The latest buzz from the Deep Thinkers inside the Beltway shows that the Obama administration hasn't gotten the word on Afghanistan yet. OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the Profound Strategists of the new administration have heard a portion of the word but not yet gotten the whole message.
That means there is both good news and bad tidings.
The good news first. (Essential caveat: if true, it's good.) The administration is reportedly considering extending the geographic scope of the UAV attacks on Taliban's leadership cadre and foreign fighter contingents. Considering the positive effects of the drone delivered missile strikes in the FATA which are recognised as such by local anti-Taliban, anti-al-Qaeda forces if not by the MSM of the US and Europe, the time to expand the coverage to other parts of Pakistan currently dominated by the Islamist jihadists has come.
The Predator presence not only inflicts physical casualties, it has a pronounced psychological impact over time. The constant awareness of the distant presence with its potential for sudden and unannounced death is a factor in the progressive demoralisation of the jihadists. Or, at least this dynamic is indicated in some defector debriefings.
The use of Predators also has an effect on the uncommitted majority. The reminder of an American sort-of-over-the-horizon presence serves to tilt the balance of uncertain loyalties against the Islamist jihadists. The flights and periodic attacks serves to stimulate an observant Muslim to consider whether or not his religious beliefs really, really require embracing Islamism or becoming either an active jihadist or a firm member of its mass support base.
If the Predator flights have no impact beyond helping to convince a potential jihadist to climb back on the fence, they are a success. Remember, one does not kill his way to victory in a counterinsurgency, he wins by progressively reducing the insurgent's capacity and political will to keep on fighting.
On balance there are a number of very good tactical and strategic reasons to enlarge the scope of Predator operations--including those of a lethal nature. The only downside is the possible negative repercussions on the less-than-stable Pakistani government. But, given the other reasons for inherent political instability as well as the greater threat of Taliban success, this is a slight and completely acceptable risk.
One way to reduce the risk posed by any expansion of Predator missions can be mitigated by assuring that the US media are not brought into the loop by leakers no doubt motivated by such High Minded considerations as the inevitable collateral civilian casualties. The Islamabad regime is undermined not so much by the actual attacks as it is by Western, particularly American, media coverage of the strikes.
(These tender souls need to get a grip on a ground truth: The only way to limit civilian casualties to zero is ending the war. Whatever assures the most rapid and complete ending to hostilities is to the good in that regard.)
So much for the possibly good news. Now the dirty end of the stick.
The Deep Thinkers and Profound Strategists of the Obama administration have apparently bought into the disastrous mission creep in Afghanistan inaugurated by the Bush-Cheney neocon ninnies. The lads and lassies of the administration intend to complement the 17,000 new pairs of boots on the ground with a flood of diplomats and other civilian personnel.
Like the neocon ninnies of the past eight years, the Hope-and-Change Crowd seems hell-bent on pursuing the impossible mission of creating a modern Western style nation-state in the geographic expression called Afghanistan. In so doing they are showing they have as little grip on reality as the ideologues of Bush-Cheney.
Way back when, way back in the Eocene of 2002, the only realistic, achievable, plausible task for US military forces was the mounting of a pure punitive expedition. The only realistic, achievable, plausible goal for military force employment was the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taliban government which hosted, protected and refused to hand over the men behind the 9/11 attacks as well as the predecessor operations. The establishment of a successor government to Taliban was not requisite, not rational and not achievable at any acceptable cost in time, lives and money.
When reality surrendered to a combination of American moral sentimentality and the pervasive neocon fantasy of a "democratic, liberal" Mideast being called into existence by an invasion of Iraq, the chances of the US accomplishing even a minimal punitive goal in Afghanistan went to zero at the speed of light. Ideology trumped realpolitick to the ultimate loss of all--the US, Afghanistan, the Sub-continent, Europe. Ideology trumped realpolitick to the ultimate success of those holding fast to another ideology--Islamism.
The roaring return of Taliban not only in Afghanistan but throughout Pakistan means one thing only. The US must focus upon achieving its minimum necessary strategic task. That task is the same as we faced following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The task is assuring that we are not militarily defeated. The polite and accurate term for this is, "not-losing."
"Not-losing" means that the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan will not be optimal from our perspective. It means a politically inconclusive end to hostilities. It means that Islamism as a political and psychological force will remain unabated in the region. None of that is desirable.
Undesirable? Certainly. Achievable? Perhaps.
We can hope to achieve our minimal necessary strategic goal of "not-losing" if and only if we focus on defeating the armed forces of Islamism, the jihadist components of Taliban and al-Qaeda. This requires that boots be put on the ground. It requires triggers to be pulled with effect. It requires that Predators fly and missiles strike.
Achieving the minimum goal does not require nation-building. It does not require turning Afghanistan into a fully functioning nation-state resembling those in the West. It does not require diplomats, negotiations or the other features of diplomacy except as a sidelight to the main event on the battlefield.
As the Korean War paradigm shows clearly, negotiations with ideologically committed interlocutors constitutes a continuation of the battlefield around a baize covered table. Like the bloodletting war, the negotiations are a test of political will.
Again drawing from the Korean War analogy, the US did not attempt any exercise in nation-building in South Korea until after the shooting stopped. Even then it took a mort of years for South Korea to develop its own institutions of politics, press, society and economy. Many of these were not and are not fully compatible with their American counterparts. That, of course, is utterly irrelevant.
The ground truth is that no matter how many diplomats, lawyers, economists, and other learned professionals we pour into Afghanistan, their efforts are going to be utterly without any real-world relevance. Afghanistan will never, repeat, never become a facsimile of the US or any European state or even South Korea. Nor should we want it to be. That sort of neo-colonial condescension is quite passe.
Come on all you Deep Thinkers and Profound Strategists! Get a grip! Take a dekko at history. The history of counterinsurgency and the history of Afghanistan deserve at least a cursory glance.
History and reality agree. Forget nation-building. Dx the lawyers, diplomats and all the rest. Focus on killing and demoralising enough of the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that they are reduced to a fair semblance of military impotence. At least enough of a reduction so that none can claim that a defeat was inflicted on the US and its partners.
Finally, folks, grin and bear it. Afghanistan will remain what it always has been. It ain't going to become the US with a funny accent. Accept that the Islamists will remain alive and well as a political and social force in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
That means, unfortunately, we and the rest of the West will have to remain vigilant against the next storm out of the mountains.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
In Afghanistan The Obama-ites Don't Get It
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