The Lesson For Today: Tough Beats Nice

The Russian Foreign Minister has taken the bland line that there has not yet been an "official" response from Tehran to the UN brokered deal on exchanging Iranian low enrichment uranium for more highly enriched reactor fuel. That was very, very diplomatic but basically irrelevant to the real world.

President Obama's public reaction was not much more realistic than that of the Russian ForMin.

During his final stop on the Asian Dud Tour, the Nice Young Man From Chicago averred that the US would be developing a package of "potential steps we can take that will indicate our seriousness."

What the hey! Has Mr Obama really, really quit smoking dope? Who does he think he is (a) threatening? or (b) kidding? "Potential steps" which just may "indicate" that the US takes the issue of the Iranian "Mahdi bomb" with "seriousness." What have we and other countries been doing the past several years--joking about the spinning centrifuges, the implosion design studies, the constant prevarications, the time-buying stalls?

You mean, Mr President, that the time has come to maybe get serious and do something?

Well, if that is the case the upcoming meeting at the "political director" level of the P5+1 should be short and conclusive. Of course, the palaver will not be short. Nor will it be conclusive.

Unless one considers the continuation of policy-as-usual to be conclusive. Given the abrupt way in which the Obama entreaties were given the yo-heave-ho by the Gnomes of Beijing and the bovine placidity shown by the Russian Foreign Minister, more of the same ole, same ole is already set to be the winner of the next round or rounds of P5+1 interactions.

No one, not even the diplomats with the most personal ego investment in the stillborn IAEA delivered deal can believe that their efforts will somehow, someway prove positive in the next few days or weeks. The deal is dead. Well, perhaps it still has a thin thready pulse which is barely detectable.

That sliver of life's potential exists courtesy of Turkey. The Turks could provide both a temporary storage site for the Iranian three percent uranium as well as the point of exchange between twenty percent enriched fuel plates and the stored uranium.

The Tehran regime has (somewhat grudgingly) admitted that the Turks unlike the Great Powers has not (a) done the Revolutionary Republic dirty, (b) reneged on past deals or contracts, (c) attempted to overthrow or otherwise compromise the Reign of the Mullahs or (d) engaged in generalized anti-Islamic activities. Thus the Tehran Toughies may be willing to turn over the bulk of their enriched uranium to Turkish custody.

The West and Russia, perhaps even China, would allow that modification to the original undertaking as it adds no risk of proliferation--particularly if the Turks allow IAEA monitoring as would seem likely. Russian and France could then work out the mechanism for exchange of twenty percent uranium, the provision of reactor ready fuel assemblies, and the final receipt of the Iranian goods. Technically, this is a more difficult way to do things, but there is no reason in principle why it would not work.

The Turkish custody option would be the final test of Iranian political good will. If Tehran rejects it that act proves to even the most Iranophilic observer that the Tehran regime's intentions have been less than honorable all along. If, to the contrary, the mullahs and their frontmen go along with this modification it buys some time to deal diplomatically with the still unresolved issue of nuclear intents and compliance with the NPT regime.

The important ground truth in all this brouhaha is that any exchange program under whatsoever detailed plan is only a means of purchasing time. Unless and until all parts of the Iranian nuclear program are brought under complete and effective IAEA supervision can their be any let down of guard against latent Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions.

The completion of any deal on the current Iranian uranium stockpile in no way does anything beyond providing another "decent" interval for diplomatic and political processes to work. Or not. Certainly there are no indications from Tehran of any lessening of political will to gain their end goals of regional hegemon and global actor.

Any reading of the rules of the global great game shows that the possession of nuclear weapons immunizes a regime against Great Power threats. Tehran has long watched (probably with more than a slight tinge of envy) the way in which Islamabad has wagged and wiggled the US.

Conclusion? Those with nukes can get what they want. Those without the Big Bang will get the shaft.

The Iranians have also learned another very, very important and quite basic truth about how the great game of nations is played. Toughness and resolve matter more than the realities of military, economic, or diplomatic power.

Of course, in the case of Iran, the presence of diplomatic supporters such as China and Russia have made the appearance of toughness and resolve all the easier to adopt and maintain. Even if Russia should change tack and support yet more sanctions, the Chinese will not. Thus Iran is safe in being as tough talking and resolute acting as the mullahs wish.

There are lessons for the US in all of this. The first lesson is also the most obvious: Niceness does not matter. Nice nations are far more likely to finish last than nice guys. The second is a corollary of the first: Toughness trumps. This does not mean it is necessary to be a global, unilateral bully but rather it is necessary to take a stance which is unmistakable and unambiguous, and to put that stance into effect with consistency and resolve.

The third lesson is not quite so open air transparent. Point three is the interrelationship of the world, particularly the Great Powers. When Bill Clinton handed the key to the American market without appropriate safeguards for our national interests, he and his successor assured that the Chinese would be willing, able, and eager to thwart American interests if doing so advanced their own. Ten years ago Beijing would have supported, or at least not blocked, sanctions against Iran. Now, they can do so with total impunity as regards American responses and with profit as regards their interests in Iran and the surrounding region.

Had not Bush/Cheney been so lame of mind as to treat Russia as a defeated rival worth only of disdain, scorn, and hortatory advice, the Kremlin might well have been less obstructionist in its approach to Iran. The nice words which Mr Obama and others in his administration have poured in the general direction of Moscow have not and will not reverse the harm done by Bush/Cheney.

To reverse the harm and structure a working relationship with Russia requires a combination of treating the Kremlin as a Great Power--as great a Great Power as we believe ourselves to be--with the capacity to be firm, resolved and ever-so-politely tough. Respect, predictability, and a well concealed fist join to provide the basis for a relationship in which intersecting national interests can be pursued with overall positive effect.

Mr Obama, listen up and listen tight. True, you did not want to be a foreign policy president; true, you have little interest in, knowledge of, or flair for foreign policy. It isn't like community organizing on a grand scale. You are sorry about that. So is the Geek.

Still, you are a bright, young, and ambitious man. So, there is time to learn the most important lesson of all in the Great Game of Nations: A nice smile and the crowd's applause will not foreign policy successes make. No, that takes a grim sort of guile and an understanding that one can be tough without being George W. Bush or Dick Cheney.