Delay Is Good--Up To A Point

The US is a maritime power. It is also a semi-accidental simulacrum of an imperial power. As George Friedman at STRATFOR correctly points out, the US has the "imperial" role not by design nor intent but rather as the inevitable result of its economic and geographical position. And, the Geek adds, its unique history.

These two factors dictate why the US, like Great Britain (but not, as Friedman argues, the Roman Empire) practices a grand strategy which focuses on maintaining a balance of power favorable to its interests and attempting to the greatest degree possible to refrain from the direct commitment of its military force. In the effort to minimize direct US force deployment, the basic approach is not one of "divide and conquer." Rather it is one of "delay, decide, select, support, and sustain."

In practice this means the US has been and continues to be well advised to emphasize standing off from a problem area, observing the interplay of the internal forces, selecting one to support, enshrining that decision in policy, and, finally, executing that policy in terms of supporting and sustaining the selected side. Importantly, the side selected need not be the status quo entity although, unfortunately, it usually has been.

The minimum intervention based select and support approach is the necessary centerpiece of successful counterinsurgency. The corollary of select and support is the manipulation of those entities not selected with the view of providing an impetus to a final power sharing formula. This approach when applied in Iraq along with the overdue "surge" was effective despite the recent spate of bombing spectaculars.

Both Iran and Afghanistan are on the table right now. It is relevant to consider both in terms of delay, decide, select, support, and sustain. This formulation can be used with respect to both internal contestants and potential external associates of the US.

Friedman suggests that the Obama administration has two options regarding Iran. One is the old standby--the military option. The other he proposes is to take a Nixon-like approach. That would mean recognizing Iran as a nuclear power, attempting detente with the mullahs with a view to a common focus against Russia.

There is a third option brushed aside by Freidman. That option is linking the US with Russia against Iran and its overt as well as covert supporters. To accomplish this the US would have to draw a firm line as to what we are willing to do both positively and negatively regarding Moscow's many, many ambitions. It is also necessary that the US forthrightly offer a partnership of equals relationship with Russia in pursuit of high value definable coinciding interests.

Maritime powers typically enlist the aid of other powers, particularly those of the continental sort, in the accomplishment of grand strategic goals. If the US can, in the words of one Israeli commentator, "suck up" to Israel, the Obama administration can and must do the same with Moscow--if it wants a viable option other than the choice of war or, in effect, surrender to Iranian policy dictates.

At the same time, the "correlation of forces" (to employ that nifty old Soviet term) in Iran gives the US a unique opportunity to employ delay, decide, support, and sustain with respect to the several internal contestants within Iran. Given the current indisposition of the Ayatollah Khemenei and the ruptures within both civil society and clerical establishment which persist even now five months after the "election" of Ahmedinejad, the US has an unparalleled opportunity to muck around creatively in the Iranian swamp.

The Afghan situation is absolutely rife with opportunities for delay, decide, support, and sustain. The Afghan nation is not a single entity but rather a congeries of tribes, ethnic backgrounds, languages, and forms of Islam. The constitution is weak. The president is strong in some aspects but not overall. The culture has a long tradition of let's-make-a-deal. Many, if not most, of the Taliban membership is less than True Believers in Islamist jihadism.

And, best of all the culture has a mechanism in place for resolving differences, settling old scores without bloodshed, making inter-community deals, and generally setting the stage for a tolerable facsimile of stability. It is the Grand Assembly of Elders. Ignored since the first American boots hit the ground so long ago in the haste to create a Western style democracy, it provides the best chance for the US to achieve its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing" to the Islamist jihadists.

While it is necessary to augment the number of US trigger pullers as well as training and advisory personnel in-country, it is even more critical that the US employ its current freedom to select a new set of entities and individuals to support and sustain--discretely. The Grand Assembly of Elders is the most appropriate, least intrusive way to effectively use influence for both hostilities termination and ultimate conflict resolution.

There is a very real danger in the delay, decide, support, and sustain approach to strategy. It is possible to delay too long. When that happens, events drive the decision making process as they did during the Bush/Cheney administration. The danger exists right now with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan. The time to exercise options as opposed to reacting to the events created by others is rapidly passing by.

President Obama has much--too much perhaps--on his desk. All are marked, "Action Immediate." He and his people would be very well advised for the best interests of the US to push the files marked "Iran" and "Afghanistan to the very top of the pile.

Time, tide, and national strategy wait for no man. Not even a man named Obama.