The other day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1851. The measure was introduced and strongly supported by the United States.
In its content Resolution 1851 is laudable. It authorises hot pursuit of those engaged in piracy and armed robbery on the high seas into the territory of Somalia--with the permission of the Transitional Government.
Secretary of State Rice hailed the Security Council's action. She averred that the measure would send a "strong signal" of international resolve to end the rash of maritime hijackings that has severely impeded trade in the Gulf of Aden.
There is only one fault with Secretary Rice's comment. It is out of touch with reality. To end piracy one does not send signals downrange. No. One sends bullets.
There is only one fault with Resolution 1851. The authority will not be used. The US Naval commander in the region has already strongly implied that the American assets detailed to the vast and growing "anti-piracy patrol" lack the specifics of intelligence and deployable forces to do more than escort and monitor.
The commander also raised another objection to hot pursuit or any other more robust measure. There is no court of competent authority available to try "alleged" pirates.
Experts in international law rushed to support this position. These worthies take the position that the various international conventions on the law of the sea which have taken effect following World War II nullified all the previous national laws and international customs and usages which provided for adjudication of acts of piracy. They maintain that none of the current conventions provide for a due process approach to trying and punishing pirates--even those caught in the act or with the tools of the pirate's trade.
Ad hoc arrangements have been made with Kenya for both the trial and incarceration of a handful of pirates captured while plying their bloody business. These deals are limited in both scope and effectiveness. Given the tenuous nature of both Kenyan and regional politics, it is highly improbable that they will be expanded.
Pirate boats have been stopped and boarded by several ships of different navies. Weapons and communications equipment were found. This constituted convincing evidence that the men (who have included nationalities other than Somali) were not out for a fun day of fishing.
Despite the evidence the pirates were released. Disarmed to be sure, but let go to try their luck some other day.
The reason?
No court of competent jurisdiction. No country which was willing to take on the burden of offering a semblance of due process and, following conviction, a reasonable imitation of secure confinement.
The UN Resolution does not change this reality. Neither does it change a related consideration. Robust actions whether or not they involve the new hot pursuit authority carry with them the real potential of killing persons who are not pirates. This causes unpleasant complications for the navy and government seen as being irresponsible trigger pullers.
There is another factor which renders the well-intentioned Resolution 1851 nugatory. Stepping ashore in Somalia, even for the brief time that might be required to free a ship, rescue a captive crew, or snatch some pirate band automatically involves the state undertaking the action in the blood soaked chaos called Somalia. An incursion would carry risks ranging from being denounced as an Islamophobic baby-killer to demands that the intervening force stay to bring stability to the country.
Like the oft-seen legend on old maps, "Here there be Tygers."
If Resolution 1851 sits as another dead letter act by the UN, that body will lose even more street cred with the bad actors of the world. This sort of "strong signal" is counterproductive. It weakens not only the UN in the eyes of Islamist outlaws such as the Pirates of Puntland, it does the same to nations such as the US which embraced and announced the hollow words of good intentions.
If the UN really, really wants to do something constructive regarding piracy in the waters off Somalia and (at least by implication) elsewhere, there is something it can do. There is a measure the Security Council can take which is real, germane, and relevant. There is an act of creation which will do more--much more--than simply send a signal'
The UN can ordain another of those special tribunals of which the organisation seems so enamored. It can create a court of competent jurisdiction to try cases of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas. It can give a holding pen for the sea going scum picked up by the vessels of the Great Gulf of Aden Piracy Prevention Patrol.
Sure, such a court may not be as high-vis or sexy as those dealing with war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity. But, an International Piracy Tribunal would be useful. Even effective. It could do something real and beneficial.
That's probably why the UN hasn't done it yet. Signals are better than useful results in the Great House by the Hudson.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
Wednesday, December 17, 2008
Let's Give It Up For The Shoe Tosser!
Muntader al-Zaidi might have been acting out some personal type of rage and frustration as he hurled his shoes and insults at George W. Bush. His action has made him a form of hero to many folks in the Mideast (and probably elsewhere.)
The Geek is of the view that al-Zadi's up front gesture of scorn and anger raises an important question or two. While the 29 year old TV journalist may have been a bit over the edge with his demonstration, it deserves to be considered as something other than a mere juvenile outburst. It also requires an assessment which goes beyond placing politically expedient labels.
Al-Zaidi has been adopted as a poster boy by people on the Left: See, the Iraqis hate us and our imperialistic ways. He has received a similar sort of bogus sanctification by those on the Right: See, it proves Iraq is "free." No person could do the same in Egypt or Saudi Arabia or pre-2003 Iraq.
Arguably both labels have a degree of truth in advertising. More importantly, neither does service to what probably lies behind not only al-Zaidi's pitching arm, the applause he has received, and the reaction to the Zaidi-throws-and-Bush-ducks episode.
To the Geek, the tossing of shoes and hurling of epithets demands an examination of what the US invasion of Iraq has brought about. This requires asking a simple question which is very difficult to answer--or, at the least to formulate a coherent response upon which a consensus can agree free of ideological bias.
The purpose of war is to bring about a better state of peace. All forms of war, aggressive, defensive, insurgent are waged in order to establish a post-war regime which is superior to that which existed prior to the cannon's roar. Not surprisingly, the details of what constitutes a better state of peace differs between aggressor and defender, insurgent and counterinsurgent. That difference is why the war is being fought.
Interventionary wars such as those being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq lay a special burden on the intervenor--that is the country which starts the war--not only to define but to achieve a state of peace which is demonstrably superior for both the intervenor and the target nation. Let's walk through that again. It's important.
The only consideration which raises an intervention above the level of naked and perhaps unprovoked aggression is the outcome. Does the outcome provide a better state of peace for the country being invaded? If the answer is yes, then the war is ethically justified. If the answer is no, then the war is nothing other than naked aggression for the benefit of the invader.
The Administration of George W. Bush and its supporters among We the People argue that removing Saddam Hussein and opening the possibility of democracy to the Iraqi people is, in and of itself, a better state of peace. Those who have opposed the war state that the results to date constitute a worse state of peace.
The proponents of the invasion having resulted in a better state of peace point to the elections in Iraq, its demonstration of effective sovereignty as embodied in the recent Status of Forces Agreement, and the trials of Saddam, Chemical Ali and others for both war crimes and crimes against the Iraqi people as proof that a better state of peace exists today. They point to al-Zaidi's actions as a clear example of the current state of Iraqi freedom.
Opponents of the American adventure in regime change note the several million internal displaced persons as well as the large number of Iraqi refugees in adjacent countries. They also note the ruined infrastructure, the destroyed neighborhoods, towns and villages. And, the tens of thousands of dead Iraqis who would be alive absent the American invasion. To the people holding this view, al-Zaidi was a symbol of the bitter resentment, not to say hatred, resident in the Iraqi victims of American aggression.
From the Geek's historically driven perspective, the American experiences in both the Philippines and Vietnam provide a guide for assessing whether or not the US effort in Iraq has been ethically justified as bringing about a better state of peace. He would like to take a brief look at both guiding cases.
In the Philippines, the US defeated a well developed, broadly supported indigenous independence movement. The cost of this was high in both American and Filipino lives. The military success was predicated not so much on the skill of American soldiers or the quality of their weapons and tactics as it was on distorting the political process which existed within Filipino society.
The same distortions continued during the long years of US occupation. They were exacerbated not only by the Japanese invasion and occupation of the islands but by the years of US backed counterinsurgency efforts against assorted communist insurgent movements during the decades which followed Filipino independence.
The distortions continued even after the communists were defeated and have done much to assure the rise and continuation of an Islamist separatist insurgency, which is both slow motion in pace and bloody in action. A close examination of the forces at work in Filipino society and politics indicates that the same basic trajectory of class based politics and internal divisions would have existed absent the American invasion, conquest, and occupation.
However, the trajectory would have been neither so long in duration nor bloody in its effects had the American government accepted Filipino independence at the end of the Spanish-American War. The American presence was like a heavy weight put on an elastic surface--it made the distortion deeper with the inevitable consequence that it took longer for the elastic to return to normal following the removal of the weight.
The same general pattern can be seen within Vietnam. The conflicts between North and South existed for centuries before the French Indochina War. The attempts by the French to reestablish colonial authority worsened this pre-existing trajectory as did the later American support of the South Vietnamese regime.
Following the defeat of the US, the North gained operational dominance over the entire country. This was as expected. But, as Hanoi has found out, there is a whale of a difference between operational dominance and unquestioned political authority.
As a result of changes both within and outside Vietnam, the county may continue as a one party state with strong authoritarian aspects but has increasingly been acknowledging the necessity of freer enterprise, a more liberal approach to the rights of the citizens, and the strong necessity of something akin to a rule of law--not party or regional connections and prerogatives.
In short, the long resident trajectories of Vietnamese society have continued. Vietnam today is what Vietnam would have been in any event had there been no American war in the country.
Leaving aside minor quibbles such as American public health measures in the Philippines or the necessity of global containment, the results of the American efforts in both venues were failures. Neither brought about a state of peace better than that which would have emerged without the US military involvement.
Rather than bringing about a better state of peace in either country, the US wars and occupations delayed the arrival of the better state. Neither American effort was ethically justifiable.
Looking back it is clear that the "golden moment" for effective and low cost regime change with a meaningful chance of bringing about a better state of peace in Iraq came and went in 1991. The halting of Coalition forces on the approaches to Basra might have been tactically and logistically justified. The standing by with folded arms as the Shiite uprising was bloodily crushed was not.
