Khamenei Slam Dunks Obama

There is nothing surprising about the response offered by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the Persian New Year's tape of President Obama. The flat rejection was telegraphed by assorted underlings in the political apparatus of Tehran.

The Iranian rejection was (or at least should have been) expected by the professionals at Foggy Bottom and Langley. The tide of revolution is still riding high in Iran even though the actuality of deposing the ancien regime is more than a generation in the past.

Revolutionary zeal is most prolonged when external opposition is prolonged, high visibility but not fatal in effect. The analogy can be seen in Cuba. There the US has been implacably hostile or, at best, angrily indifferent to the regime.

The US embarked on a policy of active hostility including diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and even para-military operations nearly a half-century ago. Even after the most obnoxious features of the failed policy were abandoned in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy Assassination, the diplomatic and economic bars remained in place.

The US effort gave the Castro regime all the cover it needed not only to emplace the accomplishments of the 26th of July Movement in concrete, but to provide the excuses and justifications required to establish a police state, embark on foreign policy adventures and not address deep, systematic problems in the Cuban economy. US policy became Castro's best and most necessary accomplice.

(Can we say, "Law of Unintended Consequences?")

The US government and We the People threw a mighty hissy-fit following the Iranian Hostage Affair. It goes almost without saying that the capture of the American embassy by the so-called "students" was authorised and controlled by Ayatollah Khomenei. The event demonstrated to Iranians and the world that the Iranian Revolution was real, potent, outrageous of old norms and permanent. The permanence was assured by the American fear and loathing directed at Iran following the release of the hostages.

At the time of the Hostage Affair as well as in its wake a few perceptive individuals commented that under the Islamist rhetoric and seeming insanity the Ayatollah Khomenei was a shrewd and very skilled Iranian politician. He quite obviously understood the cruciality of an external enemy in maintaining and consolidating the Revolution. It was the Ayatollah who assigned the role of Great Satan to the US.

The Reagan administration cheerfully accepted the role, seemingly without thought. Once accepted the role could not be easily cast off. The inertia of American domestic political considerations made that certain.

The worst effects of the US having signed on to the Iranian game plan came during the Iraq-Iran War. The US tilted far--too far--toward Iraq. The reasons adduced for this tilt were at best dubious, at worst mere twaddle.

The effect of the US orchestrated global isolation of Iran during the war has blown back on us in recent years. Not only was Saddam Hussein strengthened in his power by the US policy, Iran was tossed over to the paranoid fringe of defensiveness.

When the UN--which in the estimate of Tehran was an American tool--did not come down four square in support of Iran's animadversions of having been the target of illegal chemical weapons, a policy Rubicon was crossed in the mullahocracy. Never again would Iran lack the necessary means of deterrence and retaliation. The country would develop and field weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and, in the fullness of time, nuclear.

The isolation, the hostility, interacted with the exsanguination of the Iraq-Iran War to buttress the revolutionary commitment of the Iranian religious and political leadership--and the mass of Iranian citizens as well. This dynamic resulted in two factors which bedevil us today.

The first of these is the Iranian drive for a nuclear capacity. The quest is expensive, very expensive. The assorted UN Security Council imposed sanctions as well as the American add-ons have increased the expense.

Every increase in cost has been ignored by Tehran at best. Met with truculent rhetoric more typically. Responded to by indirect application of counter threat at worst.

Ironically, but predictably, every attempt to abate the Iranian nuclear nuisance has made the nuisance harder to abate. Now there seems little likelihood that the Iranians will abandon either enrichment or the potential of acquiring plutonium from their soon-to-go-online heavy water "research" reactor.

The second consequence of the Us-Against-All-Of-The-World attitude so easily inculcated and nourished in the Shia population of Iran with its long, long history of persecution and war was the policy goal of leaping the ring of containment presented by the US and its Persian Gulf "allies" such as Wahhibist Saudi Arabia.

Leaping lines of containment was pioneered by the Soviet Union during the Fifties and Sixties. The Iranians followed the Moscow designed strategy.

