This Time The Leaks Really Hurt

As a historian dealing with national security affairs the Geek has been long frustrated and angered by the degree of secrecy surrounding diplomatic and military communications and other documents, even those dealing with the most mundane tactical matters.  He has fought many skirmishes with the Minions of Secrecy in order to gain access to materials forty and more years old.

Many, many times when the documents have been released (usually with more than their fair share of thick black lines scattered throughout), the Geek has been surprised that the materials had ever been classified given their content.  Many seem to have been stamped "Burn Before Reading" in order to protect egos, cover over errors of judgement, and otherwise maintain what one White House wallah called, "the mystique of government."

With that as background, the release today of a quarter million documents by the media organs favored by WikiLeaks, to say nothing of the actual WikiLeaks posting, does constitute real damage to the ability of American diplomats to carry out their most basic function.  That task, the foundation of all embassy work, is to speak candidly with representatives of the host government and report back to Foggy Bottom in full, accurate, and blunt candor.  While a degree of public prevarication is a requirement for diplomats, the need for internal honesty of fact and assessment is even more vital.

Diplomats who can not report honestly and frankly are a waste of public money.  Likewise, a host government which cannot speak bluntly with American representatives constitutes a net liability for American interests.  All hands everywhere in the world play the game the same way.  All expect blunt honesty in all internal communications.  All speak with forked tongues--a friendly, bland one for public consumption and an acidic sharp one in private.  And, most importantly, all anticipate that the bluntness will stay all in the family so to speak.

Thanks to the treacherous actions of a weasel named Brandly Manning aided and abetted by a computer system which grants automatic access to any low level person with a Secret clearance, the honesty and frankness without which diplomacy in its many, many forms has been compromised.  Over and above Private Manning is the shadowy Australian Julian Assange whose motives are declared to be pure beyond the ken of mere humans but who may well be a meretricious servant of men deeper in the dark for whom the United States and its actions are anathema.

The duo of Manning and Assange as well as their media facilitators such as the NYT have conspired and acted to cripple severely the capacity of the US to engage effectively in the normal tasks of diplomacy.  They may even have damaged the American ability to formulate and execute foreign policy for years to come.

The only upside in the current affair is that none of the documents carried the highest category of classification.  Bad as the damage done by the glimpse at the real deal of diplomatic doings has been, it would have been orders of magnitude worse had the Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information category been breeched as well.

The way in which damage has been done to US interests does not reside so much in what was actually disclosed, although some of that, such as the Yemeni president saying he has no problem with smuggled whiskey provided it is "good," will have immediate negative ramifications.  The real damage will come when foreign policy makers find some item in the revelations which provides plausible public cover in rejecting an American demarche or an American request for cooperation on a matter of what can be seen as a coinciding national interest.

Most political leaders--and all who deal hands-on with foreign policy--understand how the game is played and will be disinclined to take offense at the contents of the released documents.  Most will take a thank-God-it-didn't-happen-to-us attitude.  But there will be exceptions, some genuine and others artificial.  The exceptions may well hurt.

Also likely to hurt will be the effects of released materials upon the domestic opposition to some foreign governments discussed in the documents.  Opposition groups will go over the trove with an eye for anything, any tiny tidbit which can be exploited to the disadvantage of the man or party in power.  Foreign leaders friendly to the US are the most likely victims of this data mining process.  That will hurt, particularly if they are either forced from office or compelled by the opposition to change pro-US policies.

Another way in which the release will hurt is that it will inhibit honesty both on the part of American diplomatic personnel and foreign interlocutors both inside and outside government.  If secret materials are likely to become a matter of global knowledge, the only rational response is not to talk--at least not honestly and not to write--again or at least not honestly.

This release is no victory for the public's right to know.  Most of the materials are properly classified and awaiting declassification is no unacceptable burden on Americans or foreign nationals.  No genuine need has been served by the dreadful duo of Manning and Assange--except the needs of enemies of the United States and other civilized countries.

It Is An Insurgency In Mexico

There has been a low level rumbling sort of debate regarding this proposition: Resolved, the violence in Mexico does constitute an insurgency.  The negative in the debate argues correctly that Mexico is not so gripped with violence that it is being pushed to the edge of failure.  The advocates of the negative also contend with some accuracy that the organized cartels are not seeking any political goal such as overthrowing the government.

In the second prong of their argument, the upholders of the negative are being disingenuous.  The cartels are seeking two goals.  One is strictly commercial, the allocation of turf.  The other is political, the carving out of zones free of governmental control in which the cartels can operate freely.

Once the second cartel goal is recognized, it follows that the gunslingers are waging a defensive insurgency.  True it is a unique form of defensive insurgency, but that is what it is nonetheless.

Historically, the vast majority of defensive insurgencies have been wars of national liberation.  The insurgents have been either a self-defined and recognizable society and polity ruled by outsiders (think--the American War of Independence) or an identifiable minority living in a defined geographic region within a larger polity (think--the North Caucasus.)  In both instances the ultimate goal of the insurgents is replacement of the status quo regime by one organic to the society supporting the insurgency.

The cartels have a far less expansive goal in Mexico.  The several groups desire to carve out what might be best conceived of as "police free zones" covering the approach routes to the border and, deeper in the interior, areas where illegal products might be manufactured, grown, or stored without anxiety.

There are no indications that any of the cartels want to take over the tedious, mundane quotidian functions of government at any level.  They are perfectly willing to let those who do those jobs now keep on doing them.

Even policing is OK provided the cartels, their members, and activities are exempt.  Everything reduces to the need to conduct business without any hassles from government, press, civic society, or the church.  If and when that occurs, the insurgency will come to an end.

While the smuggling of illegal drugs may have been behind the commencement of the violence, the insurgency now exists independent of drugs per se.  President Calderon may have declared a war on drugs three years ago, but the nature of the stakes has changed greatly as the blood has flowed in ever more impressive quantities.

Even if by some miracle every American who currently uses products transported or grown in Mexico were to wake up with the thought, "Today I join the Nancy Reagan Just Say No club," and followed through, the insurgency south of the border would not collapse.  The same would apply if the morality driven majority of the American polity awoke with an attack of sanity deciding that the game of prohibition was not worth the manifold costs.

The cartels long ago expanded their scope of operations.  Not unlike American organized criminals of an earlier period, the cartel leaders have come to understand that their capabilities were cross elastic.  As a result kidnappings for ransom, hijackings, human trafficking, extortion, loan sharking, and other illegal activities have become major profit centers.

The cartels have also expanded geographically extending their networks and franchises into the US.  There are no major and few medium sized cities here which lack their local affiliate with one or more cartels.  This outreach program not only has made for more profits back home but an expansion of influence, political and otherwise, into domestic communities of Mexican descent.

With the vast expansion of capabilities and consequent cash, the cartels have too much at stake to do other than continue and escalate the insurgency.  To a significant extent the outcome of the insurgency is existential for the cartels.

The outcome of the insurgency is not existential for the Mexican central government nor the elites which support it.  The government and elite can come to an understanding with the cartels, a tacit agreement to live and let live.  Winding down the military operations would be welcomed by the many ordinary people caught in the crossfire.  It would be welcomed by the business community as the ongoing war may have not crippled investment yet, but it bodes well to do so in the not so distant future.

Ending the war, reaching an understanding, deciding to live and let live does not require the government to declare defeat.  It does not even demand an immediate pulling back of the troops and new federal agents to their barracks and offices.  All that need happen is a slow ramping down of "offensive" operations, a bit less zeal in collecting or acting upon information received, a tardy response to cartel actions.  Should the cartels respond by tamping down their violence (roadblocks, shootouts, and similar high profile activities) the tit-for-tat detente will continue.

Money will change hands.  Heads will be averted.  Brave statements will be issued.  Promises to foreign governments will be made.  But, in the real world, affairs will slip to the status quo ante.  Life will go on.

President Calderon has two years left in office.  The next election will be a referendum on his war of drugs.  To continue that war or end it will be the centerpiece of the campaign whether openly or not.  The "war on drugs" is not popular now.  It will be less so two years hence.  It is unlikely to the extreme that any amount of Merinda Initiative money will alter this fact or serve to make the counterinsurgent efforts more effective.

Improvements in intelligence sharing and more US training for Mexican forces will have some slight benefits, but not sufficient to be game changing.  In this context it must be recalled that even the most mediagenic events such as discovering a tunnel equipped with light rail running under the border, or the seizing of thirty plus tons of pot are not indications of the game tilting in favor of the law and order side.  As has been the case ever since Dick Nixon started our "war on drugs," such spectacles are mere blips on the long term trajectory.

It is fully expectable that the Mexican insurgency will come to an end shortly before or after the next presidential elections.  It will come to an end because the Mexican government and elite recognize that Mexico is not Columbia.  They will understand (if they do not already) that the outcome of the cartel insurgency is not existential for the government and elite unlike the previous case in Columbia.

Provided a Mexican equivalent of the Columbian FARC does not emerge from the scrub and sierras and the cartels remain limited in their ultimate goals, there is no threat to the traditional Mexican approach to social organization and politics.  It was the existence of FARC and other expansive goal offensive insurgent groups in tandem with the Columbian cartels which made the situation in Columbia existential for the government.

In short, the Mexican government at all levels can afford a "victory" by the cartels.  What the government at all levels cannot afford is a continuation of the social and political disruption caused by the insurgency.  The violence saps the soul of the nation, rips the Mexican social compact, undercuts the ability of the individual to have any faith in the future, to envision a tomorrow which is not worse than today.  Not even a culture as resilient or as inured to death as the Mexican can survive the current and projected onslaught of blood and disruption with equanimity.

