There Are "Bad" Kurds--And Good Ones

That's where the problem lies for the United States. Worse, it's another one for which we are partially responsible.

We all know who the "bad" Kurds are. They're called the Kurdistan Workers Party, usually called the PKK. They've gotten all the news play in the past few days. They are "bad" because they attack Turkish targets as they have been doing for almost twenty-five years now.

But, who or what are the "good" Kurds?

They call themselves the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). They are "good" because they have been attacking targets in Iran as they have been doing for nearly twenty-five years now. They have gotten no significant news coverage.

The PKK have been declared to be a "terrorist" group. The PJAK has not received this distinction.

The PKK has received no US assistance, not even conversational. The PJAK has not only been talked with by American personnel, there is strong reason to believe they have been the beneficiaries of more than mere polite palaver.

You don't need to have a PhD in Kurdish Studies to see the reason for the difference in treatment. Do you?

From Washington's perspective, Turkey is a good guy (most of the time.) Also from the banks of the Potomac, Iran is a bad guy (all of the time.)

There is, however, one small problem.

"What's that?" You ask.

PKK and PJAK are not separate organisations. They share the goal of an independent Kurdistan carved out of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. More, they share leadership. They share logistics support.

They are not even Siamese twins. PKK and PJAK are different names for the same entity.

Washington knows it. Turkey knows it. The Iraqi regime knows it.

All of the above (and the mullahocracy in Tehran as well) know that (ahem) PJAK has and does receive the distant blessings of Washington. Not just the current administration but its predecessors running back a quarter century. (Don't say a word about it. The whole thing has been covert. You know, deep, deep black.)

Of course, that's how weapons supplied to the Iraqis ended up in the hands of dead PKK guerrillas inside Turkey. The strictures of plausible deniability demand that the US never speak on that matter but rather let the whole affair die with time and benign neglect.

Now, it doesn't take a particularly deep thinker to realise that it is impossible to bless one arm of a group while damning the other. Whatever benefits the one limb will aid the other.

Thus, the current problem further bedeviling the current administration's Iraq policies.

The Kurds aren't going to just stop the show because it would make our life in Iraq a little less unbearable. They've gotten up a reasonably good head of steam in recent months.

The PJAK wing has killed or captured a surprising number of Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. Their pin prick raids have stimulated not only Iranian artillery fire in reply but political difficulties in the northwestern areas of Iran.

During the same time, PKK has raised the noise level in the Turkish countryside to an unacceptable extent. The Turkish Army is good for go.

The Iraqi regime is caught in the middle. There isn't much Baghdad can do, at least in the near-term. Closing the offices of the PKK in Iraq and proclaiming the outfit to be "terrorist" is scarcely a death blow. Neither is the promise that the Iraqi government will do something about the PKK one of these days.

That leaves the US.

In principle the US could collaborate more closely and effectively with the Turkish armed forces and government. We could provide more hard, actionable intelligence in a more timely fashion. We could provide surveillance and reconnaissance equipment to support Turkish interdiction efforts. We could, at least hypothetically, spare a brigade or two to move against PKK facilities in the mountains on the Turkish border.

We could do any or all of these if it were not for the fact that hurting the "bad" Kurds also hurts the "good" Kurds. We could do any or all of these things if it were not for the fact that providing comfort for Turkey does the same for Iran.

Ahh! What a delightful policy bind!

A realpolitiker might focus on the more immediate horn of the dilemma. That would be Iraq. The realpolitiker would agree to work with the Turks in abating the PKK nuisance without regard to the collateral damage inflicted on the PJAK. Help the necessary ally without worrying about the attendant assistance given to the adversary, Iran.

The current administration has not been noted for its grip on the requirements of realpolitik. Given the recent rhetorical blasts leveled by the Decider Guy and the Veep at Tehran, as well as the counterblasts from the mullahocracy, discomfiting the Iranians may well out weigh placating the Turks.

Short-term, the Turks (with US support, and Iraqi understanding) should be able to lower the capacity of PKK to mount attacks. They've done that much before.

Longer term, military operations are not the solution. The Kurds are not going to lose political will in the foreseeable future.

The longer term answer will have to reside in some sort of semi-autonomous Kurdistan.

The Kurds face a harsh reality.

They have to come to terms with geography, just as the Turks, Iraqis, Iranians, and Syrians have to accept the dictates of ethnic and historic identity.

The Kurds may have material resources (read oil) but without the collaboration of their neighbors, it might as well stay in the ground. Kurdistan of whatsoever size is landlocked.

Another reality on the ground is water. The Turks have spent much time, effort, and oodles of Lira on their hydro projects on the upper rivers. No matter what works out finally with respect to Kurdistan, Ankara is not going to include the dams in the deal. Neither would the downstream nations, Iraq and Iran, allow the Kurds to take over control of the faucet. It's bad enough that the Turks have it now.

There will be a fair amount of killing in the future. There will have to be a lot of tough talking between countries as well as with the Kurds--even those of the bifurcate semi-Marxist guerrillas.

How much killing as well as how and when the talking will start is in some measure up the US. Ironically the situation parallels that in Palestine. (Or the West Bank and Gaza, if you prefer.)

We all know how well American efforts at brokerage have worked there.