That suppression coupled with the years of sanctions and "No-Fly Zones" neither constituted a better state of peace nor a meaningful push for internal Iraqi-driven changes. Rather, the long years of deprivation, repression and collapsing economy made the achievement of internal stability now all the harder.
The regime of Saddam Hussein would not have lasted many more years had the US and other troops stayed at home in 2003. Yes, the death of Saddam would have brought internal power struggles, deaths, and the emergence of yet another authoritarian regime.
Such a pattern is not foreign to the Iraqi social and cultural experience. A transition to another, probably slightly less obnoxious regime would have been both accepted by and acceptable to the Iraqi public generally. The strongman, the oligarch, is completely in keeping with the culture, the history of Iraq, and the region generally.
To sum it up: The American invasion of Iraq was not justified. It did not--could not--bring about a better state of peace. All the invasion has done--could have done--is delay the organic emergence of a better state--as defined by the Iraqis.
George W. Bush, and the world, should be grateful that all al-Zaidi had to throw was his shoes. He (and many Iraqis) probably would have preferred a grenade.
The Geek is of the view that al-Zadi's up front gesture of scorn and anger raises an important question or two. While the 29 year old TV journalist may have been a bit over the edge with his demonstration, it deserves to be considered as something other than a mere juvenile outburst. It also requires an assessment which goes beyond placing politically expedient labels.
Al-Zaidi has been adopted as a poster boy by people on the Left: See, the Iraqis hate us and our imperialistic ways. He has received a similar sort of bogus sanctification by those on the Right: See, it proves Iraq is "free." No person could do the same in Egypt or Saudi Arabia or pre-2003 Iraq.
Arguably both labels have a degree of truth in advertising. More importantly, neither does service to what probably lies behind not only al-Zaidi's pitching arm, the applause he has received, and the reaction to the Zaidi-throws-and-Bush-ducks episode.
To the Geek, the tossing of shoes and hurling of epithets demands an examination of what the US invasion of Iraq has brought about. This requires asking a simple question which is very difficult to answer--or, at the least to formulate a coherent response upon which a consensus can agree free of ideological bias.
The purpose of war is to bring about a better state of peace. All forms of war, aggressive, defensive, insurgent are waged in order to establish a post-war regime which is superior to that which existed prior to the cannon's roar. Not surprisingly, the details of what constitutes a better state of peace differs between aggressor and defender, insurgent and counterinsurgent. That difference is why the war is being fought.
Interventionary wars such as those being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq lay a special burden on the intervenor--that is the country which starts the war--not only to define but to achieve a state of peace which is demonstrably superior for both the intervenor and the target nation. Let's walk through that again. It's important.
The only consideration which raises an intervention above the level of naked and perhaps unprovoked aggression is the outcome. Does the outcome provide a better state of peace for the country being invaded? If the answer is yes, then the war is ethically justified. If the answer is no, then the war is nothing other than naked aggression for the benefit of the invader.
The Administration of George W. Bush and its supporters among We the People argue that removing Saddam Hussein and opening the possibility of democracy to the Iraqi people is, in and of itself, a better state of peace. Those who have opposed the war state that the results to date constitute a worse state of peace.
The proponents of the invasion having resulted in a better state of peace point to the elections in Iraq, its demonstration of effective sovereignty as embodied in the recent Status of Forces Agreement, and the trials of Saddam, Chemical Ali and others for both war crimes and crimes against the Iraqi people as proof that a better state of peace exists today. They point to al-Zaidi's actions as a clear example of the current state of Iraqi freedom.
Opponents of the American adventure in regime change note the several million internal displaced persons as well as the large number of Iraqi refugees in adjacent countries. They also note the ruined infrastructure, the destroyed neighborhoods, towns and villages. And, the tens of thousands of dead Iraqis who would be alive absent the American invasion. To the people holding this view, al-Zaidi was a symbol of the bitter resentment, not to say hatred, resident in the Iraqi victims of American aggression.
From the Geek's historically driven perspective, the American experiences in both the Philippines and Vietnam provide a guide for assessing whether or not the US effort in Iraq has been ethically justified as bringing about a better state of peace. He would like to take a brief look at both guiding cases.
In the Philippines, the US defeated a well developed, broadly supported indigenous independence movement. The cost of this was high in both American and Filipino lives. The military success was predicated not so much on the skill of American soldiers or the quality of their weapons and tactics as it was on distorting the political process which existed within Filipino society.
The same distortions continued during the long years of US occupation. They were exacerbated not only by the Japanese invasion and occupation of the islands but by the years of US backed counterinsurgency efforts against assorted communist insurgent movements during the decades which followed Filipino independence.
The distortions continued even after the communists were defeated and have done much to assure the rise and continuation of an Islamist separatist insurgency, which is both slow motion in pace and bloody in action. A close examination of the forces at work in Filipino society and politics indicates that the same basic trajectory of class based politics and internal divisions would have existed absent the American invasion, conquest, and occupation.
However, the trajectory would have been neither so long in duration nor bloody in its effects had the American government accepted Filipino independence at the end of the Spanish-American War. The American presence was like a heavy weight put on an elastic surface--it made the distortion deeper with the inevitable consequence that it took longer for the elastic to return to normal following the removal of the weight.
The same general pattern can be seen within Vietnam. The conflicts between North and South existed for centuries before the French Indochina War. The attempts by the French to reestablish colonial authority worsened this pre-existing trajectory as did the later American support of the South Vietnamese regime.
Following the defeat of the US, the North gained operational dominance over the entire country. This was as expected. But, as Hanoi has found out, there is a whale of a difference between operational dominance and unquestioned political authority.
As a result of changes both within and outside Vietnam, the county may continue as a one party state with strong authoritarian aspects but has increasingly been acknowledging the necessity of freer enterprise, a more liberal approach to the rights of the citizens, and the strong necessity of something akin to a rule of law--not party or regional connections and prerogatives.
In short, the long resident trajectories of Vietnamese society have continued. Vietnam today is what Vietnam would have been in any event had there been no American war in the country.
Leaving aside minor quibbles such as American public health measures in the Philippines or the necessity of global containment, the results of the American efforts in both venues were failures. Neither brought about a state of peace better than that which would have emerged without the US military involvement.
Rather than bringing about a better state of peace in either country, the US wars and occupations delayed the arrival of the better state. Neither American effort was ethically justifiable.
Looking back it is clear that the "golden moment" for effective and low cost regime change with a meaningful chance of bringing about a better state of peace in Iraq came and went in 1991. The halting of Coalition forces on the approaches to Basra might have been tactically and logistically justified. The standing by with folded arms as the Shiite uprising was bloodily crushed was not.
That suppression coupled with the years of sanctions and "No-Fly Zones" neither constituted a better state of peace nor a meaningful push for internal Iraqi-driven changes. Rather, the long years of deprivation, repression and collapsing economy made the achievement of internal stability now all the harder.
The regime of Saddam Hussein would not have lasted many more years had the US and other troops stayed at home in 2003. Yes, the death of Saddam would have brought internal power struggles, deaths, and the emergence of yet another authoritarian regime.
Such a pattern is not foreign to the Iraqi social and cultural experience. A transition to another, probably slightly less obnoxious regime would have been both accepted by and acceptable to the Iraqi public generally. The strongman, the oligarch, is completely in keeping with the culture, the history of Iraq, and the region generally.
To sum it up: The American invasion of Iraq was not justified. It did not--could not--bring about a better state of peace. All the invasion has done--could have done--is delay the organic emergence of a better state--as defined by the Iraqis.
George W. Bush, and the world, should be grateful that all al-Zaidi had to throw was his shoes. He (and many Iraqis) probably would have preferred a grenade.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Isn't The Campaign Over?
As far as the Geek is aware the election is over. Even the Electoral College ceremony has been concluded. Barack Obama is the one and only President-elect. Except for a few very disgruntled types on the far right wing who continue to question the location of Obama's birth, the country seems to have agreed on the identity of the next president. That's where the Geek thought reality resided.
So, please would someone brighter and more firmly rooted in the here-and-now than the Geek please tell him why the Official Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda as released the other day by the transition wallahs reads like a poorly connected series of campaign blurbs? Please ease the misery of the Geek who believes now that he must have been abducted by ufonauts and dropped off in some alternate reality by letting him know there is a good, sound, well-rooted reason for the blathering of vapid feel good phrases and calling it a foreign policy agenda.
If you haven't read this sophomoric exercise in pandering to the Great Unwashed, it is available on line. The Geek pulled it from Maxim's, but there are probably other sites holding it. http://www.maximsnews.com/news20081215obamaforeignpolicystatement10812150102.htm
The Geek is perfectly well aware that incoming administrations are not given to laying out a real foreign policy agenda. He also is acquainted with the historical record which shows how the best intentions can be rendered nugatory under the compulsion of events.
Ike limited himself to a campaign trail promise "to go to Korea" with the implication that by so doing he would end the unpopular "police action" there. He went and eventually did help bring about an armistice.
LBJ promised that "American boys will not be sent to fight and die for Asian boys." The boys such as the Geek who were already ducking bullets and pulling triggers in Vietnam were not impressed by either the realism or the honesty of the Texan's commitment.
Nixon said as how he "had a plan for Vietnam." He did. More Americans died in that unpleasant place after His Richardness took office than before.
Jimmy Carter promised to work for peace in the Mideast. (What was the alternative? To work for war?) His efforts eventually did lead to the Camp David Accord. A nice agreement brought about by the compulsion of events in the region, but scarcely a milestone on the road to peace.