Mexico can survive the coming to pass of the cartels' limited goals.  It can survive the inter-cartel battle for turf.  The question is what the limited "victory" of the cartels means to the US.

The establishment of "police free zones" in which the cartels can carry on their operations without any governmental hindrance will constitute a national security threat for the US.  The capacities of the cartels, their networks, their experience would facilitate the clandestine introduction of hostile personnel and equipment into the US.  And, given the established presence of agents from Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups advocating and practicing violent political Islam in Mexico in areas dominated by one or more cartels, the highest probability is the cartels will provide essential services to these groups and their state sponsors.

It is this probability far more than any fear of a further flooding of drugs or illegal aliens into the US which assures the US has a dog in the fight.  Unfortunately it is dog which cannot be named.  The Obama administration has great difficulty admitting, let alone defining, the pressing but not yet readily apparent threats from abroad confronting us.  So, rather than focusing on the most essential component of the Mexican question, it tiptoes around mouthing platitudes regarding drugs.  The anti-administration groups are no better preferring to view with alarm the matter of illegal immigrants.

While emotionally appealing both drugs and wetbacks do not have the inherent political power to force the government of the United States to take more robust action to assist the Mexicans in controlling the insurgency--or securing the border with greater effect.  Admittedly, there is little that can be done directly to counter the cartels and their insurgency given the very prickly hyper-nationalism of the Mexican public, particularly the political and chattering classes, but more can be done to stiffen the willingness of the government and elite to continue their efforts.

Some of what can be done is not politically popular given the anti-immigrant sentiments so widely spread in our society.  However, one of the most effective ways in which the US can buck up Mexican political will is a reform of immigration laws and procedures which favors the Mexican demands.  By enhancing our role as a critical safety valve for economically excess Mexicans we would put a whopping big obligation on the Mexican government as well as providing ourselves with a lever on their actions regarding the cartels.

The irony in all of this is while the insurgency is in Mexico, it is the US with the most at stake in its outcome.  This means we have no realistic choice other than defining just what is at stake and, given the long term magnitude of that stake, what we must do to help ensure the proper outcome.

Even if the insurgency is not existential for the Mexican government, in the long run it may well be for ours.

Big Surprise--China Counsels "Diplomacy" In Korean Affray

Diplomacy, what a marvelous word!  To many folks it is a term redolent of witchcraft, a magical fetish which, if waved properly and invoked with the correct ritualistic words, will neutralize threats, assure peace, and generally improve the lot of the human race.  To others the term brings to mind nothing more substantial than the optics of serious looking people hustling up and down impressive stairways, shaking hands while smiling in a uniquely Botox way, or, signing impressively bound documents.

In the real world diplomacy consists of either (1) a sincere exercise in (hard) bargaining based on identifiable, coinciding national interest with the intent of achieving a way of expanding or protecting these interests or (2) a creative way to expend much time in the hopes the underlying problem will go away or at least lose its initial force.  With respect to the Chinese call that the US and each of the two Koreas rely upon "diplomacy" in the wake of the latest bit of blatant provocation by Pyongyang, the latter interpretation is applicable.

The call for time wasting diplomacy is in China's interest.  This move along with the ever repeated urgings from the Trolls that both Pyongyang and Seoul show "calm" gives the appearance of an active Chinese interest in the affairs of the peninsula.  Imploring all parties to "talk," to "exercise restraint" and, above all, use "diplomacy" pumps the sweet fragrance of a Chinese love of rationality and peace.  The constant use of "diplomacy" also raises Chinese credit in the estimate of all those nice, well meaning folks who believe in the power of international institutions and meetings conducted by grimly smiling people around highly polished tables. This then is the magical power of "diplomacy."

By comparison any more realistic appraisal by a foreign leader to the effect that nothing will change in North Korean behavior unless and until there is a change in the North Korean regime is easily seen as some sort of primitive monger of war.  The less pleasant, but far more grounded in reality position holding that there is no call for diplomatic talks under whatsoever name until there is a firm reason to believe that some substantial end will emerge from the blue smoke and mirrors laden process is eclipsed by the higher moral position claimed by and granted to the Trolls for having used the words "diplomacy" and "calm" first and most.

The Trolls of Beijing long have been aware of the potency of invoking the diplomatic fetish, how it provides an appearance of high mindedness, of how it captures the debate by making more accurate and realistic approaches look almost barbaric in their bluntness.  The Trolls also realize that by moving quickly to wave the fetish, they can appear to be serious of purpose, mature global citizens, and world leaders for peace without having to do something in actuality.  It is a win-win for the Trolls.

It is also their only option given that Beijing has no intent of pulling in the leash on Pyongyang.  They have no desire to do anything which might perturb the succession of Kim Jong-un to the top spot in Pyongyang.  And, they well understand the processes at work to give the Number Three Son the street cred he needs to be even a nominal headman.  The occasional provocation, the deaths of a few or even a few dozen South Korean military personnel or civilians represent to the Trolls only the normal, expectable costs of an orderly change in government in Pyongyang.

The Chinese have far more to gain by their current course of support for Pyongyang than they have to lose.  Not only has the status quo in the Korean peninsula worked well from the perspective of Beijing, it is a object lesson to other states increasingly reliant upon Chinese support in the wacky world of diplomacy.

Consider Iran.  Iran and China have a web of interconnections ranging from the economic to the diplomatic.  These are equally vital to the national interests of both states.  Beijing desires to see the ties grow thicker and stronger as such will add much to China's benefit.

Iran and North Korea have a long history of close relations and mutual support.  The ties between the missile and nuclear weapons programs of both are quite strong and effective.  The Iranians have spent and will spend considerable sums to acquire devices and technology of North Korean origin in both areas.  The two countries have combined efforts on a number of fronts, most recently on the design of a re-entry vehicle suitable for the Nodong/Shihab missile.  The re-entry vehicle would, of course, be designed to hold a nuclear warhead.

More important than specific weapons or any given technology, the North Koreans have provided the example of how a country goes about the task of evading sanctions, ignoring diplomatic opprobrium, and generally cocking a snoot at the US and most of the other countries of the world.  Tehran has learned the most important lesson of all from its observations of North Korea versus the civilized states of the world.

That lesson is simple, even brutally so.  With China anything and everything is possible.

As long as the mullahs accommodate Chinese interests and desires, they can rely upon China's assistance and support.  China wants cheap oil, it gets it.  China wants lucrative contracts in Iran, these go to the Chinese.  For its part China gets oil, money, and further boosts for its domestic economy.  For Beijing and for Tehran it is a win-win game.

This is the model provided over the years by the infinitely less lucrative arrangements between Beijing and Pyongyang.  You might see the agreements between the Trolls and the Hermits as a sort of loss leader since it has led to the very profitable linkage between the Trolls and the Mullahs.

As long as China plays the right sort of mood music, the tunes of "diplomacy" and "calm," it has the necessary cover behind which it can do nothing.  As long as the Trolls go through the motions, mouth the correct mantras, Beijing can ignore the pleading of President Obama and others such as Australian ForMin Rudd to "exercise its influence" on Pyongyang.

One can be forgiven for believing that with the resources of the Agency and State Department at his disposal, the Guy in the Oval would have understood long ago that Beijing is a remorseless pursuer of its national and strategic interests.  Period.  Appeals to the mythical obligation to the "international community" are as bootless as would be depending upon the prognostications found in a Chinese fortune cookie.  Why the Nice Young Man From Chicago or members of his foreign policy "team" make these appeals boggles the mind.  Such a demonstration of pure out-to-lunchness is hard to understand--and impossible to forgive.

The real deal requires dropping the pretense that "diplomacy" can or will play any meaningful role unless and until the Hermits make necessary concessions on their nuclear and missile programs without any agreed upon in advance reciprocal actions.  The real deal requires accepting the high probability of more provocations in the future with the codicil of understanding that war is unlikely save by extreme miscalculation.

The realities of the situation also demand accepting the fact that the North has both an unlimited capacity for provocation and is inherently less prudent than the South.  This implies the US (and for its own reasons and in its own way, China) must be acutely situationally aware and fast to exercise a braking influence on precipitant actions by its junior partner.

This, in turn, is dependent upon a good eye and ear for nuance.  Understanding nuance, particularly during the inherently less stable and predictable period of regime change, is a foundational reality.  Whether the overly large, overly complicated, overly tardy American intelligence and foreign policy apparatus is up to the task of reading fine grain nuances of North Korean and Chinese behavior is questionable.

Even more questionable is the ability and willingness of President Obama and his closest senior advisors to both understand and act effectively upon the demands of nuance.  So far the record of the president and his administration gives no cause for optimism.

Gee, Mr Obama, wouldn't it be a lot more fun to be back in the Senate with nothing more important to do than to rail away at those obstructionist and reactionary people across the aisle?  It sure would be better for the world if that were the case.

Belaboring The Obvious Or Passing The Buck?

Adm Micheal Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has delivered in an appropriately stentorian tone his appreciation of the self-evident: China has a, even the, main role to play in convincing the North Korean regime to refrain from lobbing artillery shells on Southern territory, troops, and civilians.  Admiral Mullen is stating a position which is not only appealing but represents the consensus of the Obama administration.

The presumed ability of China to influence the actions of the rulers of the Hermit Kingdom of the North seems so obvious that it might appear foolish not to pass the baton on North Korean affairs to the Trolls of Beijing.  Of course, the contention that China should do the heavy lifting depends upon affirmative answers to a few key questions.

Do the Trolls really have as much juice as so often affirmed?  Do they have the influence equivalent to the dependence upon China normally attributed to North Korea?

