Israel was established as a Western heritage democracy. In and of itself this was an amazing phenomenon. There was little in the history of the Jews, either in Biblical days or in the long centuries of the diaspora which linked democracy with the Jewish tradition. Yet the driving personalities of the Zionist movement as well as those who fought for an independent Jewish state insisted on bringing the democratic ideals of Western and Central Europe to the country which was simultaneously ancient and new.
The seamless merging of ancient and modern can be seen in two defining characteristics of Israel and the Zionists who worked so long and hard to bring the dream to fruition. The long dead language of Hebrew was brought back from the linguistic graveyard. Democracy was embraced. King David could walk the streets of Israel today and understand all that was said around him. But the Biblical King would not begin to understand the democracy which is, or to err on the side of accuracy, was basic to Israel.
One of strongest reasons so many Americans supported Israel with ardor and depth during the Fifties, Sixties, and beyond was its highly evident commitment to democracy. When someone stated that Israel was the only outpost of democracy in the Mideast during the first forty or fifty years of the state's existence, it was simply a recognition of reality. In more recent years, the same claim must be seen not as a statement of fact but rather the product of the propagandist's tendentiousness.
It is important to keep in mind that there was no tradition of democracy in the historical experience of the Jewish people either before or after the savage Roman repression of the second uprising. Only insofar as Jews participated in democratic processes as such developed fitfully and painfully in the several European states or in the US was there any direct experience with the complex nature of democracy. In a very real sense, the pioneering Zionists and the Jews who answered the call of freedom implicit in the creation of the Jewish state brought democracy in all its manifold ways and complexities with them, political freight carried in their knapsacks as they got off the boat on the sandy shore of the land which would become Israel.
It is also critical to recall that the Jews of Western and Central Europe were not the only Jews involved in the project called Israel. Arrivals from the autocracies of the Mideast constituted a great and growing part of the citizenry. Later, vast numbers of Jews arrived from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. The latter like their coreligionists from the Mideast had no direct experience with democracy. They had no basis on which to predicate an understanding of the mix of processes of trade offs, of compromises, of partial successes which jointly make up the intricate interior of democracy.
For many years, Israel against all odds remained a vibrant democracy. Not even the addition of refugees from the autocratic antisemitic states of the Mideast threatened the effectiveness and buoyancy of democracy, Israeli style. The robust nature of Israeli democracy was demonstrated repeatedly under extreme stress. Neither a surprising initial defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War nor unending terror attacks undercut or distorted the democratic processes.
Democracy it appears could survive and prosper no matter what until Israelis themselves turned against the concept and its instrumental effects. While a portion of the Israeli sellout of their own democracy can be assigned to the impact on the polity of the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union, that was only a minor factor. The major cause of the erosion of democracy has been the combination of an increasingly fundamentalist form of the Jewish faith with an evermore strident sense of nationalism.
In this dynamic, quite evident after 1990, the Israelis have echoed the Muslim states surrounding them. From the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the contemporaneous "Holy War" against the Red Army in Afghanistan, the force of the more austere and fundamentalist schools of Islam have combined with growing nationalism to produce the plethora of groups espousing political Islam. This includes those groups and leaders embracing violence as an acceptable tool of politics. The Israeli responses have included the growth of a similar, even identical, mix of religion and nationalism to the disadvantage of real democracy.
This process can be tracked easily by looking at the ever lessening status of the political Left in Israel. Looking back at the salad days of Israel, one sees the Left as ever triumphant at the polls. The Right was marginal at best and irrelevant most of the time. Only since the First Intifada has the Right emerged to power.
In recent years, the nature of Israeli politics has become one of the Right versus the Further Right. In the current Israel, the Left has become instrumentally a mere ghost, a marginal figure with less substance than a desert mirage. Electoral contests are between the "Moderate" Right and the Further Right. All too often it has been and is the Further Right which wins. In the recent past, the biggest loser has been not the Left per se or the "Moderate" Right but the nature and character of democracy itself.
During the current administration of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Knesset has lurched evermore to the farthest shores of the Right. The Nakba Law, the loyalty oaths, the overkill reaction to the "flotillas," and, most recently and disturbingly, the anti-boycott law are all demonstrations of the way in which the Further Right is willing to lethally distort the appearance of democratic processes and structures to enervate democracy and imperil the future of the state. While some manifestations of religion linked nationalism run amok such as the demand that Israeli universities sing the national anthem at all conceivable occasions are bizarre but not harmful, others such as the recently passed full fledged assault on freedom of speech--the anti-boycott law--are fatally injurious to any meaningful exercise of democracy.
There is no fundamental difference between the abridgement of free political speech contained in the law prohibiting any Israeli from speaking or writing in support of the boycott on products originating in the "settlements" constructed on land seized during the Six Day War and the continued attempts by the renamed Organization of Islamic Cooperation to prevent something called "defamation" of religions and religious figures. Both are misguided efforts to protect something "sacred" from any criticism or opposition by limiting rights of expression.
The status of the "settlements" is contentious to say the least. There are many activists in many countries, including Israel, who consider the new cities built on land occupied by the IDF forty-four years ago to be illegal at worst and illegitimate at best. As a result, there is and has been an effort to boycott products originating in these areas. Since the government of Israel does not identify those goods or products originating in the settlements, the only course of action available to those who wish to boycott settlement products is that of boycotting all goods made or grown in Israel. This is true even for Israelis who have no desire to see their country de-legitimized or otherwise harmed.
Urging boycotts on the settlements including denial of services by Israelis to the settlements is a legitimate political tactic for those Israelis who see their government's hanging on to the settlements as inherently wrongheaded. The goal of the new law--which is probably, almost certainly, violative of the several basic laws held by the Israeli Supreme Court to be equivalent to a constitution--seeks to deny this tool of political speech to Israelis and others in Israel who oppose current government policy.
The Israeli Further Right is like Muslim political advocates in that it refuses to compromise. The Further Right goes to the mat on everything. It is dedicated to an all-or-nothing approach to politics which is anathema to democracy. Under the sway of the Further Right, Israel bodes well to become just one more standard issue Mideastern state lacking the will and ability to practice genuine democracy with all its messy deal making, horse trading, and compromises which leave no one completely happy.
Absent a genuine democracy, Israel loses a powerful claim on American understanding and support. Actions such as the anti-boycott law are repugnant to American norms and values. Even the powerful efforts of the Israel Lobby will not be able to hide this reality from politically articulate Americans and their congressional representatives. Not even the best efforts of AIPAC can convince Americans that Israel deserves support when its governmental actions show the country to be one more semi-autocracy with some democratic trappings.
Israel must rediscover its roots. Not the ones in the Hebrew Bible, but the ones carried ashore by the early Zionists and the refugees from the hectatombs of Europe. For its future, Israel must get back to its past, to the past containing genuine democracy and all the risks which accompany democracy. Artificial, monolithic consensus, the consensus of enforced silence, serves Israel very poorly. To secure its future, Israel and the Israelis must channel their past, the noisy, vibrant democracy which characterized the place for decades. Only then will they have a genuine claim on American sympathy and support.
Saturday, July 16, 2011
Friday, July 15, 2011
More "Followership" From The Hindmost
Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya. The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi. The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.
The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.
Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government. Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid. It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists. There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.
There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi. The US has no direct stake in the country. Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play. That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company. It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.
There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya. It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.
The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy. The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy. While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.
One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions. An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia. The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.
The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft. In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US. Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.
If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests? Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.
No, bucko, not oil. The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran. It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq. These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure. But there is a far more important audience.
That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran. In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges. More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.
Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort. It is focused on getting the bomb. Period. There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.
Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US. In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so. As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.
"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat. A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved. The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.
Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge. This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour. We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy. In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force. They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant. The mullahs are right in this. Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.
The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation. The Israeli government shares it. Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat. They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world. A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.
The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant. There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in. If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.
Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational. It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US. Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.
The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure. The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset. As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.
A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event. But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well. This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.
To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer. To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut. However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader. In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.
The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!" The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."
As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact. By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu. That is not a failure of policy. It is not even a simple error of judgement. It is a world class blunder.
