The G-20 Leaders Must Be Stupid Too.

Since the president of the United States and his supporters generally have delivered themselves of their considered opinion that the reason the US electorate gave the nod overwhelmingly to the Republicans was the sheer inability of We the People to comprehend the brilliant success of the progressive agenda, it will be surprising if the president and his people do not come to the same conclusion regarding the nineteen non-US heads of state assembled in Seoul.  How could it have been anything other than either (1) fear or (2) lack of intellectual horsepower which caused the Other 19 to fail to agree with the Obama assessment that the world needed more stimulus and less deficit reduction.

Since it is apparently impossible for Mr Obama to see that he is swimming upstream while all others are headed downstream,  there can be no rational explanation for the rejection of the stimulus heavy approach espoused by the American administration--and a handful of survivors in Congress.  An akin explanation must apply to the severe questioning not to say cross-examination given Mr Obama regarding the current US policy of cheapening the dollar.

The experience must have been unpleasant for the Nice Young Man From Chicago.  He was no longer the man of the hour, no longer the cynosure of the good, the true, the beautiful, the utopia of hope and change.  He was, it seems, not even first among equals.  The pride of place which has so long and seemingly without effort belonged to the US and its president seemed to have slipped insensibly to a land far, far to the east.

The president's discomfort was all too evident at the press conference where he attempted to claim that he had lost no "clout" simply because the American voters had chosen the way they did a few days earlier.  In the face of reportorial doubt, Mr Obama kept insisting that dealing with the Trolls of Beijing had been just as hard in those now long gone halcyon days of exoatmospheric popularity.  The election, he kept repeating, had done nothing to weaken his hand on the global stage.

Showing a generosity in defeat worthy of tennis at its finest, Mr Obama made nice noises in the direction of Beijing.  There is no doubt but the Trolls bested the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval on the matter of currency revaluation.  There is equally little doubt but the Trolls left Seoul with a bit more swagger than when they arrived.  They were home free on the little issue of artificially low value for the yuan.  And, best of all, no one supported the US demand that change be made.

The president was equally unsuccessful in selling the American policy of "quantitative easing."  The consensus among most of the Other Nineteen was the US sought to displace the real costs of its current and past government borrowing sprees onto the lenders as the net long term effect would be inflation cheapened dollars.  Considering the vast quantity of Treasury notes held by China it isn't too hard to guess what country was most displeased.  Of course, other countries such as Germany which are heavily export dependent as well as being direct competitors with the US may have been rather less worried about the long term value of their holdings than about the short range impact of lower costs for American made merchandise.  (Bad Geek! Only a cynic would think that.)

Regardless of the merits of the positions taken by Mr Obama, the name of the game in Seoul as in all international meetings, multilateral or bilateral, is "power."  And. as the flaccid final communique demonstrated, while the US might have influenced the agenda, it did not have any discernible impact on the results.

The Other Nineteen made the same basic evaluation as had the majority of the voters here just over a week ago.  The determination was simple.  Mr Obama had lost the juice because his policies were as wrong as a cat barking.  The explosive development of the American deficit on Obama's watch coupled with the determination shown by the president to keep on with the same old toss-money-by-the-supertanker-load approach to economic and political life to assure a loss of confidence in the good sense and judgement of the American president.  This conclusion would have been exacerbated in effect by the uncertainty attendant upon the Republican gains in Congress.

There must have been a subtext of genuine apprehension in Seoul regarding the impact of divided government prevailing for the next two years in Washington.  Given the strident ideological tone of the election on the part of both parties, apprehension as to what might play out and how it will effect the American economy and deficit was justified.  It becomes even more justified given the persistent inability of Mr Obama to act the role of decisive leader as opposed to temporizing, academic quasi-intellectual able to see all sides of the same issue.

Had Mr Obama shown any skill at leadership, any willingness to both say "here I stand, I can do no other" and act accordingly, the reluctance of others in the Nineteen to follow an American lead would have been lessened.  Put bluntly, Mr Obama has shown himself non-credible as an international leader.  He has neither the force of personality, the strength of character, or the constancy of action to serve the demands of imposing one's will on the heads of other states, heads which are able, egoistic, and committed to the national interest of their own countries.

In comparison, the Trolls of Beijing are totally credible.  Their policies are consistent, realistic, and serve national interest completely.  The words and deeds of the Trolls coincide.  They are predictable--and predictability is the greatest asset a government can have in international politics.  While there is much to criticize regarding the stance and policies of the Trolls, one is sure as to what they will do.

The same applies to other players both developed and emerging.  The governments of France, Germany, the UK, Russia, India are all predictable.  None are diving off the highest precipices of ideology.  All are pursuing well established, easy to understand national interest.  In short, they are reliable.

When the national interests and consequent policies of each of the G-20 states is examined closely, it is evident the US and its current president are the odd one.  Alone, the US lacks both a congruent foreign and international economic policy schemata.  Alone, the US lacks a clear, readily comprehended, clearly stated set of national interests.  (Slogans regarding the desirability of more American jobs do not count.)

The Other Nineteen individually judged the adequacy of American policies--and the American president.  Both came out wanting.  In short, these leaders and their advisors confirmed the earlier judgement of We the People.  There was nothing stupid about that.