In short, incoming presidents tend to make few promises in the foreign policy arena. Those which they do make are usually vague and misleading. Most are kept in the breech far more than in the observance.
However, Mr Obama ran on the mantra of "change." In large measure he was elected because a hell of a lot of We the People very much desired a change after eight years of neocon ninnie agenda driven debacles.
Is it too much to expect--no--to demand that the Obama Administration come into office with something different? A change from past pre-presidential performances? Is it somehow out of line to want an outline of foreign policy goals and objectives that transcends campaign rhetoric? That is demonstrably related to the real problems of the real world? Which shows that the new team on the block has a sound grip of current and near-term future challenges to US national and strategic interests?
While one might cling to the thin rope of hope provided by Mr Obama's appointment of Robert Gates and General Jones, that isn't enough. It is offset by his designation of Susan Rice as UN ambassador with cabinet rank. It isn't helped by his tabbing of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Both of these latter appointees are correctly understood as carriers of ideological agendas rather than being realpolikers.
Rather than do a complete disection of the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" as released, the Geek would prefer to take just a couple of salient points. Consider the matter of nuclear proliferation and fissionable materials control.
We all know that both North Korea and Iran have already been the targets of a wide variety of admittedly inconsistently imposed sanctions. So far the sanction campaign has had nil results. Given the realities of Great Power dynamics today and into the foreseeable future this is unlikely to change. Extremely unlikely.
Unless and until other Great Powers (and a whole passel of the Not-So-Great Powers) see that it is in their own self interest to prevent these states from acquiring more of a nuclear weapons capacity than they already have, no sanction regime will have an effect. Neither will an approach that combines sanctions with inducements.
The self-interest of countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan include components far less easily quantifiable than gross domestic product or other economic factors but which are equally or even more important. These include the concept of national sovereignty, national dignity and pride, the political capital investment of the regime. None of these motivators of conduct are considered by the Obama/Biden Agenda.
Nuclear arms reduction by the US or Russia is both possible and desirable. But, reduction should never be confused with elimination. No country currently in possession of a nuclear force-in-being is going to be ready to renounce this capacity. The world is a very long way from achieving a political order that makes the nuclear option obsolete. The incoming administration recognises this. It has offered the extension of the American "nuclear umbrella" to Israel and other threatened countries should Iran gain a nuclear weapons capacity.
The efforts made to date to secure weapons grade fissionable materials should be continued. But, it must also be realised that there is not now nor is there likely to be a realistic way of tracking down and gaining custody of all the highly enriched uranium or plutonium which has been made or will be made. The nasty stuff is going to continue to float about in the shadows of the globe.
Now take a close look at the "Obama/Biden Agenda" as it regards Israel.
Apparently it is not yet time for a change in the area of American policy regarding Israel. We will continue to be held hostage by the political power of the Israel Lobby. Thus the dog of American foreign policy will continue to be wagged by the tail of Israel. This means that the US and others will keep trudging along a treadmill to nowhere in the Mideast.
Not surprisingly the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" is solidly behind the Global Poverty Act and its UN progenitor, the Millennium Development Goals. The Agenda promises a doubling of US foreign aid to achieve all sorts of High Minded things. Unfortunately the Lofty Ideal is presented without acknowledging any of the real world caveats such as the inability of the UN to do more than blather or the supreme skill with which assorted kleptocrats both in and out of recipient governments see foreign aid as being a highly personalised benefit of position.
The New Team, the fountainheads of "change" stand for "tough and direct" diplomacy--whatever that might mean. Do they think that the US has been noted for its "weak and indirect" practice of international politics in the past? The Agenda is also in support of a "new partnership" with Asian countries. That's nice, but what, exactly, has been wrong with the "old" partnership? The Agenda is silent on that point.
The Agenda is silent as well on other matters of salience. The sound of collapsing states in Africa is ignored. So also is the emergence of potential threats to US interests and security in Latin America.
It is inconceivable that the Obama/Biden bunch is unaware of recent developments to our south. That they have not noticed the election of governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay that are not favorably disposed to the US passes belief. Can the new crew possibly be heedless of the current conditions in Mexico?
But, the Agenda makes no reference to any of these.
Also unmentioned in the Agenda is the latest elephant in the living room. The critter isn't a recent arrival. It's been there for years now. It just keeps on eating and growing. As it noshes its way to greater potency, it keeps being ignored by the polite folks.
The elephant is the international trade in illegal drugs. More accurately it is the relation between the drug cartels and the rebirth of hostile insurgent movements. From the Taliban in Afghanistan to FARC in Columbia, drugs and violence directed against US interests are joined hip and shoulder. Now Sendero Luminoso which had been declared dead a decade ago has lurched back from the grave, resurrected by drug money.
But, the polite people of the new kids on the foreign policy block ignored this stark and highly unpleasant reality. A reality which will demand full attention in the months and years to come.
The Geek agrees that it is time for a change. Unfortunately, the Agenda indicates that the Obama Administration doesn't agree.
So, please would someone brighter and more firmly rooted in the here-and-now than the Geek please tell him why the Official Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda as released the other day by the transition wallahs reads like a poorly connected series of campaign blurbs? Please ease the misery of the Geek who believes now that he must have been abducted by ufonauts and dropped off in some alternate reality by letting him know there is a good, sound, well-rooted reason for the blathering of vapid feel good phrases and calling it a foreign policy agenda.
If you haven't read this sophomoric exercise in pandering to the Great Unwashed, it is available on line. The Geek pulled it from Maxim's, but there are probably other sites holding it. http://www.maximsnews.com/news20081215obamaforeignpolicystatement10812150102.htm
The Geek is perfectly well aware that incoming administrations are not given to laying out a real foreign policy agenda. He also is acquainted with the historical record which shows how the best intentions can be rendered nugatory under the compulsion of events.
Ike limited himself to a campaign trail promise "to go to Korea" with the implication that by so doing he would end the unpopular "police action" there. He went and eventually did help bring about an armistice.
LBJ promised that "American boys will not be sent to fight and die for Asian boys." The boys such as the Geek who were already ducking bullets and pulling triggers in Vietnam were not impressed by either the realism or the honesty of the Texan's commitment.
Nixon said as how he "had a plan for Vietnam." He did. More Americans died in that unpleasant place after His Richardness took office than before.
Jimmy Carter promised to work for peace in the Mideast. (What was the alternative? To work for war?) His efforts eventually did lead to the Camp David Accord. A nice agreement brought about by the compulsion of events in the region, but scarcely a milestone on the road to peace.
In short, incoming presidents tend to make few promises in the foreign policy arena. Those which they do make are usually vague and misleading. Most are kept in the breech far more than in the observance.
However, Mr Obama ran on the mantra of "change." In large measure he was elected because a hell of a lot of We the People very much desired a change after eight years of neocon ninnie agenda driven debacles.
Is it too much to expect--no--to demand that the Obama Administration come into office with something different? A change from past pre-presidential performances? Is it somehow out of line to want an outline of foreign policy goals and objectives that transcends campaign rhetoric? That is demonstrably related to the real problems of the real world? Which shows that the new team on the block has a sound grip of current and near-term future challenges to US national and strategic interests?
While one might cling to the thin rope of hope provided by Mr Obama's appointment of Robert Gates and General Jones, that isn't enough. It is offset by his designation of Susan Rice as UN ambassador with cabinet rank. It isn't helped by his tabbing of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Both of these latter appointees are correctly understood as carriers of ideological agendas rather than being realpolikers.
Rather than do a complete disection of the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" as released, the Geek would prefer to take just a couple of salient points. Consider the matter of nuclear proliferation and fissionable materials control.
Nuclear WeaponsSounds good, doesn't it? But that's all it does. Looked at closely the statement not only says nothing, it shows a remarkable lack of grip on reality.
A Record of Results: The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes. Obama has taken bipartisan action to secure nuclear weapons and materials:
He joined Senator Dick Lugar (R-In) in passing a law to help the United States and our allies detect and stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world.
He joined Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Ne) to introduce a bill that seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism, reduce global nuclear arsenals, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Secure Loose Nuclear Materials from Terrorists: Obama and Biden will secure all loose nuclear materials in the world within four years. While working to secure existing stockpiles of nuclear material, Obama and Biden will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material. This will deny terrorists the ability to steal or buy loose nuclear materials.
Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Obama and Biden will crack down on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that countries like North Korea and Iran that break the rules will automatically face strong international sanctions.
Move Toward a Nuclear Free World: Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global
We all know that both North Korea and Iran have already been the targets of a wide variety of admittedly inconsistently imposed sanctions. So far the sanction campaign has had nil results. Given the realities of Great Power dynamics today and into the foreseeable future this is unlikely to change. Extremely unlikely.
Unless and until other Great Powers (and a whole passel of the Not-So-Great Powers) see that it is in their own self interest to prevent these states from acquiring more of a nuclear weapons capacity than they already have, no sanction regime will have an effect. Neither will an approach that combines sanctions with inducements.
The self-interest of countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan include components far less easily quantifiable than gross domestic product or other economic factors but which are equally or even more important. These include the concept of national sovereignty, national dignity and pride, the political capital investment of the regime. None of these motivators of conduct are considered by the Obama/Biden Agenda.
Nuclear arms reduction by the US or Russia is both possible and desirable. But, reduction should never be confused with elimination. No country currently in possession of a nuclear force-in-being is going to be ready to renounce this capacity. The world is a very long way from achieving a political order that makes the nuclear option obsolete. The incoming administration recognises this. It has offered the extension of the American "nuclear umbrella" to Israel and other threatened countries should Iran gain a nuclear weapons capacity.