The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.
Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government. Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid. It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists. There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.
There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi. The US has no direct stake in the country. Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play. That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company. It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.
There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya. It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.
The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy. The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy. While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.
One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions. An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia. The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.
The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft. In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US. Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.
If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests? Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.
No, bucko, not oil. The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran. It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq. These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure. But there is a far more important audience.
That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran. In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges. More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.
Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort. It is focused on getting the bomb. Period. There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.
Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US. In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so. As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.
"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat. A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved. The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.
Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge. This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour. We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy. In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force. They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant. The mullahs are right in this. Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.
The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation. The Israeli government shares it. Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat. They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world. A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.
The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant. There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in. If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.
Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational. It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US. Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.
The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure. The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset. As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.
A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event. But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well. This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.
To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer. To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut. However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader. In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.
The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!" The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."
As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact. By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu. That is not a failure of policy. It is not even a simple error of judgement. It is a world class blunder.
Sunday, July 10, 2011
Cheers And Tears For South Sudan
Yesterday South Sudan became the 196th independent sovereign state on Earth. The raising of the new national flag was the result of intensive diplomatic efforts on the part of the US and UK to end a twenty year long defensive insurgency which pitted the primarily African, Christian south against the overwhelmingly Arab, Muslim north. The post war road to independence has been long--six years--and filled with still unresolved difficulties such as the division of oil revenues and the status of disputed territory.
The most interesting aspect of the MSM coverage of the independence celebration in Juba, the capital, has been the recitation of a seemingly unending litany of problems confronting the place. Mention is made of the poverty, the lack of education, the feuds which separate the leaders of the new government, the lack of infrastructure, lack of jobs, lack of medical care, lack of almost everything other than oil and fertile land. Learned tongues cluck over the inexperience of the governmental personnel at all levels. There is head shaking over the hostility still resident in Khartoum along with dire hints that the matter is not yet permanently settled.
Of course much mention is made of the international assistance which will be coming. The British foreign minister has promised much. The US is not far behind. China, with an eye firmly on the source of the oil of Sudan, has indicated it will be inclined to be generous. Then, of course, the NGO industry has already cranked up its not inconsiderable resources--most importantly its public relations and lobbying capabilities. One gets the impression that donors almost beyond count are lining up hoping to toss some money in the general direction of Juba.
Looking at the mixture of hand-wringing and calls for as well as assurance of aid in abundance, one cannot help but think of the US at the time of its foundation. It matters not which date is selected--that of the Declaration of Independence, the surrender of the British at Yorktown, the signing of the final treaty, or the adoption of the Constitution--the picture was much the same. The birth of the US, the period from the first shootout at Lexington to the adoption of the Constitution, was a prolonged and painful process lasting the best part of two decades. At no time would the smart money placed a bet on the success of the Americans.
The US was massively underdeveloped. It had no industry. Its only exports were agricultural products and naval stores. And, the export market for these had been constricted by British action after independence had been gained. The Americans were riven with internal divisions, not least of which was the split between states where slavery was commonplace and those where it was nonexistent. The US was broke. The circulating media were so worthless and specie (gold and silver) so lacking that barter was normal.
The American government was composed in the main of former insurgent fighters with little if any actual governmental experience. The many strong personalities often clashed in contests of ego and ideology. Corruption was rampant as is illustrated by the traffic by speculators in the land warrants used by states and Congress in lieu of pay for the men of the Continental Army.
The British had only partially and grudgingly acknowledged defeat when they signed the treaty ending the war. In the aftermath London did not live up to its obligations under the treaty particularly as regarded the evacuation of military posts on the upper Great Lakes. Together with their trade policy, this failure to abide by the requirements of the treaty indicated the British expected American independence to be transitory. As if that hostility was insufficient, the French occupied the Mississippi Valley and showed no sign of leaving. The Spanish from their colonial outpost in Florida schemed with Americans of doubtful loyalty to the new country to pry loose the territories of the old southwest and attach it to Madrid.
The American population was small in comparison to the land. Medical care was absent outside the handful of major cities (more like large villages than true cities) and often inept even where it existed. While Americans were notably literate by the standards of the day, the overall rate of literacy was not much better than the twenty-five percent reported for South Sudan. And, despite the agrarian nature of most of the US, hunger was far from absent given the lack of a circulating medium of constant value as well as problems with transportation stemming from the very limited and rudimentary infrastructure of the period.
There were no international donors lining up to toss money at the US. No NGO took up the American plight as the poster cause of the moment. No UN, no WHO, no WFP stood by eager to provide whatever humanitarian assistance might be needed. At best, the world was massively indifferent to whether or not the US survived and prospered. More than a few European states rather hoped that this radical experiment in democracy would sputter and die--the sooner the better.
The US and We the People were very much on our own. For the Americans of the independence period it was, to use a phrase of the day, a matter of "root, hog, or die." We would have to solve our internal frictions. We would have to pay our debts. We would have to create a government. Create a currency. Create an economy and the jobs which would come with it. We, and only we, would have the duty and privilege of creating a country with a future--or not.
Arguably, the root of our success is not to be found in some sort of unique ability on the part of the leaders of the period. Nor, it can be shown, was the success attributable to an act of divine providence. The American success in all its fits, starts, blind alleys, and failures was simply the consequence of having no choice other than national extinction.
As the prospect of being hung in two weeks reputedly has the effect of concentrating the mind most wonderfully so also does the ever-present prospect of national death concentrate the efforts and will of many, many people. The Americans chose to root rather than die.
The first two generations of independent existence were neither easy nor, in retrospect, pretty. The challenges were many and great. The failures of were plentiful. Many individuals in positions of power acted in the most petty and self-serving ways imaginable. It was a magnificent muddle with no light at the end of the tunnel until after the second war of independence ended in 1815. After that, while much remained to do if the American experiment were to prosper, its survival was almost certain.
Perhaps it is most unfortunate that South Sudan will be denied the chance to make it on its own merits. It may be regrettable that the South Sudanese will not be faced with the stark choice of "root or die." Arguably, the laudable humanitarian impulses which motivate at least some of the offers of aid and assistance will be the cause of a moral dry rot which will sap the political will and energies of the South Sudanese to make a genuine go of it as a sovereign state with a unique national identity.
As the current situation in South Sudan is considered, it is worth remembering that every rich, powerful, and successful state in the world today was once no better off than is South Sudan. Every last member of the G-8 or even the G-20 was as internally riven, as poor, as lacking in infrastructure, education, jobs as is South Sudan. It is worth considering how each made it from that sort of dire beginning to their status today. One commonality is the absence of external assistance. Another is that success came only with time, difficulty, and the painful development of internal consensus on what to do and how to do it as well as putting that consensus into practice with genuine structures created organically and not in response to some outside "experts" opinion and advice.
Parents in their understandable desire to save children from pain and mistakes often forget how much they learned by failing, by making bad choices, by having to decide in microcosm to "root" rather than "die." The same is true in spades when developed, successful states contemplate a new arrival in the international community.
Helicopter moms and dads often discover too late that their constant hovering has done more harm than good to the capacity of their children to fly free and alone in a hostile or at least indifferent world. Perhaps it is time that helicopter states and NGOs including international organizations learn the same. Whether hogs or states, not all root successfully. Some die.
The most interesting aspect of the MSM coverage of the independence celebration in Juba, the capital, has been the recitation of a seemingly unending litany of problems confronting the place. Mention is made of the poverty, the lack of education, the feuds which separate the leaders of the new government, the lack of infrastructure, lack of jobs, lack of medical care, lack of almost everything other than oil and fertile land. Learned tongues cluck over the inexperience of the governmental personnel at all levels. There is head shaking over the hostility still resident in Khartoum along with dire hints that the matter is not yet permanently settled.
Of course much mention is made of the international assistance which will be coming. The British foreign minister has promised much. The US is not far behind. China, with an eye firmly on the source of the oil of Sudan, has indicated it will be inclined to be generous. Then, of course, the NGO industry has already cranked up its not inconsiderable resources--most importantly its public relations and lobbying capabilities. One gets the impression that donors almost beyond count are lining up hoping to toss some money in the general direction of Juba.
