Initiative--You Can't Win A War Without It

On the tactical level in Afghanistan, US and other International Security Assistance Force members may or may not have the initiative. They may or may not be carrying the fight to the enemy, initiating combat, forcing the tempo of combat. The picture on that level is far from clear.

On the operational level and the even more rarefied stratum of strategy, the reality is more clear. On these two levels of war, the US and its partners do not have any semblance of initiative. This means, if history is any guide, there is no chance of winning or even achieving the minimum strategic goal of "not losing."

The reason behind this highly unfortunate state of affairs is simple. The US and therefore its partners in Afghanistan have no idea what the goal of the war is. There has been no consistent policy vision. The US has failed completely to define just what the "better state of peace" it hoped to achieve through war might be.

The Geek has to back off a bit and take a running start at the nature of the problem and why it may now be a problem without a good solution.

Wars are not irrational spasms of bad temper. War is part of politics, it is diplomacy with an attitude. The goal of war, like that of diplomacy, is the achievement of a policy goal. In war the policy goal constitutes a better state of peace--at least from the perspective of the victor. Or, in the case of the Korean War paradigm which governs most interventionary operations, the "not-loser."

The better state of peace has to be carefully crafted as a policy goal before the guns of intervention fire. The nature and character of the goal allows the definition of victory (or "not-losing.) If the goal is the hole at the end of the fairway, then the definition of victory is the flag marking the hole and "not losing" is the green surrounding it.

Before the instruments of national power can be assembled and orchestrated in a viable theory of victory, the establishment of the goal and the definition of minimal as well as maximal success must be undertaken. In short, don't put boots on the ground and fingers on the trigger without a clear end purpose. Without this prerequisite, all that can be done is killing people and breaking things without any chance of achieving a better state of peace.

World War II made it easy, too easy, deceptively easy for the US to establish a goal and define victory. The goal was the complete suppression of the aggressor states. The definition of victory was unconditional surrender by the aggressors.

Badda-bing! A better state of peace.

Korea showed the total war paradigm was not sovereign. The nuclear stalemate assured that the good ole days of squashing the evil enemy so that good might reign supreme would simply be a short cut to national suicide.

Interventionary wars such as Vietnam or Afghanistan (or even the invasion of Iraq, but detailed consideration of that awaits another post) require very, very careful thinking and planning to establish--slow down, important words come next--an achievable better state of peace. Very, very careful planning is also required to define the end goal of the operation in a way which is realistically relevant to the nature of the human terrain over which the war will be fought.

This careful, realistic planning was not done prior to putting bombs and boots on the ground in Afghanistan. There was no discussion, let alone consensus on what a better state of peace might be in the wake of war. There was no unitary, consistent and realistic goal toward which the instruments of national power were to be directed. Thus, there was neither a definition of minimal and maximal success nor the emergence of a coherent theory of victory which pitted the strengths of the US against the weaknesses of the enemy.

At that point, moments before the first bombs or troops hit the ground of Afghanistan, our strategic pooch was well and completely screwed.

We were doomed even before getting to Tora Bora to flounder and flail. To kill and be killed. To wander clueless in the deserts of policy blunder.

Technology and valor or blood and money alone have not and can not redeem the initial failure. These factors no matter how critical they are to the waging of war will not assure the achievement of either a better state of peace or the minimal goal of not losing.

Right now, today if not sooner, the US must decide just what war it is fighting. And just what the better state of peace might be. It must at least understand that without achieving the minimum of not losing, the bad guys have won and will keep on winning.

Seven plus years ago, the W. Bush administration had two clear, distinctly different options.

The US could mount a simple, direct, short-duration punitive expedition against al-Qaeda and its Taliban government supporter. The better state of peace would be characterised by the destruction of these two hostile entities. The goal would be the removal of al-Qaeda and Taliban as effective threats to the US. Success would be defined by dead leaders and followers in both al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The other option was that of building a new nation in Afghanistan. The better state of peace in this case would be characterised not simply by the removal of al-Qaeda and Taliban as threats but their replacement by a secular, multi-party democracy complete with a functioning independent judiciary and absence of corruption and the other features which have taken the West and the US centuries to develop.

The very breadth of this vision of a better state of peace made goal setting impossible and defining success even more so.

Unfortunately for Afghans and Americans alike, the W. Bush administration after having stated that we were not going to undertake "nationbuilding" went ahead to do just that.

Now we have no idea just what the goal in the continued war might be. As a result we do not, have not had, and can not achieve the initiative at the operational or strategic levels of the war no matter what transpires at the lower depths where men kill and die.

The enemy, Taliban and its ilk, have the initiative because they have a clear and realistic vision of a better state of peace. Their better state is defined by the establishment of an Emirate of Afghanistan where Islamist interpretations of Sharia reign supreme.

They can and do have a goal--the forced removal of US and other foreign forces from Afghanistan along with Afghan apostate lackeys of the Crusaders.

They have an equally clear definition of victory. The ass of the last American soldier getting on the last plane out of Kabul.

Because their better state of peace, policy goal and definition of victory are coherent to the point of unity, the bad guys of Taliban have an effective theory of victory. There is nothing new in it. It is the standard issue insurgent theory of victory.

This standard issue has three components: Outlast the other side's political will to continue. Inflict enough casualties so that the counterinsurgents realise the cost far outweighs the benefits. Demobilise support from the indigenous government and mobilise support from the increasingly war weary uncommitted majority to the side of the insurgent.

To date, the resurgent Taliban has practiced the traditional, typically successful insurgent theory of victory quite well.

But not perfectly--as when it undertook a massively counterproductive suicide bombing campaign against Afghan civilians that had the latter running in droves to the government and its foreign supporters. But, while imperfect, Taliban has followed the historically sanctioned script well enough to have the initiative. Well enough to be winning today.

The man who was selected by the W. Bush administration to be Our Man in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, at least realises dimly that Taliban is winning and winning rapidly. He is apparently aware that he does not have the reflexive support from the Obama administration that he enjoyed with its predecessor. It apparently has come to his attention that he is not the most popular man in Afghanistan and that his version of a government is seen derisively and dismissively throughout the fractious land.

Hamid Karzai is making a desperate grab for the initiative. While his sudden decision to call for snap elections in April rather than wait for the 20 August date set by the Independent Election Commission is correctly seen by many as a bid for power, a grasp at the appearance of legitimacy, it is more than that. Karzai's probably very ill-considered snap election demand is a bid for the initiative.

He wants to wrong foot his political opponents, true. But, there must be at least the vague hope that if he is elected by the population rump that might conceivably be able to vote in April, he will be in a position to make a deal with Taliban and oust the foreigners without losing his head (literally) in the process.

Right next door the Pakistani government has made a deal in Swat while their army claims military victory in one of the less important Frontier Agencies against Taliban. Karzai probably has the dream of doing something similar. Taliban can have Sharia. He keeps his head and some power for at least some time.

The US and its partners have made their "concerns" known to Karzai, but it is debatable how much leverage the foreigners have at this juncture. If we were clearly winning, if we had demonstrable initiative against Taliban, we would have the necessary juice to force Karzai to keep to the original schedule.

Of course, if we were winning, Karzai never would have made his play in the first place.

Fortunately for our collective ego as well as the political future of President Obama, we have a fall back position. When the boots of the last American soldier hit the deck of the last flight out of Bagram and the green flag of Taliban flies over Kabul, we can blame the whole defeat on Pakistan.

Well, that will be only a partial lie.