Even more important: Does Beijing have any real interest in modifying Pyongyang's behavior in the way desired by the US, South Korea, and Japan?  What, if any, interests held by the Trolls to be important would be facilitated or advanced by becoming the carrier of American water in the Korean Peninsula?  What costs would the Trolls impose on the US for agreeing to be the point man on American policy?

Given the North Korean defining philosophy of juche, meaning national self-reliance and an absolute avoidance of even the slightest appearance of foreign "domination" even by a close "friend" and ally such as China, what grounds exist to believe that Pyongyang would capitulate in any manner to Chinese pressure or blandishments?  Can the centrality of a unique definition of nationalism and national strength trump even the capacity of China for influence?

None of these questions are without answer, but, for most of them the answer would be unpleasant to the eyes and ears of President Obama and most of his foreign policy "team."  Even more disturbing, at least for those Americans who are not part of the presidential inner circle, would be the answer to another, more basic question.

This foundation question?  By seeking to put China in the driver's seat is the administration acknowledging that  the US no longer has the ability or will to take the lead in advancing and protecting the interests not only of itself but of close and strategically critical allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the other, smaller states of the Pacific littoral who increasingly have been looking to us as the barrier against China's more expansionist and aggressive policies?

The North Korean regime took advantage of the visit by a highly qualified American nuclear expert, Siegfried Hecker, to demonstrate just how effective their application of juche has been in the area of nuclear materials production. While the exhibit of their new centrifuge cascade as well as the construction of a new and much larger light water reactor near the site of the decommissioned one at Yongbyon can be interpreted as showing how important China has been in Pyongyang's evasion of the sanctions, it can also be seen as a tribute to juche.

The Hermit Kingdom of the North has been and remains willing to provide only one half the required daily calorie requirement to its citizens, telling them to scrounge for the rest.  In essence and in the internal messages given its population every day, the sacrifice is necessary in the name of juche, the need to maintain sufficient military strength to deter the main enemies and assure national independence.  The result is simple: Nobody is happy, but most all are willing to (literally) tighten their belts if doing such keeps the country sovereign.

To put it in a slightly different way, the linkage of sacrifice with the needs of juche and the constant threats presented by South Korea, the US, Japan, and others of the "imperialist camp," provides North Korea with a degree of monolithic political will virtually beyond the capacity of a Westerner to comprehend or even imagine.  Within the context of a multi-generational cult of personality which has engraved itself on the hearts and minds of nearly every North Korean, the sacrifice-equals-independence driven political will provides the Hermits Of Pyongyang with an instrument of remarkable durability.

The impending succession of Kim Jong-un has put stresses on the leadership mechanism as well as the ties that bind leadership to population.  Unlike the long preparatory period preceding the ascension of Kim Jong-il, the current transfer of both power and legitimacy to the number three son has been taking place at warp speed.  It has been and will continue to be critical for the smooth passing of the mantel of heaven from father to son for the son to win his bones with the very hardline bunch behind the throne.

This has meant that Kim Jong-un be perceived as a tough and shrewed man, a man capable of performing actions which would crush a lesser personality.  The sinking of the CheoAn as well as the artillery stonk on Yeonpyeong island are calculated provocations intended to demonstrate the new kid's capacity and willingness to take risks successfully.

Of course the risks were far more apparent than real.  Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul want to restart the Korean War.  Neither does China.  Nor the US.  All  hands agree that war is not a winner.

The Hermits of Pyongyang must have known quite well before the sinking of the CheoAn that there would be no real repercussions.  As had been demonstrated previously by the tepid responses to the nuclear weapons test and the partially successful test firing of a prototype ICBM, the talk might be tough and the UN sanctions apparently so as well, but where the rubber hits the road the consequences would be nonexistent.  The Hermits knew they could depend upon the Trolls to play the stall game effectively and, if necessary, either veto sanctions or conspire in their avoidance.

The Trolls and the Hermits alike had appreciated the American president as having a diplomatic backbone equivalent to that of President McKinley.  They also agreed in their view that the South Korean government and people were so enamored of peace and prosperity to respond with little beyond a few unpleasant words to the sinking of a warship and the killing of a few dozen sailors.

The artillery fire mission the other day was a small escalation of the CheoAn affair.  The difference resides in the presence of civilian bodies (two) among the dead.  That difference is not sufficient to ignite a war, and all concerned knew this before the first shot was fired.

Right now the primary interest of North Korea other than assuring the succession goes smoothly is the extortion of more food aid from the world generally and the West more particularly.  As an attention getting device the shelling has worked--quite well.  The probability the food will flow in greater quantity has been enhanced particularly as the need for food--even on the terms dictated by Pyongyang which contravene normal policy--has been embraced by one time South Korean foreign minister and now UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Longer term the Hermits of Pyongyang want much more than food aid.  This is why the Hermits insist to every  (in Lenin's famed formulation) "useful fool" who happens by that everything is on the table including the nuclear program provided North Korea is treated with "respect."  What the Hermits leave out of the discussion is that the only goal worth sacrificing the nuclear and other weapons related programs is the reunification of the two Koreas under Northern domination.  The Hermits have been convinced for some years now that the best way to achieve that goal is by slowly and surely reducing the political will of South Korea and its primary supporters.  Combining provocations with stalls is a good tactic in achieving that goal.

China has no problem with the goal of the Hermits.  If anything a reunification on the terms and conditions dictated by Pyongyang would mesh with Chinese regional interests.

Reunification is a long way off at best.  Thus China has short term goals with respect to North Korea.  Most of all the Trolls want transition to go down slick and sure.  No bumps, no surprises, one Kim out and another, younger one in without missing a beat.

Beijing understands the need for Number Three Son to have the correct credentials in the estimate of the assorted powers behind the throne.  Thus they have no difficulties with provocations, even an escalating series of such.  The Trolls have full confidence in President Obama to do nothing beyond words, symbols such as joint naval exercises, and showing continued faith in the UN.  They are also sure the South Korean government is in no hurry to see Seoul as an "ocean of flame."

A companion goal for the Trolls is a burnishing of the perceptions of their power in the region.  By being seen as the key player in the Korean affair it is probable that they will be seen more generally as being what they wish to become--regional hegemon.

By passing the buck to Beijing the Obama administration has given assistance to the Trolls in their goal of enhanced diplomatic and political influence and status in the region.  And, given the contagion of perceptions common in the world, greater influence and status throughout the globe.

To answer the question which is the title of this post: The Obama administration has both underscored the apparent but not necessarily real influence of China on North Korea and passed the buck to Beijing.  By doing so the administration has simultaneously boosted the Trolls in their quest for more influence and surrendered another portion of American diplomatic strength.

Wow!  What a great way to pursue the national and strategic interests of the United States.

The Fatal Appeal Of Negotiations

Currently the US is doing the same old, same old.  As it has been for a mort of frustrating years, the incumbant administration along with its counterparts present and past have been plugging away, singing the same tired song: Negotiations conquer all.  There are three critical sets of negotiations either sort of underway,  hoped to be underway soon, or prayed to be commenced sometime, anytime.

The first of these, the one which is more or less underway, is the US sponsored direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the stated goal of a comprehensive peace agreement within the next year (or so.)  The hoped to be started soon, say on 6 December, is the next round of talking at each other with the contestants being the P5+1 group on one side of the table and the Iranians on the other.  The third, the one policy makers hope and pray may take sometime soon is the Six Power Talks involving North Korea.

Three categories of similarity link the three totems to the appeal of negotiation.  All have been and are being pushed by the US.  In all three cases strong sets of pressure and inducements have been employed--or, in the case of inducements, promised--over an extended period of time.  Finally, all are replays of earlier failures.

What makes it any different this time around?  Why should any rational person argue that one more diplomatic engagement will accomplish what all the previous ones have failed to do?

The conventional wisdom offered by proponents of give-diplomacy-a-chance has two main parts.  The first is some variant of the contention that talking is better than fighting.  The second is this time,  unlike all the previous ventures, the context has changed: The sanctions have bit hard or the Israelis recognize the time is right and the PA knows it must produce peace or face Hamas sponsored regime change.

A number of high ranking members of the trust-us-we-are-statesmen crowd have assured the American public that the latest round of sanctions which include far more restrictive measures imposed by the US and the European Union have severely undercut the Iranian economy while the pro-democracy forces have refused to knuckle under to the repressive capacities of the Tehran regime.  Objective evidence including that from official Iranian sources does indicate the sanctions, particularly those affecting Western private investment in the oil sector, have made the already bad economic situation worse.  And, there is no doubt but the pro-democracy, Green movement continues to annoy the regime.

Both amount to a "so what?" in the the actions of the Iranian government.  The Iranians well understand that the contest between itself and the P5+1 generally and the US in particular is one of political wills.  They are betting that they possess the greater political will just as they have demonstrated in all the past diplomatic soirees.  If the Iranians and the P5+1 actually sit down somewhere (the venue has not yet been agreed upon) on 6 December, the Iranians will be willing to talk about Iran's role in matters of global import, about the need for revision of the UN Security Council, about the solving of mythic global warming, about almost any and everything other than the ongoing enrichment of uranium.  The US and the others of the P5+1 want to talk about fissioning atoms only.

The Iranians have already demonstrated their ability to teach Andre Gromyko and others of the legendary Iron Pants Brigade of Soviet negotiators a thing or two about how to stall, bob, and weave, and otherwise buy time and wear out the other side's political will.  Also, as the government and its supporters are members in good standing of the Shia sect of Islam, they take great pride in the capacity of the Iranian nation to suffer, to absorb pain in the service of belief.

The net effect of the sanctions has been to engage effectively the Shia commitment of pain for belief while simultaneously boosting the Iranian sense of nationalism.  That is a powerful combination, a combination guaranteed to promote political will.