Looking at the mixture of hand-wringing and calls for as well as assurance of aid in abundance, one cannot help but think of the US at the time of its foundation. It matters not which date is selected--that of the Declaration of Independence, the surrender of the British at Yorktown, the signing of the final treaty, or the adoption of the Constitution--the picture was much the same. The birth of the US, the period from the first shootout at Lexington to the adoption of the Constitution, was a prolonged and painful process lasting the best part of two decades. At no time would the smart money placed a bet on the success of the Americans.
The US was massively underdeveloped. It had no industry. Its only exports were agricultural products and naval stores. And, the export market for these had been constricted by British action after independence had been gained. The Americans were riven with internal divisions, not least of which was the split between states where slavery was commonplace and those where it was nonexistent. The US was broke. The circulating media were so worthless and specie (gold and silver) so lacking that barter was normal.
The American government was composed in the main of former insurgent fighters with little if any actual governmental experience. The many strong personalities often clashed in contests of ego and ideology. Corruption was rampant as is illustrated by the traffic by speculators in the land warrants used by states and Congress in lieu of pay for the men of the Continental Army.
The British had only partially and grudgingly acknowledged defeat when they signed the treaty ending the war. In the aftermath London did not live up to its obligations under the treaty particularly as regarded the evacuation of military posts on the upper Great Lakes. Together with their trade policy, this failure to abide by the requirements of the treaty indicated the British expected American independence to be transitory. As if that hostility was insufficient, the French occupied the Mississippi Valley and showed no sign of leaving. The Spanish from their colonial outpost in Florida schemed with Americans of doubtful loyalty to the new country to pry loose the territories of the old southwest and attach it to Madrid.
The American population was small in comparison to the land. Medical care was absent outside the handful of major cities (more like large villages than true cities) and often inept even where it existed. While Americans were notably literate by the standards of the day, the overall rate of literacy was not much better than the twenty-five percent reported for South Sudan. And, despite the agrarian nature of most of the US, hunger was far from absent given the lack of a circulating medium of constant value as well as problems with transportation stemming from the very limited and rudimentary infrastructure of the period.
There were no international donors lining up to toss money at the US. No NGO took up the American plight as the poster cause of the moment. No UN, no WHO, no WFP stood by eager to provide whatever humanitarian assistance might be needed. At best, the world was massively indifferent to whether or not the US survived and prospered. More than a few European states rather hoped that this radical experiment in democracy would sputter and die--the sooner the better.
The US and We the People were very much on our own. For the Americans of the independence period it was, to use a phrase of the day, a matter of "root, hog, or die." We would have to solve our internal frictions. We would have to pay our debts. We would have to create a government. Create a currency. Create an economy and the jobs which would come with it. We, and only we, would have the duty and privilege of creating a country with a future--or not.
Arguably, the root of our success is not to be found in some sort of unique ability on the part of the leaders of the period. Nor, it can be shown, was the success attributable to an act of divine providence. The American success in all its fits, starts, blind alleys, and failures was simply the consequence of having no choice other than national extinction.
As the prospect of being hung in two weeks reputedly has the effect of concentrating the mind most wonderfully so also does the ever-present prospect of national death concentrate the efforts and will of many, many people. The Americans chose to root rather than die.
The first two generations of independent existence were neither easy nor, in retrospect, pretty. The challenges were many and great. The failures of were plentiful. Many individuals in positions of power acted in the most petty and self-serving ways imaginable. It was a magnificent muddle with no light at the end of the tunnel until after the second war of independence ended in 1815. After that, while much remained to do if the American experiment were to prosper, its survival was almost certain.
Perhaps it is most unfortunate that South Sudan will be denied the chance to make it on its own merits. It may be regrettable that the South Sudanese will not be faced with the stark choice of "root or die." Arguably, the laudable humanitarian impulses which motivate at least some of the offers of aid and assistance will be the cause of a moral dry rot which will sap the political will and energies of the South Sudanese to make a genuine go of it as a sovereign state with a unique national identity.
As the current situation in South Sudan is considered, it is worth remembering that every rich, powerful, and successful state in the world today was once no better off than is South Sudan. Every last member of the G-8 or even the G-20 was as internally riven, as poor, as lacking in infrastructure, education, jobs as is South Sudan. It is worth considering how each made it from that sort of dire beginning to their status today. One commonality is the absence of external assistance. Another is that success came only with time, difficulty, and the painful development of internal consensus on what to do and how to do it as well as putting that consensus into practice with genuine structures created organically and not in response to some outside "experts" opinion and advice.
Parents in their understandable desire to save children from pain and mistakes often forget how much they learned by failing, by making bad choices, by having to decide in microcosm to "root" rather than "die." The same is true in spades when developed, successful states contemplate a new arrival in the international community.
Helicopter moms and dads often discover too late that their constant hovering has done more harm than good to the capacity of their children to fly free and alone in a hostile or at least indifferent world. Perhaps it is time that helicopter states and NGOs including international organizations learn the same. Whether hogs or states, not all root successfully. Some die.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
The Land Of Pinocchio Is At It Again
No one oriented in time and place expects governments to be open, honest, and ever truthful in their public (or most private) statements. Diplomacy is often a contest of careful mendacity on a par with the sort practiced by lawyers working in an adversarial system. That is, blatant duplicity of the easily exposed sort is eschewed in favor of the well-crafted framing of a statement, an issue, a position. The good diplomat like the good advocate in court depends on what is not said even more than that which is said to mask the truth--particularly when the truth is uncomfortable from one's perspective.
The heavyweights of the Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) fail to meet the standard of proper diplomatic lying. This is unfortunate as the armed forces and ISI are the government of Pakistan far eclipsing in both power and public esteem the elected civilian political structure. As such, they are far more a part of the problem and in no way a contributor to the solution as regards the threat posed to civilized states by the damaged but not yet defeated advocates of violent political Islam which stalk Afghanistan, the FATA, and Pakistan proper.
The power elite of the armed forces and ISI is back at it. As has so often been the case, they are lying in a fashion which boggles the mind in its breathtaking absurdity. In the most recent ejaculations of denial and counter accusation, the spokesman for the Pakistani general staff insults the intelligence of all who read or hear his thundering denunciation of a recent spate of articles and editorials linking the ISI and armed forces with groups dedicated to violent political Islam and the recent murder of a well known and respected Pakistani journalist.
The immediate reaction of any half-way intelligent and well-informed person to the preposterous posturing of Major General Athar Abbas' remarks is to quote Ronald Reagan's comment during one of the 1980 debates, "There he goes again." The line delivered with a slow, sad shake of the head. The modern major general was announcing that the shoe put upon the collective foot of the Pakistani military and ISI fit tightly--it pinched and he was yelling, "Ouch!"
As unbelievable fables go, the Abbas Denial was on a par with the outpouring of outraged dignity following the Great Abbotabad Raid. The credibility of the Pakistanis, never high, was stretched far beyond its Young's Modulus with the earnest protestations of innocence with which the Pakistani heavies met the news that the Americans had found and liquidated Osama bin Laden within pistol shot of their very own military academy.
While the US government for reasons of state (the justification of all ill-advised and ultimately less than productive actions) has downplayed the possibility that the senior ranks of our "ally" in the "joint" war with al-Qaeda, the various Talibans, and all similar groups could possibly have known that bin Laden resided close at hand in comfortable isolation, this reticence should not be interpreted as accepting the Pakistanis as being pure and lofty of motives and intentions. Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the long standing relationship between ISI and the army on the one hand and the several terror merchant groups on the other could keep a straight face while stating they had seen "no smoking gun."
Back in the Oligocene--the days of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush--one did not have to be a member of the American intelligence community to know that ISI and the Pakistani armed forces were connected hip and shoulder with various Islamist groups, including the one which would come to power in Afghanistan as the Taliban. Minority opinion in both administrations warned against turning over responsibility for the endgame in the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis as the latter would take advantage of the opportunity to install entities hostile to the interests of the US in the region and globally. As is usually the case, the minority was shoved to the margins so they could watch their gloomy prognostications come to pass with the fullness of time.
