Not surprisingly there is--and will continue to be--enormous speculation over just what motivated the members of the Norwegian committee to take the action which they did. The Geek rather likes the view taken by Her Geekness, "It's preemptive. How can Obama go ahead and send more troops to Afghanistan after getting the Peace Prize?"
Admittedly, Her Geekness has a slight propensity for the darker view of Norwegians, perhaps because she is of Norwegian descent. Still, the award of the PP will make it easier for Mr Obama to take the most-worst of the several options being discussed during the current "strategy review" process. Both the man and his fellow "progressives" within the Democratic Party want very, very much to end the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The US is ramping down its presence in Iraq. It will continue to do so probably at an accelerating rate given both the reality that the US has done all it can hope to do there and the heavy emphasis given nationalism by al-Maliki's political apparatus. It is not improper for the US in effect to declare victory and go home. Nor is such a declaration unsupported by the facts on the ground.
Afghanistan is a completely different proposition. A careful reading of General McChrystal's assessment shows it not simply to be grim but to paint a portrait of impending loss. While honest people may honestly differ on the General's portrayal, it behooves the senior leadership of the US to take a worst realistic case view of the dynamic in Afghanistan--and its implications over time.
The buzz from inside the Beltway is that the administration, that is to say, President Obama, are all set to forget about Islamist jihadists in general, ignore or deprecate the Taliban in particular, and focus on al-Qaeda. This shift would provide a plausible basis for denying any increase in troop strength or limiting it to one of a purely symbolic level.
The recasting of Taliban from the role of co-conspirator with al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks is a nifty bit of political slight of hand. Like a stage prestidigitator, Mr Obama and his assistants need only divert the attention of We the People with one hand while sawing the woman in half with the other. And, just like the audience at a magic show, We the People are ready, willing, and eager to participate in our own deception.
The Obama crew speak the truth when they describe Taliban as a purely "local" phenomenon. This "truth," like so many in politics is a partial one. Yes, Taliban is local. Local to Afghanistan. Local to Pakistan. It is also part of the global Islamic jihadist movment. This means that it is a non-local phenomenon.
What the Obama administration evidently does not want to know is the relationship between all the various Islamist jihadist entities around the world. All may be separate; all are connected. They are connected by basic ideology. By goals. By methods. By the psychological dynamics of True Belief.
What this means not only today but into the foreseeable future is that the defeat of one component is a defeat for all. A victory by one is a victory by all.
This dynamic is particularly salient when the Islamist jihadist group either defeats the US or is generally seen as having been defeated in the field by the Great Satan.
The Taliban has assumed an importance in the sump of Islamist jihadism which transcends even that enjoyed by the largely symbolic al-Qaeda. The status of Taliban comes from the simple fact that it has survived--and even prospered--under the impact of the US led invasion of Afghanistan. The status of Taliban has been enhanced further by its ongoing capacity to withstand the combined efforts of the Pakistani Army and CIA UAV strikes.
There is a really delightful, downright delicious irony in the increased status of Taliban today compared to that which it had eight years ago. It comes from the perfect synchronicity between the origins of Taliban and its recent growth.
Remember when and by whom Taliban came into existence?
That's the ticket, bucko! When the Reagan administration turned responsibility for operating the anti-Soviet fighters to the Pakistanis. We provided money and materiel. The Pakistanis, particularly the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), decided who got what and to what effect. It was an ISI officer, "Colonel Imam," who created Taliban and guided its efforts.
The colonel and his fellows from both the ISI and Army were quite successful. Taliban came out on top after the Soviet withdrawal. Taliban became the government. Sure, it was opposed by the Northern Alliance, but with Islamabad on its side, Taliban was secure.
Secure enough to offer protection to al-Qaeda. The protection was no doubt agreed to by the men behind the scenes at ISI. After all, it was a phone call from Islamabad that allowed Osama bin Laden to beat feet a few minutes ahead of the incoming cruise missiles following the USS Cole bombing.
As the first American boots hit the ground eight years ago, ISI and seconded Pakistani Army personnel were there to facilitate the withdrawal of threatened al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters and leaders. The US government knew this--and allowed it to happen.
Presumably, the reason for turning a Nelsonian eye to the flight of the jihadists included guarantees from the Pakistani government, military, and ISI that the fugitives would not return to the field. Any American decision maker who took such assurances at face value was severely deluded. But, such has happened before (and will again in the future.)
Not to put too sharp a point on the matter, the Pakistani government, military, and ISI provided sanctuary to both Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Pakistani government, military, and ISI provided at least some of the means by which Taliban recovered over the next several years. What the Pakistanis did not provide, the Americans did with the undermanned and poorly planned campaigns over the same period.
The take-away?
The US (inadvertently) and the Pakistanis (intentionally) created Taliban. The US (again inadvertently) and the Pakistanis (once more intentionally) resuscitated and buffed up Taliban.
Now, Mr Obama and his administration are poised to give not only Taliban but the entirety of the global Islamist jihadist movement a hefty shot of growth hormone. Before they do so by seeking to give peace a premature chance in Afghanistan, they would be well advised to consider a couple of bits of recent history.
The Nice Young Man From Chicago might want to talk with his Secretary of State--or better yet, her husband. He might want to explore what happened when the lawyerly Clinton administration withdrew in a huff from Somalia following a failed (and desperately poorly planned/executed) special forces raid.
If the Clintons could bring themselves to be honest, they would respond that the precipitous American flight convinced Osama bin Laden and others that the US had even less political will when faced with fatalities than the Soviets.
Then Mr Obama might inquire as to the consequences of the inept American ripostes to the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Again, if the Clintons could forget their law school predicated propensity for obfuscation and pettifoggery, they would have to fess up that in both cases the flights of cruise missiles only emboldened the Islamist jihadists.
The Clinton administration had a deep distaste for foreign affairs generally--and those of a violent nature in particular. It offended the deeply entrenched lawyers' love for matters being neat, tidy, precise, and predictable. As a result the administration attempted neat, tidy, precise, and predictable tactics with which to answer the jihadist attacks. The cruise missiles are neat, tidy, (relatively) precise, and predictable in effect.
The eminently predictable, if quite unintended, consequence of the cruise missile strikes was a further strengthening of jihadist political will and certainty of victory. That is why both Osama bin Laden and the Taliban chieftain, Omar, shrugged off the US demands following 9/11. They expected nothing more than another round of cruise missile attack.
While George W. Bush and his neocon ninnies have much to answer for, at least it can be said fairly that they demonstrated the American capacity and political will to wage up close and personal war against jihadists and those who support them. This unexpected development shook, rocked, and rolled the world of the Islamist jihadists.
The Koran waving, bomb wearing jihadists recovered their poise, their will to kill, their will to die in the name of the Faith. And, as outlined above, we helped them in the process.
The lawyers in the Oval now face the choice of doing what needs to be done--fight and defeat not simply al-Qaeda but the far more significant Taliban. Or, inflict one more defeat upon the US and all other civilized countries which will have to face the increased and lengthening black shadow of Islamist jihadist terror.
The Norwegian nincompoops have not helped Mr Obama in the slightest. By their hopelessly ill-considered action they have made peace in the world far less likely.
Mr Obama wants desperately to see himself as a "transformational" figure such as those he animadverted have preceded him to the rostrum in Oslo. The irony is that the transformation he will wreak by making the easy, popular, but disastrously wrong choice on Afghanistan will be one which makes life here and elsewhere more likely to be nasty, brutish, and short.
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