Are They Really That Smart?

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has released a special issue of its Inspire online magazine.  This "Extra-Extra!-Read-All-About-It! release is dedicated to a single topic.  The only matter considered is the "failed" parcel bomb plot.

To AQAP's chief propagandist, the one time North Carolina resident turned full time "traitor to America," Samir Khan, the operation was not a failure.  In his typically breezy not to say cocky way, this self-proclaimed "traitor" points out that the job cost AQAP a bit over four thousand dollars but will result in "billions" of bucks in enhanced security costs to the American air cargo industry.  In terms of cost accounting, ole "Sammy" is bang on.

The jihadist publication promised a continuation of low cost, high economic damage attacks.  AQAP avers that it has hit on a new formula for successfully bringing about the collapse of the US and the West, a sort of death by a thousand paper cuts way of waging war.

The special issue also repeated the AQAP claim of responsibility for the crash of a UPS flight in Dubai which killed the two man crew.  This claim has been rejected by the officials in Dubai, but the results of a review of the crash investigation has not yet substantiated the local view that the incident resulted from causes other than a terrorist attack.  However, there has been no evidence of an on-board explosion, so the cause remains an open question.

Leaving aside the matter of the Dubai incident, the Inspire narrative does pose an interesting question for analysts.  There is no arguing against the contention that the parcel bombs have resulted in greater attention being paid to air cargo.  This attention will both cost extra money and introduce additional frictions into a critical component of the international logistics system.  Over the longer term the delays occasioned by enhanced security will bring substantial indirect costs, but not such as to cripple the industry let alone bring the US to its financial knees.

It has been known since the Pliocene epoch of terrorism that every increment in increased security brings both additional direct costs and a slew of frictions both economic and political in its wake.  By responding to terrorist incidents, the target automatically hands the terrorist a small victory.  The inevitable combination of increased costs, increased frictions, increased apprehensions, and decreased belief in the capacity of the target government to provide a satisfactory level of security exacts political and social as well as economic costs.  The current contretemps over "strip or grope" is excellent evidence of the overall consequence of security driven frictions.

Those adherents of violent political Islam who have lived in the US or elsewhere in the West such as Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki would be well aware of the dynamic of terror-enhanced security-increased frictions.  Thus the question for analysts is this: Did AQAP intend and plan the parcel bomb attack in order to inflict economic damage or is the Inspire explanation one of an after-the-fact nature?

To put it more simply: Are the operatives of AQAP as smart as Khan alleges or did the talented propagandist invent his theory to meet the facts, including the irrefutable one of failure?  In support of the second interpretation is a critical fact absent in the glowing tribute to the brilliance of the Deep Thinkers and Master Strategists of AQAP.

The missing fact?

Well, bucko, how about the cause of the operation's failure?  The attack was betrayed to Saudi intelligence by a defector from AQAP.  Actually, the man was a multiple defector.  He had bounced from terror to Saudi "rehabilitation" and then back to AQAP and finally back to the waiting arms of the Saudis.  The unlikely series of bounces hints strongly that the informant had been targeted on AQAQ by the Saudis and he then performed his task with precision.  Since penetration of hostile entities is the first line of defense and the Saudis have more than one dog in the fight with AQAP, the use of an intentional penetration asset seems quite likely.

The fact that the operation, admittedly a very clever and cheap one, was compromised fatally by a Saudi penetration asset must be more than a tad galling to the heavyweights of AQAP.  The fertile imagination of Samir Khan provided a way of retrieving a measure of success from what is otherwise a failure tinted with the humiliation of betrayal from within.

Ole Sammy makes much of the insight and intelligence of his running buddies of AQAP.  That is the reason for the article detailing not only the infernal devices but also the security systems successfully evaded.  Of course, by giving these operational details the article would seem to be undercutting the value of its promises that the campaign would continue as it provides useful grist for the intelligence and security mills of the US and other countries.

Whether AQAP continues with a focus on parcel bombs or uses another approach one thing is sure--AQAP is not going to fade away, organizational bones bleaching in some sunwashed wadi deep in the mountains of Yemen.  A second unpleasant reality will remain as well: AQAP is aware of the greatest vulnerability in the US and most of the West.  That vulnerability is the demands for more security and the inevitable costs of providing such.

We the People--and the government--must carefully consider just how much security is enough.  We must keep in mind that every time the security wrench ratchets tighter, the costs and the frictions go up as well.  There is a crossover point where the negatives of security are such as to accomplish the goals of the terrorists without a single additional terrorist act.

How close are we right now to the crossover point?  That is the question the Inspire braggadocio demands we, all of us, answer.