Way back in the regime of Zia it was obvious that the Pakistani military would eagerly embrace the ideas of the dictator which focused on importing Wahhibism so as to promote Islam of the most austere and demanding sort as a mechanism of social and political cohesion. The implications of this were high profile: The Islamification program would drive a move to the more and more extreme. The program would facilitate the growth of violent political Islam oriented groups. And, ultimately it would assure that Pakistan would become an evermore Islamist state.
American decision makers were immune to the negative counsel, seeing instead an easy way to slip out of the continued burden of doing something in a small, inconvenient, and out of the way state with a history of being ungovernable. Anyway, the boys of Islamabad were big on reassuring Washington's rarefied levels about the pacifistic nature of Islam and the need of the Pakistani people for a stronger national identity in the face of Indian aggression.
In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war put the problem of Pakistan and its operations in Afghanistan very much on the far back burner. The Clinton administration was so disinterested in Pakistan that its Deep Thinkers would have had a hard time finding the place on a map--until the Pakistanis demonstrated their nuclear capacity. By then, of course, it was too late. Too late to stop the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. Far too late to undo the damage done by the Pakistani backed installation of Taliban in Kabul.
Of course, the ending of the cold war reduced Pakistan's importance in American eyes. For decades Islamabad had depended upon the Left-leaning policies of India to turn on the spigot of US military aid along with the occasional civilian project.
The best thing that happened to Pakistan was the attack on 9/11. After a nearly proforma demonstration of reluctance, Islamabad signed on to the Global War on Terror in exchange for massive amounts of American money. It was interesting to say the least that the goodies demanded by the armed forces of Pakistan were those useful for high intensity conventional war with India rather than the more pedestrian items having utility in counterinsurgent or counter terrorist operations.
To keep the goodies flowing, the Pakistanis had to rely on their capacity to lie convincingly and in a well-timed manner. They played a transparently double game from the very outset of the so called "joint" effort. Given that the US already knew that the only reason Osama bin Laden had escaped a cruise missile strike years before 9/11 was a phone call from Islamabad, yet we went on catering to the Pinocchio of the Sub-continent. There was no intention of even closing the borders to Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel escaping the American invasion and its aftermath let alone actually fighting the Mighty Men of the Koran.
But the Pakistanis talked a good game. And, because they had a nuclear arsenal, we had to pretend they were telling us the truth. All we could do was hope that the bribes we paid bought us sufficient influence on their decision making that the armed forces and ISI might stop their training, supporting, harboring, and strategic planning efforts.
The hope was illusory at best. However, the US had compounded its errors by invading Iraq and so mishandling the day after "victory" that it became the main event and Afghanistan a mere sideshow. As a result, we had to continue believing the palpably false assurances of cooperation issuing from Islamabad on a daily basis. The reality was far different. The Pakistanis provided sanctuary in the FATA in return for a promise, since broken, that the Great Warriors of the One True Faith would limit themselves to killing Americans and apostate Afghans.
During the long interim from 2004-2010 the Taliban(s) and the Haqqani network as well as al-Qaeda rested, retrained, refitted, and grew safe from harm in the cities and hillsides of Pakistan and the FATA. As a result, the Americans were losing more and more in country and the Pakistani military and ISI felt more and more confident in their ability to lead Uncle Sam around by the nose using a string of lies.
The pity of it all was the lies worked. They worked because there seemed no viable alternative available to American decision makers. We became co-conspirators in our own defeat. Our role was limited to a continued refusal to blow the whistle on the easily demonstrated prevarications of the Pakistanis. One of the services provided by Private Bradley Manning and his publicists at WikiLeaks has been to expose many (but not all) of the lies peddled by Islamabad as well as the reality that American diplomats knew them to be untruths. In short we were not stupid, merely adrift at the policy level.
The Pakistani string of successful lying came to an end dramatically in May. There was no way the lies of the Pakistanis could be accepted, even as a pretense, after the raid. It is regrettable that the Obama administration has not taken advantage of the sea change initiated by Boat Six to force the Pakistanis to choose sides finally and definitely.
The biggest advantage which will accrue to the US from the decision to draw down our forces in Afghanistan and adopt more of a counter terrorist posture is our logistics dependence upon Pakistan will be decreased. This means we will be in a much better position to link any continued assistance to Islamabad on demonstrated performance rather than nice sounding words. It is much harder to lie by actions than it is with mere words. So, Pakistan will be deprived of its advantage, an advantage it has used against us for a decade now.
While it may not be approved diplomatic form, it would be good politics both domestic and international to call the liars of Islamabad to account. Diplomacy is usually conducted by vague words and ambiguous phrases so everyone walks away claiming success, but the Pakistanis need to be handled with a direct and blunt approach.
The time is now to say to Islamabad, to the armed forces, to ISI, to Major General Abbas, "Cut the crap! You're busted!"
The heavyweights of the Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) fail to meet the standard of proper diplomatic lying. This is unfortunate as the armed forces and ISI are the government of Pakistan far eclipsing in both power and public esteem the elected civilian political structure. As such, they are far more a part of the problem and in no way a contributor to the solution as regards the threat posed to civilized states by the damaged but not yet defeated advocates of violent political Islam which stalk Afghanistan, the FATA, and Pakistan proper.
The power elite of the armed forces and ISI is back at it. As has so often been the case, they are lying in a fashion which boggles the mind in its breathtaking absurdity. In the most recent ejaculations of denial and counter accusation, the spokesman for the Pakistani general staff insults the intelligence of all who read or hear his thundering denunciation of a recent spate of articles and editorials linking the ISI and armed forces with groups dedicated to violent political Islam and the recent murder of a well known and respected Pakistani journalist.
The immediate reaction of any half-way intelligent and well-informed person to the preposterous posturing of Major General Athar Abbas' remarks is to quote Ronald Reagan's comment during one of the 1980 debates, "There he goes again." The line delivered with a slow, sad shake of the head. The modern major general was announcing that the shoe put upon the collective foot of the Pakistani military and ISI fit tightly--it pinched and he was yelling, "Ouch!"
As unbelievable fables go, the Abbas Denial was on a par with the outpouring of outraged dignity following the Great Abbotabad Raid. The credibility of the Pakistanis, never high, was stretched far beyond its Young's Modulus with the earnest protestations of innocence with which the Pakistani heavies met the news that the Americans had found and liquidated Osama bin Laden within pistol shot of their very own military academy.
While the US government for reasons of state (the justification of all ill-advised and ultimately less than productive actions) has downplayed the possibility that the senior ranks of our "ally" in the "joint" war with al-Qaeda, the various Talibans, and all similar groups could possibly have known that bin Laden resided close at hand in comfortable isolation, this reticence should not be interpreted as accepting the Pakistanis as being pure and lofty of motives and intentions. Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the long standing relationship between ISI and the army on the one hand and the several terror merchant groups on the other could keep a straight face while stating they had seen "no smoking gun."
Back in the Oligocene--the days of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush--one did not have to be a member of the American intelligence community to know that ISI and the Pakistani armed forces were connected hip and shoulder with various Islamist groups, including the one which would come to power in Afghanistan as the Taliban. Minority opinion in both administrations warned against turning over responsibility for the endgame in the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis as the latter would take advantage of the opportunity to install entities hostile to the interests of the US in the region and globally. As is usually the case, the minority was shoved to the margins so they could watch their gloomy prognostications come to pass with the fullness of time.
Way back in the regime of Zia it was obvious that the Pakistani military would eagerly embrace the ideas of the dictator which focused on importing Wahhibism so as to promote Islam of the most austere and demanding sort as a mechanism of social and political cohesion. The implications of this were high profile: The Islamification program would drive a move to the more and more extreme. The program would facilitate the growth of violent political Islam oriented groups. And, ultimately it would assure that Pakistan would become an evermore Islamist state.