The efforts made to date to secure weapons grade fissionable materials should be continued. But, it must also be realised that there is not now nor is there likely to be a realistic way of tracking down and gaining custody of all the highly enriched uranium or plutonium which has been made or will be made. The nasty stuff is going to continue to float about in the shadows of the globe.
Now take a close look at the "Obama/Biden Agenda" as it regards Israel.
IsraelWhat about this differs from the position taken by any of the past ten or eleven presidents? With the sole exception of the reference made to the disastrous 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, any incoming administration from Eisenhower on could have (and did) make virtually identical commitments.
Ensure a Strong U.S.-Israel Partnership: Barack Obama and Joe Biden strongly support the U.S.-Israel relationship, and believe that our first and incontrovertible commitment in the Middle East must be to the security of Israel, America's strongest ally in the region. They support this closeness, and have stated that the United States will never distance itself from Israel.
Support Israel's Right to Self Defense: During the July 2006 Lebanon war, Barack Obama stood up strongly for Israel's right to defend itself from Hezbollah raids and rocket attacks, cosponsoring a Senate resolution against Iran and Syria's involvement in the war, and insisting that Israel should not be pressured into a ceasefire that did not deal with the threat of Hezbollah missiles. He and Joe Biden believe strongly in Israel's right to protect its citizens.
Support Foreign Assistance to Israel: Barack Obama and Joe Biden have consistently supported foreign assistance to Israel. They defend and support the annual foreign aid package that involves both military and economic assistance to Israel and have advocated increased foreign aid budgets to ensure that these funding priorities are met. They have called for continuing U.S. cooperation with Israel in the development of missile defense systems
Apparently it is not yet time for a change in the area of American policy regarding Israel. We will continue to be held hostage by the political power of the Israel Lobby. Thus the dog of American foreign policy will continue to be wagged by the tail of Israel. This means that the US and others will keep trudging along a treadmill to nowhere in the Mideast.
Not surprisingly the "Obama/Biden Foreign Policy Agenda" is solidly behind the Global Poverty Act and its UN progenitor, the Millennium Development Goals. The Agenda promises a doubling of US foreign aid to achieve all sorts of High Minded things. Unfortunately the Lofty Ideal is presented without acknowledging any of the real world caveats such as the inability of the UN to do more than blather or the supreme skill with which assorted kleptocrats both in and out of recipient governments see foreign aid as being a highly personalised benefit of position.
The New Team, the fountainheads of "change" stand for "tough and direct" diplomacy--whatever that might mean. Do they think that the US has been noted for its "weak and indirect" practice of international politics in the past? The Agenda is also in support of a "new partnership" with Asian countries. That's nice, but what, exactly, has been wrong with the "old" partnership? The Agenda is silent on that point.
The Agenda is silent as well on other matters of salience. The sound of collapsing states in Africa is ignored. So also is the emergence of potential threats to US interests and security in Latin America.
It is inconceivable that the Obama/Biden bunch is unaware of recent developments to our south. That they have not noticed the election of governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay that are not favorably disposed to the US passes belief. Can the new crew possibly be heedless of the current conditions in Mexico?
But, the Agenda makes no reference to any of these.
Also unmentioned in the Agenda is the latest elephant in the living room. The critter isn't a recent arrival. It's been there for years now. It just keeps on eating and growing. As it noshes its way to greater potency, it keeps being ignored by the polite folks.
The elephant is the international trade in illegal drugs. More accurately it is the relation between the drug cartels and the rebirth of hostile insurgent movements. From the Taliban in Afghanistan to FARC in Columbia, drugs and violence directed against US interests are joined hip and shoulder. Now Sendero Luminoso which had been declared dead a decade ago has lurched back from the grave, resurrected by drug money.
But, the polite people of the new kids on the foreign policy block ignored this stark and highly unpleasant reality. A reality which will demand full attention in the months and years to come.
The Geek agrees that it is time for a change. Unfortunately, the Agenda indicates that the Obama Administration doesn't agree.
Saturday, December 13, 2008
Time For A Change--Defining America's "Mission"
Recently Oxfam America launched a petition drive with the view of calling upon the incoming Obama Administration to develop (and, presumably, implement) plans to end the sexual violence directed against women in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa. The nature of the petition as well as its wording implies strongly that this act represents a test of the American "mission" in the world.
Oxfam America and others of like mind have, with this petition, joined the chorus of groups and individuals demanding that the US live up to its global "mission" by alleviating global poverty, ending anthropogenic climate change, feeding those who are hungry, protecting the tropical rainforests, halting acoustic pollution of the oceans, and other tasks too numerous too mention. All of these activities are necessary. All are important. All would serve to the greater benefit of humankind.
But, to what extent are they incumbent upon the United States? How can one argue that any or all constitute America's "mission?"
Getting a grip on what, if any, "mission" accrues to the United States is manifestly necessary. It is necessary if the Obama Administration is to formulate a coherent foreign policy and gain the support of We the People--or at least the politically articulate portion which is concerned with foreign affairs.
For a half century there was no debate over the American "mission." It was consensually understood and agreed that the "mission" of the US was to act as Leader of the Free World in the apocalypse freighted Cold War with the Soviet Union and its clients.
With the end of that confrontation, uncertainty replaced the consensus. The records of the Clinton and W. Bush Administrations demonstrate this uncertainty and confusion, albeit each in a different fashion.
As any number of diplomatic historians have argued over the past century, any confusion regarding the "mission" of the US in the world has stemmed from a basic split in how Americans and their governments have balanced the pursuit of ideals with the requirements of realism. The recurrent shifts between realism and idealism in American foreign policy have existed almost from the beginnings of the American experience.
The roots of idealism are to be found in the "mission statement" implicit in the views of the founders of the Puritan colony of Plymouth. To the Puritan mind, they were on an "errand into the wilderness." The nature of that errand was to continue the process of purifying their community so that in the fullness of time and consonant with the will of God, they would be recalled to England. Recalled to save the mother country from the creeping evil of "Popishness."
You don't get more idealistic than that.
Despite a brief flurry of revolutionary zeal which saw the American Patriots attempt to export the beauties of their revolution to Canada by force of arms, the leaders of the Revolutionary and early Constitutional periods were remarkably free of the idealistic fervor which normally propels a nation born of war. As the underlying pragmatism of the Constitution shows clearly, the "decider guys" of the Federal period held ideals well tempered by a healthy regard for the requirements of reality.
The writings of the Founders and their immediate successors indicate that realism trumped the excesses of idealism. In foreign affairs the universal position was commercial friendship with all who reciprocated and a total rejection of any sort of intervention in the affairs of other countries. It was believed and argued that by focusing its efforts upon developing its land, resources, and, most importantly, its domestic institutions of government, the United States could provide an example worthy of emulation.
In short, the Americans of the early Nineteenth Century were in favor of a sort of leadership-by-example approach to foreign policy. By so doing and by the fact of success, the US would encourage the peoples of other countries to embrace our form of government, economy, and social organisation.
Not until the last years of the 19th Century did this general consensus fray. When it did start to ravel, it came apart with speed and ferocity. Expansion across the continent, at first peaceful (unless you were an indigenous American in the way), morphed into the more muscular Manifest Destiny of mid-century. This in turn transmogrified into the euphemistically expressed imperialism of the Internationalist Progressives.
The Internationalist Progressives were activist oriented ideologues. To their eyes, the US had a "mission" which went far beyond filling a large chunk of the North American continent. Far transcended mere success in the development of resources and institutions. Going much further than leadership-by-example and its essentially realistic view of costs and benefits, the Internationalist Progressives were gung-ho for the forcible exportation of American institutions to other peoples regardless of the desires of the recipients.
The Internationalist Progressives were eager to take on the challenge offered by Rudyard Kipling. They rushed to pick up "the White Man's Burden."
Whether Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt or Democrats like Woodrow Wilson, US Administrations with the backing of the majority of We the People mounted interventions and occupations throughout the world. The Internationalist Progressives never argued that pragmatic interests or the requirements of reality demanded these interventions and occupations except in passing.
The real motive was always idealism.
The ideal in play was simple, easily understood, and agreed upon by virtually all Americans.
Here is the ideal, short and sweet
The nature and character of the United States and its institutions were superior to those existing elsewhere. The exportation of these were in the best interests of the recipients. The moral nature of America demanded that we right presumed wrongs by providing better government, better economic structures, better social institutions.
We could do no other. It was our "mission."
President Wilson put it perfectly as he ordered the landing of troops at Vera Cruz during the midst of the bloody and expropriation minded Mexican revolution. "We will teach the Mexicans to elect good men."
The grunts fighting to suppress the Philippine Insurrection put it just as well. They were a bit more cynical, but such is the prerogative of the guys at the bloody tip. They had a jingle which contained the chorus, "Under the wide and starry flag/We'll civilize them with a Krag." (The Krag-Jorganson rifle was the standard issue weapon of the time.)
We the People and our governments stuck with the idealism of the Internationalist Progressives until the awesome let down of the Twenties. Reality slapped us in the face. The "War to End Wars" had not ended wars. The "War to Make the World Safe For Democracy" hadn't performed that miracle.
World War I was a failure from the American perspective. Lives had been expended for nothing. Blood out, zilch in.
The Internationalist impulse was replaced, not by realism, but by another form of idealism. We the People became self-absorbed both during the years of apparent plenty--the Twenties--and during the time of poverty--the Thirties. This was the time of our total disengagement from the affairs and threats of the world. This was the time of Isolationism.
