In his WaPo op-ed piece last Saturday, Professor Ackerman compares General Stanley McChrystal's forthright statement at the previous day's conference at the Strategic Studies Institute with the insubordinate actions of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. The comparison is specious. It is misleading in the extreme. It is historically as wrong as a cat barking.
Professor Ackerman is not the only person pontificating from a basis of historical ignorance--willful or otherwise. Today in the WaPo, Eugene Robinson plays the same game albeit without referencing the famed Truman-MacArthur donnybrook. Richard Cohen completes the WaPo trifecta. Mr Cohen does drag the ghosts of Truman and MacArthur back into the spotlight.
Now, for the edification of pundits great and small, here is why the analogy between the comments of the bluntly spoken and honest minded General McChrystal and the statements, letters, and actions of the prima donna of the US Army, Douglas MacArthur, is wrong. And, bucko, here is why any comparison between the bluntly spoken and honest minded Harry Truman and the present incumbent are wrong as well.
First it is essential that the context of the Truman-MacArthur contretemps be established. The general was a legend in his own mind--and the popular perception of We the People. Having defied orders, failed to take precautions despite warnings, and generally fouled up the defense of the Philippine Islands at the outset of World War II in the Pacific, MacArthur was turned into a "hero" by the press with the connivance of the Roosevelt administration. The president was in desperate need of a "hero," genuine or not, in the darkest days of the war.
For the balance of the hostilities in the Pacific, MacArthur was an adequate but far from brilliant commander. He was, however, a genius at public relations so that his halo glistened ever more brightly as the war continued. (It might be noted that the grunts bestowed upon the General a far from flattering nickname, "Dugout Doug.")
At the end of the war, MacArthur became the de facto ruler of Japan. Most but not all historians reckon that the General did a decent job of running Japan, but it must be noted that his major accomplishment was allowing the Japanese to rediscover their democratic experience which had been masked with the rise of militarism during the late Twenties and Thirties. He invented nothing, but didn't stop the Japanese from exercising their remarkable capacities for self-organization in both political and economic matters.
When the North Koreans invaded the South in June 1950 it came as a bolt from the blue to Washington--and MacArthur. MacArthur had precluded the CIA and its predecessors from operating in his geographic areas of responsibility both during and after World War II. As a result there was no American intelligence agency operating in the Korean peninsula which might have provided adequate warning.
In the confusing opening days of the war as first South Korean and then American troops were defeated--badly, it was Harry Truman and his administration which acted both decisively and effectively. Truman and his people (which group included some of the most gifted foreign policy personalities in recent American history) made a number of critical and time sensitive decisions which had two important consequences.
First and foremost, the decisions assured the war would be limited in scope, goals, and means. There would be no widening of the war geographically. The goal was initially limited to restoring the status quo ante. The means strictly eschewed the nuclear option.
The first turning point in the war came with the twin successes of defense and offense. The defensive success was that of stopping the North Korean Peoples Army at the Pusan Perimeter. The offensive success was, arguably, MacArthur's finest moment--the amphibious landing at Inchon, far behind the NKPA lines.
MacArthur's finest moment left as fast as it came. Almost immediately he lost sight of the initial goal and replaced it with one of his own--the defeat of the NKPA, occupation of North Korea, and the forced unification of the two Koreas. The Truman administration went along with the General.
The movement of US, South Korean, and other UN forces into the North had the result of bringing the Chinese into the war. Despite ample warnings through diplomatic channels, the General poo-pooed the possibility of the Chinese entering in any number.
He was wrong. The Peoples Liberation Army moved with dramatic effect into the war. The US, South Korean, and other forces were compelled into rapid and sometimes disorderly retreat. MacArthur lost it.
He demanded that the atomic bomb be used. He proposed sowing a radioactive band of death along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. He demanded that the Chinese Nationalist forces be "unleashed" against the Mainland.
All of this was contrary to the limited war policy which had been decided upon by President Truman. The General was (as the military terminology has it) "counseled" and even gently, very gently reprimanded. Privately of course. The General was touchy. His ego was quite easily bruised.
MacArthur was a man upon whom subtlety was lost. He ignored the "counselling" and "guidance" provided by the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. He shot off his mouth criticizing the Truman decisions. At one point he violated orders regarding an upcoming effort to start ceasefire talks by imperiously and publicly demanding the virtual surrender of the NKPA and the Chinese.
That torpedoed the first effort at talking peace.
Then the General allowed the public release of a letter he had written to the Republican leader in the House of Representatives. The letter was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Truman presidency. No US commander before that (or since for that matter) had ever penned such a bitter and baseless diatribe against his commander-in-chief.
Had the MacArthur strategy been put into effect as it was laid forth in the letter and other public statements, the US would have taken on a land war in China and a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. MacArthur's strategic view would have resulted in an American defeat to say nothing of costing lives beyond counting.
Truman faced the rank and dangerous insubordination with firmness, decisiveness, and a willingness to run enormous political risks. In his decision to fire MacArthur he was backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff including its chairman, Omar Bradley. The bantam from Missouri fired the General from Megalomania.
Truman was excoriated in the majority of the press. The Republicans yelled for his scalp. In the end, Truman and his administration survived the storm of congressional hearings, press abuse, popular disapproval. Ultimately, the General as he predicted in his speech to a joint sitting of Congress simply "faded away." History (or at least historians) pronounced Truman right and MacArthur wrong.
There it is. History, complex events, in a small capsule. Easy to understand. Even a law professor ought to be able to wrap his brain around it.
General McChrystal has not been insubordinate. He has done nothing other than to follow his orders. He was tasked with assessing the state of the war. He did. He was told to be blunt and honest. He has been.
The London remarks were not out of line in the slightest. No orders were given that were of the gag variety. Even the President has acknowledged that.
However it is more than passingly strange that members of the chattering and political classes who demanded a full, public debate of the Iraq "surge" a few years back are now reaming out General McChrystal for doing that both in public and private regarding the Afghan mess.
President Obama should have realized that when he took the advice of Secretary of Defense Gates and others and appointed General McChrystal, he was naming a man renowned for his straight forward way and total intellectual integrity--to say nothing of moral courage. General McChrystal is a rare man. He is a professional man-at-arms, not a careerist ticket puncher with his nose firmly in place--and not on his face.
Just as General McChrystal is not General MacArthur updated, President Obama is not a brand new and improved version of President Truman. Truman made decisions and took personal responsibility for them. He acted quickly and decisively without regrets, without polls, and without looking back.
He consulted to be sure. But he made the decisions. He exercised leadership. He did not follow the winds of either his party (and he was the most yellow dog of yellow dog Democrats) or the American public. As the sign on his desk read, "The buck stops here."
Nor did Truman dither. Hold endless review sessions. Endless meetings with senior staff. He listened. He read. He chose. He acted. He acted in a timely manner. He was, of course, not a lawyer so he understood the real world meaning of that lawyer-loved phrase, "time is of the essence."
Truman would have appreciated McChrystal. He would have listened to McChrystal. Then he would have decided. Quickly. Effectively.
Truman deserved McChrystal. But, he had MacArthur.
McChrystal deserves Truman. He has Obama.
Pity.
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