American decision makers were immune to the negative counsel, seeing instead an easy way to slip out of the continued burden of doing something in a small, inconvenient, and out of the way state with a history of being ungovernable. Anyway, the boys of Islamabad were big on reassuring Washington's rarefied levels about the pacifistic nature of Islam and the need of the Pakistani people for a stronger national identity in the face of Indian aggression.
In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war put the problem of Pakistan and its operations in Afghanistan very much on the far back burner. The Clinton administration was so disinterested in Pakistan that its Deep Thinkers would have had a hard time finding the place on a map--until the Pakistanis demonstrated their nuclear capacity. By then, of course, it was too late. Too late to stop the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. Far too late to undo the damage done by the Pakistani backed installation of Taliban in Kabul.
Of course, the ending of the cold war reduced Pakistan's importance in American eyes. For decades Islamabad had depended upon the Left-leaning policies of India to turn on the spigot of US military aid along with the occasional civilian project.
The best thing that happened to Pakistan was the attack on 9/11. After a nearly proforma demonstration of reluctance, Islamabad signed on to the Global War on Terror in exchange for massive amounts of American money. It was interesting to say the least that the goodies demanded by the armed forces of Pakistan were those useful for high intensity conventional war with India rather than the more pedestrian items having utility in counterinsurgent or counter terrorist operations.
To keep the goodies flowing, the Pakistanis had to rely on their capacity to lie convincingly and in a well-timed manner. They played a transparently double game from the very outset of the so called "joint" effort. Given that the US already knew that the only reason Osama bin Laden had escaped a cruise missile strike years before 9/11 was a phone call from Islamabad, yet we went on catering to the Pinocchio of the Sub-continent. There was no intention of even closing the borders to Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel escaping the American invasion and its aftermath let alone actually fighting the Mighty Men of the Koran.
But the Pakistanis talked a good game. And, because they had a nuclear arsenal, we had to pretend they were telling us the truth. All we could do was hope that the bribes we paid bought us sufficient influence on their decision making that the armed forces and ISI might stop their training, supporting, harboring, and strategic planning efforts.
The hope was illusory at best. However, the US had compounded its errors by invading Iraq and so mishandling the day after "victory" that it became the main event and Afghanistan a mere sideshow. As a result, we had to continue believing the palpably false assurances of cooperation issuing from Islamabad on a daily basis. The reality was far different. The Pakistanis provided sanctuary in the FATA in return for a promise, since broken, that the Great Warriors of the One True Faith would limit themselves to killing Americans and apostate Afghans.
During the long interim from 2004-2010 the Taliban(s) and the Haqqani network as well as al-Qaeda rested, retrained, refitted, and grew safe from harm in the cities and hillsides of Pakistan and the FATA. As a result, the Americans were losing more and more in country and the Pakistani military and ISI felt more and more confident in their ability to lead Uncle Sam around by the nose using a string of lies.
The pity of it all was the lies worked. They worked because there seemed no viable alternative available to American decision makers. We became co-conspirators in our own defeat. Our role was limited to a continued refusal to blow the whistle on the easily demonstrated prevarications of the Pakistanis. One of the services provided by Private Bradley Manning and his publicists at WikiLeaks has been to expose many (but not all) of the lies peddled by Islamabad as well as the reality that American diplomats knew them to be untruths. In short we were not stupid, merely adrift at the policy level.
The Pakistani string of successful lying came to an end dramatically in May. There was no way the lies of the Pakistanis could be accepted, even as a pretense, after the raid. It is regrettable that the Obama administration has not taken advantage of the sea change initiated by Boat Six to force the Pakistanis to choose sides finally and definitely.
The biggest advantage which will accrue to the US from the decision to draw down our forces in Afghanistan and adopt more of a counter terrorist posture is our logistics dependence upon Pakistan will be decreased. This means we will be in a much better position to link any continued assistance to Islamabad on demonstrated performance rather than nice sounding words. It is much harder to lie by actions than it is with mere words. So, Pakistan will be deprived of its advantage, an advantage it has used against us for a decade now.
While it may not be approved diplomatic form, it would be good politics both domestic and international to call the liars of Islamabad to account. Diplomacy is usually conducted by vague words and ambiguous phrases so everyone walks away claiming success, but the Pakistanis need to be handled with a direct and blunt approach.
The time is now to say to Islamabad, to the armed forces, to ISI, to Major General Abbas, "Cut the crap! You're busted!"
Friday, July 8, 2011
Of Course Iran Is Behind The New "Surge" In Iraq
Admiral Mike Mullen made a blunt and truthful statement which has not been well received in Tehran. The only thing at all wrong with the admiral's remarks was their tardy nature. It is not inaccurate to characterize the chairman's accusation of Iranian complicity in the uptick of attacks on Americans in Iraq as yesterday's news.
With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq. The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations. The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers. Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism. As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought. Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.
Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne. He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it. Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne. In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.
He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists. He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes. To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions. All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.
Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal. His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end. Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.
The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal. The take in Tehran is simple: Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.
In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct. We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq. The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change. But, the view inside Baghdad is different. So is the perspective from the Pentagon.
The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists. Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless. A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan. This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.
It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA. Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.
The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence. The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea. Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep. Only Sadr is opposed.
Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics. To do so would be to put himself publicly in league with the Iranians. This would undercut his power in Iraq. Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.
It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war. By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded. By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop. And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.
It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument. Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally. This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world. Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.
The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks. This is a calculated risk. The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government. Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias. Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?
Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here. His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities. Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously. Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.
Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume." That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.
With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq. The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations. The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers. Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism. As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought. Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.
Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne. He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it. Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne. In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.
He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists. He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes. To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions. All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.
Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal. His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end. Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.
The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal. The take in Tehran is simple: Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.
In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct. We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq. The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change. But, the view inside Baghdad is different. So is the perspective from the Pentagon.
The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists. Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless. A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan. This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.
It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA. Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.
The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence. The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea. Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep. Only Sadr is opposed.
Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics. To do so would be to put himself publicly in league with the Iranians. This would undercut his power in Iraq. Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.
It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war. By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded. By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop. And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.
It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument. Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally. This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world. Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.
The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks. This is a calculated risk. The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government. Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias. Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?
Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here. His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities. Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously. Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.
Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume." That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Think Globally, Act Locally
This old bumper sticker phrase much loved by the tree hugging crowd some twenty years ago has become the new, de facto slogan of al-Qaeda under the direction of its new capo d' tutti capi, Ayman al-Zawahiri. This, in itself, is not surprising as the good doctor has long been known for his possessing a far greater interest in making Egypt a model of shariah in action than in establishing a global caliphate.
What makes the latest expression of the world according to Zawahiri (it has a catchy title: The Message of Good Hope and Tidings For Our People In Egypt. OK, maybe it loses something in translation.) is the way in which he combines the ideas of making Egypt safe for a Salifist view of Islam with the further disestablishment of the US as a force in the region. The six parts of "The Message" are themselves a riff on Zawahiri's earlier and vastly important philosophical book best known by its short title Exoneration. In both he argues that the successful jihad mounted to date by al-Qaeda and its franchises forced the Obama administration to abandon Mubarak and prepare the way for the success of violent political Islam in Egypt.
In both "The Message" and "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri contends that the moment has come to shift the focus of jihad on the internal revolutions in Egypt and other countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Syria so as to put more pressure not only on the local apostate rulers but on the US. In essence he is calling for al-Qaeda to act not as a global non-state player but rather as the facilitator and coordinator of local efforts such as those being waged by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP,) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM,) and al-Shabaab. It is clear that he believes that the US will be overstretched by simultaneous challenges mounted by these groups as well as smaller entities and lone wolves preying on soft targets throughout the Mideast and North Africa.
Even in this context it is self-evident that al-Zawahiri's focus in on Egypt. His view of the Ummah is through the prism of Egyptian nationalism. He sees the (in his eyes) necessary victory of the most austere form of Islam in Egypt will vault the country to primacy in the emerging caliphate. As a good Egyptian nationalist, one who rivals the quite secular Nasser as a hyper-nationalist, al-Zawahiri sees Cairo as the fulcrum of the new Islam, the next Caliphate.
