The Geek will not take second place to any person or group in arguing that the US invasion of Iraq four and a half years ago was the largest single foreign policy blunder committed by Washington in over a half century. Arguably, it constitutes the greatest idiocy since Wilson blew the chance to dictate a peace of exhaustion in the Great War instead of sending our forces to the trench stench of the Western Front.
In a recent and widely reported study written under the auspices of the Oxford Research Group by Paul Rogers, a professor of peace studies (whatever that might be) at the University of Blandford in England, one of the main conclusions is that only al-Qaeda benefited from the US sponsored exercise in regime change. The Geek wouldn't argue with that in the slightest. (It's been his position since the second Clinton administration.)
Before going on with a critique of Professor Rogers' effort, fairness demands a link or two. Try http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gP9Ykotg3lJT7rZ487g_LcYaIh6Q or http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7032630.stm. For a Mideast view try http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=22578. Not surprisingly PRESS TV sees the study as Nobel Prize quality--http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=26293§ionid=351020201.
Rogers not only sees the invasion of Iraq as having been an unmitigated disaster which can only be remedied by the immediate withdrawal of all foreign (read US since the Brits are already in pack-up-and-pull-out mode) troops. He also concludes on a basis which totally eludes the Geek that the displacement of the Taliban in Afghanistan was of incalculable value to al-Qaeda.
Now, if the Professor of Peace Studies had limited himself to a criticism of the tactical and operational details of the botched US and NATO effort to eliminate the al-Qaeda leadership cadre along with Taliban, the Geek would have no problem with the contention. Removing Taliban and its explicit protection and support of Osama bin Laden's group was in and of itself both necessary and proper. The way the effort was conducted according to Rumsfield's misunderstanding of the term "economy-of-force" was a soup sandwich.
Rogers is convinced that diplomacy and civil development efforts would have and will provide a sovereign remedy for the pathogen called Islamism as well as its expression Jihadism. Perhaps the professor overlooks the diplomatic attempts made to convince Taliban that it was in the regime's best interests to expel al-Qaeda. Invoking the tradition of hospitality, Taliban refused.
At this point, diplomacy of the talk sort had reached its limits. In principle, it might have been possible to offer foreign aid, trade concessions, or other forms of what, in less rarefied arenas, would be called bribes. That might have worked. It might not have. One thing is certain; prolonged attempts to cozen or bribe Taliban would have worked to the advantage of al-Qaeda.
Since all diplomacy other than identifying and building upon coinciding national interests rests on coercion and the ultimate form of coercion is war, it is not surprising the US and NATO saw invasion as the least-worst course of action. That the invasion did not bring about either the demolition of al-Qaeda or peace in our time in Afghanistan does not undercut the correctness of the initial decision in the wake of the failure of talking diplomacy.
Rogers ignored the limits of diplomacy in his consideration of Afghanistan. That was a major intellectual error. He committed an even greater error by insisting that only diplomacy would work in the future in the contest between Islamism and the West.
To be even minimally effective, diplomacy depends upon some slight coinciding interest between antagonistic states. This condition is usually met. An excellent example can be made from US relations with the former Soviet Union during the most glacial days of the Cold War in the early 1960s. Even at the lowest points in the bi-lateral relation, both Moscow and Washington had one coinciding national interest--survival.
As the details of the Cuban Missile Crisis make clear, neither side was finally willing to face the ultimate existential threat of a nuclear exchange. An appropriate compromise was developed, and both countries backed away from the edge of the atomic void.
The question that Professor Rogers and others of a similar mind need to consider is whether or not the Islamists of the world, either in power as a government such as is the case with Iran or existing as a set of hazily defined groups as in the case of al-Qaeda, have any coinciding interests with the West. In doing so, the Professor Rogers of the world might remember that there are times when the diplomatic game becomes so zero sum that no rapprochement is possible. (Since the professor teaches in England, he might think back to September 1939.)
Americans of the Rogers orientation might think back to 7 December 1941. They might consider the limits of both diplomatic negotiation and economic sanctions as they review the events which culminated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. There are many interesting and enlightening parallels between Japan's view of its role in the world then and the Islamist's perspectives today.
Professor Rogers and those who agree with him would be well advised to consider the relationship between firm resolution on the part of a state and its overall success in conducting diplomacy in the absence of coinciding national interests. Arguably, the failure of US political will in conflicts ranging from the Vietnam War to the "humanitarian" intervention in the Great Political Morass Called Somalia during Clinton's first administration bolstered not only Osama bin Laden's view of the US as a decadent country but emboldened Taliban's leaders to defy US led diplomacy following 9/11.
Demonstrating resolve is critical in Iraq today.
Yes! We shouldn't have invaded in the first place.
Yes! The current administration lied in order to justify the neocon ninnies' slavering desire to promote democracy and free enterprise.
Yes! Iraq has given a training ground to jihadists from around the world.
Yes! The ongoing war has encouraged wannabe jihadist terrorists in Europe and elsewhere.
Yes! The place is a mess politically even if the security situation is improving.
OK. The obbligatos are out of the way. Now back to the future of reality.
Leaving now with our tail tucked high and tight between our legs would only turn a bad situation into a worse one. Lack of political will, lack of resolve, will only encourage the adversary to push harder. Appeasement comes in many forms. One form of this high class word for agreement to be blackmailed is the premature abandonment of a war.
Professor Rogers, do you really, really believe on the basis of history as opposed to personal preference, predilection, or prejudice that the Tehran regime will be more likely to negotiate on nuclear or other security related matters in good faith if the US abandons Iraq?
If you do, all the Geek can say is, "You are totally gripless."
Given the professor's orientation toward civilian economic programs as a means of undercutting the appeal of Islamism, the Geek suspects that Mr Rogers, like many others, is gripless concerning the teleology of the Islamists as well as the motivations of many, perhaps most, jihadists. To paraphrase the famous campaign slogan, "It's not the economy, stupid!"
The goal of Islamism is global, existential. The motives of all-too-many jihadists is not one of economic marginalization; it arises from personal existential questions of meaning, honor, purpose in life, as well as cultural ones of family status, visions of past Islamic glory, interpretations of religious doctrine. None of these can be addressed by economic aid, access to education, or well-intended efforts at the chimera of multi-culturalism.
Overall, the Geek sees no alternative but to lump Professor Rogers' effort on behalf of the Oxford Research Group into the same category as he does the views of the "Surrender! Now!" coterie in Congress and the media. All are well-intentioned. More---
All fail to get a grip!
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment