After his strong statements at the International Institute For Strategic Studies in London the other day, there is no doubt where the general stands on either the nature of the desired strategy for Afghanistan or the number of combat troops needed to implement it with sufficient effectiveness. Now, there should be no doubt in the President's mind about what the General thinks is necessary if failure is to be prevented. (Video conferencing would not have allowed McChrystal's intensity to have emerged in full. You need to be up close and personal to experience that.)
The nitty-gritty of all the palaver over the re-assessment of our strategy and goals in Afghanistan boils down to a choice between one of three alternatives: a counter-insurgency such as the General desires, a pull back to counter-terrorism directed against al-Qaeda as proposed by Vice-President Biden, or a modified counter-insurgent approach which diminishes the focus on building a Western style nation-state in the country.
There is no need to base our appreciation on what happened to the British or the Soviets when they tried to occupy Afghanistan as some "experts" did in their appearances before Sen John Kerry's Foreign Affairs committee. Neither historical example has any relevance to what either General McChrystal has proposed or the lessened form represented as the third option above.
The repeated calls for a re-focusing of our efforts to the civilian side of the counter-insurgency approach with an emphasis on institutional make-overs, economic development, and the establishment of a rule of (presumably not over polluted by religion) law under an independent judiciary are wide of the mark. Indeed, they are not really relevant to either the removal of the Islamist jihadists of Afghanistan or the establishment of a stable internal regime.
Yes, everybody in Kabul--and elsewhere--would like to see a dollar torrent pouring over the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. Just as the Pakistanis want to see ever more of Uncle Sam's greenbacks greening their country. The reality is that while everybody wants money, the money is of no relevance to solving the basic political and social questions in either country.
This cold reality is quite evident in Pakistan where the increased US aid budget has been met both by howls of derision from politicians and complete apathy by the population which still distrusts the US as a partner in the local counter-terrorist campaign. In Afghanistan, money would be no more the root of all solutions than it has been in Pakistan.
The basic context of the human terrain in Afghanistan--the terrain on which the war will be won or lost to the degree that any interventionary operation "wins"--is deeply fragmented. Schisms exist in language, ethnic composition, tribal affiliation, and school of Islam followed. The role of a tribal leader, or a religious one for that matter, is to be the nexus of a self-organizing system at the local level. Even if a more or less secular form of "nationalism" were to emerge in Afghanistan as it has under Maliki's shrewd political sponsorship, it would be of an indigenous, self-organized sort.
Self-organizing systems can emerge in any context. However, the more peaceful the context, the safer people feel, the more likely it becomes that the self-organizing process will continue up from the local to the regional and finally to the national level. The most critical component of General McChrystal's strategic concept is its emphasis on insulating the civilian population from violence whether at the hands of the Islamist jihadists (as is most likely) or the Afghan national forces and their foreign colleagues.
With bodies, both foreign and domestic, interposed between the violence of the jihadists and the life of the uncommitted civilian majority, the process of self-organizing can begin and continue. The result after some time will be a stable Afghanistan--provided the foreign experts on nation-building stay out of the way. What eventually emerges from the self-organizing capacities of the Afghan civilian population--particularly tribal, religious and other leaders may not be to the delight of Western proponents of the 21st century liberal, pluralistic, secular nation-state--but it will be of Afghan manufacture and thus stable.
Perhaps it won't be noise free, but there has been no significant period of Afghan history in which internal violence has been totally absent--save during those years of foreign invasion and occupation. Even then there were internal conflicts which would have facilitated the foreign dominance had the outsiders shown the wit to use it effectively.
In so far as outside money and expertise are relevant to accomplishing either counter-insurgency or counter-insurgency lite (the third option above) it should, no, must, be provided at the local level according to the self-perceived needs of the local self-organized groups. It must not be "a gift from the American people" or a dictate from the remote and distrusted denizens of Kabul, but a tool needed by the self-organized local group(s) and put into their hands, and their hands alone.
Far more important than outside money or advice is the perceived willingness and ability of both foreign and Afghan national force personnel to stand between the black turbans of the jihadists and the soft targets of the civilian population. To establish the necessary trust and confidence which precedes effective self-organizing, it is utterly essential the security forces actually be there, be on the ground, up close and personal, effectively countering the jihadists and their violence. Beyond simply "being there," it is essential that the forces be there over time, time sufficient for both trust and self-organizing to reach the critical tipping point that turns non-commitment to commitment, if not to Kabul, at least to the idea of peace in every local valley.
A close study of Vietnam shows that where security forces were present and effective, and the outside assistance was provided strictly according to locally perceived needs without any attendant strings, the local valley became both peaceful and anti-Viet Cong, anti-North Vietnam. Admittedly these peaceful valleys were few and far between, but that should be no shock given the wrong-as-a-cat-barking American strategy and operational doctrine.
General McChrystal seems far more attuned to the realities on the ground than were the guys running the Vietnam War debacle. Providing that he receives the necessary troops and is able to evade too much emphasis on the centralized creation of a nation-state from the resistant human terrain of Afghanistan, there is a very real chance that the US and its allies will achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing" as we have in Iraq.
"Not losing" in Afghanistan will be a very serious (but not fatal) blow to the global Islamist jihadist movement--just as "not losing" has proven to be in Iraq. "Not losing" in Afghanistan would be the outcome of counter-insurgency lite (the third option above) as the similar approach has demonstrated in Iraq. Taken in conjunction with Iraq, "not-losing" in Afghanistan would not be the beginning of the end of the global conflict with Islamist jihadism, but it might prove to be the end of the beginning.
Anything less, as in the politically appealing Biden Option of enhanced counter-terrorism in the FATA of Pakistan, would constitute a defeat for us and a shot of steroids for the Islamist jihadist movement everywhere. Anything more than counter-insurgency lite such as unlimited nation building would also be a defeat. A defeat because it is a task beyond accomplishment in a timely nature.
Rarefied discussion of strategy accompanied by pouring over Burn-Before-Reading level secret intelligence assessments may be great fun for the Deep Thinkers around the White House, Foggy Bottom, and the Five Sided Wigwam By the Banks of the Po-to-mic, but it is not particularly useful. Or necessary. There are only three options. Only one has the chance of bringing the minimum (and maximum realistic) strategic result of "not-losing."
It is time for the gab fest to end. It is time to make it march, because the good guys in Afghanistan are quite minus on minutes. It is time for decisive leadership. It is time for the Nice Young Man From Chicago to realize that the war in Afghanistan is worth more than twenty-five minutes. It is more important than even the 2016 Summer Games.
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