To this end "The Message" calls upon Egyptian Muslims to act as one, to act quickly and decisively so as to assert Egypt's pride of place among the Muslim majority states of the world. This appeal will not fall on deaf ears. Overlooked in all the hoopla over the yearning for genuine democracy expressed during the overthrow of Mubarak is a very basic and potent ground truth: Egyptians have felt diminished as a people, a nation over the past thirty years. After the national high point of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the road has been strictly downhill.
Egyptians have increasingly seen themselves as citizens of a diminished country. More and more they have come to see themselves as having lost status, position, even dignity. The thought that Egypt had become nothing more than a dependency of the US rankled--deeply. As is the case in Russia, the notion of having lost national status not only rankled, it motivated. Mubarak was deeply hated not simply because he presided over a country neck deep in corruption, nepotism, inequity, but because he had not only acquiesced in but actively fostered the decline of Egypt in the region and in the world. On Mubarak's watch, many believed and continue to believe, Egypt was no longer a country worthy of respect but rather the object of derision.
Al-Zawahiri's skilled blending of religion and nationalism serves to counter this pervasive sense of Egyptian degradation. By seizing the present moment, al-Zawahiri argues, Egyptians can reclaim their dignity, their status, their pride, their place in the sun. Merging the Egyptian national identity with the true belief of basic and uncompromising Islam will bring salvation, or, if not salvation, at least pull Egypt and its people out of the slough of the marginalized, the trivialized, the ignored, the bowed head beggers.
Al-Zawahiri promises that an Egypt powered by Islam of ninety proof purity will once more be what it seemed to be many, many years ago during the heyday of Nasser--a force in the world, a country that could call the tune danced to by supposed superpowers. All that is required, the one time medic alleges, is for Egyptians not to fall prey to American blandishments or secret plots made in the USA and hold true to the calls of the faith and the needs of political Islam--including the use of violence should such be either necessary or desirable.
In "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri extends his argument to include countries such as Yemen, Syria and the states of North Africa. His position is both simple and inherently attractive, particularly to younger members of the over-educated and underemployed middle class.
In short he says, "All of you, Syrians, Yemeni, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans are members of societies which were once great. You are all citizens of states which were once respected, even feared by the infidels. You are people of nations which were once great but are now small."
He then asks the essential question, "Why? Why were you who were once so great are now so small?"
And, unsurprisingly, he gives the correct answer. "Because you abandoned the path of pure and true Islam. Because you surrendered to government by apostates, by turncoats who say they are Muslims but act and govern as if they are kaffir."
Then comes the expected call to arms. "You will be great once more, respected and feared once again, feel the dignity you deserve only when you join the jihad. Only when you throw out the apostates and restore genuine Islamic rulers will you regain your greatness."
Shrewdly al-Zawahiri backs his argument by emphasizing Islam's stance on social justice, economic equity, and political openness. He contrasts the nature of the Islamic posture in all these critical and highly emotional issues with the stance of the US and Uncle Sam's local clients. He wraps all the ills of the Islamic Mideast and North African states in an American flag. He demands locals act for local goals while doing so in the global context of putting increased pressure on the US--pressure to withdraw.
It is worth considering that the thinking of al-Zawahiri has been picked up, reflected and even amplified by other high profile advocates of violent political Islam. Anwar al-Awalacki in Yemen has done this in recent weeks. Indeed much of the theoretical writing in the several issues of Inspire might have come from the keyboard of the American born and educated cleric, but the ideas and arguments, the logic and goals, are those of al-Zawahiri.
Even in the geographic expression, Somalia, where one is surprised to discover a level of literacy which would allow the reading of al-Zawahiri's rather dense prose, the locals have been extolling the ideas of the medic turned mass murderer. The same applies to recent musings by spokesmen for AQIM. Clearly, al-Zawahiri has a message that many are both reading and amplifying.
The US has been playing the role assigned to it in The World According to Ayman. Our aid to the Ugandan forces in Somalia has been increased as has been the assistance provided to the fictitious government of Somalia. Shortly we can expect more Predator strikes in Somalia along with a significant ramp-up of the remote controlled death from above operations in Yemen. Carefully targeted special operations will not be long in the offing.
The regional impact of the ongoing mess in Libya is growing. There will be a requirement in the not-too-distant future for the US to make some choices as to what we should or must do to help the local forces and governments in their struggle with AQIM. While we have no bulls in the herd, particularly as compared with European countries, the small but rapidly growing AQIM will reach the level of potential threat to US interests long before the next election here.
Think Globally, Act Locally! Al-Zawahiri has it right. So right that we may soon be wishing for the good old days of Osama bin Laden. The legion of experts assured us that al-Zawahiri would be a nebbish as the Lord High Poobah of al-Qaeda because he had the charisma of a nematode.
What a crock! Brains beat charisma every time--particularly in war.
What makes the latest expression of the world according to Zawahiri (it has a catchy title: The Message of Good Hope and Tidings For Our People In Egypt. OK, maybe it loses something in translation.) is the way in which he combines the ideas of making Egypt safe for a Salifist view of Islam with the further disestablishment of the US as a force in the region. The six parts of "The Message" are themselves a riff on Zawahiri's earlier and vastly important philosophical book best known by its short title Exoneration. In both he argues that the successful jihad mounted to date by al-Qaeda and its franchises forced the Obama administration to abandon Mubarak and prepare the way for the success of violent political Islam in Egypt.
In both "The Message" and "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri contends that the moment has come to shift the focus of jihad on the internal revolutions in Egypt and other countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Syria so as to put more pressure not only on the local apostate rulers but on the US. In essence he is calling for al-Qaeda to act not as a global non-state player but rather as the facilitator and coordinator of local efforts such as those being waged by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP,) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM,) and al-Shabaab. It is clear that he believes that the US will be overstretched by simultaneous challenges mounted by these groups as well as smaller entities and lone wolves preying on soft targets throughout the Mideast and North Africa.
Even in this context it is self-evident that al-Zawahiri's focus in on Egypt. His view of the Ummah is through the prism of Egyptian nationalism. He sees the (in his eyes) necessary victory of the most austere form of Islam in Egypt will vault the country to primacy in the emerging caliphate. As a good Egyptian nationalist, one who rivals the quite secular Nasser as a hyper-nationalist, al-Zawahiri sees Cairo as the fulcrum of the new Islam, the next Caliphate.
To this end "The Message" calls upon Egyptian Muslims to act as one, to act quickly and decisively so as to assert Egypt's pride of place among the Muslim majority states of the world. This appeal will not fall on deaf ears. Overlooked in all the hoopla over the yearning for genuine democracy expressed during the overthrow of Mubarak is a very basic and potent ground truth: Egyptians have felt diminished as a people, a nation over the past thirty years. After the national high point of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the road has been strictly downhill.
Egyptians have increasingly seen themselves as citizens of a diminished country. More and more they have come to see themselves as having lost status, position, even dignity. The thought that Egypt had become nothing more than a dependency of the US rankled--deeply. As is the case in Russia, the notion of having lost national status not only rankled, it motivated. Mubarak was deeply hated not simply because he presided over a country neck deep in corruption, nepotism, inequity, but because he had not only acquiesced in but actively fostered the decline of Egypt in the region and in the world. On Mubarak's watch, many believed and continue to believe, Egypt was no longer a country worthy of respect but rather the object of derision.
Al-Zawahiri's skilled blending of religion and nationalism serves to counter this pervasive sense of Egyptian degradation. By seizing the present moment, al-Zawahiri argues, Egyptians can reclaim their dignity, their status, their pride, their place in the sun. Merging the Egyptian national identity with the true belief of basic and uncompromising Islam will bring salvation, or, if not salvation, at least pull Egypt and its people out of the slough of the marginalized, the trivialized, the ignored, the bowed head beggers.
Al-Zawahiri promises that an Egypt powered by Islam of ninety proof purity will once more be what it seemed to be many, many years ago during the heyday of Nasser--a force in the world, a country that could call the tune danced to by supposed superpowers. All that is required, the one time medic alleges, is for Egyptians not to fall prey to American blandishments or secret plots made in the USA and hold true to the calls of the faith and the needs of political Islam--including the use of violence should such be either necessary or desirable.