The reality of threat kept knocking on Uncle Sam's door as the Thirties ended. Few were ready to listen. Ultimately reality with a thwacking great boot kicked the door in on 7 December 41.
During the war, We the People, with the full and often knowingly duplicitous encouragement of the Administration of FDR, were filled with the ideal of a world that would be made peaceful by the joint efforts of a war-winning coalition. We were assured (and we assured ourselves) that once the grand combine of the US, the UK, the USSR (as well as the tag-alongs, France and China) had obliterated the aggressors, they would continue to guarantee a world of peace through the United Nations.
That idealistic view was proven to be hallucinatory even before the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco. With the acknowledgement of the Cold War as being real, very dangerous, and long term in nature, realism came out of the shadows for the first time in generations.
The Containment Policy as interpreted by Truman and then Eisenhower was profoundly realistic. It accepted the limitations imposed by reality. It accepted the world as it was and sought to remake the global political order slowly on the margins until the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union caught up with it.
The policy of roll back espoused by most Republicans on the Right and even some Cold War Liberals on the Left was idealistic. When attempted even in limited form, roll back proved that ideals could be quite deadly. (Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis and hold your breath at just how close we came to the very unpleasant reality of a nuclear exchange.)
Whew! We're through a quick background sketch of the zigs and zags of US foreign policy and its companion, the nature of any American "mission."
Without recapitulating the ideologically propelled debacles of the past twenty years, suffice it to say that recent history parallels the history of long ago. Idealism leads to interventions in the affairs of other peoples and countries without due regard as to the human terrain upon which our well-intended efforts are to operate.
Realism, which has been conspicuously absent over the past decade and a half, demands that We the People and our governments take the world as it is.
Realism requires that we properly appreciate what our core national and strategic interests actually are.
Realism insists that we evaluate closely and carefully what the risks and benefits of a particular policy option might be.
Realism is based upon a full understanding of the strengths and limitations resident in our instruments of national power.
Realism also is predicated upon an accurate reading of the human terrain upon which our policy will operate.
Given the nature of the world's political and economic order today, the pure leadership-by-example model that served the nation well during the first century or so of its existence no longer is sufficient to protect, let alone advance, our core national and strategic interests. It was realistic back then. Now it is not.
The realism of the Cold War is no longer realistic. It is not applicable in a multi-polar world. It would only become realistic should the current conflict expressed as the Global War on Terrorism become a seemingly permanent bifurcation between the Islamist oriented states and all other countries. This Huntington "Clash of Civilizations" is unlikely, but not impossible. Not impossible by a long shot.
A new definition of realism must not only take account of global problems in which the US must play a collaborative role in its own national interest, it must acknowledge that not every "human wrong" no matter how despicable can be addressed by the US acting alone or in concert with other like-minded countries. This is why the Oxfam America and similar High Minded efforts are both wrong-headed and, if acted upon, would lead only to failure.
The collapse of states, the plunder and rapine of kleptocracies and kleptocratic movements are filled with nauseating abuses of human rights. They are filled with the most reprehensible of human cruelties.
These miseries and crimes are real. But, that does not mean that it is realistic for the US or the EU or even that central depository of the High Minded, the UN, to intervene, particularly to intervene with military force.
Nations, even Great Powers, must choose their battles carefully and cautiously. Care, caution, proper detailed planning based on accurate understandings of the human terrain to be targeted as well as the goals to be accomplished are all hallmarks of a realistic foreign policy.
An even more central feature of realism in foreign policy is knowing what the nation's core interests are and how the proposed policy will serve to defend or advance these interests.
Idealism, no matter what form, no matter how lofty the aspirations behind it might be, serves only to cloud the eye and befuddle the mind of a nation. Blind and stupefied countries rarely, if ever, have any useful "mission."
Oxfam America and others of like mind have, with this petition, joined the chorus of groups and individuals demanding that the US live up to its global "mission" by alleviating global poverty, ending anthropogenic climate change, feeding those who are hungry, protecting the tropical rainforests, halting acoustic pollution of the oceans, and other tasks too numerous too mention. All of these activities are necessary. All are important. All would serve to the greater benefit of humankind.
But, to what extent are they incumbent upon the United States? How can one argue that any or all constitute America's "mission?"
Getting a grip on what, if any, "mission" accrues to the United States is manifestly necessary. It is necessary if the Obama Administration is to formulate a coherent foreign policy and gain the support of We the People--or at least the politically articulate portion which is concerned with foreign affairs.
For a half century there was no debate over the American "mission." It was consensually understood and agreed that the "mission" of the US was to act as Leader of the Free World in the apocalypse freighted Cold War with the Soviet Union and its clients.
With the end of that confrontation, uncertainty replaced the consensus. The records of the Clinton and W. Bush Administrations demonstrate this uncertainty and confusion, albeit each in a different fashion.
As any number of diplomatic historians have argued over the past century, any confusion regarding the "mission" of the US in the world has stemmed from a basic split in how Americans and their governments have balanced the pursuit of ideals with the requirements of realism. The recurrent shifts between realism and idealism in American foreign policy have existed almost from the beginnings of the American experience.
The roots of idealism are to be found in the "mission statement" implicit in the views of the founders of the Puritan colony of Plymouth. To the Puritan mind, they were on an "errand into the wilderness." The nature of that errand was to continue the process of purifying their community so that in the fullness of time and consonant with the will of God, they would be recalled to England. Recalled to save the mother country from the creeping evil of "Popishness."
You don't get more idealistic than that.
Despite a brief flurry of revolutionary zeal which saw the American Patriots attempt to export the beauties of their revolution to Canada by force of arms, the leaders of the Revolutionary and early Constitutional periods were remarkably free of the idealistic fervor which normally propels a nation born of war. As the underlying pragmatism of the Constitution shows clearly, the "decider guys" of the Federal period held ideals well tempered by a healthy regard for the requirements of reality.
The writings of the Founders and their immediate successors indicate that realism trumped the excesses of idealism. In foreign affairs the universal position was commercial friendship with all who reciprocated and a total rejection of any sort of intervention in the affairs of other countries. It was believed and argued that by focusing its efforts upon developing its land, resources, and, most importantly, its domestic institutions of government, the United States could provide an example worthy of emulation.
In short, the Americans of the early Nineteenth Century were in favor of a sort of leadership-by-example approach to foreign policy. By so doing and by the fact of success, the US would encourage the peoples of other countries to embrace our form of government, economy, and social organisation.
Not until the last years of the 19th Century did this general consensus fray. When it did start to ravel, it came apart with speed and ferocity. Expansion across the continent, at first peaceful (unless you were an indigenous American in the way), morphed into the more muscular Manifest Destiny of mid-century. This in turn transmogrified into the euphemistically expressed imperialism of the Internationalist Progressives.
The Internationalist Progressives were activist oriented ideologues. To their eyes, the US had a "mission" which went far beyond filling a large chunk of the North American continent. Far transcended mere success in the development of resources and institutions. Going much further than leadership-by-example and its essentially realistic view of costs and benefits, the Internationalist Progressives were gung-ho for the forcible exportation of American institutions to other peoples regardless of the desires of the recipients.
The Internationalist Progressives were eager to take on the challenge offered by Rudyard Kipling. They rushed to pick up "the White Man's Burden."
Whether Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt or Democrats like Woodrow Wilson, US Administrations with the backing of the majority of We the People mounted interventions and occupations throughout the world. The Internationalist Progressives never argued that pragmatic interests or the requirements of reality demanded these interventions and occupations except in passing.
The real motive was always idealism.
The ideal in play was simple, easily understood, and agreed upon by virtually all Americans.
Here is the ideal, short and sweet
The nature and character of the United States and its institutions were superior to those existing elsewhere. The exportation of these were in the best interests of the recipients. The moral nature of America demanded that we right presumed wrongs by providing better government, better economic structures, better social institutions.
We could do no other. It was our "mission."
President Wilson put it perfectly as he ordered the landing of troops at Vera Cruz during the midst of the bloody and expropriation minded Mexican revolution. "We will teach the Mexicans to elect good men."
The grunts fighting to suppress the Philippine Insurrection put it just as well. They were a bit more cynical, but such is the prerogative of the guys at the bloody tip. They had a jingle which contained the chorus, "Under the wide and starry flag/We'll civilize them with a Krag." (The Krag-Jorganson rifle was the standard issue weapon of the time.)
We the People and our governments stuck with the idealism of the Internationalist Progressives until the awesome let down of the Twenties. Reality slapped us in the face. The "War to End Wars" had not ended wars. The "War to Make the World Safe For Democracy" hadn't performed that miracle.
World War I was a failure from the American perspective. Lives had been expended for nothing. Blood out, zilch in.
The Internationalist impulse was replaced, not by realism, but by another form of idealism. We the People became self-absorbed both during the years of apparent plenty--the Twenties--and during the time of poverty--the Thirties. This was the time of our total disengagement from the affairs and threats of the world. This was the time of Isolationism.
The reality of threat kept knocking on Uncle Sam's door as the Thirties ended. Few were ready to listen. Ultimately reality with a thwacking great boot kicked the door in on 7 December 41.
During the war, We the People, with the full and often knowingly duplicitous encouragement of the Administration of FDR, were filled with the ideal of a world that would be made peaceful by the joint efforts of a war-winning coalition. We were assured (and we assured ourselves) that once the grand combine of the US, the UK, the USSR (as well as the tag-alongs, France and China) had obliterated the aggressors, they would continue to guarantee a world of peace through the United Nations.
