The Incontestable Irrelevance Of Military Victories

General Sir David Richards, the new head of Her Majesty's Forces, has opened himself to attack.  The general delivered his view that al-Qaeda and others of the violent political Islam persuasion cannot be defeated in any meaningful sense of the word by military means in a recent interview.  If he becomes the subject of vitriol, he can at least comfort himself with the recognition that he has done nothing but tell it like it is.

Sir David has done something quite difficult for a professional soldier--admitted that military victories can be irrelevant to the solution of larger political conflicts.  As he drew a line between conventional peer-to-peer wars and the sort of asymmetrical and messy affray such as that being waged in Afghanistan, the general has simultaneously underscored the value of his assessment and limited its application appropriately.  History powerfully buttresses the accuracy of his conclusion.

The granddaddy of modern defensive insurgencies, the first war of "national liberation," also known as the War of American Independence, proves Sir David's point.  The British Army won most of the battles, losing only two of any significance, but ended up waving goodbye to the former colonies.  As has been the case in every insurgency whether defensive or offensive in nature, the military, its successes and failures, are merely tools for influencing the political will of the two real contestants--the politically articulate portions of the two opposing populations.

The American War of Independence proved the most central point regarding all insurgencies or insurgency-like asymmetrical  conflicts: The side which can spend time and accept casualties will best the side which seeks to save time and limit casualties.  Additionally, the American War of Independence demonstrated that while a side cannot kill its way to victory, the infliction of casualties without reward will exhaust the political will of the less committed side over time.

The same set of lessons was given to the US during its involvement in the Wars of the Vietnamese.  The US won the overwhelming majority of the company sized and larger engagements.  This was irrelevant over the long---to We the People, overly long--haul.  A sizable segment of the politically articulate American public lost political will to continue the effort.  As had been the case with the British nearly two centuries earlier, the American political structure packed it in, picked up our balls, and went home.

The Algerian War of Independence although more complex in its social, cultural, and racial dimensions shows the same irrelevance of mere military victory to political success.  Overlooked by too many is the simple albeit brutal fact that the French military had the insurgents on the ropes.  The combination of a new operational doctrine in the rural areas and the convincing French success in the Battle of Algiers decimated the insurgent capacity to continue effective military or paramilitary operations.  It didn't matter.  The nature of politics not only in the two antagonistic ethnic groups in Algeria but also in France conspired to offset totally any and all victories by French forces.

General Richards is of the view that the same dynamic exists with respect to al-Qaeda and the other purveyors of violent political Islam.  He is not being pessimistic when he concludes that the very best that can be expected from military means is the containment of the threat.  That is accurate, provided one adds that containment will require punitive expedition employment when a specific threat can be linked to a specific foreign location or governmental facilitator.

Al-Qaeda and the others are ideologically motivated.  Much, if not all, of their ideology is both pernicious and persuasive.  In these factors, the ideology of violent political Islam resembles its precursors of National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism.  The one was defeated by military means solely because its purveyors chose the route of peer-to-peer war as the preferred avenue to global success.  The other, which as a result more closely resembles today's violent political Islam, rejected direct aggression selecting instead indirect, proxy, and other nasty little violent expressions.

As noted in yesterday's post, al-Qaeda has opted for the death-by-a-thousand-paper-cuts method of conflict.  This means, quite simply, that military muscle is not as relevant as so many of hawkish temper have hoped.  There are roles, critical ones, for military force, but none are sovereign remedies for the threat which will be confronting us for at least another generation.

The general demonstrated his firm grip on reality when he recommended "upstream" means to combat the ongoing threat.  As the conflict is primary one of values, norms, world views, in short, ideologies, his view has great merit.  It is unfortunate that all too may policy makers and "decider guys" in the US and elsewhere in the West define "upstream" means as being economic in nature.  Spreading money as opposed to ideas per se is not the answer, rather the countries of the West must employ the full panoply of soft power mechanisms with an emphasis on education in order to head off the next generation of wannabe martyrdom seekers.

The power and appeal of Western values, norms, world views, and ideas should never be underestimated.  Nor should they be deprecated as is so often the case by members of the assorted national "elites."  As was seen in the long running conflict with the ideas and institutions of Marxism-Leninism, the potency of the West intellectually, culturally, politically was enough to spell finish to both the Cold War and Soviet Communism.

Bombs and bullets are far more inherently limited in their effect than are words and ideas.  It may be rare, but it is more than simply welcome to read a correct appreciation made by a very experienced and quite senior military commander.  Hail, Britannia!