In comparison the P5+1 lacks any genuine semblance of a coherent political will.  Two of the group have shown both will and ability at skirting or flatly avoiding the imposition of the most biting of the sanctions.  Two others have excellent records until very, very recently of looking the other way as private concerns violate the sanction regime.  And, at least four of the countries have a much higher priority in solving domestic economic concerns.  Overall this means the firmness of will on one side of the table is far less than on the other.

Takeaway: The results of any upcoming "negotiations" can be summarized by a line in a Herman's Hermits tune from the Sixties, "Second verse, same as the first."

The Israeli-Palestinian talks are still on hiatus.  What else can be expected?  The PA has been relying on the Obama administration to do the heavy lifting for them.  Despite its best efforts in pressure, inducements, and hortatory talk, Team Obama has not and will never be able to produce what the PA wants and thinks it must have.

The PA wants a lot.  It wants Israel back to the 1948 Green Line.  It wants East Jerusalem.  It wants either a
"right of return" or financial compensation for those who fled the land which became Israel during the wars of independence.  Most of all it wants a two state solution as an intermediary stop on the road to a one state solution which sees the end of Israel as constituted currently.

The Israeli government is not unaware of the PA's goals both short and long term.  No Israeli government will grant the PA a free pass to those goals.  No conceivable--which is to say, politically acceptable to the American electorate--amount of American pressures and inducements will work to get the PA what it wants.

This is not to imply the government of Israel is much more flexible than its PA interlocutor.  The Israelis may be willing to exchange some undeveloped semi-desert real estate on an acre for acre basis for the land on which the "settlements" exist, but they are not about to relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem which has been incorporated legally into the State of Israel regardless of any UN or US position to the contrary.

Nor is the Israeli government (this one or any other) willing to see a hostile state come into existence on its borders, even the more expansive ones defined by the line of settlements.  Thus the insistence of an Israeli armed presence in a security zone in the Jordan Valley.  It is doubtful that the government of Israel would accept a UN force there, given the record of that organization.

It is a certainty that the Israelis will not agree to any Arab "right of return."  Financial compensation might be possible--particularly if the US pays it.

The political will of the Israelis regarding a peace agreement is made explicit in a law pending before the Knesset.  This law, which is expected to pass easily, requires a super-majority (80 out of 120 members) in the Knesset to approve any agreement containing a territorial transfer.  The alternative to the super-majority will be a national referendum.  (Can we say, "Ice cube in a blast furnace?")

In short, it is hard to see what might exist to justify any continuation of the "peace talks."  Perhaps the US should abandon the effort and cut its political and diplomatic losses.

"But, wait, Geek," you protest.  "What about the Arab League/Saudi Arabian promise of diplomatic recognition and other goodies, like overflight rights?"

Yeah, right.  And, Hitler's Germany diplomatically recognized Poland even as the panzers crossed the common border.  What a concept, twenty or so Arab League members open embassies in Tel Aviv or wherever.  That will be a new challenge for Israeli security: Keeping tabs on legions of subversives and espionage agents.  And, overflights?  EL Al has done quite well without them--and imagine the restrictions for national security and air safety as well as protecting Mecca from "Jewish pollution" which would come as a part of the deal.

Finally there is the negotiation round we keep hoping for.  The one with North Korea.  In a fine exhibit of just how much the sanction regime has hurt the country the Hermits have not only started construction of a one megawatt, thermal, light water reactor equally useful for producing either electricity or plutonium but invited an American expert to tour their new uranium enrichment plant.  Built in a mere eighteen months the new plant definitely impressed the visiting American.

The North Koreans understand political will.  The twin nuclear developments show this.  So does history.  The seemingly endless talks which finally (due to Soviet action and Ike's nuclear threat) yielded the armistice were nothing but a joint Chinese-North Korean effort at outlasting the Americans in the interlocking processes of talking about peace while fighting a war.

The North Koreans are not going to abandon their nuclear effort without gaining something very, very important in return.  Promises of fuel, food, or even "safe" nuclear reactors will not cut it with the Hermits of Pyongyang.  We already know that from the events following the 1994 quasi-agreement brokered by the Clinton administration.

As long as Pyongyang has the tacit backing of Beijing (which will  be a day or two longer than forever), the Hermits see no percentage in settling for less than reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification must be under terms and conditions of Pyongyang's liking if not dictation.  Acceptance of such by Seoul of a Pyongyang dictate is less likely than Nancy Pelosi showing a wrinkle.

So, reality asks the trenchant question, "What is there to negotiate about?"

The answer to that question is self-evident.

Perhaps the unwillingness of Americans to accept the self-evident and highly negative answers to this and similar questions demonstrates just why we are so addicted to diplomatic negotiations even when there is very little or no chance of such resulting in a good outcome.  We really are that strange and seemingly mythical creature--a peaceloving people.  Indeed we love peace so much we will keep on talking until the moment the first bullet (or missile) is fired at us.

A great strength, a great national value is also the major weakness our enemies can and do use against us.  Just comes with the territory, the territory of the unique American mind.

The Saudi Gerontocracy Gets Sick(er)

The relatively pro-American king of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah, is coming to the US for medical treatment.  The patient has presented with a blood clot which puts pressure on the spinal nerves already insulted by a bad disc.  The eighty-six year old king has relinquished his role as protector of the Haj to the interior minister, Prince Nayef ibn Abdulaziz and his role as chief of the National Guard to his son Prince Mitab.  Other ruling functions will be taken over by the eighty-two year old Crown Prince Sultan, who is returning from Morocco where he has been recuperating from surgery in the US early last Spring.

Sultan is next in line for the throne when Abdullah goes to his reward.  Coming next after Crown Prince Sultan is Prince Nayef who is currently second deputy prime minister in addition to his role as chief secret policeman.  Nayef is known to be a religious conservative thus standing at some remove from the current king and crown prince.

The feebleness of the monarchy is not enhanced by the physical frailty of both king and crown prince.  Complicating the matter of succession is the question of whether or not opposition of a significant sort exists to the ultimate coming to the throne of Nayef.  Even though the order of succession is well established and was underscored by the appointment of Nayef to the seemingly redundant post of second deputy prime minister, (done to expand Nayef's hands-on knowledge of how the game of politics Saudi style is played inside the royal tent) this does not assure automatically that the parade to the throne will go down as a well choreographed exercise.

Any palpable resistance to the emergence of Nayef has the real potential of rocking, even toppling the House of Sand.  Even if the ordained order of precedence is followed seamlessly, Nayef as king complicates US policy in the Mideast.  It might also bode a sharp increase in the so far low key conflict between Shite Iran and Wahhibist Saudi Arabia.

The whiff of instability or a shift in the orientation of the king has immediate implications for the US.  The recently culminated arms deal with Saudi Arabia might be in jeopardy.  The administration has requested a fast track approval process from Congress.  Ideally Congress would act favorably during the lame duck session but, more realistically, action will be postponed until the new Republican dominated Congress convenes next year.

Already some congress types including Republicans who support the deal at least nominally have raised the issue of what happens if there is regime change in Saudi Arabia.  The usual inference made from such chin rubbing is anxiety over the potential that the US equipment would be used against Israel.  Another contending inference is the AIPAC is flexing its backroom muscle.  Both inferences have some merit, particularly the latter as more than a few Democrats owe their continued tenure in office to the blessings by Jewish voters combining inherent progressive predilections with concern for the wellbeing of Israel.

There is another, totally different reason to take a long hard look at the weapons deal given the religious conservatism of Nayef.  Actuarial tables almost dictate that Nayef will make it to the throne within ten years and possibly much sooner.  His commitment to the austere, severe theology and practices of Wahhibism will have a number of effects, all of which will exhibit themselves quickly after Nayef takes charge.

The critical context here is the role played by Saudi Arabia in exporting Wahhibism throughout the Muslim and much of the non-Muslim world.  The copious spewing of petrodollars in support of Wahhibist mosques and madrassas has had significant impact upon the growth of political Islam to include the violence embracing portion.

Pakistan went from a country which wore its defining Islam rather lightly to a heartland of violent political Islam quickly after Zia took the Saudi money and force fed his "Islamization" program more than thirty years ago.  The Taliban may have been fabricated in Pakistan but only as a consequence, an easily foreseeable result of Saudi exported Wahhibism.  The same dynamic can be seen elsewhere from the Philippines to North Africa.

Even in the US, Saudi funded Wahhibist mosques and madrassas have served to create homegrown adherents of violent political Islam.  The same applies to the UK and much of Western Europe.

As a man far more religious in his character than Abdullah and, before him, Fahd, it may be expected that support for the Wahhibist Export Program will increase under Nayef.  As a significant, direct and positive correlation can be seen between the increase in Wahhibism and the growth of violent political Islam, it is not out of line to suggest that the same will occur to an even greater degree with Nayef serving as Guardian of the Two Mosques.

Iran threw down the gauntlet years ago, challenging Saudi Arabia for the role of regional hegemon.  To date the House of Saud has responded with the caution which has characterized most of its existence.  Given that Nayef takes his task of advancing the interests of the Sunni (even those who are not Wahhibist) against challenge by the "apostate" Shites, Saudi responses or counters are likely to become less and less restrained in the future.

As some of the more pessimistic (or realistic) observers of Iraq have predicted ever since the first American combat boot hit the ground in that country, the most probable first venue of confrontation between the mullahs of Tehran and the Sunni establishment will be Iraq.  The ongoing conflict between the triumphalist oriented Shia and the former masters of Iraq, the minority Sunnis, will not end soon, even if by some miracle the current political impasse achieves a simulacrum of solution.

