How Do You Win Against People Who Love To Die?

Jeffery Imm asks an important question in his post today on Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org/.) Stripped to its essentials, Imm's question is how does one win aganst an enemy who "embraces death" in tactics such as suicide bombing?

He makes two correct assertions. One is that conventional military tactics seek victory through, as General George S. Patton actually said, "making the other poor son of a bitch die for his country." The other point is that the war with Islamists and Jihadists is primarily an ideological conflict.

While these assessments are correct, they do not in and of themselves answer the basic question.

Neither does Mr Imm's apparent reliance upon security mechanisms ranging from strategic intelligence to the efforts of local law enforcement agencies.

To reach the answer, a firm grip must be taken on a governing reality. It is not possible to stop all suicide attacks. That is true in the US. It is true in Europe. Even the most technologically sophisticated, most comprehensive security systems imaginable will not be leakproof.

It is the same problem which exists with air and missile defense systems. The initiative lies with the attacker. He chooses the time, place, and weight of attack. Complicating the situation is the parallel fact that it is always cheaper to increase the weight of the attack than the strength of the defense.

In defending against terror attacks by individuals quite willing to die in the attempt, the increased layering of defensive measures has the effect of introducing friction in economic, social, and political systems. Systemic frictions are additive.

A little friction, a small amount of extra delay, the marginal increase in cost, the slight uptick in suspicions, uncertainty, fear might be acceptable. Over time, individuals and institutions can adjust to the minor inconveniences, delays, costs, and paranoia.

We've seen that in operation since 9/11.

No one would allege that the post-9/11 measures are one hundred percent effective. No one would assert the current system is foolproof. That's because it isn't.

Worse, as layers of sought security are added, frictions increase. These compounded frictions can do as much or more economic, social and political damage than the terror they were intended to prevent.

Worse yet, even at a level far surpassing what would be tolerable to Americans, security measures do not guarantee safety.

Even Israel, which is far more of a garrison state than the US or any country in Europe, does not have an absolute defense against a resolute terrorist.

Step into countries such as Pakistan, let alone Afghanistan or Iraq, and the anti-terrorist situation is much worse than in the previously mentioned countries. In these war or nearly-war venues, the use of terror requires no particular competence. All that is necessary is to strap on the bomb, get behind the wheel of the explosive loaded vehicle and, at what is hoped to be the right time and place, push the button.

If the button-pusher has reached the right place at the right time, a bus filled with off-duty soldiers is blown to small fragments of plastic, metal, and body parts. If the man with the button is wrong, then a couple of children are atomized.

Paradoxically, perhaps the situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq points to the ultimate answer to Mr Imm's question.

Let's walk through it.

Remember, the purpose of terror is to terrorise. The goal of the terrorist is to directly, materially, and substantially influence the behavior and policies of the target government by creating a pervasive climate of fear among the citizens. The terrorist depends upon the civilian targets, through a process of willing self-identification with the actual victims, to act as a force multiplier.

In short, the terrorist hopes that the effects of his (necessarily) limited actions will be magnified by the fear driven demands of the civilian population among which his targets exist. The terrorists' killing actions don't directly influence the government. No. The killing drives the larger population to force the government in the desired direction.

Now, we have to remember the critical limiting factor to the potential political power of terror as a tactic. Each member of the target population must allow himself to be terrorised for terror to have any effect.

Terrorists of all ideological colors (including the commander of the British Bomber Command during WW II) have operated on the assumption that terror attacks carried on long enough and in sufficient weight will have the desired effect on the target population. Even though the historical record shows clearly that this has rarely, if ever, occurred, today's employers of terror hold the same belief.

If a close examination is made of the relationship between terror attacks directed against soft civilian targets in Afghanistan and Iraq and the consequences of these attacks within the populations, the result is surprising. It also gives the answer to Mr Imm's question.

The Geek doesn't propose to fire a barrage of numbers. Just the results of examining all the relevant, open source indicators from both countries over the past eight months.

Get a grip on this.

As Taliban shifted to terror attacks against civilian targets, the focus of resentment shifted increasingly from the US/NATO/Afghan National Army operations with their (inadvertent) civilian deaths to the insurgent attacks with their (intentional) civilian deaths.

The same dynamic operated in Iraq. As al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups bombed and shot civilians, the more-or-less uncommitted population shifted visibly from either a pro-insurgent posture or one of strict neutrality to one favoring the Multi-National Forces.

To make it simple: killing civilians is counterproductive. This truism applies whether the killing is done by an American fighter-bomber or a terrorist suicide bomber. It applies regardless of the reason(s) behind the killing. It applies regardless of who does the killing: insurgent, member of a national army, or Blackwater security guards.

Now the counter-intuitive response to Mr Imm's question. First, recognise that no absolute defense against suicidal terrorists is possible at any frictionally acceptable level of effort. Second, recognise that some deaths from terrorist operations are inevitable. Finally, while not foregoing reasonable defensive methods, when the inevitable happens, use it to consolidate political will to continue the ideological struggle.

This answer require some proactive efforts. The most important of these is educating the American (and European) publics to the reality of the current conflict--that it is a long duration ideologically based Second Cold War. Equally important is the necessity of acknowledging the reality that leakproof defense is impossible.

The next requirement is the hardest to implement. It is critical for Americans and others to recognise that there is no terror unless each and every individual in a target population makes the decision to be terrorised.

This is a gut check that few wish to be called upon to undergo.

We may not wish it. We may not want it. But, sometime in the not-too-distant future, the action of some terrorist group will demand that we undergo it.

The Geek, drawing on history as always, is willing to bet hair that we Americans have the guts to take the attack, pull together, and press on.

That is the ultimate answer to Mr Imm's question. That is how we win against people who love to die.