That idealistic view was proven to be hallucinatory even before the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco. With the acknowledgement of the Cold War as being real, very dangerous, and long term in nature, realism came out of the shadows for the first time in generations.
The Containment Policy as interpreted by Truman and then Eisenhower was profoundly realistic. It accepted the limitations imposed by reality. It accepted the world as it was and sought to remake the global political order slowly on the margins until the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union caught up with it.
The policy of roll back espoused by most Republicans on the Right and even some Cold War Liberals on the Left was idealistic. When attempted even in limited form, roll back proved that ideals could be quite deadly. (Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis and hold your breath at just how close we came to the very unpleasant reality of a nuclear exchange.)
Whew! We're through a quick background sketch of the zigs and zags of US foreign policy and its companion, the nature of any American "mission."
Without recapitulating the ideologically propelled debacles of the past twenty years, suffice it to say that recent history parallels the history of long ago. Idealism leads to interventions in the affairs of other peoples and countries without due regard as to the human terrain upon which our well-intended efforts are to operate.
Realism, which has been conspicuously absent over the past decade and a half, demands that We the People and our governments take the world as it is.
Realism requires that we properly appreciate what our core national and strategic interests actually are.
Realism insists that we evaluate closely and carefully what the risks and benefits of a particular policy option might be.
Realism is based upon a full understanding of the strengths and limitations resident in our instruments of national power.
Realism also is predicated upon an accurate reading of the human terrain upon which our policy will operate.
Given the nature of the world's political and economic order today, the pure leadership-by-example model that served the nation well during the first century or so of its existence no longer is sufficient to protect, let alone advance, our core national and strategic interests. It was realistic back then. Now it is not.
The realism of the Cold War is no longer realistic. It is not applicable in a multi-polar world. It would only become realistic should the current conflict expressed as the Global War on Terrorism become a seemingly permanent bifurcation between the Islamist oriented states and all other countries. This Huntington "Clash of Civilizations" is unlikely, but not impossible. Not impossible by a long shot.
A new definition of realism must not only take account of global problems in which the US must play a collaborative role in its own national interest, it must acknowledge that not every "human wrong" no matter how despicable can be addressed by the US acting alone or in concert with other like-minded countries. This is why the Oxfam America and similar High Minded efforts are both wrong-headed and, if acted upon, would lead only to failure.
The collapse of states, the plunder and rapine of kleptocracies and kleptocratic movements are filled with nauseating abuses of human rights. They are filled with the most reprehensible of human cruelties.
These miseries and crimes are real. But, that does not mean that it is realistic for the US or the EU or even that central depository of the High Minded, the UN, to intervene, particularly to intervene with military force.
Nations, even Great Powers, must choose their battles carefully and cautiously. Care, caution, proper detailed planning based on accurate understandings of the human terrain to be targeted as well as the goals to be accomplished are all hallmarks of a realistic foreign policy.
An even more central feature of realism in foreign policy is knowing what the nation's core interests are and how the proposed policy will serve to defend or advance these interests.
Idealism, no matter what form, no matter how lofty the aspirations behind it might be, serves only to cloud the eye and befuddle the mind of a nation. Blind and stupefied countries rarely, if ever, have any useful "mission."
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Time For A Change--Pirates And Somalia
The US has floated a new proposal at the UN Security Council. Under its provisions foreign forces would be allowed rights of hot pursuit right past the high tide line and onto Somalian territory. Such rights would, of course, be attendant upon the permission of the UN sponsored Transitional National Government. (No mention was made of the fact that the Somalian central regime is highly transient, not at all national and a government only by courtesy.)
The effrontery of the American proposal apparently rankled the African Union, which made any number of unkind comments regarding the "wealthy" nations being ready to use force against a handful of hardscrabble fishermen trying to eek out a living through seizing ships while being "indifferent" to the fate of Somalia and the Somali people. There was a subtext of implication. An implication that the same"wealthy" nations had promoted the collapse of Somalia nearly twenty years ago.
The fine folks at the African Union might want to refresh their acquaintance with history. The history of their own continent. Specifically, the history of Somalia during the last couple of decades. The US undertook to protect the humanitarian operations of the UN in the early Nineties. The mission was well intended but failed as a result of High Minded aspirations of "nation building." The US effort was ably backed and humanitarian aid offered by any number of the so-called "wealthy" nations.
(It might be recalled as well that during the time of the US intervention in Somalia, the African Union as well as the governments and media of several member states including Kenya severely reamed out the US for practicing both "neocolonialism" and "genocide." Say what!)
The ultimate failure of this first effort at nation building was the responsibility of Somalian leaders. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts was also a product marked "Made in Somalia."
The overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts occurred, not because the US wanted it to (although no tears were shed over the corpse of an Islamist/jihadist entity in Washington,) but because exiled Somalis and assorted member states of the African Union wanted this eventuality to occur. They did it through the agency of the Ethiopian Army which, while receiving a certain level of gratuity from the US for the effort, represents a government which is a member in good standing of the African Union.
The subsequent failure of the Transitional National Government is the responsibility of the Somalis and the African Union. The AU has an up close and personal interest in Somalian stability. This is a far more direct interest than the US has with regard to the place. Our anxiety, which is well-rooted, revolves around the viability of Somalia as a terrorist training and basing site.
The states bordering that geographical expression called Somalia should exercise the most direct involvement. Kenya along with Ethiopia have the greatest interest in providing stability in Somalia. Kenya perhaps more than Ethiopia since the majority of refugees find heading south to join the already large Somalian population in Kenya both easier and more attractive than crossing the wastes of the Ogaden to find sanctuary in Ethiopia.
The African Union along with any number of High Minded but evidently gripless groups and individuals seem to think that the pirate problem in the waters off Somalia can not be abated unless and until the simple fisherfolk turned pirate can return to steady jobs at a good income in a peaceful pursuit.
Get a grip!
Some of the pirates early on in the game might have been unemployed fishermen in search of a (dis)honest couple of bucks. But those days, if they ever existed, are long in the past. Piracy is a big money maker for all concerned. The parties include not only the trigger pullers in the skiffs or the crews of the motherships, they include Somali clans and tribes scattered throughout the refugee communities of Europe. The parties include as well terrorist groups. Given the profits from this year alone--in excess of 100 million dollars of ransom, there is money enough for all and then some.
The US and other maritime nations, wealthy or not, have a direct national interest at stake in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy drives up the costs of shipping. Piracy delays cargos. Piracy costs, in short, both time and money. This means countries heavily involved in maritime commerce have national interests in play.
Here is a ground truth which the AU might not find palatable. Right now the US and other maritime nations have no national interests in play in Somalia. Somalia is not worth anyone's effort because no one has a vital national interest at risk there. Nobody that is except Kenya and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.
So far (with the laudable exception of the French and British) the nations represented in the waters off Somalia have been long on speeches, advice, and having pretty boats drive around the blue waters but have been very short on direct action against the pirates. Many fine words have been expended upon the need of an appropriate court in which to try "alleged" pirates. Somber faces have propounded questions regarding international law, its limits and exceptions.
Speeches, advice, and questions of international law are fine--in their place and time. Noble and High Minded expressions of sentiment regarding the need for a stable government in Somalia and well-paying jobs for Somali fishermen are good for filling space in the media both old and new--but massively irrelevant to the needs of the real world.
It is time for a change. The change must have two components.
The first is short, simple, and unpleasant. Start killing pirates. Accept the inevitable errors and the equally predictable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the High Minded over the terrible catastrophe of pirates becoming fish food. Over the vast sweep of history from the expeditions of a young Julius Cesar to the closing days of the Nineteenth Century, the only way in which piracy has been stopped is through the shedding of large quantities of pirate blood.
The second choice is not simple or short. It is unpleasant. The African Union and the UN have two choices. Here they are.
One is to allow the Transitional National Pseudo-government to walk the plank when the Ethiopians withdraw their forces. The most militant of the tripartite Islamist/jihadist movement, the Shahab, constantly state that during the period of the Union of Islamic Courts there was no piracy. OK. Put them to the test. They are going to take over Somalia if and when the Ethiopians leave. No doubt about that. Somalia will become, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warns, a center for jihadist activities. The US will have to do something robust when that happens. It will be in our national interest.
The second choice is to insist that the African Union clean up the mess in Somalia. This will not be easy. It will be expensive in lives, money, and time. Taking military action will carry with it the risk of blow back to those countries with a sizable Islamic population. The outcome may well be ambiguous enough to assure the long-term probability of an Islamist/jihadist threat remaining in Somalia for years and years to come.
The African Union will demand the assistance and support of the UN and the "wealthy" nations of the world. This support and assistance should be forthcoming. It will be in the collective interest of the world.
The problem(s) presented by the failed state of Somalia are difficult to settle and impossible to predict as to final outcome. This is not a reason to resist making the tough choices.
The time for dithering, talking, excusing, justifying, and ignoring the pirates of Somalia or the land which gave them birth and gives them sanctuary is past. It is time for a change.
The incoming Obama Administration has to get a grip on the reality and take a leadership role in at least the matter of killing pirates so the sealanes will be safe. That is the minimum necessary strategic interest of this country.
As the old Nike ad put it, "Just do it!"
The effrontery of the American proposal apparently rankled the African Union, which made any number of unkind comments regarding the "wealthy" nations being ready to use force against a handful of hardscrabble fishermen trying to eek out a living through seizing ships while being "indifferent" to the fate of Somalia and the Somali people. There was a subtext of implication. An implication that the same"wealthy" nations had promoted the collapse of Somalia nearly twenty years ago.
