That Isn't Quite Cricket, Old Boy

Cricket is the perfect British sport. It is slow paced, interminable in duration, impossible for an outsider to understand and governed by rules which are again incomprehensible to the outsider. And, as was reputed to the former British Empire, it is a sport upon which the sun never sets.

The attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore the other day is an excellent, perhaps perfect, example of the latest fashion in Islamist terrorism. It was fast paced--except for the exfiltration. (At least two of the trigger-pullers are caught on tape strolling down the street, automatic weapons dangling loosely in their hands, until they casually hop on a motorbike and scoot off into the metaphorical sunset.)

Unlike the typical test match, the attack was short in length although the debate over the causes and consequences is likely to last longer than three matches taped end-to-end. Again, quite unlike the sport at the center of the storm over Pakistan, the attack is not impossible for the observer to comprehend and the rules not nearly so obscure.

While the target was ostensibly the Sri Lankan team--probably in an attempt to introduce a measure of ambiguity into questions of motivation and goal, the substantial target was the Pakistani government. There are several reasons behind this statement.

The action demonstrated the less than competent nature of the Pakistani police and security forces. Even though several policemen died in the attack, neither they nor their surviving colleagues were able either to stop the attack or kill any of the attackers. Heck, as the videotapes show, the police could not even encourage the shooters to run rather than walk to their getaway vehicles. Given that the government assured the visiting Sri Lankan team that it would receive "presidential level" security, the resulting affair indicates that level of protection is very low at best.

The action will have several consequences. All of these are bad from the perspective of the more than a slightly beleaguered government.

The inability of the government to quickly identify, arrest and effectively prosecute the shooters or those behind them will further erode public confidence in Islamabad's ability to assure the internal peace and security of the nation.

In this context it should be recalled that more than 8,000 Pakistani civilians died as a result of terrorist actions in 2008. There were more than 2,300 separate attacks including more than three dozen suicide bombings that year.

Many of these attacks were followed by waves of arrests. But, there were few,if any, prosecutions let alone convictions. Indeed there have been no convictions of a person involved in a high profile terrorist act since 2002. If this attack follows the standard scenario it will be one more replay of the famed line in "Casablanca" where Claude Rains orders his men to "arrest the usual suspects."

Another negative for Islamabad comes from the reality that the greatest fatality in the shooting was cricket in Pakistan. At least in international terms, cricket is dead. Certainly Pakistan's chances of hosting the World Cup of Cricket are deader than King Tut. Given that the sport has very high status in the Sub-continent, this is not an inconsiderable loss.

Finally, the attack has given a new life and increased impetus to the growing fears that Pakistan is a failing state. It has provided additional evidence to support the contention that Pakistan is soon to go down the Islamist tubes. This is underscored by the growing buzz to the effect that the security authorities at some level must be in cahoots with the Islamist jihadists who carried out the exercise.

The greatest beneficiary of the attack is the Islamist groups such as Pakistani Taliban. This is true even in the (unlikely) event that the Islamists were not directly involved in planning or executing the attack.

Anything that serves to provoke the government to burdensome acts of repression benefits those who oppose both the government and the status quo. So wrote Carlos Marighela. The historical record shows his counsel to have been both wise and correct.

Anything which shows or seems to show that the government is weak, irresolute or lacking the will to defend itself against insurgency benefits only the insurgent. This little truism has been known by every insurgent leader since Sam Adams. It is particularly true with respect to Pakistan with its need for both understanding and support from outside regimes which may be skeptical of Islamabad's will and intent in countering the spread of Islamism and its armed, evil twin, jihadism.

Anything which erodes the economic base of the country benefits the insurgents-in-waiting as declining economic expectations increase political disaffiliation. This attack cannot but scare off any tourists so far dauntless enough to include Pakistan in their plans. The same may be averred regarding foreign investment. Pakistan needs money and this attack will not help the government achieve that goal.

The longer the actual authorship of the attack goes either unknown or insufficiently proved the better--from the perspective not only of the author of the action but of the Islamist insurgents. The beauty of ambiguous signature operations is that it allows all observers to use them as palimpsests upon which to imprint their favorite villain du jour. Beauty also lies in the way in which ambiguity forces the government to flail at shadows, unsure as to where their blows are directed or upon whom they land.

As an added feature, ambiguity assures that the story will have longer legs. It serves to push the story into successive news cycles which, in turn, propels the narrative into more and more minds around the world. This makes sure the government is perceived in an every darker way.

The bad guys have bowled. The batsman from Islamabad may be holding his bat, but he can't even get enough of a swing to make a sticky wicket.