The Iranians have played a semi-overt and quite aggressive program of support for their co-religionists in Iraq.  To date the Saudis have been most notable by the absence of open (or even much covert) support for their Sunni cousins.  The success of the Iranians over the past couple of years in backing both openly and otherwise the Shite political slate has undercut the often repeated assertion that Arab Iraqis will be immune to the influence of the foreign Persians regardless of religious identity.

Formerly attempts at some sort of "pan-Islam" movement have foundered on the rock of nationalism.  Historically the notion that nationalism trumps religious identity has been correct.  The growth of "fundamentalist" which is to say political Islam since the Iranian Islamic Revolution has changed the game completely--particularly with respect to the Shites.  For members of this long discriminated against, marginalized minority component of Islam, the worm has well and truly turned with the success of the Iranian Revolution and the removal of the Sunnis from their position of dominance in Iraq by the American invasion.

Again due to his religious convictions it is doubtful that a King Nayef would be deaf to the plight of Sunnis across the border.  This may not mean war in its conventional sense but it will mean conflict of a sub-war nature in all its messy extent, including restrictions on the flow of oil from three very large producers of that much prized substance.

The push by Iran for its very own "Mahdi Bomb" may, to a high order of probability, convince a King Nayef to go the same course.  There is no doubt that the other Sunni majority or dominated states of the Gulf region would seek to push Nayef in this direction.  The only alternative to a quickly developing nuclear arms race in the Gulf would be success by the US and its diplomatic partners--and this is not likely.

Then, of course, there is Israel.  Depending on the details of the regional political context five years or so from now, a King Nayef might be convinced that he has a special responsibility to remove the Jewish thorn from the side of the Arab/Muslim camel.  While a strong anti-Israel stance on the part of King Nayef may not be a for sure, a realistic possibility of such coming to pass represents a very severe challenge to regional and global stability even if an Israeli-Palestinian comprehensive peace agreement has come into existence.  (Not that anyone should bet the ranch on that eventuality.)

It would behoove the Obama administration to plan on the emergence of Nayef to power in the very short term.  The House of Saud has not been particularly stable for years.  The nature of the current king as well as the next man in line do not encourage delay in considering just how Nayef might or could alter the current context--and what, if anything, the US can do to safeguard its interests with a changed context.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration has not yet demonstrated the slightest capacity to think ahead, to plan for unpleasant but highly probable contingencies.  "Muddling through" might work for the British, and the French place great faith in their equivalent, "Systeme D," but kicking the can down the street is a very poor way for the US to conduct business in the Mideast--or anywhere.

But, as they say around the Oval, "Who has the can?"

Are They Really That Smart?

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has released a special issue of its Inspire online magazine.  This "Extra-Extra!-Read-All-About-It! release is dedicated to a single topic.  The only matter considered is the "failed" parcel bomb plot.

To AQAP's chief propagandist, the one time North Carolina resident turned full time "traitor to America," Samir Khan, the operation was not a failure.  In his typically breezy not to say cocky way, this self-proclaimed "traitor" points out that the job cost AQAP a bit over four thousand dollars but will result in "billions" of bucks in enhanced security costs to the American air cargo industry.  In terms of cost accounting, ole "Sammy" is bang on.

The jihadist publication promised a continuation of low cost, high economic damage attacks.  AQAP avers that it has hit on a new formula for successfully bringing about the collapse of the US and the West, a sort of death by a thousand paper cuts way of waging war.

The special issue also repeated the AQAP claim of responsibility for the crash of a UPS flight in Dubai which killed the two man crew.  This claim has been rejected by the officials in Dubai, but the results of a review of the crash investigation has not yet substantiated the local view that the incident resulted from causes other than a terrorist attack.  However, there has been no evidence of an on-board explosion, so the cause remains an open question.

Leaving aside the matter of the Dubai incident, the Inspire narrative does pose an interesting question for analysts.  There is no arguing against the contention that the parcel bombs have resulted in greater attention being paid to air cargo.  This attention will both cost extra money and introduce additional frictions into a critical component of the international logistics system.  Over the longer term the delays occasioned by enhanced security will bring substantial indirect costs, but not such as to cripple the industry let alone bring the US to its financial knees.

It has been known since the Pliocene epoch of terrorism that every increment in increased security brings both additional direct costs and a slew of frictions both economic and political in its wake.  By responding to terrorist incidents, the target automatically hands the terrorist a small victory.  The inevitable combination of increased costs, increased frictions, increased apprehensions, and decreased belief in the capacity of the target government to provide a satisfactory level of security exacts political and social as well as economic costs.  The current contretemps over "strip or grope" is excellent evidence of the overall consequence of security driven frictions.

Those adherents of violent political Islam who have lived in the US or elsewhere in the West such as Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki would be well aware of the dynamic of terror-enhanced security-increased frictions.  Thus the question for analysts is this: Did AQAP intend and plan the parcel bomb attack in order to inflict economic damage or is the Inspire explanation one of an after-the-fact nature?

To put it more simply: Are the operatives of AQAP as smart as Khan alleges or did the talented propagandist invent his theory to meet the facts, including the irrefutable one of failure?  In support of the second interpretation is a critical fact absent in the glowing tribute to the brilliance of the Deep Thinkers and Master Strategists of AQAP.

The missing fact?

Well, bucko, how about the cause of the operation's failure?  The attack was betrayed to Saudi intelligence by a defector from AQAP.  Actually, the man was a multiple defector.  He had bounced from terror to Saudi "rehabilitation" and then back to AQAP and finally back to the waiting arms of the Saudis.  The unlikely series of bounces hints strongly that the informant had been targeted on AQAQ by the Saudis and he then performed his task with precision.  Since penetration of hostile entities is the first line of defense and the Saudis have more than one dog in the fight with AQAP, the use of an intentional penetration asset seems quite likely.

The fact that the operation, admittedly a very clever and cheap one, was compromised fatally by a Saudi penetration asset must be more than a tad galling to the heavyweights of AQAP.  The fertile imagination of Samir Khan provided a way of retrieving a measure of success from what is otherwise a failure tinted with the humiliation of betrayal from within.

Ole Sammy makes much of the insight and intelligence of his running buddies of AQAP.  That is the reason for the article detailing not only the infernal devices but also the security systems successfully evaded.  Of course, by giving these operational details the article would seem to be undercutting the value of its promises that the campaign would continue as it provides useful grist for the intelligence and security mills of the US and other countries.

Whether AQAP continues with a focus on parcel bombs or uses another approach one thing is sure--AQAP is not going to fade away, organizational bones bleaching in some sunwashed wadi deep in the mountains of Yemen.  A second unpleasant reality will remain as well: AQAP is aware of the greatest vulnerability in the US and most of the West.  That vulnerability is the demands for more security and the inevitable costs of providing such.

We the People--and the government--must carefully consider just how much security is enough.  We must keep in mind that every time the security wrench ratchets tighter, the costs and the frictions go up as well.  There is a crossover point where the negatives of security are such as to accomplish the goals of the terrorists without a single additional terrorist act.

How close are we right now to the crossover point?  That is the question the Inspire braggadocio demands we, all of us, answer.

The (Not So) Ugly Face Of Nationalism Haunts Europe--Again

The European Union is once again facing crisis.  Well, more than one crisis to err on the side of accuracy.  The better known one, the crisis which attracts all the ink both real and virtual as well as the attention of those great beasts collectively named "The Market," is the one involving another round of EU bailouts.  The lesser volume crisis attracted the attention of EU chief magistrate, Herman van Rompey, who delivered a speech last week in which he equated the growing scepticism concerning the Union with an explosive and destructive increase of the dreaded creature from the depths of hell: nationalism.

The Eurocrats of Brussels are contractually obligated to put loyalty to the structures of the Union over national affections.  Even elected national officials are required to put the interests of their governments and people subordinate to the needs and policies of the One Big Union.  Beyond those obligations there is a sentiment abroad in the "elites" of Europe to the effect that the days of the petty nation-state are over, replaced by the One Great Society and Polity called "Europe."

The presumptions of the Euro-fanatics have prevailed even when the great hordes of the unwashed, the hoi polloi, have made it clear--as in the famed case of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty--that they want no truck with a supranational entity, another and quite suspect layer of government.  Whenever the voices of the lesser orders have shouted loud and clear, "No!," the Eurocrats and Euro-fanatics have simply changed the rules and insisted on another turn at bat, another chance to assure that the peasants get it right.

The rolling thunder of default crises which have and continue to strike the Eurozone have had the net effect of engendering an ever greater distrust in the minds of the peoples of Europe regarding not only the legitimacy of the fiat currency, the Euro, but of the political scheme which resides behind it.  Greeks have quite literally taken to the streets in opposition to the dictates of the Eurocrats which accompanied the bailout of the Greek deficit mess.  The same has occurred in Spain and Portugal.  And, threatens in Ireland.

The Irish, who are not noted for a lack of national identity and pride in that identity, have already made it plain to the Lords Protector of the EU that infringements on sovereignty are unacceptable.  The demands made by Brussels that the Irish restructure their corporate tax rate as a part of the price of Eurozone assistance is over the edge.

Imagine that, a government seeking to protect low corporate tax rates!  What is happening in Dublin?  Has the Irish parliament been taken over by a branch of the Tea Party movement?

No.  The Tea Party has remained safely confined on this side of the Atlantic.  Rather, the Irish government is well aware of the depth of hostility held toward the EU by the average Irish voter.  The government is also aware that raising the corporate taxes would be akin to severing the Irish financial jugular.  Also, comments from members of the Dail hint strongly that even the Irish political hoi olligoi is not immune to the powerful attractions of nationalism.

Even in Germany and France, the two strongest proponents of economic and political potency through international cooperation--that is, through the mechanisms of the EU--have been showing an increasingly steep tilt toward national primacy.  German taxpayers are not thrilled at the prospect of paying for Greek or Spanish or Portuguese policies of social spending largess.  The French, who have long believed that government exists only to strip the individual of his last sou and final shred of liberty, are more and more willing to see the One Big Union as being the worst malefactor in these twin threats.

Herman van Rompey is far from being alone in seeing a direct line connecting doubts about the efficacy and legitimacy of the EU to the rise of aggressive nationalism and its inevitable handmaiden, war.  Of course, van Rompey and the others of his ilk are as wrong as a cat barking.

Austria is a member in good standing of the EU.  Neighboring Switzerland is a complete non-participant in the One Big Union.  Yet the Austrian army is not mobilized on the border ever vigilant, waiting for the Swiss legions to pour across.  Nor is EU member Sweden deploying enhanced border protection against the nocturnal commando raids from non-member Norway.

Somehow, go-it-more-or-less alone Norway and Switzerland among others have managed to elude the embrace of the Union while not becoming aggressive exemplars of the sins of nationalism.  As Mr van Rompey must know in his more rational moments, there is no necessary tie between primacy of loyalty to one's home country and pursuit of that country's national interest and warfare.  The EU is not a necessary mechanism for the restraint of nationalism.  It is not a requisite for peaceful intercourse among the several European states.

The long ago precursor of the EU, the European Iron and Coal Community, was a creation, or, more accurately, a reaction to the extremes of economic and political competition which had laid the foundations for both parts of the Great European Civil War of the early and mid Twentieth Century.  The original concept actually was formed before German tanks rolled across the Polish border and was well rooted in a proper but narrow interpretation of the conditions which had brought World War I.

The initial Iron and Coal Community worked well.  It worked so well that it quickly expanded into the Common Market.  The Common Market, as the name makes explicit, was a customs union.  As such, it worked to the mutual benefit of its members.  But, as it was a limited institution, it made no claim upon the primary loyalties of individual Europeans.  It made no political demands.

Even in its limited role, the Common Market did not enjoy universal approbation.  French farmers, Italian factory workers, German industrialists all found more than a few reasons to oppose the Market.  Nonetheless, the Market was reconceptualized as a political as well as economic institution.  Leaving aside all the fits, starts, zigs and zags, the Common Market ultimately morphed into the EU.  Along the way, the Eurozone was fabricated, a common currency without the mechanisms of a central bank or an aggregate device of economic governance.

In both its initial and later, Lisbon Treaty based form, the EU was the creation of the political and opinion molding elites of the member states.  The people of Europe were not consulted.  At no time other than the Irish referendum did the hoi polloi have a seat at the table.  This was not oversight.  It was intentional as the self-appointed sophisticates of the elites did not trust their own citizens.  That was true at the beginning; it is true today.

The EU in both its dot one and dot two forms were crammed down the collective throats of Europeans generally in a manner identical to the passage of Obamacare here.  Not surprisingly, the peasants have not been pleased, with the result there is a strong current of resentment, a strong desire to vomit the cram down back in the faces of those who did the cramming.

The current and continuing deficit contretemps has given both a motivation and a focus for those who feel strong discontent with the Union.  The Eurocrats are well aware of this.  The European Parliament as well as the executive entity have attempted to deflect the worst effects of popular rejection by developing a series of ploys which can be seen as a European version of the American federal government's technique of unfunded mandates.  The idea is to displace both responsibility and political blame to the national governments, which are required by the Union to undertake unpleasant and expensive actions.

Nifty, heh?  By displacing all unpleasant and politically costly actions onto national governments, not only is the EU held harmless but is actually enhanced.  Popular anger directed at national governments can be massaged to become support for the Union.  The EU regime can be portrayed credibly as the savior of the common man in a way resembling the elevation of the US federal government as a moral pinnacle compared to the reactionary state governments during the salad days of the civil rights movement.

Whether the Eurocrats will win is both unclear and debatable both as to probability and longer term effect.  Should the stresses on the Eurozone cause the collapse of the Euro as a credible circulating medium, the shock waves will not be good for the Union.  However, should the Union fail, the failure will be limited to the overreach of entering the sphere of politics, of power over the lives of individual citizens of European countries.  In effect, this would mean the Union would revert to the days of the Common Market.  It is arguable that this would be a very real benefit for Europeans both as individuals and as nation-states.

As President Obama meets with leaders of the Union's member states (for a scheduled two hours) on the sidelines of the NATO conference, he might be advised to consider that the EU and his administration are staring failure in the face for the same reason.  Both he and the Eurocrats held the views and convictions of the average citizen in contempt.  Both he and they refused to accept the voice and views of the citizens, listening only to like minded members of their respective elites.

Or to put it very simply: Both President Obama and the Euro-fanatics forgot that the common citizen, the hoi polloi had minds--and votes--of their own.  Both Mr Obama and his counterparts in Europe must now pay the price.  And, so Mr Obama has.  And so they will.

The Loonies Keep On Running The Asylum--And One Exception

By nature and education the Geek is a historian.  Specifically he is a historian of military, diplomatic, and national security affairs and affrays.  This means he has a broad vicarious experience with the idiocies, asininities, and flat out lunacies which have characterized the policies and actions of the US and other governments over the past few centuries.  In the direct experience department the Geek has witnessed up close and personal the witlessness of the same over a period of more than thirty years.

The Geek mentions these salient parts of his life neither to brag nor to buff his credibility in writing on the contemporary morass of US foreign, military, intelligence, and related policies.  Rather, it is to underscore his high tolerance for emotional and intellectual suffering.  Of late even this capacity has been sorely tested, tested beyond its Young's Modulus even.

The Obama administration is responsible for this unpleasant and unprecedented moment in the Geek's long and peripatetic life.  The Nice Young Man From Chicago and his numerous ideological soulmates as well as various and sundry mid-level minions have been involved in a farrago of ineptitude which not only boggle the mind but demand an impossible degree of willing suspension of disbelief if to be taken as the product of mature and considered judgement.

One illustration of the dynamics in play is the Don't-Touch-My-Junk explosion.  More accurately, it is the response of the TSA to the stand by one man in San Diego's airport.

The necessary starting point in any assessment of the TSA, or its parent outfit, Der Heimatsicherheitsamt to the unexpected Peasants' Revolt epitomized by the the Hero of "Don't touch my junk!" is simply acknowledging the foundation truth that the humiliation of passengers in the name of security adds not one whit of genuine safety to airline travel.  The "Strip or Grope" mentality is as functional in providing security as would be mammary glands on a bull.

While it is unfashionable in the social and political circles in which Mr Obama and his fellow travelers are welcome, the circles established by the self-appointed elites of academia, journalism, and the law, the down and dirty truth is airline security is threatened by a discrete and definable segment of the human race.  The nature of this segment is made clear in a recent report by one of those "executive security" consultancies.  The report (the Geek knows he should have a link here, but he made a series of wrong clicks and lost it--a misdemeanor augmented by his extreme laziness which precludes going back to find it) showed that in nine of the top ten terrorist infested countries, the terrorists were adherents of violent political Islam.  (The lone exception was Columbia.)

Anyway the cookie is crumbled, the vast majority of terrorist actions over the years since 9/11 (and most of the preceding twenty as well) were perpetrated by Muslims, practitioners of violent political Islam, AKA jihadis, jihadists, Islamists, Islamic separatists, radical extremists, and a host of other more or less euphemistic monikers.  This rather excludes most customers of American airlines.

To put it terms even one of the high school dropouts recruited by TSA: Potential terrorists are not randomly distributed among the population of the US.  Even when considering the problem of homegrown wannabe martyrs, the potential threat is limited to a very small and quite discrete group: Muslims.

This implies strongly that focusing efforts on the small population will not only save the majority of travelers from the studied humiliation and degradation of the "strip or grope" policy but have a far greater chance of actually stopping or deterring potential martyrdom seekers.  To put it in a politically incorrect way: Profiling is the answer.

Anyone with any experience in security, intelligence, or street policing--and many who lack that sort of hands-on experience--can attest that profiling is used everywhere and everyday by everyone responsible for law enforcement, security, and intelligence.  Heck, it is used everyday by all of us when deciding if we should cross the street to avoid an oncoming stranger--or answer a knock on the door in the hours of darkness.

Profiling is not racist.  It is not xenophobic.  It is an experience based means of rapidly and effectively organizing data, putting perceptions into a useful pattern, making quick and accurate appraisals of unexpected encounters.  It is part of the quotidian human experience.

The methods of identifying potential high risk travelers have been well established and are capable of continuous refinement.  The use of augmented profiling techniques by well trained and field experienced individuals has been use for years in Europe.  (The Geek has always been impressed by the virtually invisible middle aged men standing in a concourse observing while not seeming to do so, scanning the crowd for the one in a million or so people who is in genuine need of enhanced screening.)

Were it not for the ideology of hyper-sensitivity in American politics today, we would be doing the same, openly and proudly.  Were it not for the unintended but predictable consequences of the "politics of victimization" produced by the civil rights movement of the Sixties, we would be free to profile away and by doing so both enhance internal security and public trust in the organs of state.

Absent profiling and with a massive contempt for the public it is supposed to "protect," the TSA has fallen back on a defense in depth approach to guarding its sovereign authority to act the part of the bully.  As part of its defense the Tyrants have proudly trumpeted the "fact" that their screening has prevented 130 "dangerous or illegal" items from being brought on board aircraft.  The Tyrants would not identify the items, citing "security concerns" but did mention a ceramic knife and--hang on for this one, its a hoot--a hypodermic needle and syringe containing heroin.