The fine folks at the African Union might want to refresh their acquaintance with history. The history of their own continent. Specifically, the history of Somalia during the last couple of decades. The US undertook to protect the humanitarian operations of the UN in the early Nineties. The mission was well intended but failed as a result of High Minded aspirations of "nation building." The US effort was ably backed and humanitarian aid offered by any number of the so-called "wealthy" nations.
(It might be recalled as well that during the time of the US intervention in Somalia, the African Union as well as the governments and media of several member states including Kenya severely reamed out the US for practicing both "neocolonialism" and "genocide." Say what!)
The ultimate failure of this first effort at nation building was the responsibility of Somalian leaders. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts was also a product marked "Made in Somalia."
The overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts occurred, not because the US wanted it to (although no tears were shed over the corpse of an Islamist/jihadist entity in Washington,) but because exiled Somalis and assorted member states of the African Union wanted this eventuality to occur. They did it through the agency of the Ethiopian Army which, while receiving a certain level of gratuity from the US for the effort, represents a government which is a member in good standing of the African Union.
The subsequent failure of the Transitional National Government is the responsibility of the Somalis and the African Union. The AU has an up close and personal interest in Somalian stability. This is a far more direct interest than the US has with regard to the place. Our anxiety, which is well-rooted, revolves around the viability of Somalia as a terrorist training and basing site.
The states bordering that geographical expression called Somalia should exercise the most direct involvement. Kenya along with Ethiopia have the greatest interest in providing stability in Somalia. Kenya perhaps more than Ethiopia since the majority of refugees find heading south to join the already large Somalian population in Kenya both easier and more attractive than crossing the wastes of the Ogaden to find sanctuary in Ethiopia.
The African Union along with any number of High Minded but evidently gripless groups and individuals seem to think that the pirate problem in the waters off Somalia can not be abated unless and until the simple fisherfolk turned pirate can return to steady jobs at a good income in a peaceful pursuit.
Get a grip!
Some of the pirates early on in the game might have been unemployed fishermen in search of a (dis)honest couple of bucks. But those days, if they ever existed, are long in the past. Piracy is a big money maker for all concerned. The parties include not only the trigger pullers in the skiffs or the crews of the motherships, they include Somali clans and tribes scattered throughout the refugee communities of Europe. The parties include as well terrorist groups. Given the profits from this year alone--in excess of 100 million dollars of ransom, there is money enough for all and then some.
The US and other maritime nations, wealthy or not, have a direct national interest at stake in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy drives up the costs of shipping. Piracy delays cargos. Piracy costs, in short, both time and money. This means countries heavily involved in maritime commerce have national interests in play.
Here is a ground truth which the AU might not find palatable. Right now the US and other maritime nations have no national interests in play in Somalia. Somalia is not worth anyone's effort because no one has a vital national interest at risk there. Nobody that is except Kenya and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.
So far (with the laudable exception of the French and British) the nations represented in the waters off Somalia have been long on speeches, advice, and having pretty boats drive around the blue waters but have been very short on direct action against the pirates. Many fine words have been expended upon the need of an appropriate court in which to try "alleged" pirates. Somber faces have propounded questions regarding international law, its limits and exceptions.
Speeches, advice, and questions of international law are fine--in their place and time. Noble and High Minded expressions of sentiment regarding the need for a stable government in Somalia and well-paying jobs for Somali fishermen are good for filling space in the media both old and new--but massively irrelevant to the needs of the real world.
It is time for a change. The change must have two components.
The first is short, simple, and unpleasant. Start killing pirates. Accept the inevitable errors and the equally predictable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the High Minded over the terrible catastrophe of pirates becoming fish food. Over the vast sweep of history from the expeditions of a young Julius Cesar to the closing days of the Nineteenth Century, the only way in which piracy has been stopped is through the shedding of large quantities of pirate blood.
The second choice is not simple or short. It is unpleasant. The African Union and the UN have two choices. Here they are.
One is to allow the Transitional National Pseudo-government to walk the plank when the Ethiopians withdraw their forces. The most militant of the tripartite Islamist/jihadist movement, the Shahab, constantly state that during the period of the Union of Islamic Courts there was no piracy. OK. Put them to the test. They are going to take over Somalia if and when the Ethiopians leave. No doubt about that. Somalia will become, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff warns, a center for jihadist activities. The US will have to do something robust when that happens. It will be in our national interest.
The second choice is to insist that the African Union clean up the mess in Somalia. This will not be easy. It will be expensive in lives, money, and time. Taking military action will carry with it the risk of blow back to those countries with a sizable Islamic population. The outcome may well be ambiguous enough to assure the long-term probability of an Islamist/jihadist threat remaining in Somalia for years and years to come.
The African Union will demand the assistance and support of the UN and the "wealthy" nations of the world. This support and assistance should be forthcoming. It will be in the collective interest of the world.
The problem(s) presented by the failed state of Somalia are difficult to settle and impossible to predict as to final outcome. This is not a reason to resist making the tough choices.
The time for dithering, talking, excusing, justifying, and ignoring the pirates of Somalia or the land which gave them birth and gives them sanctuary is past. It is time for a change.
The incoming Obama Administration has to get a grip on the reality and take a leadership role in at least the matter of killing pirates so the sealanes will be safe. That is the minimum necessary strategic interest of this country.
As the old Nike ad put it, "Just do it!"
Time For A Change--Iran
Of late it seems as if every "foreign policy expert" has come out either for or against opening some sort of dialogue with Iran. Even former Agency analysts and fieldhands have come out of the shadows with a view on the necessary next step in the dance between Washington and Tehran.
Looking at the problem through the lens of history, the Geek is persuaded that the time for talks has come. The Geek has come to this conclusion by considering the effects of the self-donned chastity belt of "non-recognition." The US demonstrated a marked preference for ignoring the reality of political changes of which it did not approve over the course of the Twentieth Century.
For a few years we pretended that revolutionary Mexico did not exist. Then for more than a decade we turned a Nelsonian eye to the Soviet Union. After World War II we went to the absurd length of ignoring unpleasant facts of political reality in China. Every Administration from Ike to W. Bush averted their eyes from the island of Cuba.
Of course we cocked our collective snoot at Iran since 1979.
In every one of these cases except the last two, the US finally had to get a grip on reality and engage in normal diplomatic relations. In every case the policy of non-recognition had no useful effect. The illusion of some sort of moral purity never matches the cold, hard reality of dealing with a government--no matter how unpleasant it may be--as one more nation-state with interests.
The mullahocracy of Tehran and its puppet sham parliament and president are obnoxious. The Tehran regime is unpleasant in the extreme. Nonetheless it exists. We have to deal with it. We have to get over its insults, its threats, its internal repression, its sponsorship of lethal groups.
We have to talk with the mullahs, or at least their frontmen. We have to talk directly, face to face.
Opening direct, public, high profile relations is not necessary. Nor is such desirable. It is not in our better interests.
The process followed by the Nixon administration with respect to China provides a useful template. The coinciding interests of the US and Iran regarding Iraq and Afghanistan provide the necessary context.
Neither the mullahs nor ourselves wish to see a close approximation of civil war in Iraq. Neither ourselves nor the mullahs want to see Taliban back in power in Afghanistan. (In a related matter, neither Tehran nor Washington hopes to see a Taliban in control of Pakistan.)
While the sporadic low level conversations between US and Iranian personnel in Iraq have been without real useful result, they provide the opening wedge. Using backchannel means of communication we should arrange for a suitable mid- to high-level member of the Obama Administration to make an unannounced trip to Tehran.
(The same level of secrecy which attended Kissinger's first trip to China is no longer possible. The media are no longer so cooperative as to sit on a story as they once were.)
If the mullahs refuse the offer or prove disastrously uncooperative in maintaining the low profile nature of the trip and conversations, fine. The Lads in Tehran will have made their choice. We--and the world--will know where the mullahs stand. There will be neither reason nor demand that we try again or try harder or offer more concessions.
If, however, the visit proves productive, the basis will have been laid for a path toward normal diplomatic relations. There will be ground on which to build regarding the vexing issues of nuclear material production, sponsorship of terrorist groups, and so forth.
Most importantly, the attempt at low-visibility diplomacy will help to answer a vital question. It will help provide an understanding of the most important single question confronting the world regarding the nature and character of the Iranian government.
The question?
Is the source of Iranian conduct eschatological or not? Is the government and the mullahs in the back room oriented toward international affairs with the perspective of a real world oriented nation-state or is it seeking the end times, the coming of the Mahdi through the mechanism of apocalypse?
The answer to this question is fundamental to all other considerations of policy toward Iran. We have to get the answer ourselves. Only the conduct of the Iranians from the very first contact will provide a basis for an accurate answer.
Looking at the problem through the lens of history, the Geek is persuaded that the time for talks has come. The Geek has come to this conclusion by considering the effects of the self-donned chastity belt of "non-recognition." The US demonstrated a marked preference for ignoring the reality of political changes of which it did not approve over the course of the Twentieth Century.
For a few years we pretended that revolutionary Mexico did not exist. Then for more than a decade we turned a Nelsonian eye to the Soviet Union. After World War II we went to the absurd length of ignoring unpleasant facts of political reality in China. Every Administration from Ike to W. Bush averted their eyes from the island of Cuba.
Of course we cocked our collective snoot at Iran since 1979.
