In this case the "George" in question is the Peoples Republic of China. And, the "it" in question is North Korea. More specifically, the "it" means dealing with the twin conundrums: one serious, the other quite trivial (except for those directly involved in the fate of the two American women journalists facing twelve years as prisoners in the Hermit Kingdom of the North's hellish prisons).
To put it bluntly: The US does not have, never has had, and will not suddenly gain, the leverage necessary to either force or induce the Pyongyang politburo to comply with our policy requirements. The US never, repeat, never, should have invested the high-profile, high-visibility diplomatic prestige in the North Korean drive to become a semi-hemi-demi nuclear power.
Nearly fifteen years ago when the Clinton administration made the grave error of wading in to the North Korean swamp, the Geek forecast that by so doing the US would only invite both failure and a repeated requirement to, as SecDef Gates put it the other day, "Buy the same horse twice." The noisy, prolonged and ultimately failed Clinton push to preclude the Hermit Kingdom from pursuing a rudimentary nuclear capacity was one more example of the worst features (and the most common characteristics) of American foreign policy: ad hoc reaction to a perceived threat and the intermixing of domestic political imperatives with the needs of diplomacy.
As anyone and everyone familiar with the history of North Korean diplomatic methods must have known, the Clinton era efforts came to nothing. The same was expected and occurred when the neocons of the George W. Bush White House went after the same goal a decade or so later. The muscular fellows of the W. Bush years no more had the leverage either positive or negative to gain Hermit Kingdom compliance with American objectives than had the more touchy-feely types of the Clinton crew.
Not only were bilateral efforts doomed to fail, so also was the collective approach of the Six Power Talks. Effective sanctions were bootless right out of the box due to the fundamental disagreement between at least one of the powers and the rest.
China had a completely different take on the potential threat posed by North Korean ambitions from that informing the policy stance of the US, South Korea and Japan. China had as well a view of its own interests which did not mesh well with the policy requirements of the US.
Quite frankly, the Beijing government did not and does not see North Korea as a threat in either the near or the far-term. Knees did not knock in the Forbidden City as they apparently did in Washington over the prospect of the Hermit Kingdom developing some pretense of a nuclear capability. This despite the fact that China is far, far closer to North Korea than the US or Japan.
China was (and is) comfortable with the capacity it possesses to abate any North Korean menace with purely conventional means should such prove necessary. (It helps that the formidable North Korean defenses face south.) Beyond that, China has abundant non-military means to either force or cozen Pyongyang's agreement to Beijing's "guidance."
Ignoring the geopolitical realities, both the Clinton and W. Bush administrations plunged ahead with a reckless abandon and a sense of certainty totally devoid of a real world basis. We tried--ultimately without success--to get the Chinese to sing from our sheet of music.
Instead both the Clinton and W. Bush crews should have been quietly asking Beijing just what tune should be sung to gain the most satisfactory outcome.
Now the Obama collective seems hell bent on following the same course to failure blazoned by the two previous administrations. The rhetoric has become ever more heated. The threats of "consequences" ever more brazen. The visibility of the American total commitment to a single outcome ever more visible. Prestige on the international scene ever more invested.
Stop! Time out! A whistle on the play.
The US must dial down the volume. It must sidle up to the Chinese. Quietly, very quietly so as to save some measure of face for Uncle Sam, we must turn the problem over to them. Let George do it.
This means recognising a pair of realpolitik realities. The first is that China is the operative regional hegemonic power in this case. The second is acknowledging that Beijing has operated a conservative and highly effective diplomacy since the Communist victory in 1949.
China has a long and close relationship with North Korea. The Chinese government has a far better understanding of the internal dynamics of the Hermit Kingdom than does the US. The specialists in North Korean affairs in Beijing know the strengths and weaknesses of the Pyongyang regime. They know the personalities. The inner rivalries and alliances. In short, they know the levers to pull and buttons to push in order to gain compliance.
