The centerpiece of the speech was the PM's acceptance of a "demilitarised" Palestinian state. In reality there is no need to read further. The requirement for the hypothetical Palestinian state to be demilitarised is completely unacceptable to even the so-called "moderates" of the Palestinian Authority. This point was made clear by a member of the PA's inner circle of government instantly following the Netanyahu speech.
Nabil Abu Rudeinah declared the condition of demilitarization "sabotaged all initiatives" and "paralysed all efforts" being made by the Americans and the Palestinians. Then, in a volte face remarkable even by Arab diplomatic standards, he went on to dismiss the demilitarization requirement as a "detail" and not a matter of substance such as the halt to West Bank settlement growth and the need for a "Palestinian right of return."
Nor was the instant, total rejection unique to the close aid of Mahmoud Abbas. One Saeb Erekat who is described as a "senior Palestinian negotiator" blew the Netanyahu speech away by demanding that President Obama decide whether or not the Israeli PM was to be treated as being "above the law," a choice which would result in chaos, violence and similar icky-poo things.
As to the question of just who or what might assure any Palestinian state might be "demilitarised" as such would be defined by the Israelis, the PM had the answer. It is a completely unworkable, even irrelevant answer, but it is the only one Netenyahu could give. He placed the onus on the "international community."
The notion of a "demilitarized" Palestinian state is not new. Several Israeli governments made the same requirement before. As far back as 1968, less than a year after the victory of the Six Day War, the Israeli response to a Johnson administration suggestion of land-for-peace brought a more or less affirmative response with the critical qualification that the West Bank occupied at that time by the IDF be completely demilitarised if it were to be transferred to an "Arab authority." At the time that authority presumably would have been the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
The idea was a non-starter for reasons organic to Israel and its internal politics even more than the rejectionist position taken instantly by Yassir Arafat and Fatah as well as most Arab states (including, in public at least, Jordan.) The idea was equally lost at the starting blocks when it was periodically revived.
The deliberate creation of "facts on the ground," as previous Israeli governments called the act of building large "settlements" on militarily critical terrain in the occupied territories, assured that the chance of finally putting a two state solution in place was minimised. Further, the design, construction and location of the new towns and cities gave the IDF some built-in advantages (it was hoped at the time) over any new Arab attacks across the Jordan and through the West Bank.
As events of the post-Oslo years have made clear, the possibility of the fiction called the "international community" guaranteeing a demilitarised Palestinian state is zero. The violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas has made a complete mockery out of any policy of demilitarization. Even the efforts by the US, Egypt and a few other countries to stop the flow of arms from Iran to Hamas have been less than spectacularly successful.
In short, the Palestinians will reject demilitarization as they are of the view that without a genuine armed force the Palestinian state would be a hollow shell, a castrated version of a genuine nation-state. The utter dedication of groups such as Hamas and states such as Iran to the destruction of Israel means that without a leakproof interdiction effort, no demilitarised state is possible. Considering the deep divides which separate the Great Powers as well as critical second level powers, the chance of gaining and maintaining a leakproof interdiction effort over time is Zero.
No Israeli government can accept a Palestinian state which possesses weapons beyond those appropriate for internal police and security needs. Even the most peace oriented government cannot take a chance with the lives and physical safety of its population.
Bottom line? The Netenyahu caveat means no two state solution.
At the same time, the PM's seeming concession has alienated (infuriated?) the political right of Israel. The nationalists, who have a capacity for zaniness equalling that of the Islamist jihadists without the love of dying while killing civilians, are announcing their defection from the PM. It is too soon to assess whether or not the move by some of the religious and nationalist right and ultra-right will have any real world impact, but in the fandango which is politics Israeli style, all is possible.
It is also too soon to evaluate the actual impact of the Netenyahu message on the Obama administration. Of course, the first words out of the White House were the usual ya-da-ya-da. Ever ready press mouthpiece Gibbs called it an "important step forward." But, then, what else could the flack say? Presidents don't piss on the Prime Minister of a friendly, critical ally.
No more than Obama's Address To The Arab And Muslim World did Netanyahu's proposal and request for immediate, unconditional negotiations change the foundation dynamic of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The instant response of both the Arabs of the PA and the far Right Wing of Israel makes that clear.
With the (limited) exceptions of Egypt and Jordan, which made a sort of peace with Israel, no Arab state has shown the least willingness to accept the basic reality of the situation. They know what the reality is; they have rubbed their collective noses in it for sixty years and more. Israel exists.
Whether the Arabs like it or not--and they most certainly do not--Israel exists. It is the ultimate "fact on the ground." And, it is not going to go away.
Arab leaders know that as well as they know the direction of Mecca. But, any effort, any genuine attempt to officially recognise the reality in front of them, is damned by the Islamists in their midst--and in Tehran.
Hosni Mubarak knows precisely what brought him to power. King Abdullah II, whose father had more guile and guts per square centimeter than any other Arab head of state in the past fifty years, knows what killed his grandfather, King Abdullah I, and tried to kill his father more times than can be counted conveniently.
Occupants of shaky thrones and places of power from Morocco to Iraq know the history of their own region--at least as it has manifested itself in violent death inflicted on those so unwary or so realistic as to attempt peace with Israel. They know darn well that the "international community" can do nothing save send representatives to the funeral should any of them follow the examples of Anwar Sadat or King Hussein.
Giving peace a chance means to invite the assassin's bullet or bomb. The Obama administration cannot be so hopelessly out to lunch as to be unaware of this. (Or can they?) Similarly, the Obama crew cannot be so ignorant of the past fifty years of Mideast history as to really, really believe that Arab states can be cozened or forced into a comprehensive peace treaty no matter how many concessions they might wring from Israel. (Or are they?)
Netanyahu made no concessions. He offered nothing new. He did not throw his own country off the sled and into the mouths of the wolves so close at hand. At the same time he hacked off the far Right of his own country. And, probably did the same to the occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
Falling between two stools is all too easy. And, all too painful.
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