Using the history-is-on-our-side appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Moscow fostered movements and wars of "national liberation" with the goal and intent of violating the global lines drawn by the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Proxy war and propaganda worked together to make less relevant the "Free World-Soviet Bloc" paradigm which informed US foreign policy. (It also had the desirable side effect of causing the US to fritter away diplomatic, economic and military resources in remote and inconsequential areas of the globe.)

The mullahocracy of Iran has also deployed the history-is-on-our-side ideology. True, this time it is derived from "sacred" rather than secular sources. But, the effect is the same. Yes, the ideology is drawn from the minority Shia experience, but it is powerfully reinforced by the undeniable successes of the Iranian Revolution in opposing the US and the West generally.

The most high profile result of the Iranian effort to leap the line has been its alliance with Syria and sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. It deserves mention that the Iranian "outreach" efforts in countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines has not been without measurable success.

The House of Sand (oops! The Geek meant, Saud) has wakened to the danger in the past year or so along with some of the other Gulf States, but the awakening may have come a bit late and may have as its primary effect the reinforcing of Sunni Islamist groups both Wahhibist and Salifist. Other target states which have received the ministrations of the Iranian "Angels" are even further behind the curve and thus far more at risk of internally destabilizing effects from pro-Iranian Islamist groups.

So, to steal a title from one of Lenin's most famous works, "What is to be done?"

This is a genuine toughy. As with China and Cuba, the US has locked itself into a long duration policy of confrontation with Iran.

Now, the US did once in its recent history reverse a long standing effort of hostile confrontation. That one worked well from our perspective. At least initially.

The Nixon administration in one fell swoop abandoned twenty years of opposing the Peoples Republic of China. The Nixonites saw that the US and the PRC had an interlocking national and strategic interest. Both had a common rival in the Soviet Union. Beijing and Washington saw in each other a counter to Moscow. We both "seen our opportunity and took it." (With apologies to George Washington Plunkett.)

The same imperative has never existed with respect to Cuba. It does not exist in the case of Iran. Our opportunity came and was untaken twenty years ago as Chemical Ali's bombs fell on unprotected Iranian troops.

This brute fact seems to rule out any replay of Kissinger's "secret" trip to China forty years ago. It seems to obviate the potential for a dramatic rapprochement with Tehran. Certainly the terms for rapprochement laid out by Ayatollah Khameni are unacceptable. Great Powers may alter their policies thus tacitly admitting past errors, but they do not apologise.

(For the record, there is no hint that Lesser Powers make a habit of apologising. Being a government means never having to say you're sorry.)

Dropping sanctions without some sort of quid pro quo is also a non-starter. To do such would only embolden, would simply stoke revolutionary zeal and appeal with long term results which would not be desirable from an American perspective.

This leaves keeping to our present course. It implies an increase in sanctions. This means gaining full support from both Moscow and Beijing. This in turn implies that the US will have to have something to offer in return. Beijing is unthreatened by anything Iran does in the near to mid-term. Moscow feels qualified to deal with Iran unaided if a real threat seems to be developing.

Both countries may be right. The US may have to grant that point and keep its fingers crossed. The fall back position is greater reliance upon EU countries to firmly enforce the sanction regime. Given the leakage caused by German and French companies, there is room for improvement. A lot of room.

However, under current global economic conditions the Europeans are not going to do anything which harms national interest. What, if anything, can the US offer to offset this understandable position? Hard to say. But, probably not enough.

Well, what about the Israeli option?

Realistically that option does not yet exist. The Israelis will require US assistance and support. The climate is not right for that move. Yet.

That leaves public diplomacy. We have heard the official response from the mullahocracy. We have not yet heard from the "outlying precincts," the Iranian people. In a few more days word will start electronically leaking out in sufficient quantity to get some sense on the degree to which the average sort-of-upscale Iranian supports or opposes the Ayatollah-in-Chief.

If there are any grounds for encouragement, President Obama should go back to the TV studio. His greatest personal tool is his (teleprompter dependent) rhetoric and engaging public persona. Keep on using it, Mr President, you may be our best, least secret weapon. What the heck, it's better than bombs bursting in the sand.