Hope Versus Reality In Iran (and the US)

Following the events on the streets of Tehran and other cities in Iran is exciting, frustrating and, ultimately, tinged with sadness. It is apparent that many of those involved in confronting the mullahocracy want more, much more than a replay of the election.

The beautifully ambiguous chant, "down with the dictator," shows the ambitions of many extend far beyond simply replacing the mouthpiece-of-the-regime, Ahmedinejad, with a kinder, gentler, nicer sort of chap who would still toe the foreign policy line established by the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei. People are more willing to face clubs and bullets when their goal is large than when it is limited, small.

Opposition icon Moussavi has reportedly said he is willing to accept "martyrdom." This is the necessary prerequisite for political success in Iran--if the goal is more than simply to prevail in a disputed election. It is conceivable that Moussavi is playing a cynical game--his call for a general strike is redolent of self-preservation--but it is within the realm of possibility that the hard line prime minister of years gone by has been transformed by recent events into something more than a politico genuflecting to the GA and his coterie.

Perhaps Moussavi has found himself to be the sort of "transformational" figure for Iran that President Obama's flacks trumpet him to be. One might hope that Moussavi has found within himself greater depths and strengths than he had ever thought before.

From the dynamic apparent in the videos and tweets out of Iran, it is clear that more than a few of Iran's younger, more affluent, better educated, and, withal, alienated citizens see this transformational potential in Moussavi. For them, Moussavi is no longer a politician, he is a symbol, an icon of the change they so desperately hope may come.

The brutal, historically documented truth is that reality trumps hope. In Iran the reality is that the regime has the guns and, potentially, the will to use them. Today the minions of the mullahs, the cops, the vigilantes of the Basji used clubs, water cannons, tear gas and genuine, fer sure, lethal bullets to break up the demonstrations in Tehran.

The Basji, which is comprised of the same sort of mentalities as was the Nazi SA, is a reliable crew of sadistic thugs drawn from the margins of Iranian society. Formed back during the existential war with Iraq, the Basji has proved its reliability and importance to regime maintenance over the intervening twenty years. Today, it is the least politically risky force for the GA and his fellow turban-topped, Koran-thumpers to use against the Iranians in opposition.

Should the Basji prove insufficient, the mullahs can order up the Revolutionary Guard. This organ of state is a very good approximation of the Nazi SS at its height. Utterly loyal to the regime, completely dedicated to the preservation of the status quo, and very well armed, trained, equipped, and indoctrinated, the Revolutionary Guard can be depended upon to gun down their fellow citizens in wholesale lots without a qualm should they be directed to do so.

Like the SS or the KGB of the final decades of the Soviet Union, the Revolutionary Guard is virtually a state within the state. The continuation of the RG (to say nothing of the lives and power of the individual officers and men) stands upon maintaining the current regime in full, unquestioned dominance. The mullahocracy (and the rest of the world) can and does bet its collective bippy on the Revolutionary Guard doing its (killing) job.

Martyrdom is the way of Shia. Martyrdom was the key to the Islamic Revolution thirty years ago. It was central to Iran's strategy during the Iraq-Iran War. A little martyrdom, too little martyrdom inflicted upon the opposition will create more opposition. Sufficient martyrdom, the sort that would be inflicted by the Revolutionary Guard and perhaps even the amateurs of the Basji, will drown the opposition in its own blood.

No one should underrate the will of the mullahocracy to keep itself in power. It is clear the GA and his fellows are feeling nervous. It is equally evident that they fear that the opposition in the streets entertains ambitions transcending the removal of their chosen public image, Ahmedinejad. They see the long range target as their theocratic rule and not the political and international figurehead.

The desperate, rapidly shifting diversionary efforts of Khemenei are evidence of this. First he and his cronies blamed the outrage in the streets on "American meddling." The next day the GA announced that "Britain is enemy number one," as he reached far back in Iranian history to grab the magic of evil Albion and its agent the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Most recently, Khemenei went to the Islamist default position and placed responsibility for the demonstrations on the "Zionist controlled media."

(One might be forgiven for wishing that Allah could give His Representative in Qom the right story the first time.)

As history has shown repeatedly, desperate, fearful regimes engage in desperate actions. Like the possibility of mass slaughter such as to put Tienanmen Square deep in the shadows. The Chinese government killed in the hundreds. If massacre comes to Tehran it will be in the thousands.

The bloodletting at Tienanmen was carried out in the hours of darkness as shameful acts should be. The media were not there. Could not be there. The mullahs will not be so fortunate if they order the cancel button be pushed on the opposition. Twenty years has wrought such a transformation that the images and words of those about to butchered will flash around the world nearly instantaneously. The mullahs cannot hope to prevent that--unless they shut down the Internet and cell phone service completely.

Such a blackout would signal their intentions with certainty. The world will know what is contemplated before it happens.

So far, the Obama administration has played the game cautiously and well. It has properly and prudently left public expressions of condemnation up to the Congress and individual Americans. The President is correct when he avers that any posturing by the administration would harm the efforts of the opposition by allowing the mullahs to portray it as an American tool.

This will change with the speed of light if the mullahs in their fear and desperation order the Basji or, worse, the Revolutionary Guard into bloody action.

At that moment the whole world will be watching. It will not be watching Tehran so much as it will turn to Washington, D.C. expecting the American president to do what American presidents have been expected to do for the past sixty some years. Lead.

That's right. Lead. Tell us, show us, what you and by example the rest of us should do now.