Now heroin may be illegal, but is it a security threat?  A danger to the traveling public?  Does someone over at TSA or DHS envision the passenger rushing the cockpit, kicking in the reinforced door and then, while shouting, "Smackheads Rule!" running up both pilots with an OD?  Wowie!  Zowie!  Bet old Osama wishes he had thought of that one.

It is to be hoped that the Peasants' Revolt, the Don't-Touch-My-Junk movement will call a time out in the lunacy of TSA.  One can hope that it will occasion a rethinking of domestic air security so that manpower and money will be focused, focused on the real threats--the contents of the cargo bins and the intentions of individuals who meet the criteria of experienced based profiling.

Loony strike number two.  Think Pakistan.  As we all know from the uncountable assurances from usually credible people such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton, Pakistan is not only our good ally in a common struggle against violent political Islam, but any "bad" things once done by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been ended.  If those warranties were not enough then we must all be quieted in our apprehensions by the repeated statements from Pakistani officials to the effect that even if ISI had backed Taliban and the Haqqani network in the past, the boys in spookland were no longer doing so.

Right, dude, fer sure.

Comes now an article in The Nation which is hardly a bastion of right wing nut rantings.  The article details the direct involvement of ISI in the daily affairs of the Haqqani network and Taliban in Afghanistan.  Specifically, the article recounts the role played by ISI as a peacmaker between rival factions following the escape of NYT reporter David Rohde from his Afghan captors.  As the account deals with actions taken in recent months, the announcements of ISI's change of heart are, shall we say, called into doubt.

The reality is far divorced from the soothing mood music played without letup by the current administration and its assorted factotums or apologists.  Pakistan is not, repeat, not an ally in a common cause with the US and other civilized states.  It is a country the government of which is pursuing a narrowly defined national interest in Afghanistan which runs counter to the goals of both the Afghans and the US.  Pakistan's government and military cooperate with the US only to the minimal extent necessary to facilitate the flow of cash from Washington to Islamabad.

Unless and until the administration rectifies its totally erroneous stance regarding Pakistan, the effort in Afghanistan will be prolonged unnecessarily.  It is past time for President Obama to engage in some of that "hand to hand combat" which he seemed to relish with respect to Republicans only a few weeks ago but this time with Pakistan.  It is past time for the US to "tilt" even more in the direction of India.  It is past time for the US to let the Pakistanis know without any doubt that the days of the money flood are over.  It is past time for the administration to tell the Pakistanis clearly that unless they play we will no longer pay.

Lunacy, it has been argued, consists of doing the same thing over and over again even though the action brings no positive result.  That has been the case with our policy to Pakistan.  Just because the George W. Bush administration got it dead wrong in Pakistan is no excuse for the current bunch to keep on making the same disastrous mistakes.  Obama maintained that he was different from George W.  It is time he make it so regarding Pakistan.

Now for the one exception.  The US Marines are bringing fourteen M1 tanks to their area of operations.  This  move was first desired more than a year ago when the jarheads first entered Afghanistan in force.  At the time it was denied for fear it might alienate the locals with their memories of the armor heavy Soviet forces back in the Eighties.  The Marines renewed their request in recent months.  This time it was approved by General Petraeus.

He made the right call.

Generally armor is not too useful in counterinsurgency operations but in the present case it represents an important addition to the Marine's combat capacities.  The 120mm main gun on the M1 provides a long range, instant response direct fire capability quite useful in the open terrain areas currently under Marine tactical responsibility.  The direct fire is more accurate than indirect fire from artillery.  The tanks can move with the troops and be available faster than air delivered fire.  Finally, the accuracy of the 120 will limit the probability of collateral civilian casualties.

Fourteen tanks is not a massive number.  Most Afghans, even those in the Marine TAOR will be unaware of their presence.  Certainly the introduction of a company of MBTs is not a sign of desperation or impending defeat.  Rather, it is a belated and easily justified move which will tilt the advantage further in the favor of the Americans and their in-country ally.

The exception here underscores the sheer lunacy extant at the policy levels of the US government.  If only the folks topside had as firm a grip on the realities of the world as do the Marines and General Petraeus, we would all be better off.  Perhaps the difference between the realistic views down the food chain and the what-planet-are-they-living-on? perspectives demonstrated at the top arises from the fact that the guys way down deal with real matters, matters of winning or losing, living or dieing while Mr Obama and his associates have been breathing overly rarefied air, the air of the elite so long their brains have suffered as a result.

Life behind well polished desks or around glittering conference tables leads to a fatal lack of appreciating the exigencies of life in the real world.  The Marines and those responsible for their lives have lived long in the most grueling of environments.  As a result they lack the luxury so available to those at the highest level of government--the luxury of ignoring reality and embracing lunacy.

The Yemeni Dilemma

The rapidly collapsing state of Yemen is on the verge of becoming a serious rival to Pakistan's FATA as a secure base for groups advocating and practicing violent political Islam.  Foreign fighters displaced from Afghanistan and elsewhere by successful security operations are coming to Yemen as a sort of evil twin to the Haj.  Along with genuine foreigners are sizable numbers of denizens of the Arabian Peninsula returning to familiar deserts and barren mountains from their travel-broadens-the-mind sojourns in combat zones ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan and other, even more exotic, climes.

These early birds of passage will be followed by others as the operations in Afghanistan and from the sky over the FATA become ever more lethal and thus discouraging to the Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith.  Yemen seems destined to become even more of a center of violent political Islam as more and more muscle is added by the returnees.

There is no doubt but Yemen and its Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) are the most attractive venue for those folk dedicated to the tenets of violent political Islam.  Yemen is an ungoverned and perhaps ungovernable place with a physical and human terrain seemingly ideal for the propagation and growth of AQAP.  The attractiveness of Yemen is in no way lessened by the talents of Anwar al-Awlaki as is hinted at by the flow of wannabe martyrdom seekers from Western Europe, the UK, and the US.  Thanks to the Internet, Yemen is only a click or two away from anywhere on Earth.

The Yemen dilemma is both real and pressing for American decision makers.  Individuals based in its so far very hospitable environment constitute a genuine threat to CONUS as events of the past year have brought home with appropriate drama.  At the same time the government of Yemen has demonstrated a pervasive lack of political will and competence in confronting the AQAP such as to make the government of Pakistan appear to be a frothing-to-fight bunch in comparison.

Yemen's internal problems ranging from exceptional poverty to the ongoing nature of two insurgencies to the ever increasing shortage of water to an unsupportable population growth assure the government lacks the resources and legitimacy necessary to take on AQAP even if it wanted to.  Further exacerbating the weakness, not to say impotence, of the government is the intensely tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture.  Of course, the government in no way helps its cause by exhibiting a level of corruption and nepotism which would make the old Dick Daley machine in Chicago drool with envy.

Since the Yemeni population is characterized by a degree of prickly nationalism which surpasses even that of the Mexicans, the capacity or the desirability of the US to enter the conflict directly is nil at best.  Realistically, any direct, evident American presence in Yemen would be counterproductive.  It is not, as Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the US does not "need" another war but rather that any attempt to wage war in Yemen would be to assure failure.

Even the relatively low footprint usage of Predators and other UAVs is not really safe.  Yemeni tribesmen are aware of the Predators overhead and resent their drone overhead even when no Hellfire missiles are forthcoming.  Perhaps the initial reaction to the arrival of the Predators would not have been so negative had the US not used Tomahawk cruise missiles in an ill-advised and failed attack to take out a high value personality about a year ago.  The attack may not have killed its intended victim but did manage to terminate with the utmost of prejudice a number of civilians including women and children and a well respected high ranking member of the local government.

About the only military activity the US can undertake without unacceptable risks of an unintended, counterproductive outcome is training selected Yemeni personnel and providing logistical, intelligence, and procurement support.  This level of assistance would be "safe" and might have some benefits for the local central government but will not defeat AQAP.  It will not abate nor measurably lessen the threat to the US resident in Yemen.

Even the capture or killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, desirable and emotionally satisfying as such might be, would not alter the state of play in Yemen in favor of the US.  Nor would a more robust Saudi presence in Yemen, even if the House of Sand could be persuaded that such might be in its interests.

The task of making the human terrain of Yemen unsuitable for the continued growth of violent political Islam is one of establishing effective governance in the place for the first time in modern history.  This in turn means assisting the government of Yemen in winning the crucial bones of perceived legitimacy.  Due to the tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture, the legitimacy must be functional as it can never be inherently existential, not until the primary loyalty of the individual Yemeni focuses on the state rather than the tribe.

The "soft" power instruments of the US are both available and appropriate for the task of enhancing the perceived functional legitimacy of the central government.  In considering this the Geek is reminded of the time in the early Seventies when he encountered Mideastern students, including those from Yemen (among whom was the father of Anwar al-Awlaki) who were attending New Mexico State University (NMSU.)  The majority of these men (and they were, unsurprisingly, all male) were taking courses in dry land agriculture, hydrology, and similar real world, severely practical matters.  All intended to go back home and apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills to the very real and pressing problems there.  Mr Awlaki senior was in no way different from the majority.

Forty years ago NMSU and other state schools had rather large programs supported by the State Department and USAID to find, recruit, and educate a new generation of technically competent leaders in most of the states of the Mideast and North Africa.  Schools such as NMSU had much experience in dealing with the sort of problems confronting countries with limited rainfall, extensive dry lands, periodic flooding, and the other disasters which limit agricultural development in places such as Yemen.

