It is appropriate that President Obama be first up. It has been reported that the Nice Young Man From Chicago is prepared to let the Karzai government know that the American commitment to his rule and his country is not "open ended."
Well, if true, that proposition deserves support, even applause. Over the past six hundred or so posts, the Geek has harped repeatedly on a very basic requirement for successful "foreign contingency operations"--the credible capacity to de-commit from the "host" government. An excellent example of the historical basis for this contention is found in the end stages of the US participation in the Vietnamese War.
When the Saigon government finally came to believe that the Nixon administration was deadly serious about withdrawing American combat forces and turning the actual fighting over to the ARVNs, the government and the military of South Vietnam got equally serious about defeating both the North Vietnamese invaders and the more-or-less indigenous offensive insurgency of the Viet Cong.
ARVN fought well even as the North staged its final and quite overwhelming offensive in 1975. There is strong reason to conclude that the South would have defeated this very open aggression save for one unexpected, unforeseen development. That development was the action of the Democratic party controlled Congress in preventing the use of American air power and logistic support in aid of the South. This action was taken despite the promises made to the South by the Nixon administration--promises which were essential to the "favorable" outcome of the Paris Peace Talks.
The Vietnam experience contains two important lessons. The first is that only with the emergence of a credible capacity for American de-commitment did the South Vietnamese become ready, willing, and, most importantly, able to fight. The second lesson is rarely considered: Only the US Congress through its heedless acts was able to undercut the ability of the Southern forces to fight effectively.
If both these lessons are properly understood, they provide a firm foundation for an effective end game strategy for the US to pursue in Afghanistan. The capacity to de-commit requires the US and its allies focus on the main task of assuring the Islamist jihadists will have no basis upon which to make the later claim that they had militarily defeated the US and its associates. This prime requirement implies that the US and the others drop notions of turning Afghanistan into a model Western style polity and society.
There can be no gainsaying that Karzai and his entire government is reprehensibly corrupt and self-defeatingly inefficient. This realities are also irrelevant. Corruption and inefficiency are endemic in many areas of the world. Corruption is more than simply business as usual--it is a way of life. Even states which are both allied with us and considered "Western" such as South Korea and Japan have had episodes of corruption in very recent years. Inefficiency is not restricted to Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or Iraq, it is the pandemic disease of governments everywhere--including the good ole US of A.
Telling Karzai to clean up his own personal mess is all well and good. It plays well in the press and within the chattering class. Far more important is the message that the American presence is going to come to an end. When it does, you, Mr Karzai and the rest, will have to keep on living there. Thus, it behooves your own personal interest to make both government and military more effective, less repressive, and more in tune with civilian needs, fears, and hopes.
It also means that Karzai has to do a deal with both his political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, and the less frothing at the mouth leadership of the assorted groups mustered under the convenient banner of the Taliban. But, making deals is what Karzai is best at. It is why he may be the right man to be at the flimsy helm in Kabul.
The second good idea comes from the Spanish Defense Minister, who must have been taking lessons in hard headed realism from the Maggie Thatcher of nearly thirty years ago. Carme Chacon has called for a "blockade" of the three ports in Somalia most often used by the pirates and their motherships. Apparently unimpressed by the unwieldy amphyctony of forty navies which patrols the region, she wants the EU contingent to mount the effort.
A close blockade has much to recommend it, even if events prove it must be expanded beyond the initial three port effort. If the skiff riding thugs can't put to sea, they can't commit acts of piracy.
Of course, the historical record shows that most navies abhor brown or brownish water operations. Most warships, even the smallest, are designed for blue water operations. This does not mean the capacity for close in operations is absent--the new American Littoral Control Ship (LCS) is designed for just such tasks. This means that objections of unsuitability are unfounded.
Nor is there any difficulty with matters of national sovereignty. The Transitional Federal Government has already given foreign naval vessels authority to operate in territorial water.
Still, blockades are tedious, difficult, and mistakes may occur. It is both more fun and easier to drive around in nice shiny ships in deep blue water. If the political leaders of the EU have sufficient testicular fortitude and mental acumen they will take the defense minister's proposal under the closest study--and approve it double quick.
Gustavo de las Casas has done a bit of "thinking the unthinkable" in Foreign Policy. The idea is simple to state, seductive in its purported simplicity, but, ultimately not likely to be anywhere nearly as effective as its proponent thinks.
De Las Casas suggests that it is not yet time to finish the task of destroying al-Qaeda. Weaken it as we have been doing, yes. Obliterate its middle management, no.
He argues (in a questionable analogy) that al-Qaeda is a social networking site, a sort of hellish version of Facebook. By obliterating the middle levels of al-Qaeda, the good guys would force an automatic (and the Geek adds, further) decentralization of Islamist jihadism. The existence of al-Qaeda, de las Casas argues is the best way to detect, track, and, in the fullness of time, wrap up wannabe jihadist martyrs.
He also argues that the US and others should limit their killing of senior and mid-level al-Qaeda figures to those who are demonstrably effective. The others, the duds as it were, should be left in place, unhindered but watched.
There are historical precedents both for and against the propositions advanced by de las Casas. For example, when, during the Reagan administration, the US took out the main Libyan clandestine services communication center, the result gravely impaired the American ability to monitor Libyan operational planning and execution by denying us high quality ELINT. On the other side of the coin, the best successes of the controversial Phoenix program in South Vietnam were those based on killing the competent and encouraging the promotion of the incompetent.
It might be noted that the US and the South Vietnamese in the context of Phoenix had access to very high quality HUMINT which allowed for a reasonably accurate parsing between the competent and incompetent. It is not likely that the same level or quality of intelligence is or will be available to do the same sort of "natural selection" within the ranks of al-Qaeda.
However, the ultimate argument against the de las Casas proposal is simply that Islamist jihadist groups like insurgent groups throughout history are fundamentally self-organizing in nature. What counts the most in the formation of new Islamist jihadists is not the presence or absence of al-Qaeda but the existence of the idea, the concept of Islamist jihadism as a religiously approved action, even a religious obligation.
The importance of al-Qaeda now is its value as a symbol of the requirements, strictures, and sacred writings of Islam taken to their logical extreme. Armed political Islam with a global agenda is infinitely more important in and of itself as a motivator and inspiration to those who seek martyrdom now and into the future than is al-Qaeda or Taliban or Hamas.
Major Hasan needed nothing beyond the precepts of his religion along with the justifications and encouragements offered by clerics such as Anwar al Awliki. The real "facebook" analogy is not to be found in al-Qaeda or any other particular Islamist jihadist group but rather in the web of sites, chat rooms, and so on found all across the vast band of the internet.
By "thinking the unthinkable" de las Casas has performed a service. He has called in effect for a new and more creative thinking about the nature and character of both known organizations and the dynamics by which Islamist jihadists ranks are replenished by new recruits. To this extent his idea is a good one. It deserves follow up.
That's it, foreign policy fans, the few good ideas wandering around the world today. One can hope for more tomorrow. But, not too hard, as disappointment is bound to ensue.
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