In "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri extends his argument to include countries such as Yemen, Syria and the states of North Africa. His position is both simple and inherently attractive, particularly to younger members of the over-educated and underemployed middle class.
In short he says, "All of you, Syrians, Yemeni, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans are members of societies which were once great. You are all citizens of states which were once respected, even feared by the infidels. You are people of nations which were once great but are now small."
He then asks the essential question, "Why? Why were you who were once so great are now so small?"
And, unsurprisingly, he gives the correct answer. "Because you abandoned the path of pure and true Islam. Because you surrendered to government by apostates, by turncoats who say they are Muslims but act and govern as if they are kaffir."
Then comes the expected call to arms. "You will be great once more, respected and feared once again, feel the dignity you deserve only when you join the jihad. Only when you throw out the apostates and restore genuine Islamic rulers will you regain your greatness."
Shrewdly al-Zawahiri backs his argument by emphasizing Islam's stance on social justice, economic equity, and political openness. He contrasts the nature of the Islamic posture in all these critical and highly emotional issues with the stance of the US and Uncle Sam's local clients. He wraps all the ills of the Islamic Mideast and North African states in an American flag. He demands locals act for local goals while doing so in the global context of putting increased pressure on the US--pressure to withdraw.
It is worth considering that the thinking of al-Zawahiri has been picked up, reflected and even amplified by other high profile advocates of violent political Islam. Anwar al-Awalacki in Yemen has done this in recent weeks. Indeed much of the theoretical writing in the several issues of Inspire might have come from the keyboard of the American born and educated cleric, but the ideas and arguments, the logic and goals, are those of al-Zawahiri.
Even in the geographic expression, Somalia, where one is surprised to discover a level of literacy which would allow the reading of al-Zawahiri's rather dense prose, the locals have been extolling the ideas of the medic turned mass murderer. The same applies to recent musings by spokesmen for AQIM. Clearly, al-Zawahiri has a message that many are both reading and amplifying.
The US has been playing the role assigned to it in The World According to Ayman. Our aid to the Ugandan forces in Somalia has been increased as has been the assistance provided to the fictitious government of Somalia. Shortly we can expect more Predator strikes in Somalia along with a significant ramp-up of the remote controlled death from above operations in Yemen. Carefully targeted special operations will not be long in the offing.
The regional impact of the ongoing mess in Libya is growing. There will be a requirement in the not-too-distant future for the US to make some choices as to what we should or must do to help the local forces and governments in their struggle with AQIM. While we have no bulls in the herd, particularly as compared with European countries, the small but rapidly growing AQIM will reach the level of potential threat to US interests long before the next election here.
Think Globally, Act Locally! Al-Zawahiri has it right. So right that we may soon be wishing for the good old days of Osama bin Laden. The legion of experts assured us that al-Zawahiri would be a nebbish as the Lord High Poobah of al-Qaeda because he had the charisma of a nematode.
What a crock! Brains beat charisma every time--particularly in war.
Saturday, July 2, 2011
The "Improbable" Artificial State Has One More Anniversary
The United States is unique--exceptional, if you will--in a number of ways. Among these arguably the most important is the fundamental reality that it is a totally artificial state. A second unique feature, arguably almost on a par with the first, is that the US is that rare bird, a state which has created a nation.
As a nation and as a polity, We the People, each and every one of us, is part of a purely artificial state. We are defined not by borders per se nor by language. We are not defined by religious confession, pace the large number of Christians who would wish it otherwise.
What defines us as a state and thus as a nation is a set of ideas. That basement truth is what makes us both artificial and exceptional. We are the product of that most ineffable and powerful entity--the intellect. Founded on ideas, the ideas became our foundation. Over time the memes by which Americans see and understand themselves have both remained fixed and highly mutable, evolving with changes in our size, our complexity, the shifting sands of science and technology, the alterations of our demographics, the creative destruction of our economy while staying unaltered in all the essentials, the cornerstones of thinking so often expressed in simple, almost buzzword terms: democracy, transparency, rule of law, separation of church and state, equality of opportunity, free enterprise, and so on.
The fact that we are citizens of a set of ideas made manifest in human structures and institutions usually flies below our personal and political radar. Having been born and raised in this crowd sourced set of ideas, we are as unaware of its central and crucial nature as is the fish of the water in which it swims. It takes the perspective of either the immigrant or of having returned to the US after a long absence abroad to awaken the consciousness, to become aware of just how faint and fragile the foundations of our collective enterprise actually are--and how powerful a force they effect upon us.
The existence, let alone the flourishing of the US has been termed "improbable" as far back as the end of the Nineteenth Century as the US emerged on the global stage for the first time. Foreign observers, men of rank, power and learning saw the reality of the American experience with a clarity which eluded most Americans. They saw the artificial nature of the US as both a great strength and an awesome source of potential weakness.
The strengths were self-evident. The artificial nature of the US, its foundations being ideas, provided a haven for all, a safe harbor for all those ideas and individuals seen as too dangerous to be tolerated in the states of Europe founded on language, customs, borders, the verdicts of ancient wars. The US was by its nature imbued with a degree of flexibility, a willingness to experiment, to take a chance far beyond any European country. As the US and its people were defined by ideas and not by the accidents of precedent or ancestry there were more rewards for trying something new, for striking out in a new direction, for doing things differently. At the same time the citizens of this artificial state and nation held onto the basics, the foundational principles with a rigor and a zeal almost beyond European comprehension.
The weaknesses were not so apparent, but were equally real. One very important weakness which arose directly from our foundation as an intellectual artifact was uncertainty as to what it took to be a "real" American.
The US was caught in a never ending crisis of identity. Being founded on ideas and having a population representing virtually every nation on Earth, We the People always wondered "who are we?" At the core, what did it mean to be an American? The endemic identity crisis peaked in epidemic outbreaks from time to time over the course of our history. Recurrent waves of anti-immigrant sentiment represented a manifestation of this. So also did the episodic outbreaks of religious frenzy. Hyper-patriotism thrived periodically as we sought to reassure ourselves regarding our identity.
Another, closely related weakness was our uncertainty as to how and when we should have relations with other countries. It had always been a given that the US would seek cordial commercial relations with all other states. In this orientation we Americans showed ourselves to be the citizens of a maritime power, a state which sought the broadest possible networks of trade. Beyond that one element there has never been a long lasting consensus on the role of the US in the world. Isolationist or interventionist represent just two poles in the America foreign policy dilemma. Idealism or realism are the verbal flags marking two other extremes in the foreign relations conundrum which grows from the artificial nature of the US.
The never ending swings between idealism and realism in our foreign policy as well as the equally drastic swings between withdrawal and engagement with the world both come from the unique, artificial nature of the US. In a real sense our history shows that the US lacks permanent friends and enemies. In this way we are not exceptional. But, our history also shows that the US does not have many permanent interests. Indeed, beyond free trade there is no present day national interest which can be traced back much beyond the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.
Lasting interests are the necessary products of states which do not have identity crises. Lasting interests are defined as are the states which have them--by experience, usually that of ancient wars. A sharp reminder of this dynamic and its difference from the forces at work in the US can be seen in the opposing ways in which many Mexicans and the majority of Americans see the war between their two countries. To the Americans the affray of more than a century and a half ago is a null referent. To the Mexicans it was a defining experience, a national humiliation the stain of which lingers on to the present moment. The demand by so many Mexican apologists for a more "liberal" immigration policy on the part of the US is really an attempt to rewrite the verdict of a war most Americans are unaware of having taken place.
Because we are a state and a nation defined by ideas, ideas which are both unchanging and ever mutating we Americans fail to see just how long and complex the task of "nation-building" actually is. We can blithely assume that since our defining ideas and the institutions which grow from them are and have been so successful, other people in other countries will want to adopt them wholesale just as soon as they are informed. It was this simple assumption that propelled George W. Bush and his fellow neocons into the misguided and wrongheaded effort to transform Afghanistan and remake Iraq, not some perverse and evil impulse. It might be noted that most of We the People thought the same until enough time and American corpses showed the error of the underlying assumption.
