Over in the Hermit Kingdom of the North the invective hurling goes on unabated with the North Korean airforce vowing to shoot down any Japanese aircraft which penetrates the sacred space of the North by so much as "0.001 mm." While China is said to be completely supportive of the "tough" sanctions directed against North Korea by the Security Council, the rust bucket purportedly carrying prohibited cargo plodded through the South China Sea watched by satellites and the USS John McCain, which is not expected to do any more than keep eyeballing the suspect ship.
Feeling almost as if he is playing the role of the narrator in some old TV Western serial like the Lone Ranger who periodically intones in the grave but urgent voice of one announcing the impending end of the world, "Meanwhile, back at the ranch...," the Geek directs his attention to the ongoing, even developing affrays in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is beaucoup in progress in these interlocked venues. Most of it is good from the perspective of those who do not desire to see Islamism on the road to triumph.
Granted, leading organs of the American MSM exemplified by the New York Times see defeat for the US, Pakistan and the Karzai where others see the glimmerings of success. The NYT is firmly convinced that the Pakistani glass is near empty rather than filling fast in the wake of the Swat Valley campaign and the commencement of operations in South Waziristan.
The Times is appalled by the lack of apparent devastation in Swat. Their reporter was evidently quite perturbed by the appearance of normality in the district as he flew overhead. Farmers were actually harvesting their crops. Buildings stood intact rather than lying in rubble heaps across the streets and roads. Vast areas of field and forest showed no sign of having been bombed or napalmed into wastelands. Mounds of corpses were conspicuous by their absence.
Putting the visuals together with the prolongation of military operations beyond their first, highly optimistic estimated date for completion, the Times writers concluded that the Pakistani army had not been successful in defeating Taliban. Not only does this conclusion show a deep inability to differentiate between a successful counterinsurgency effort and high intensity conventional war, it indicates a strong desire on the part of the paper to ignore reality in favor of ideological desires.
Why the NYT is so eager to see the Pakistani government defeated in its first genuine, sustained effort to regain control of its country from the rude barbarians of Taliban is not for the Geek to state. What can be written is that the Times is doing a major disservice to the government, military and citizens of Pakistan in its efforts to portray defeat at a time when neither victory nor loss can be accurately assessed or predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.
While the government of Pakistan is far from attaining any meaningful form of victory in its existential contest with the Taliban, both it and its military forces as well as the general run of the Pakistani population which has supported the counterinsurgency effort deserve both honest reporting and a hearty vote of confidence (and congratulations) for having finally taken up the challenge presented by the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.
The army has evidently fought far more effectively than many in the West predicted. The destruction and collateral civilian casualties were both far below what many on our side of the world feared given the training, organisation and equipment of the Pakistani army. The first sine qua non of successful counterinsurgency is limiting civilian death, destruction and dislocation to the maximum extent possible.
The death and destruction have obviously been limited severely as the Times report makes clear. The dislocation was not so constrained. There resides the major problem confronting the government and its supporters such as the US. The internally displaced persons (IDP) must be returned to their homes, fields and businesses with rapidity. There must be ample assistance provided so that the returning IDPs can restart their lives quickly and effectively. This will require not only substantial amounts of the long green but also a fair, transparent and non-corrupt system of assistance distribution.
That process, the myriad problems of returning and resettling the IDP population as well as giving a proper jump start to their lives is a far, far greater challenge to the government than is the killing or capture of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban Theocrat-in-Chief. An even greater challenge will confront the lads of Islamabad as the IDPs return to Swat.
That second challenge which will confront the government as the IDPs return is that of providing essential governmental services such as a judicial system which is perceived as fair, transparent, impartial and effective. After all, the reason so many people in Swat originally supported Taliban was the awesome failure of the regime to provide these. Importantly, the jury will remain out for quite some while on this matter and there is no reason for optimism.
Quite simply, the government of Pakistan does not have a good record in providing the essentials of government in any department. Partially this is the consequence of its hyperfocus on war with India over disputed territories including the massive use of limited resources on the development of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. Partially it is the result of the repeated military coups. Finally it is, in part, the necessary result of the deep political divisions which have both scarred the political history of Pakistan and called the army out of the barracks and into the offices of power.
The government and army made the correct decision to use the momentum which is currently on their side by moving into the FATA, particularly South Waziristan the inner sanctum of the Islamist jihadists--Taliban, Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Taking the war to the insurgents is absolutely necessary if ultimate success is to be achieved. Keeping the initiative is key.
The South Waziristan nut is one which will be very, very difficult to crack. The writ of Islamabad has never run deeply in the FATA. Establishing it will be a demanding task. On the up side is the propensity of Taliban to kill the wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong time with the result that it alienates the very people whose support is essential.
When a Taliban suicide bomber detonated himself in a mosque in Kandahar he not only killed a jilly-poo of civilians including women and children, he caused the local villagers to take up arms against the Islamist jihadists. As a result the Taliban lost status and potency with the local tribes as well as a number of its trigger pullers and wannabe martyrs.
Taliban's typical Islamist jihadist emphasis on death is the government's "secret" weapon. As long as the military refrains from unnecessary killing and destroying so as to lay the onus of civilian deaths, dislocation and fear on Taliban it will have a better than even chance of defeating the Islamist jihadists and establishing Islamabad's authority in the region.
This development is good news for the US effort in Afghanistan. As the increased American troop presence in Helmand province makes itself felt, the combination of that plus the Pakistani movement into South Waziristan puts Taliban and al-Qaeda in the grip of the vice. More and more, provided Pakistan keeps on with the current operations, the Islamist jihadists can run but they will no longer be able to hide in the remote fastness of the mountains of South Waziristan.
The deep kimchee in which the jihadists are finding themselves has been evidenced in recent weeks by reports showing that the "foreign" fighters are exfiltrating Afghanistan and the FATA and resurfacing in Yemen and Somalia. While it is too early and too much serious fighting remains to make firm predictions, the combination of the US escalation, the new tactical and operational thinking of the US command in Afghanistan, and the ancillary pressure being applied by the Pakistanis does not auger well for the Islamist jihadists.
The correlation of forces (to use that wonderful old Soviet term) in Afghanistan provides a firm reason for President Karzai's call to Taliban not to seek the disruption of August's elections. The Karzai call is not, as the NYT seems to believe, a sign of weakness, but, rather, an indication that the man is reading the tea leaves with a fair degree of accuracy.
The tipping point in both Pakistan and Afghanistan has come. Whether the balance will finally fall in favor of the counterinsurgent forces or not cannot be predicted with certainty today. The situation should clarify in the next thirty to sixty days, but right now all that can be stated with conviction is that the dynamic favors the good guys in both countries for the first time.
Provided that the new tactical and operational approach espoused by the US command in Afghanistan is put into effect and the Pakistani effort continues, by this time next year it should be possible to state firmly that the US has achieved its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing." It is not possible to be so sanguine regarding Pakistan. The government has a far more complex task before it in that it must not only militarily defeat Taliban but it must mitigate the conditions which provided Taliban with its appeal to the men in the streets of Pakistan.
Now, back to the ongoing requiem for Michael Jackson---
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