For various reasons including a desire by students to do work in areas ranging from political science to urban planning, the basic efforts pioneered with success in the Sixties and early Seventies fell increasingly by the wayside.  The situation in Yemen demands that the State Department, USAID, and relevant universities reinvigorate the old approach with haste.

Agricultural shortfalls coupled with water scarcity, population growth, and the economic displacement of current farmers represent a critical area in Yemen's present capacity for survival as well as its longer term prospects.  A crash program focusing on these considerations with an emphasis on eduction of locals would rebound to the credit of the US and the government of Yemen alike.  Insofar as the current deficiencies are addressed and future talent developed, the perceived functional legitimacy of the Yemeni government will be enhanced.  At the same time the demonization of the US would be lessened--perhaps even ended.

Beyond legitimacy enhancement and life improvement efforts, the US can assist the local government in properly exploiting the inherent provincialism and tribal loyalties of the several tribes against AQAP.  As the number of foreigners entering the tribal homelands increases, there will be more and more frictions with the locals.  Every time and ever place where foreign fighters have embedded themselves with local coreligionists, the consequent frictions have outweighed the ties of Islam.  To a Yemeni even a Saudi is an outsider, a person who may be entitled to hospitality and protection but also a person who can overstay his welcome or abrade the customs of hospitality by his arrogance or indifference.

An awareness of and exploitation of tribal sentiments, norms, and values can serve the coinciding interests of the US and the Yemeni central government.  The US has already shown its awareness of the intense xenophobia which characterizes many of the Yemeni tribals.  All that is needed now is an informed program conducted with and through the San'a regime to exploit these norms and values to the disadvantage of AQAP and even "homeboys" such as Anwar al-Awlaki.  (The least-worst solution to the problem of Anwar is for him to die at the hands of an insulted local tribesman.)

The really nifty thing about Yemen is that it provides an excellent venue to explore not only smaller footprint means of waging military counterinsurgency but ways of engaging soft power tools to promote the perceived legitimacy of the threatened host government.  To do this successfully all hands in Washington and San'a must understand that stability and peace alike rest on the twin pillars of properly employed coercion including lethal force and enhanced popular perceptions of governmental legitimacy.  The fact that Yemen is almost as bad off in the governance area as Somalia not only makes the challenge greater--it will make the success all the more compelling when (and if) it happens.

Resetting The "Reset" Button?

Life is getting tougher for the Guy In The Oval in the old foreign relations corral.  You know matters are heading down the tubes when Afghan president Hamid Karzai demands--in the WaPo no less--that the US, in a term beloved by noted pundit Sarah Palin, "cease and desist" in executing the highly successful nighttime raids on suspected Taliban and Haqqani sites.

Admittedly this latest twist in the Saga of Hamid puts one in a position of accepting the diagnosis of manic-depressive psychosis once offered by Ambassador Eikenberry.  In the real world the probability of the hours of darkness operations taken always in conjunction with Afghan National Force members being halted is somewhat less than Ron Paul voting to expand the powers of the Federal Reserve System.  Hitting the heavyweights, the hard core of an insurgent group with a rapid tempo is a highly effective means of degrading both the combat efficiency and political will of the target groups.

The fact that some Afghans are bothered by the notion of women and children being rousted by Americans whose combat kit makes them look about as sympathetically human as the Imperial Stormtroops of Star Wars fame is a case of TS.  A few hurt Islamic sensibilities is a small cost to pay for the prospect of genuine lowering of the violence, the blood and death which falls disproportionately on the same civilian population.  Even Karzai must be aware of this governing reality and its necessary corollary: You can't be president of anything if the purveyors of violent political Islam take over or even remain as a viable, nascent threat to the Kabul regime.

The takeaway from the latest gust from the mouth of Hamid is simple:  This too will pass.  Swiftly.

The same realistic optimism cannot be applied to the growing frictions between the Obama administration and the Dynamic Duo in the Kremlin.  The festering issue of American ratification of the pending new START is developing with the rapidity of a case of gas gangrene.

Senator Jon Kyl, (R) Arizona, who is the point man for the GOP on the START ratification, has cut Mr Obama off at the knees.  Obama was so ill-advised (or so unrealistically certain of his own political juice) that he assured Russian president Medvedev that the treaty would be brought to a successful conclusion during the lame duck session.  Kyl has demurred.  This means the treaty in all its contentious whole will linger on until the next Congress with the increased Republican presence in the Senate.

The administration has attempted to sweeten the deal--or, more accurately--has genuflected to Republican fears that the new version of START will limit the capacity of the US to upgrade and modernize its rather elderly nuclear arsenal.  The difficulty comes in that the money pledges are scheduled over a ten year period with no enforceable means of assuring that future administrations and congresses will honor the promises.  Kyl and other Republicans want more money upfront so that work can be started and a dynamic created to make future funding more probable.  On this the current administration has dragged its collective feet.

Overall, the new START is a decent treaty.  It does, as usually has been the case in this sort of matter, give advantages to the Russians.  However none of these seriously alter the balance of terror which has worked so well so long to keep the peace between Russia and the US.  Ratification would provide a reasonably firm basis for other agreements on "tactical" nuclear systems, for example, or a new and more comprehensive test ban understanding.  It might even serve to increase mutual confidence such as to allow the Kremlin to work with the US in the anti-ballistic missile arena.  A creative and mutual understanding in this area would serve both countries' interests in a measurable way.

When the proposed treaty is finally brought to the Senate, the debate may be quite contentious.  There are more than a few Republicans there who are unreconstructed Cold Warriors who seem to believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union was some sort of shrewd commie plot.  There is a bit of truth here, but not in the way presumed.

Vladimir Putin shows both his age and background in his fundamental distrust of the US.  The current prime minister and past (as well as possible future) Russian president is rather much of the Cold Warrior himself albeit in more nationalistic ways than his predecessors of the pre-1991 sort.  That is why he has so obviously left the America brief in the hands of Medvedev.  Putin anticipates failure and is not going to have the tar of catastrophe sticking to his hands.  The Bare Chested Man On Horseback sees the US as the Main Enemy to this day and his attitude is not going to change for the better.

This is another good reason to ratify START.  A quick and relatively low contention ratification process will weaken Putin's hold on the internal levers of power in the Kremlin coterie.  The relative reduction of the power of Putin's anti-American view will enhance the possibilities of enhanced cooperation in the myriad of matters of coinciding national interest which rest on the table currently.

Putin's suspicions about and distrust of the US received a shot of steroids with the sudden, unannounced rendition of Viktor Bout by the government of Thailand.  Bout, a long time international dealer in weapons whose favored customers were rogue states and insurgent or terrorist groups, was indicted for violation of US law following a Drug Enforcement Administration sting operation.  Arrested in Thailand the legal wrangle was finally settled in favor of the American demand that the man be extradited for trial in the US.

When the rendition went down the Russians screamed bloody murder.  It was an unusual event.  Even the Russian foreign minister got into the act.  Rarely, if ever, has an international criminal received such massive and vocal support from the government of a major state.

To the Russians--who had used any amount of pressure and inducement to free Bout from the clutches of the Thais--the extradition as well as the process leading to it were redolent of American arrogance, of the sort of unilateralism regularly decried by Vladimir Putin back in the days of George W.  His foreign ministry and other organs of official opinion singled out the unwillingness of the American side to put its case on the table for mutual examination and joint determination.  This perspective is not uniquely Russian but the passion with which it is stated is as Russian as Ivan the Terrible.

There is, of course, more than insulted Russian national ego involved in the Bout Affair.  Faced with a horrific number of years as a guest of the Bureau of Prisons, there is a chance that Viktor will have an attack of the Talking Disease.  Certainly there are a lot of questions the US would like to place before the one time Russian air force interpreter.  We would like to know just how he got his hands on the more major weapons he peddled.  And, it would be interesting to determine who authorized the use of Russian Air Force transports to carry his "private enterprise" cargo.  The list goes on at some length but you get the point, eh, bucko?

Bout knows where the bodies are buried.  He knows just how ranking the buried bodies are.  He has a set of very good reasons to dime out anybody and everybody.  This gives Viktor a great capacity to produce fear in major sections of the Russian elite both in and out of the government and military services.

Coming hard on the heels of the revelations regarding the defection of a very high ranking spook in the successor agency of Vladimir's alma mater KGB, the prospects of the damage which a fast talking Bout might do is and will cause sleepness nights in the Kremlin and its ancillaries.  Both the Bout Affair and its spook community predecessor have heightened the Putin fear and loathing of the US.  Any delay or modification of the proposed START ratification process will do the same only more so.

President Obama will be meeting the "good cop" of the Dynamic Duo in the context of the upcoming NATO conference at which the top topics will be Afghanistan and the (not officially of course due to Turkish sensibilities) anti-Iran missile defense system.  Both subjects would be benefited greatly by Russian cooperation.  At this juncture, due to the ability of Mr Obama to promise what he cannot deliver and the bonfire of the Bout Affair, this cooperation is less rather than more likely.

In terms of US national interest Medvedev is greatly to be preferred as an interlocutor over his higher profile and nominally junior prime minister, Putin.  It is important, therefore, that both Mr Obama and the Republicans understand this as well as the ground truth that Russia is not going to go away.  It is not and never has been--pace the unfortunate and misguided remarks and policies of George W. Bush and, later, Joe Biden--one with Nineveh and Tyre.

The Russians and the Russian leadership are both insecure and possessed of a prickly sense of national pride. In all diplomatic doings including presidential promises this foundation reality must be kept in mind.  Russia is, at least in the minds of Russians high and low, a Great Power, and it is an absolute imperative that the US treat it as such in all matters, great and small.  Only by doing so with the utmost of sedulousness can the US hope to accomplish critical matters of central national interest.