In every one of these cases except the last two, the US finally had to get a grip on reality and engage in normal diplomatic relations. In every case the policy of non-recognition had no useful effect. The illusion of some sort of moral purity never matches the cold, hard reality of dealing with a government--no matter how unpleasant it may be--as one more nation-state with interests.
The mullahocracy of Tehran and its puppet sham parliament and president are obnoxious. The Tehran regime is unpleasant in the extreme. Nonetheless it exists. We have to deal with it. We have to get over its insults, its threats, its internal repression, its sponsorship of lethal groups.
We have to talk with the mullahs, or at least their frontmen. We have to talk directly, face to face.
Opening direct, public, high profile relations is not necessary. Nor is such desirable. It is not in our better interests.
The process followed by the Nixon administration with respect to China provides a useful template. The coinciding interests of the US and Iran regarding Iraq and Afghanistan provide the necessary context.
Neither the mullahs nor ourselves wish to see a close approximation of civil war in Iraq. Neither ourselves nor the mullahs want to see Taliban back in power in Afghanistan. (In a related matter, neither Tehran nor Washington hopes to see a Taliban in control of Pakistan.)
While the sporadic low level conversations between US and Iranian personnel in Iraq have been without real useful result, they provide the opening wedge. Using backchannel means of communication we should arrange for a suitable mid- to high-level member of the Obama Administration to make an unannounced trip to Tehran.
(The same level of secrecy which attended Kissinger's first trip to China is no longer possible. The media are no longer so cooperative as to sit on a story as they once were.)
If the mullahs refuse the offer or prove disastrously uncooperative in maintaining the low profile nature of the trip and conversations, fine. The Lads in Tehran will have made their choice. We--and the world--will know where the mullahs stand. There will be neither reason nor demand that we try again or try harder or offer more concessions.
If, however, the visit proves productive, the basis will have been laid for a path toward normal diplomatic relations. There will be ground on which to build regarding the vexing issues of nuclear material production, sponsorship of terrorist groups, and so forth.
Most importantly, the attempt at low-visibility diplomacy will help to answer a vital question. It will help provide an understanding of the most important single question confronting the world regarding the nature and character of the Iranian government.
The question?
Is the source of Iranian conduct eschatological or not? Is the government and the mullahs in the back room oriented toward international affairs with the perspective of a real world oriented nation-state or is it seeking the end times, the coming of the Mahdi through the mechanism of apocalypse?
The answer to this question is fundamental to all other considerations of policy toward Iran. We have to get the answer ourselves. Only the conduct of the Iranians from the very first contact will provide a basis for an accurate answer.
Time For A Change--Pakistan
The US has coddled the hell out of the military and intelligence service of Pakistan for the past eight years. The billions of dollars spent there have bought no noticeable improvement in the counter-terrorist or counterinsurgency capacities of the military. The effort has been without success.
The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to be a fortress of Islamism/jihadism. The military is not much better. These two unpleasant ground truths are the reason that most, if not all, terrorist roads end in Pakistan.
The time has come to get a grip on this reality. It is really long past time to drop the pretense that Pakistan is an ally in the effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar e-Taiba.
It is time to publicly acknowledge that Pakistan provides ready sanctuary, easy cover, and competent training and support to the people fighting the US, killing Americans, and seeking the goal of ejecting the US and the West from the sub-continent.
Unless and until Pakistan ceases being the recruiting, training, financing, and general purpose rest and recreation center for the jihadists of the world, the world has no hope of being rid of their noxious presence. The instruments of American national power, along with those of other countries which have a realistic appraisal of the threat presented by jihadism and the critical role played by Pakistan in facilitating jihadism, must be employed to alter Pakistan's behavior--radically.
This does not mean another great adventure in regime change. There is no need (and even less possibility of success) for a Iraq type invasion.
What is needed is the application of economic and diplomatic pressure on the government of Pakistan to take two specific actions. Get a grip on them. It isn't hard even though the current administration couldn't (or wouldn't) do it.
The ISI must be disbanded. Period. Reform of the ISI so as to remove the Islamists/jihadists is as impossible as reforming the Mafia to remove the Tony Soprano types.
The Pakistani military has to be reoriented from wishing for yet another losing war with India. The job for the armed forces of Pakistan is twofold. Secure the borders between Pakistan and India as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mount a sustained counterinsurgency and pacification campaign not only in the FATA but Swat and other jihadist heartlands.
In short, the armed forces of Pakistan should take on the greatest challenge and perform the most important mission any military can--insure the structural integrity of the government. Make sure the government of Pakistan and only the government of Pakistan has authority over the population of Pakistan.
Given the parlous economic conditions of Pakistan, conditions that can only be worsened by the current global recession, the US and its partners (we assume the US will have partners globally after next January 20th.) can put the squeeze on Pakistan with a high probability of success. Yes, the government of Pakistan will squawk like the cliched stuck pig about foreign dictates and the beauties of national sovereignty. That is only to be expected. Let them scream all they want--as long as they also do what is required.
Cut off all military and economic assistance until the required twin efforts have been undertaken, at least to the extent that results are visible. Then and only then reprogram the aid. This time emplace sufficient oversight that the money is spent only for purposes consistent with stamping out the terrorist groups and their supporters.
"But, wait a minute, Geek! The Paks have nukes. They have plutonium. We can't take the risk."
The Pakistani bomb is one of the reasons we have to go the "tough love" route. Their assembled, deliverable nuclear arsenal represents a threat to India and--potentially--Iran. One of these countries already has a nuclear deterrent and the other one seems hellbent to do the same. In any event, the Government of Pakistan is well aware of what might (will) happen if some of its nuclear material ends up as a mushroom cloud somewhere. The bomb is not a reason to cease pressure on Islamabad. It is a reason to increase it.
The administration of George W. Bush swived the pooch with respect to Pakistan. The reasons for this severe failure are still unclear. In so far as the past is prologue, in this case it is the cause of a very dark future. Coddling Pakistan, its military, its ISI, has not only brought the Taliban resurgence, it has brought the world Mumbai.
To have a better chance of a future without more Mumbais there must be a change. To have a better chance of a future without one, two, many Talibans, there must be a change.
The change must happen in Pakistan. The change must be started in Washington.
The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to be a fortress of Islamism/jihadism. The military is not much better. These two unpleasant ground truths are the reason that most, if not all, terrorist roads end in Pakistan.
The time has come to get a grip on this reality. It is really long past time to drop the pretense that Pakistan is an ally in the effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar e-Taiba.
It is time to publicly acknowledge that Pakistan provides ready sanctuary, easy cover, and competent training and support to the people fighting the US, killing Americans, and seeking the goal of ejecting the US and the West from the sub-continent.
Unless and until Pakistan ceases being the recruiting, training, financing, and general purpose rest and recreation center for the jihadists of the world, the world has no hope of being rid of their noxious presence. The instruments of American national power, along with those of other countries which have a realistic appraisal of the threat presented by jihadism and the critical role played by Pakistan in facilitating jihadism, must be employed to alter Pakistan's behavior--radically.
This does not mean another great adventure in regime change. There is no need (and even less possibility of success) for a Iraq type invasion.
What is needed is the application of economic and diplomatic pressure on the government of Pakistan to take two specific actions. Get a grip on them. It isn't hard even though the current administration couldn't (or wouldn't) do it.
The ISI must be disbanded. Period. Reform of the ISI so as to remove the Islamists/jihadists is as impossible as reforming the Mafia to remove the Tony Soprano types.
The Pakistani military has to be reoriented from wishing for yet another losing war with India. The job for the armed forces of Pakistan is twofold. Secure the borders between Pakistan and India as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mount a sustained counterinsurgency and pacification campaign not only in the FATA but Swat and other jihadist heartlands.
In short, the armed forces of Pakistan should take on the greatest challenge and perform the most important mission any military can--insure the structural integrity of the government. Make sure the government of Pakistan and only the government of Pakistan has authority over the population of Pakistan.
Given the parlous economic conditions of Pakistan, conditions that can only be worsened by the current global recession, the US and its partners (we assume the US will have partners globally after next January 20th.) can put the squeeze on Pakistan with a high probability of success. Yes, the government of Pakistan will squawk like the cliched stuck pig about foreign dictates and the beauties of national sovereignty. That is only to be expected. Let them scream all they want--as long as they also do what is required.
Cut off all military and economic assistance until the required twin efforts have been undertaken, at least to the extent that results are visible. Then and only then reprogram the aid. This time emplace sufficient oversight that the money is spent only for purposes consistent with stamping out the terrorist groups and their supporters.
"But, wait a minute, Geek! The Paks have nukes. They have plutonium. We can't take the risk."
The Pakistani bomb is one of the reasons we have to go the "tough love" route. Their assembled, deliverable nuclear arsenal represents a threat to India and--potentially--Iran. One of these countries already has a nuclear deterrent and the other one seems hellbent to do the same. In any event, the Government of Pakistan is well aware of what might (will) happen if some of its nuclear material ends up as a mushroom cloud somewhere. The bomb is not a reason to cease pressure on Islamabad. It is a reason to increase it.
The administration of George W. Bush swived the pooch with respect to Pakistan. The reasons for this severe failure are still unclear. In so far as the past is prologue, in this case it is the cause of a very dark future. Coddling Pakistan, its military, its ISI, has not only brought the Taliban resurgence, it has brought the world Mumbai.
To have a better chance of a future without more Mumbais there must be a change. To have a better chance of a future without one, two, many Talibans, there must be a change.
The change must happen in Pakistan. The change must be started in Washington.
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