment. The Muslim has a duty to exalt his faith above all others, which means he is allowed to attack the "false" beliefs. His double standard is not hypocritical but rather is an honest expression of duties and beliefs.
Ms Clinton is not a Muslim as far as is publicly known. She is, however, an American. As a holder of an office of trust and confidence under the Constitution, she has taken an oath of office swearing to protect and defend the Constitution to the best of her ability. She is a lawyer by education. Putting the two aspects of Ms Clinton's life together, it must be concluded that she understands the OIC backed resolution is repugnant to the Bill of Rights.
She became a "maroon" of the highest order when she did not meet the demand that the US support 16/18 with any reaction other than gales of derisive laughter.
Fortunately, a person has emerged from the fog of merely inept, incompetent, brain dead wonks and pols inside the Beltway. Finally there has been an act of such unmitigated idiocy that the Award must be bestowed.
The envelop, please. Riiippp. Raise the slip of paper inside. Read the distinguished name of the winner.
"And, the winner is.....(drum roll.) Lick lips in anticipations. "The winner is Hillary Clinton!" Applause.
That's right, bucko. The recipient is our most distinguished Secretary of State. Ms Clinton gets the Award not for her efforts to push back on the eviscerated foreign aid budget. Nor for her opposition to the cuts to the Foreign Service appropriation. No. Those were not moronic.
Well, what then? Is this belated recognition for Hilary's hard work to bring about the Libyan policy morass? No, although a strong case can be made for her receiving at least an honorable mention in this area.
SecState Clinton deserves the "What A Maroon!" Award for her recent collaboration with the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC,) the Turkish proponent of political Islam and historian manque, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in the area of preventing religious defamation. In an announcement datelined Jeddah, Ms Clinton and Dr Ihsanoglu declared the US would host a series of meetings to focus on the implementation of a UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.
This measure passed by the discredited Human Rights Council last March is intended to combat in an "urgent" fashion the growth of something called "Islamophobia." While carefully avoiding the use of either the word "Islam" or "Muslim," the intent of the resolution to single out the faith of the Prophet for special protection is clear. The fifty plus Muslim majority states of the OIC have long pushed for the criminalization of any written, spoken, or graphic consideration of any aspect of Islam in any manner other than the adulatory. After many failures, the OIC and its supporters such as Russia and China succeeded in getting 16/18 passed by a minority of the HRC members.
It is always essential to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the OIC membership is well known for limiting free expression and inquiry. The same is true of states which have sided with the OIC in its efforts to stifle open expression and the equally free inquiry which accompanies expression. Some OIC states, such as Pakistan, whose delegation introduced 16/18 as well as its numerous predecessors, has blasphemy laws of the most draconian sort enshrined in law.
It is equally necessary to recall that OIC states such as Egypt are (in)famous for the easy availability of antisemitic billingsgate such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Throughout the Muslim states, Judaism is defamed in the worst imaginable ways and in all media. Christianity is no better treated. Nor is Hinduism. Or Buddhism. Or minority groups within Islam such as the Alawites of Syria. All religions other than the most mainstream versions of Islam are fair targets for "defamation." Even the two largest subgroups of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia are willing, even eager, to "defame" the other.
Of course this "defamation" is not seen as such by the Muslims. To a good Muslim, the other faiths are either bastions of the infidel or expressions of apostasy. Thus, it is impossible by definition to "defame" them. Having not submitted to the unique Muslim view of the deity, adherents to all other faiths are fair game for whatever vitriol any Muslim cares to spill forth.
Logically, as the only "true" faith, only Islam merits protection as only Islam can be "defamed" by the vile slanders of the infidels and apostates. It is not extreme to assert that even the most objective, fact based, well documented assessment of Islam is automatically "defamatory" if it comes from the tongue or pen of an infidel or apostate. Considered from a Muslim perspective, the HRC resolution and all national policies or actions which arise from its application can serve to protect only Islam as only Islam resides in the realm of true faith.
As a dedicated adherent of political Islam, the OIC Secretary General is willing to do whatever is necessary to advance and protect the interests and position of Islam. Thus, it is not surprising that he seized upon the Norwegian tragedy to argue that now more than ever the states of the West must move quickly and effectively to turn the theory of resolution 16/18 into legal practice. The unfortunate reaction of so many in the Western and American elites to the berserker act of Brevik gave added power to Ishanoglu's argument.
The elites in the post-Brevik days continued and amplified their assertion that any criticism of Islam or any linkage of Muslims with terror serves the end of alleged "rightwing extremists" with the results such as those in Norway. This exercise in absurdity and political correctness automatically plays into the censorious hands of the OIC. Somehow, even the most objective and well-documented negative interpretations of Islam or the relation between the tenets of the faith and violent political actions are seen by the left leaning elites as being responsible for the action of Brevik. Without any documentation, the same people argue that a myriad of potential Breviks are lurking all through Western and American societies waiting to be triggered into violence by some less than hosanna laden treatment of Islam or Muslims.
Showing her elite credentials and leftward bent, Ms Clinton signed onto the OIC's gag-the-infidels gambit. No matter what her intentions are and no matter what the outcome may be, the secretary's agreement to a series of meetings oriented to putting 16/18 into practice gives the Muslim "speechophobic" move a legitimacy it does not deserve. Her action provides an imprimatur to a resolution which strikes at the heart of the most basic and critical right resident in Western societies.
Free inquiry and expression is a protean right. It is also a right from which many others emerge. It is so basic to Western liberties and Western economic, social, political, and cultural development that it is simply impossible to separate free speech from the West as it exists today. The utter absence of any real free inquiry and expression in the countries of the OIC goes far to explain why these states are comparatively backwards in all respects.
The irrelevance of rights, including that of free expression and inquiry, in Muslim majority states is not surprising. Islam, unlike other major faiths, has no inherent concept of rights. Islam is all about duty. Believers have duties to the deity and to other believers, but, as good slaves, they have no inherent rights. In sharp contrast, other faiths, particularly those preeminent in the West, not only acknowledge the existence of rights, rights which are inherent to the human condition, but exalt those rights by stating clearly and repeatedly that the exercise of rights requires the concomitant acceptance of duties.
To the faithful Muslim, the Western emphasis on rights constitutes a world through the looking glass. It is not comprehensible to the good and faithful Muslim with his focus on knowing his duties and executing them with willing joy. The Muslim has a duty to protect his religion against the words of the infidels and apostates. His duty goes so far as to seek to prevent the infidel and apostate from sullying the faith by even an honest and objective narrative treatment. The Muslim has a duty to exalt his faith above all others, which means he is allowed to attack the "false" beliefs. His double standard is not hypocritical but rather is an honest expression of duties and beliefs.
Ms Clinton is not a Muslim as far as is publicly known. She is, however, an American. As a holder of an office of trust and confidence under the Constitution, she has taken an oath of office swearing to protect and defend the Constitution to the best of her ability. She is a lawyer by education. Putting the two aspects of Ms Clinton's life together, it must be concluded that she understands the OIC backed resolution is repugnant to the Bill of Rights.
She became a "maroon" of the highest order when she did not meet the demand that the US support 16/18 with any reaction other than gales of derisive laughter.
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