When the interventionary impulse leads to failure as it so often has, the reaction is withdrawal. The American isolationist sentiment is predicated just as is our interventionary equivalent upon the defining ideas of the US. Both are expressions of moral sentiments which reside deeply in our collective understanding of both our past and our present nature. Moral sentiments ranging from being the shining city on the hill to its opposite, the cavalry riding to the rescue of the innocents threatened by external, violent evil are part, a central part, of our self-understanding, our collective self-definition. We are doomed to continue to repeat the cycle of engage and disengage as we are that of being "realistic" only to turn "idealistic."
But our greatest weakness as an artifact of the minds of men is the potential to lose faith in our collective self, our shared institutions and structures, our capacity to shape our future. The American identity is subject to seismic shocks. Should one or a combination of those shocks result in a loss of faith in ourselves and our collective capacities, the result would be fatal to the American experiment.
The blame-America-first crowd along with those who celebrate cultural relativism threaten the American faith. The constant refrain chanted by the tireless throats of these two groups which has pervaded so much of our collective consciousness for the past three decades is like water dripping on rock, slowly eroding, gradually corroding the solid and indestructible boulder to a handful of sand and mud. Taken in the present context of war weariness, frustration with an implacable enemy addicted to terror, and the fear provoked by economic catastrophe looming, the soul sapping effects of the naysayers in our midst represent a very real challenge to the nature of the US and We the People.
We often give credit to ideas, particularly the ideas on which we are founded; we call them "powerful" and "eternal." And so they can be. It is also true that there is nothing more fragile and quick to flee than an idea. Or a state and a nation founded simply and solely on ideas.
As a nation and as a polity, We the People, each and every one of us, is part of a purely artificial state. We are defined not by borders per se nor by language. We are not defined by religious confession, pace the large number of Christians who would wish it otherwise.
What defines us as a state and thus as a nation is a set of ideas. That basement truth is what makes us both artificial and exceptional. We are the product of that most ineffable and powerful entity--the intellect. Founded on ideas, the ideas became our foundation. Over time the memes by which Americans see and understand themselves have both remained fixed and highly mutable, evolving with changes in our size, our complexity, the shifting sands of science and technology, the alterations of our demographics, the creative destruction of our economy while staying unaltered in all the essentials, the cornerstones of thinking so often expressed in simple, almost buzzword terms: democracy, transparency, rule of law, separation of church and state, equality of opportunity, free enterprise, and so on.
The fact that we are citizens of a set of ideas made manifest in human structures and institutions usually flies below our personal and political radar. Having been born and raised in this crowd sourced set of ideas, we are as unaware of its central and crucial nature as is the fish of the water in which it swims. It takes the perspective of either the immigrant or of having returned to the US after a long absence abroad to awaken the consciousness, to become aware of just how faint and fragile the foundations of our collective enterprise actually are--and how powerful a force they effect upon us.
The existence, let alone the flourishing of the US has been termed "improbable" as far back as the end of the Nineteenth Century as the US emerged on the global stage for the first time. Foreign observers, men of rank, power and learning saw the reality of the American experience with a clarity which eluded most Americans. They saw the artificial nature of the US as both a great strength and an awesome source of potential weakness.
The strengths were self-evident. The artificial nature of the US, its foundations being ideas, provided a haven for all, a safe harbor for all those ideas and individuals seen as too dangerous to be tolerated in the states of Europe founded on language, customs, borders, the verdicts of ancient wars. The US was by its nature imbued with a degree of flexibility, a willingness to experiment, to take a chance far beyond any European country. As the US and its people were defined by ideas and not by the accidents of precedent or ancestry there were more rewards for trying something new, for striking out in a new direction, for doing things differently. At the same time the citizens of this artificial state and nation held onto the basics, the foundational principles with a rigor and a zeal almost beyond European comprehension.
The weaknesses were not so apparent, but were equally real. One very important weakness which arose directly from our foundation as an intellectual artifact was uncertainty as to what it took to be a "real" American.
The US was caught in a never ending crisis of identity. Being founded on ideas and having a population representing virtually every nation on Earth, We the People always wondered "who are we?" At the core, what did it mean to be an American? The endemic identity crisis peaked in epidemic outbreaks from time to time over the course of our history. Recurrent waves of anti-immigrant sentiment represented a manifestation of this. So also did the episodic outbreaks of religious frenzy. Hyper-patriotism thrived periodically as we sought to reassure ourselves regarding our identity.
Another, closely related weakness was our uncertainty as to how and when we should have relations with other countries. It had always been a given that the US would seek cordial commercial relations with all other states. In this orientation we Americans showed ourselves to be the citizens of a maritime power, a state which sought the broadest possible networks of trade. Beyond that one element there has never been a long lasting consensus on the role of the US in the world. Isolationist or interventionist represent just two poles in the America foreign policy dilemma. Idealism or realism are the verbal flags marking two other extremes in the foreign relations conundrum which grows from the artificial nature of the US.
The never ending swings between idealism and realism in our foreign policy as well as the equally drastic swings between withdrawal and engagement with the world both come from the unique, artificial nature of the US. In a real sense our history shows that the US lacks permanent friends and enemies. In this way we are not exceptional. But, our history also shows that the US does not have many permanent interests. Indeed, beyond free trade there is no present day national interest which can be traced back much beyond the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.
Lasting interests are the necessary products of states which do not have identity crises. Lasting interests are defined as are the states which have them--by experience, usually that of ancient wars. A sharp reminder of this dynamic and its difference from the forces at work in the US can be seen in the opposing ways in which many Mexicans and the majority of Americans see the war between their two countries. To the Americans the affray of more than a century and a half ago is a null referent. To the Mexicans it was a defining experience, a national humiliation the stain of which lingers on to the present moment. The demand by so many Mexican apologists for a more "liberal" immigration policy on the part of the US is really an attempt to rewrite the verdict of a war most Americans are unaware of having taken place.
Because we are a state and a nation defined by ideas, ideas which are both unchanging and ever mutating we Americans fail to see just how long and complex the task of "nation-building" actually is. We can blithely assume that since our defining ideas and the institutions which grow from them are and have been so successful, other people in other countries will want to adopt them wholesale just as soon as they are informed. It was this simple assumption that propelled George W. Bush and his fellow neocons into the misguided and wrongheaded effort to transform Afghanistan and remake Iraq, not some perverse and evil impulse. It might be noted that most of We the People thought the same until enough time and American corpses showed the error of the underlying assumption.
When the interventionary impulse leads to failure as it so often has, the reaction is withdrawal. The American isolationist sentiment is predicated just as is our interventionary equivalent upon the defining ideas of the US. Both are expressions of moral sentiments which reside deeply in our collective understanding of both our past and our present nature. Moral sentiments ranging from being the shining city on the hill to its opposite, the cavalry riding to the rescue of the innocents threatened by external, violent evil are part, a central part, of our self-understanding, our collective self-definition. We are doomed to continue to repeat the cycle of engage and disengage as we are that of being "realistic" only to turn "idealistic."
But our greatest weakness as an artifact of the minds of men is the potential to lose faith in our collective self, our shared institutions and structures, our capacity to shape our future. The American identity is subject to seismic shocks. Should one or a combination of those shocks result in a loss of faith in ourselves and our collective capacities, the result would be fatal to the American experiment.
The blame-America-first crowd along with those who celebrate cultural relativism threaten the American faith. The constant refrain chanted by the tireless throats of these two groups which has pervaded so much of our collective consciousness for the past three decades is like water dripping on rock, slowly eroding, gradually corroding the solid and indestructible boulder to a handful of sand and mud. Taken in the present context of war weariness, frustration with an implacable enemy addicted to terror, and the fear provoked by economic catastrophe looming, the soul sapping effects of the naysayers in our midst represent a very real challenge to the nature of the US and We the People.
We often give credit to ideas, particularly the ideas on which we are founded; we call them "powerful" and "eternal." And so they can be. It is also true that there is nothing more fragile and quick to flee than an idea. Or a state and a nation founded simply and solely on ideas.
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