Once More Taliban Defeats Taliban

In past posts the Geek has hammered away on a critical point. In an insurgency the insurgents are often their own worst enemy. Excesses executed by the insurgents serve to alienate potential support among the uncommitted majority and push the center closer to the counterinsurgent side.

In Iraq the defeat of the insurgents of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups was evident as soon as these Islamist jihadist True Believers became overly robust in imposing their unique and intolerant view of what constituted proper Muslim behavior. As soon as that happened it was inevitable that popular revulsion would set in to the benefit of the Americans and the Baghdad government. The insurgent propensity for using suicide bombs against soft, civilian targets hastened the coming of the end.

The same dynamic has been seen in Afghanistan. Particularly as Taliban hit soft civilian targets two years ago, opinion shifted toward the government. This trend slowed and even reversed in the face of American and Coalition air strikes which resulted in civilian casualties. The pendulum can swing quickly if Taliban--particularly non-Afghans fighting for Taliban--start up the civilian targeting again or chop off too many heads, hands or other body parts in the name of Islamist purity.

Now we are seeing the dynamic in full swing in Pakistan. As the Geek predicted some months ago, Taliban overplayed its hand in Swat. Further, under government pressure, Taliban ramped up a sucide bombing effort directed not against government, military or police targets but rather against civilians.

The result has been so dramatic that even the New York Times, which so often seems to be on its knees beseeching some almighty power for an American defeat, has recognised it. Beatings, beheadings, killings generally along with extortion, bully-boy ass kickings, expropriations and generalised repression of the most egregious sort alienated even those who first welcomed the promise of fair, impartial, uncorrupt Sharia.

As it lost in Swat, Taliban resorted to the tried and true tactics of terror. Suicide and other bombs exploded around the country. In common with the Iraqis and Afghans, the Pakistanis can tolerate a fair amount of lethal violence directed against legitimate targets such as military and police posts or governmental installations. It may not be a time for a shrug and yawn, but as long as the bombs and bullets are restricted to an acceptable range of targets, there's no particular rush to anger.

This is why the Geek chortled with more than a little glee when some damnfool Taliban type blew himself up during Friday prayers at a mosque in the Upper Dir District. When the body parts were reassembled, the count was over thirty killed, some of them children.

It was a case of a bomb too far.

The locals have taken to the hills. In pursuit of Taliban. Particularly the foreign fighters in Taliban's service. With a verve which almost puts the outrage of the Minutemen of Concord to shame, the tribals have surrounded several villages harboring Taliban fighters. To say the local and national governments are pleased is to engage in extreme understatement. The local tribesmen have formed an irregular militia at least five hundred strong and opened a large, economy size can of whup-ass on the (to use the current approved Pakistani government term) "miscreants."

This development indicates the creation of a new, creative synergy in Pakistan. The success of the Pakistani army in Swat has both driven the Taliban to unacceptable extremes and emboldened the locals by giving them faith that the army will not leave them dangling out in the gales of politics--Pakistani style. By their action the tribesmen have given encouragement of the most visible sort to Islamabad to keep the pressure on the turbaned fanatics.

Keeping the heat on Taliban is critical. It is every bit as important as the need for Islamabad to address (with the backstage assistance of the US and others) the needs of the refugees from Swat including their return to the region and re-establishment of their disrupted lives.

Insurgencies are determined as to their outcome (just as conventional wars are) by possession of the initiative. The Big Mo (to quote George H.W. Bush) is key to success on the battlefield. It is just the same in the contest for allegiance and perceived legitimacy. Right now the bloodshed has bought Islamabad time to meet the requirements for functional legitimacy with the displaced persons of Swat, the tribes of the FATA and the disillusioned generally.

But, as the decision makers of Islamabad (and Washington) try to focus on the non-violent aspects of regaining and maintaining the ascendancy in the struggle for perceived legitimacy among the uncommitted or partially committed majority, it is essential that the armed pressure be kept on the Taliban trigger pullers. The war--as the tribesmen of Upper Dir are showing--must be brought up close and personal to the Taliban. They must be given no sanctuary, no place to hide, to regroup, to replenish the means and will to keep on fighting.

This requirement loops into the usage of the new American forces in Afghanistan. Operations in the border area must mesh to an effective extent with both regular and citizen militia forces doing their thing in and near the FATA. Only in that way will the "anti-miscreant" forces create an anvil and hammer which will mean the end of Taliban as a clear and present danger to both countries.

A second requirement is that the onus for civilian casualties must be placed upon Taliban, most importantly the foreign elements within Taliban. Both Afghans and Pakistanis appear to have the same rough calculus of acceptability: Muslim local kills Muslim local is OK; Muslim foreigner kills Muslim local is not OK; non-Muslim foreigner kills Muslim local is very, very bad.

That priority of perception must be kept in mind when planning and executing all military operations. It must govern not only what is done but how it is done. As a consequence American lives will be placed at greater risk. But, without taking all possible measures to assure that all of us outside non-Muslims do not kill local Muslim non-combatants, we do nothing but strengthen the appeal of Taliban.

This reality is yet one more unpleasant ground truth in a war which has already developed more than a few new, distasteful realities. But, to win we must insist that only the enemy kill the women, the children, the non-combatant.

In that way we can help Taliban kill its way to defeat.