The Fatal Appeal Of Negotiations

Currently the US is doing the same old, same old.  As it has been for a mort of frustrating years, the incumbant administration along with its counterparts present and past have been plugging away, singing the same tired song: Negotiations conquer all.  There are three critical sets of negotiations either sort of underway,  hoped to be underway soon, or prayed to be commenced sometime, anytime.

The first of these, the one which is more or less underway, is the US sponsored direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the stated goal of a comprehensive peace agreement within the next year (or so.)  The hoped to be started soon, say on 6 December, is the next round of talking at each other with the contestants being the P5+1 group on one side of the table and the Iranians on the other.  The third, the one policy makers hope and pray may take sometime soon is the Six Power Talks involving North Korea.

Three categories of similarity link the three totems to the appeal of negotiation.  All have been and are being pushed by the US.  In all three cases strong sets of pressure and inducements have been employed--or, in the case of inducements, promised--over an extended period of time.  Finally, all are replays of earlier failures.

What makes it any different this time around?  Why should any rational person argue that one more diplomatic engagement will accomplish what all the previous ones have failed to do?

The conventional wisdom offered by proponents of give-diplomacy-a-chance has two main parts.  The first is some variant of the contention that talking is better than fighting.  The second is this time,  unlike all the previous ventures, the context has changed: The sanctions have bit hard or the Israelis recognize the time is right and the PA knows it must produce peace or face Hamas sponsored regime change.

A number of high ranking members of the trust-us-we-are-statesmen crowd have assured the American public that the latest round of sanctions which include far more restrictive measures imposed by the US and the European Union have severely undercut the Iranian economy while the pro-democracy forces have refused to knuckle under to the repressive capacities of the Tehran regime.  Objective evidence including that from official Iranian sources does indicate the sanctions, particularly those affecting Western private investment in the oil sector, have made the already bad economic situation worse.  And, there is no doubt but the pro-democracy, Green movement continues to annoy the regime.

Both amount to a "so what?" in the the actions of the Iranian government.  The Iranians well understand that the contest between itself and the P5+1 generally and the US in particular is one of political wills.  They are betting that they possess the greater political will just as they have demonstrated in all the past diplomatic soirees.  If the Iranians and the P5+1 actually sit down somewhere (the venue has not yet been agreed upon) on 6 December, the Iranians will be willing to talk about Iran's role in matters of global import, about the need for revision of the UN Security Council, about the solving of mythic global warming, about almost any and everything other than the ongoing enrichment of uranium.  The US and the others of the P5+1 want to talk about fissioning atoms only.

The Iranians have already demonstrated their ability to teach Andre Gromyko and others of the legendary Iron Pants Brigade of Soviet negotiators a thing or two about how to stall, bob, and weave, and otherwise buy time and wear out the other side's political will.  Also, as the government and its supporters are members in good standing of the Shia sect of Islam, they take great pride in the capacity of the Iranian nation to suffer, to absorb pain in the service of belief.

The net effect of the sanctions has been to engage effectively the Shia commitment of pain for belief while simultaneously boosting the Iranian sense of nationalism.  That is a powerful combination, a combination guaranteed to promote political will.

In comparison the P5+1 lacks any genuine semblance of a coherent political will.  Two of the group have shown both will and ability at skirting or flatly avoiding the imposition of the most biting of the sanctions.  Two others have excellent records until very, very recently of looking the other way as private concerns violate the sanction regime.  And, at least four of the countries have a much higher priority in solving domestic economic concerns.  Overall this means the firmness of will on one side of the table is far less than on the other.

Takeaway: The results of any upcoming "negotiations" can be summarized by a line in a Herman's Hermits tune from the Sixties, "Second verse, same as the first."

The Israeli-Palestinian talks are still on hiatus.  What else can be expected?  The PA has been relying on the Obama administration to do the heavy lifting for them.  Despite its best efforts in pressure, inducements, and hortatory talk, Team Obama has not and will never be able to produce what the PA wants and thinks it must have.