Beijing has a clear interest in a stable North Korea. It has an equal interest in assuring that the Hermit Kingdom not only continues to exist but that it does nothing so rash as to result in a regionally destabilizing consequence. It has no desire to deal with hordes of North Korean refugees flooding across the Tuman and Yalu rivers bringing with them the attention of the human rights and humanitarian crisis oriented entities whether from the UN or the legion of NGOs.
China, in short, has much at stake in North Korea. It has a set of major imperatives in play which dictate constructive effort to protect stability and good order in the Korean peninsula.
The Obama administration and particularly its minions in Foggy Bottom would be well advised to take a dekko at the historical record of Chinese diplomacy and the foreign policy it supports. If they were to do so they might be surprised with what they find.
Regardless of the internal idiocies committed by Mao and his successors ranging from the Great Leap Forward with its attendant multi-million deaths-through-starvation to the Cultural Revolution to the bloody suppression of the pro-democracy movement twenty years ago, the foreign policy of the country has been conservative and careful in its execution. Even the seemingly rash action of entering the Korean War was cautious in its execution. Warnings were given, a demonstration attack was made. Only when both words and bullets were ignored by the US did the full-fledged intervention unfold.
Throughout the past sixty years Beijing has repeatedly shown itself to be a mature practitioner of the Great Game of Nations. In a way this is surprising given all the centuries during which the Center Kingdom simply ignored the lesser breeds of barbarian who lived beyond the pale of the Empire. Surprising or not, the fine record of Chinese diplomacy is there for any with the wit to read and heed.
Turning the North Korean portfolio over to the "Georges" of Beijing would be a tad humiliating to the diplomats and politicians who have invested ego in the failed policies of recent years, but it would be in the best interests of the US. On several levels.
The most obvious is it would both relieve the US of a responsibility it cannot discharge--getting the Hermit Kingdom to forsake the bomb. What should be equally obvious but seems not to be is that making this move would greatly enhance the bilateral relations between the US and China. Any improvement such as would result by the candid admission that China is both a regional hegemon and a global Great Power would benefit our need for Beijing's cooperation on other, more important vexing matters including Iran, the global economy and the achievement of an acceptable agreement on global climate change.
There are many in the US who would find this explicit recognition of American limits galling. These folks can take some measure of comfort in the reality that China has become the Great Power it is today in large measure because we made it so. Our (arguably) misguided emphasis on "globalization" during the Clinton years, which brought with it the trade liberalisation, served to make China rich. The riches sucked from the pockets of American consumers have provided Beijing with the means necessary to produce its current formidable military force and buy American treasury notes in multiples of billions.
Without Bill Clinton and the neocons who succeeded him as well as Walmart, China would not be the world class Great Power it is now. So, asking "George" to carry the water regarding North Korea is simply to accept the "success" of our foreign economic policies.
The fate of the two young ladies from Al Gore's "Current TV" operation can be best addressed by the Chinese. The two women in question would not be in a Hermit Kingdom slammer today had it not been for the sincere conviction in Pyongyang based upon their reading of history that the US can be extorted most efficiently by the taking of hostages--particularly female hostages.
Of course a realpolitik based diplomacy would simply write off the two journalists. The coldly realistic view of foreign policy rejects the notion that policy should be bent to protect the futures of two individuals who were so ill-advised as to prance about a poorly defined international frontier where agents of a despotic regime hostile to the US might seize their bodies under any or no pretext with a view toward extortion.
The idea that a country should, let alone must, act to save two awesomely stupid people from the easily foreseeable results of their stupidity runs against all dictates of realpolitik. However the demands of domestic politics insist that the US make every effort to gain the quick release of the two women.
And, so we must. But we have no leverage beyond giving into whatever requirements the hostage takers care to make. Unless---
That's right, unless we "let George do it." The Boys From Beijing know who to talk to and what to say. The road to freedom for these two unfortunate young women in the employ of Al Gore runs through Beijing. Not Washington. Not the UN. Beijing.
Bombs or hostage release--Let George Do It.
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