The American Problem--High Tech vs Low

The Counterterrorism Blog http://counterterrorismblog.org/, had a post by Douglas Farah focusing on the problem of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which are one of the two weapons of choice in Iraq and increasingly in Afghanistan. The other preferred weapon is, of course, the suicide bomber.

Mr Farah in common with so many others who have considered the dilemma of American advanced technology being successfully countered by the opposition's use of "primitive" weapons and tactics tend to focus on the structural difficulties faced by the military services in procuring proper defensive methods.

That is a very real difficulty. No doubt about it. Compared to the Pentagon's procurement "system" the average glacier moves at the speed of light.

However the asymmetry of technology between the US and its enemies is nothing new. It dates back to the earliest of the Indian Wars during the Colonial period. (Don't throw up your hands in disgust, the Geek isn't going to go that far back.)

At the bitter end of WW II in the Pacific our grunts encountered an interesting type of IED. It consisted of a covered hole. In the hole was a Japanese soldier. Between his legs was a thwacking big shell--something like an eight inch or larger naval rifle round. In his hands was a hammer.

The operating instructions?

When the guy in the hole heard a vehicle, preferably a tank, going overhead, he was to smack the nose mounted zero delay fuse smartly with his hammer.

That nifty idea which combines the best features of the IED and the suicide bomber was easily countered. The troops after discovering the first hole and occupant, simply avoided the roads. If necessary they bladed new roads alongside the old.

If we had been forced to invade the Japanese Home Islands, we would have run across thousands of these "primitive" weapons. There would have been other variations as well. All lethal, all low-tech.

In Vietnam our fabled helicopter maneuverability quickly spawned an effective counter. It was simple. It was low tech. It worked.

Here it is. Dig a hole. Bell shaped is best. Place megaphone shaped openings in each ordinal point. Put a Viet Cong in the center of the hole. Connect him to other guys in other identical holes with an old French field telephone. Tell him to keep his ears open.

Triangulation from three or more VC listeners allowed the detection and accurate tracking on both range and azimuth of a helicopter serial at twenty or so klicks. It was just about as good as radar.

Using this information, a map and knowledge of US tactics the local VC or North Vietnamese commander could decide whether to resist the coming US attack or abandon the ground leaving behind only a few snipers and a bunch of mines.

Cool, huh?

Speaking of mines. The Vietnam War was full of them. While the VC and NVN didn't have explosively formed penetrators, they were inordinately creative with mine manufacture, placement and concealment. One result was that the grunts preferred to ride on top of the M-113 armored personnel carriers rather than inside them.

Outside, you might get sniped. Inside you would get dead if the slab sided mound of aluminum hit a mine or was hit by a rocket propelled grenade.

The Vietnam War lasted long enough for the smart lads working at and for the Pentagon to develop some defenses against the IEDs used by the blackhats. They never did. Still, as soon as the grunts took to riding on the top of the M-113s (or walking) mine casualties dropped. A low tech solution to a "primitive" weapon.

The troops in Vietnam had an advantage denied to those today in Iraq and Afghanistan. There were a lot more of them.

The most effective counter to IEDs and suicide bombers is a lot of boots on the ground. As the Geek has written so often, counterinsurgency is the most manpower intensive form of war which exists. While advanced technology can be a potent force multiplier particularly in reconnaissance and surveillance or in precisely engaging a target with minimal collateral damage, it cannot replace boots, trigger fingers and the brains which operate both.

The Geek is strongly supportive of the decision to (finally, three or more years later than should have been the case) acquire the mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicle. But, that new piece of automotive and ballistic inventiveness will not be a panacea. At least initially its presence will be a magnet to the Iraqi insurgents and those who support them to develop and demonstrate ways of taking the big beast out.

It has been a general historical lesson of the many insurgencies over the past three hundred or so years that there is always, repeat, always a low technology solution to any advanced technology capability.

Men on the ground, properly trained, supported by a doctrine that is relevant to the realities of a counterinsurgent war and backed by a resolute leadership are the most effective way to defeat an enemy.

If you get a grip on that reality there is no need to hyperventilate about technology, procurement policies or other attractive irrelevancies.