The PA wants a lot.  It wants Israel back to the 1948 Green Line.  It wants East Jerusalem.  It wants either a
"right of return" or financial compensation for those who fled the land which became Israel during the wars of independence.  Most of all it wants a two state solution as an intermediary stop on the road to a one state solution which sees the end of Israel as constituted currently.

The Israeli government is not unaware of the PA's goals both short and long term.  No Israeli government will grant the PA a free pass to those goals.  No conceivable--which is to say, politically acceptable to the American electorate--amount of American pressures and inducements will work to get the PA what it wants.

This is not to imply the government of Israel is much more flexible than its PA interlocutor.  The Israelis may be willing to exchange some undeveloped semi-desert real estate on an acre for acre basis for the land on which the "settlements" exist, but they are not about to relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem which has been incorporated legally into the State of Israel regardless of any UN or US position to the contrary.

Nor is the Israeli government (this one or any other) willing to see a hostile state come into existence on its borders, even the more expansive ones defined by the line of settlements.  Thus the insistence of an Israeli armed presence in a security zone in the Jordan Valley.  It is doubtful that the government of Israel would accept a UN force there, given the record of that organization.

It is a certainty that the Israelis will not agree to any Arab "right of return."  Financial compensation might be possible--particularly if the US pays it.

The political will of the Israelis regarding a peace agreement is made explicit in a law pending before the Knesset.  This law, which is expected to pass easily, requires a super-majority (80 out of 120 members) in the Knesset to approve any agreement containing a territorial transfer.  The alternative to the super-majority will be a national referendum.  (Can we say, "Ice cube in a blast furnace?")

In short, it is hard to see what might exist to justify any continuation of the "peace talks."  Perhaps the US should abandon the effort and cut its political and diplomatic losses.

"But, wait, Geek," you protest.  "What about the Arab League/Saudi Arabian promise of diplomatic recognition and other goodies, like overflight rights?"

Yeah, right.  And, Hitler's Germany diplomatically recognized Poland even as the panzers crossed the common border.  What a concept, twenty or so Arab League members open embassies in Tel Aviv or wherever.  That will be a new challenge for Israeli security: Keeping tabs on legions of subversives and espionage agents.  And, overflights?  EL Al has done quite well without them--and imagine the restrictions for national security and air safety as well as protecting Mecca from "Jewish pollution" which would come as a part of the deal.

Finally there is the negotiation round we keep hoping for.  The one with North Korea.  In a fine exhibit of just how much the sanction regime has hurt the country the Hermits have not only started construction of a one megawatt, thermal, light water reactor equally useful for producing either electricity or plutonium but invited an American expert to tour their new uranium enrichment plant.  Built in a mere eighteen months the new plant definitely impressed the visiting American.

The North Koreans understand political will.  The twin nuclear developments show this.  So does history.  The seemingly endless talks which finally (due to Soviet action and Ike's nuclear threat) yielded the armistice were nothing but a joint Chinese-North Korean effort at outlasting the Americans in the interlocking processes of talking about peace while fighting a war.

The North Koreans are not going to abandon their nuclear effort without gaining something very, very important in return.  Promises of fuel, food, or even "safe" nuclear reactors will not cut it with the Hermits of Pyongyang.  We already know that from the events following the 1994 quasi-agreement brokered by the Clinton administration.

As long as Pyongyang has the tacit backing of Beijing (which will  be a day or two longer than forever), the Hermits see no percentage in settling for less than reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification must be under terms and conditions of Pyongyang's liking if not dictation.  Acceptance of such by Seoul of a Pyongyang dictate is less likely than Nancy Pelosi showing a wrinkle.

So, reality asks the trenchant question, "What is there to negotiate about?"

The answer to that question is self-evident.

Perhaps the unwillingness of Americans to accept the self-evident and highly negative answers to this and similar questions demonstrates just why we are so addicted to diplomatic negotiations even when there is very little or no chance of such resulting in a good outcome.  We really are that strange and seemingly mythical creature--a peaceloving people.  Indeed we love peace so much we will keep on talking until the moment the first bullet (or missile) is fired at us.

A great strength, a great national value is also the major weakness our enemies can and do use against us.  Just comes with the territory, the territory of the unique American mind.